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America 
and  the  Canal  Title 

OR 

An  examination,  sifting  and  interpreta- 
tion of  the  data  bearing  on  the  wresting 
of  the  Province  of  Panama  from  the 
Repvhlic  of  Colombia  by  the  Roosevelt 
Administration  in  1903  in  order  to  secure 
title  to  the  Canal  Zone 


BY 

JOSEPH  C.  FREEHOFF,  Ph.D.  «^ ^-4 

statistician  with  the  Public  Service  CommissioQ 
for  New  York  City 


V 


PUBLISHED  BY  THE  AUTHOR 

37S  Fourth  Avenue   (Room  806) 
NEW  YORK 


Fists 

.5 
•F1 


Copyright,  1916 
by 

JOSIPH    C.    FREEHOFr 


J.  F.  TAPLEY  CO. 
NEW  YORK 


P ana  Oil  i^ioiusy 


4 


DEDICATED 
TO 

JOHN  FREEHOFF 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

PAGE 

Preface      i 

CHAPTER 

I     Clear  the  Enterprise  of  Every  Stain     .      .      .15 

II    Roosevelt's  Article  — "  The  Panama  Blackmail 

Treaty" 32 

III  President    Roosevelt    Attempted    to    Coerce 

Colombia 104 

IV  The  "  Vaudeville  "  Revolution  on  the  Isthmus  138 
V    Violation  of  the  Treaty  of  1846      .      .      .      .214 

VI     President  Roosevelt  "  Took  "  the  Canal  Zone  255 
VII     Acting  as  the  Mandatory  of  Civilization  .      .310 

APPENDICES 

I     From  President  Roosevelt's  Message  to  Con- 
gress—  December  7,   1903 351 

II     President   Roosevelt's    Message   to   the   Con- 
gress—  January  4,  1904 366 


PREFACE 

In  this  book  the  writer  shows  that  the  Roose- 
velt Administration  in  1903  collaborated  with  a 
small  party  of  separatists  on  the  Isthmus,  Bunau- 
Varilla  acting  as  intermediary,  for  the  purpose  of 
devising  a  plan  to  wrest  the  Canal  Zone  and  lit- 
toral from  the  Republic  of  Colombia  by  force,  and 
that  it  gave  assurance  to  these  separatists  that 
it  would  protect  secession  in  Panama.  It  did  ac- 
tually do  the  latter.  In  doing  so,  it  ( i )  violated 
international  law,  (2)  violated  the  Treaty  of 
1846,  and  (3)  rent  asunder  a  sister  republic. 

The  critical  reader  will  want  to  know  how  the 
damaging  evidence  found  in  this  book  that  is  not 
in  the  nature  of  an  original  official  document 
was  obtained.  This  has,  of  course,  a  bearing  on 
its  credibility.  It  was  obtained  through  rogatory 
proceedings,  instituted  by  the  New  York  World 
on  the  Isthmus  while  preparing  its  defense  for 
libel  in  an  action  brought  against  it  by  the  Federal 
Government.  It  is,  therefore,  sworn  testimony 
in  part  wrenched  from  unwilling  witnesses  in  a 


2  Preface 

court  of  record.  This  testimony  corroborates  the 
inferences  suggested  by  official  documents  pub- 
lished by  our  Government. 

It  is  the  mature  judgment  of  the  writer  that  in 
the  conferences  between  the  Roosevelt  Adminis- 
tration and  the  separatists  the  following  were  the 
important  provisions  that  were  agreed  to : 

1.  The  separatists  were  to  persuade  ($,  $)  the 
military  and  political  representatives  of  Colombia 
on  the  Isthmus  to  cooperate  in  the  secession  of  the 
Province  of  Panama,  and,  in  addition,  they  were 
to  arrange  to  take  over  its  civil  government. 

2.  Our  Government  was  to  recognize  the  new 
republic  not  later  than  forty-eight  hours  after  the 
Declaration  of  Independence,  and  to  prevent  Co- 
lombia from  landing  troops  on  the  Isthmus  to  re- 
store her  sovereignty. 

It  is  proper  that  we  should  offset  this  sweeping 
indictment  of  our  then  Administration  with  an 
excerpt  from  an  article  by  Roosevelt  which  ap- 
peared in  The  Outlook  on  October  7,  191 1 : 

On  December  7,  1903,  and  again  on  January  4,  1904, 
as  President  of  the  United  States,  in  messages  to  the  two 
Houses  of  Congress,  I  set  forth  in  full  and  in  detail  every 
essential  fact  connected  with  the  recognition  of  the  Re- 
public of  Panama,  the  negotiation  of  a  treaty  with  that 
Republic  for  building  the  Panama  Canal,  and  the  actions 
which  led  up  to  that  negotiation — actions  without  which 


Preface  3 

the  canal  could  not  have  been  built,  and  would  not  now 
have  been  even  begun.  Not  one  important  fact  was  omit- 
ted, and  no  fact  of  any  importance  bearing  upon  the  actions 
or  negotiations  of  the  representatives  of  the  United  States 
not  there  set  forth  has  been,  or  ever  will  be,  discovered, 
simply  because  there  is  none  to  discover.  It  must  be  a 
matter  of  pride  to  every  honest  American,  proud  of  the 
good  name  of  his  country,  that  the  acquisition  of  the  canal 
and  the  building  of  the  canal,  in  all  their  details,  were  as 
free  from  scandal  as  the  public  acts  of  George  Washington 
and  Abraham  Lincoln. 

It  is  a  matter  of  keen  disappointment  to  well- 
informed  Americans  of  high  character  that  there 
is  no  resemblance  at  all  between  the  public  acts  of 
George  Washington  and  of  Abraham  Lincoln  on 
the  one  hand  and  those  of  the  Roosevelt  Adminis- 
tration in  the  taking  of  the  Canal  Zone,  on  the 
other  hand.  Of  no  pubHc  act  of  either  Washing- 
ton or  Lincoln  can  anything  like  the  following  be 
said : 

I  am  interested  in  the  Panama  Canal  because  I  started 
it.  If  I  had  followed  traditional,  conservative  methods  I 
would  have  submitted  a  dignified  state  paper  of  probably 
two  hundred  pages  to  Congress,  and  the  debate  on  it  would 
have  been  going  on  yet ;  but  i  took  the  canal  zone  and 
let  Congress  debate,  and  while  the  debate  goes  on,  the 
canal  does  also. 

The  writer  has  included  in  the  appendix  that 
portion  of  the  message  of  December  7,  1903, 
which  deals  with  the  events  on  the  Isthmus,  and 


4  Preface 

the  entire  message  of  January  4,  1904.  Roose- 
velt has  stated  in  the  first  excerpt  above  that  they 
contain  the  final  word  on  the  subject — all  that  is 
knowable  and  all  that  will  ever  be  known.  The 
writer  hopes  that  before  reading  this  book  the 
reader  will  carefully  study  Roosevelt's  full  state- 
ment in  these  messages. 

Inasmuch  as  Roosevelt's  article  in  the  Metro- 
politan Magazine  for  February,  191 5,  entitled: 
"The  Panama  Blackmail  Treaty,"  is  presumably 
his  complete  statement  against  ratification  of  the 
pending  treaty  with  Colombia,  the  writer  felt  that 
its  incorporation  in  the  appendix  of  this  book  was 
required  in  order  to  give  as  fully  as  possible  the 
other  side  of  the  controversy.  He,  therefore,  re- 
quested permission  to  reproduce  it.  The  follow- 
ing inconclusive  letter  from  the  Managing  Edi- 
tor of  the  magazine  is  the  only  communication 
received  in  reply: 

Replying  to  yours  of  July  24th,  in  which  you  request 
permission  to  reprint  from  the  Metropolitan  Magazine 
Colonel  Roosevelt's  article  on  "The  Panama  Blackmail 
Treaty,"  I  am  unable  to  give  you  that  permission  with- 
out first  consulting  Colonel  Roosevelt.  As  soon  as  he 
returns  from  the  West  I  will  take  the  matter  up  with 
him  and  let  you  know. 

The  writer  intended  to  set  over  against  his  own 
statement  the  full  statement  of  Roosevelt.     Per- 


Preface  5 

mission  to  reproduce  the  mentioned  article  not 
having  been  granted  Roosevelt's  side  of  the  con- 
troversy is  not  fully  stated. 

President  Wilson,  in  an  address  delivered  be- 
fore the  Chamber  of  Commerce  of  the  United 
States  on  February  3,  191 5,  stated  the  method  em- 
ployed by  the  writer  in  the  examination  of  our 
title  to  the  Canal  Zone.  It  is  contained  in  the 
following  excerpt : 

I  agreed  with  a  colleague  of  mine  in  the  cabinet  the 
other  day  that  we  had  never  before  in  our  lives  attended 
a  school  to  compare  with  that  we  were  now  attending 
for  the  purpose  of  gaining  a  liberal  education. 

Of  course,  I  learn  a  great  many  things  that  are  not  so, 
but  the  interesting  thing  about  that  is  this :  Things  that 
are  not  so  do  not  match.  If  you  hear  enough  of  them, 
you  see  there  is  no  pattern  whatever;  it  is  a  crazy  quilt. 
Whereas,  the  truth  always  matches,  piece  by  piece,  with 
other  parts  of  the  truth.  No  man  can  lie  consistently, 
and  he  cannot  lie  about  everything  if  he  talks  to  you 
long.  I  would  guarantee  that  if  enough  liars  talked  to 
you,  you  would  get  the  truth ;  because  the  parts  that  they 
did  not  invent  would  match  one  another,  and  the  parts 
that  they  did  invent  would  not  match  one  another.  Talk 
long  enough,  therefore,  and  see  the  connections  clearly 
enough,  and  you  can  patch  together  the  case  as  a  whole. 

A  great  mass  of  evidence  was  sifted  in  order  to 
penetrate  through  plausible  falsehoods  to  basal 
facts.  The  sifted  evidence  was  marshaled  and 
carefully  weighted.     It  is  reproduced  largely  in 


6  Preface 

the  form  of  quotations  with  the  connecting  nexus 
in  the  form  of  inferences  and  conclusions  supplied 
by  the  writer.  It  is  the  first  comprehensive  ac- 
count in  book  form  of  the  events  connected  with 
our  acquisition  of  the  Canal  Zone. 

The  conclusions  expressed  are  based  on  the  quo- 
tations found  here  and  there  throughout  the  book. 
Moreover,  they  are  not  always  solely  based  on  the 
quotations  in  connection  with  which  the  con- 
clusion is  expressed.  Viewed  thus  broadly  the 
writer  is  convinced  that  every  conclusion  is  war- 
ranted.    It  was  his  purpose : 

Nothing  [to]  extenuate, 

Nor  to  set  down  aught  in  malice. 

The  data  bearing  on  the  taking  of  the  Canal 
Zone  by  our  Government  are  widely  scattered, 
and,  therefore,  inaccessible  to  the  general  reader. 
Those  which,  so  to  speak,  mirror  this  chapter  of 
our  history  are  assembled  in  this  book,  which  thus 
makes  them  accessible  to  the  public. 

The  significant  facts  have  been  assembled  and 
sifted  in  our  search  to  determine  whether  we  have 
a  clear  title  to  the  Canal  Zone.  They  unmistak- 
ably show  that  it  was  taken  by  force.  The  pay- 
ments to  our  partner  in  crime  do  not  clear  the 
title  of  its  stain.     It  is  stolen.     Gilding  the  polit- 


Preface  7 

ical  crime  with  the  gloss  of  fine  words  does  not  re- 
move the  national  disgrace. 

This  is  a  subject  on  which  one  is  not  warranted 
in  expressing  an  opinion  unless  he  has  critically 
examined  the  available  evidence.  Only  the  per- 
son who  has  a  message  and  can  present  it  without 
prejudice  is  entitled  to  ask  audience.  Therefore, 
he  who  speaks  on  the  subject  should  state  his 
credentials.  In  this  instance,  credentials  take  the 
form  of  political  affiliations.  The  writer  voted 
for  Roosevelt  for  Vice-President  in  1900  (in  Wis- 
consin), supported  him  for  President  in  1904  (in 
New  York),  and  in  the  Republican  primary  of 
191 2.  After  the  Republican  convention  at  Chi- 
cago he  joined  the  Progressive  Party  and  is  now 
a  member  of  that  party. 

The  writer's  interest  in  Roosevelt  dates  from 
the  picturesque  support  that  the  latter  gave  to 
Senator  Edmunds  for  President  in  the  Republi- 
can national  convention  of  1884.  At  the  time, 
Roosevelt  was  featured  in  the  west  as  a  young 
Lochinvar  of  the  east  valiantly  fighting  the  battle 
of  political  righteousness.  His  vigorous  support 
of  Edmunds  won  the  writer's  boyhood  fancy. 

It  now  seems  that  there  had  grown  up  in  the 
west  a  Roosevelt  myth  commencing  with  the  con- 
vention named,  which  he  attended  as  one  of  the 


8  Preface 

big  four  of  New  York.  His  conduct  always 
seemed  to  be  in  harmony  with  exalted  moral  pur- 
pose. Social  well-being  seemed  to  be  the  goal 
toward  which  he  steered  with  unerring  precision. 
This  was  the  writer's  estimate  of  Roosevelt  when 
the  repeal  of  the  tolls-exemption  provisions  of  the 
Panama  Canal  Act  became  a  national  issue. 

A  critical  study  of  the  financial  policy  that  the 
Hay-Pauncefote  treaty  imposes  on  the  United 
States  in  the  management  of  the  Panama  Canal, 
and  that  is  imposed  on  the  country  by  the  nature 
of  the  enterprise,  coupled  with  an  exhaustive 
study  of  the  method  employed  to  secure  the  Canal 
Zone,  convinced  the  writer  that  the  attitude  of 
Roosevelt  was  foreign  to  the  requirements  of  na- 
tional honor. 

It  may  be  urged  that  citations  which  justify  the 
course  pursued  by  the  Roosevelt  Administration 
have  been  omitted  from  this  volume.  The  fol- 
lowing excerpt  from  the  pen  of  Secretary  Hay  is 
typical : 

Any  charge  that  this  Government,  or  any  responsible 
member  of  it,  held  intercourse,  whether  official  or  unof- 
ficial, with  agents  of  revolution  in  Colombia,  is  utterly 
without  justification. 

Equally  so  is  the  insinuation  that  any  action  of  this 
Government,  prior  to  the  revolution  in  Panama,  was  the 
result  of  complicity  with  the  plans  of  the  revolutionists. 


Preface  9 

The  Department  sees  fit  to  make  these  denials,  and  it 
makes  them  finally. 

Roosevelt  cites  the  following  from  Secretary 
Hay  as  of  controlling  importance : 

The  action  of  the  President  in  the  Panama  matter  is 
not  only  in  the  strictest  accordance  with  the  best  prece- 
dents of  our  public  policy,  but  it  was  the  only  course  he 
could  have  taken  in  compliance  with  our  treaty  rights 
and  obligations. 

These  statements  of  the  late  lamented  Secre- 
tary Hay  have  not  survived  the  scrutiny  of  his- 
torical criticism.  All  communications  of  similar 
character  have  crumbled  before  the  searchlight  of 
truth  and  historical  method  for  separating  truth 
and  falsehood. 

William  Roscoe  Thayer  published  in  Harper's 
Magazine  for  July,  191 5,  a  sympathetic  article  on 
the  connection  of  the  Roosevelt  Administration 
with  the  Isthmian  events  in  the  fall  of  1903,  which 
resulted  in  our  securing  the  Canal  Zone.  The 
following  excerpts  are  apropos: 

From  the  moment  of  Mr.  Roosevelt's  accession  the 
State  Department  felt  a  new  impelling  force  behind  it: 
the  Secretary  still  conducted  the  negotiations,  but  the 
creation  and  decision  of  policy  came  to  rest  more  and 
more  with  the  President. 

In  no  case  was  this  so  true  as  in  that  of  the  Panama 
Canal.  In  the  earlier  stages  Mr.  Roosevelt  gave  direc- 
tions which  Mr.  Hay  carried  out;  before  the  end,  how- 


lo  Preface 

ever,  the  President  took  the  business  into  his  own  hands ; 
and  he  has  ever  since  frankly  assumed  entire  responsi- 
bihty  for  the  achievement.  .  .  . 

Throughout  October  Mr.  Hay  seems  to  have  had  less 
and  less  communication  with  the  Isthmus  and  Bogota, 
whereas  the  activity  of  President  Roosevelt  increased. 

Responsibility  for  the  dynamic  climax  to  this  solution 
of  the  Colombia-Panama  struggle  rested  entirely  with 
the  President,  who  seems  not  always  to  have  informed 
Secretary  Hay  and  the  Cabinet  officers  of  his  acts. 

The  writer  reached  the  same  conclusion  by  a 
comparative  study  of  the  diplomatic  and  other 
correspondence  of  the  Roosevelt  Administration 
of  the  period  in  question.  This  investigation  led 
him  to  conclude  that  Secretary  Hay  did  not  know 
the  facts  connected  with  the  Isthmian  disturbance 
in  1903.  This  makes  it  clear  that  the  certification 
made  by  Secretary  Hay,  of  the  correctness  of  the 
conduct  of  the  President,  is  based  upon  belief  and 
not  upon  knowledge. 

In  this  book  we  deal  only  with  the  principal 
events  connected  with  our  acquisition  of  the  Canal 
Zone.  A  detailed  and  chronological  statement  of 
them  can  be  found  with  only  incidental  analysis 
and  interpretation,  in  "The  Story  of  Panama''  by 
Henry  N.  Hall,  staff  correspondent  of  the  New 
York  World.  This  comprehensive  statement  of 
facts  constitutes  Mr.  HalFs  testimony  before  the 
Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs  of  the  House  of 


Preface  1 1 

Representatives  from  January  26  to  February  20, 
19 1 2,  and  has  been  printed  as  an  official  document. 

The  citations  in  this  book  whose  source  is  not 
indicated  in  connection  with  their  presentation 
are  taken  from  the  "Diplomatic  History  of  the 
Panama  Canal''  (official  document),  "The  Story 
of  Panama"  (official  document)  and  other  official 
documents,  including  the  Congressional  Record. 

This  book  is  the  by-product  of  another  work 
dealing  with  the  Panama  Canal  finances,  tolls, 
accounts  and  underlying  treaties.  The  amount 
of  space  required  to  cover  all  these  matters  turned 
out  to  be  such  that  it  was  necessary  to  abandon  the 
original  plan  and  treat  this  one  phase  of  the  ques- 
tion as  an  independent  though  related  study. 
The  part  of  the  original  plan  that  had  already 
been  worked  out  was,  therefore,  pigeon-holed  to 
enable  the  writer  to  complete  the  present  work. 
The  other  section  of  the  work  as  originally 
planned  will  be  published  later  under  the  title: 
"America  and  the  Canal  Tolls." 

This  book  contains  more  or  less  repetition. 
Fundamental  principles  and  important  documents 
are  involved  in  the  consideration  of  a  question  like 
this,  and,  as  they  have  a  bearing  on  the  various 
standpoints  from  which  the  question  was  con- 
sidered, repetition  was  inevitable.     It  would  not 


12  Preface 

have  been  desirable  to  have  avoided  it  entirely  if 
it  could  have  been  done.  All  minds  are  not 
equally  mature  and  so  it  may  well  be  that  the 
method  of  here  a  little  and  there  a  little  from  dif- 
ferent standpoints  is  the  way  of  correct  under- 
standing. As  the  writer  aimed  to  instruct  as  well 
as  to  explain  official  documents  and  secondary 
evidence,  repetition  became  a  vital  part  of  his 
method. 

Some  of  the  citations  and  arguments  which 
show  that  there  was  no  revolution  on  the  Isthmus 
in  the  fall  of  1903  also  show  that  the  Treaty  of 
1846  was  violated  and  that  the  Canal  Zone  was 
taken  by  force.  Therefore,  some  of  the  repeti- 
tion may  be  more  apparent  than  actual  as  the  same 
data  and  arguments  were  used  to  show  different 
contentions. 

Acknowledgments  are  due  to  President  Jose  V. 
Concha  of  the  Republic  of  Colombia  for  a  cable- 
gram in  which  he  gives  an  official  version  of  a 
memorandum  he,  as  Minister  of  the  Colombian 
Legation,  handed  to  our  Government  in  1902  in 
which  it  was  provided  that  the  annuity  to  be  paid 
to  Colombia  for  the  canal  concession  was  to  be  de- 
termined by  arbitration  if  it  could  not  be  deter- 
mined by  diplomacy ;  to  Senor  Francisco  Escobar, 
Consulado  General  De  Colombia,  in  New  York, 


Preface  13 

for  the  cablegram  from  President  Concha  of  Col- 
ombia printed  on  page  35,  for  several  valuable 
pamphlets,  and  for  having  informed  the  v^riter  of 
the  existence  of  important  official  documents  and 
how  to  gain  access  to  them ;  to  Roberto  Ancizar, 
Secretary  of  the  Colombian  Legation  at  Washing- 
ton, for  verification  of  two  official  documents,  for 
a  copy  of  a  Colombian  official  document  not  yet 
printed  and  for  several  valuable  pamphlets;  to 
Henry  N.  Hall,  for  an  official  copy  of  'The  Story 
of  Panama"  comprising  his  testimony  before  the 
House  Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs;  and  to 
Leander  T.  Chamberlain  for  excerpts  taken  from 
his  pamphlet,  "A  Chapter  in  National  Dishonor," 
some  of  which  were  adapted  to  fit  into  our  line 
of  argument  without  direct  acknowledgment. 
Special  acknowledgment  is  due  my  colleague, 
James  L.  Bahret,  for  valuable  editorial  sugges- 
tions. The  author  was  prevented  through  lack 
of  strength  from  carrying  out  all  of  them. 

The  author  is  solely  and  alone  responsible  for 
the  material  incorporated  and  the  views  expressed 
in  this  book.  He  received  encouragement  from 
Senor  Francisco  Escobar  of  the  Colombian  Con- 
sulate in  New  York.  The  Colombian  Legation 
at  Washington  was  indifferent.  The  writer's 
suggestion  that  it  secure  for  him,  if  possible,  two 


14  Preface 

official  documents  not  published  and  furnish  a 
better  translation  of  an  excerpt  from  a  Colombian 
official  communication  were  ignored.  This  is 
merely  stated  for  the  purpose  of  focusing  re- 
sponsibility for  the  contents  of  this  book  on  the 
author. 

During  the  final  revision  of  the  manuscript  the 
writer  was  ordered  by  his  physician  not  to  do  in- 
tensive work.  Therefore  the  book  is  not  as  well 
integrated  as  it  would  otherwise  have  been  and 
repetition  appears  that  would  have  been  elimi- 
nated. It  is  believed  that  these  defects  in  the 
story  of  the  taking  of  the  Canal  Zone  by  the 
Roosevelt  Administration  as  herein  narrated  are 
merely  formal,  and  that  they  do  not  impair  its 
scientific  value. 

Joseph  C.  Freehoff. 

Saranac  Lake,  N.  Y. 
November  15,  191 5 


AMERICA  AND  THE 
CANAL  TITLE 

Chapter  I 
Clear  the  Enterprise  of  Every  Stain 

Construction  of  the  Panama  Canal  was  com- 
pleted in  the  summer  of  1914.  SHdes  now  and 
then  interrupt  transit.  Removal  of  these  slides 
merely  adds  to  the  cost  of  the  canal  as  a  commer- 
cial enterprise. 

Our  Government  "took"  the  Canal  Zone  from 
Colombia  at  the  point  of  the  bayonet.  It  was  un- 
willing to  pay  the  price  determined  by  due  process 
of  law.  Our  title  is,  therefore,  stolen.  This 
stain  on  the  enterprise  will  remain  until  unstinted 
reparation  has  been  made  to  the  despoiled  owner 
— Colombia.  Concerning  the  construction  of  the 
canal  and  our  seizure  of  the  Canal  Zone,  the  New 
York  World  said  in  an  editorial  in  the  winter  of 
1912: 

IS 


i6  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

It  is  the  greatest  feat  of  construction  ever  undertaken 
by  any  government.  The  manner  in  which  this  work  has 
been  done  under  the  direction  of  Colonel  Goethals  is  one 
of  the  engineering  triumphs  of  all  history.  Every  Amer- 
ican citizen  should  be  proud  of  it. 

When  the  canal  is  thrown  open  to  the  commerce  of  the 
world  there  should  be  no  blot  on  the  record.  There 
should  be  nothing  for  the  American  people  to  explain  or 
to  apologize  for.  .  .  . 

The  full  story  of  .  .  .  [the]  Panama  transaction  is  yet 
to  be  told — the  Washington  lobby,  the  framing  of  the 
treaty  which  Colombia  rejected,  the  organization  and 
financing  of  a  Panama  revolution  in  New  York  City,  the 
part  played  by  the  United  States  Government  in  this  con- 
spiracy. .  .  . 

The  seizing  of  the  Canal  Zone  did  more  to  arouse  the 
hostility  of  South  American  repubHcs  against  the  United 
States  than  anything  else  that  has  happened  since  they 
won  their  independence.  While  Colombia's  demand  for 
justice  remains  unsatisfied  this  country  will  always  be 
an  object  of  suspicion  on  the  part  of  its  South  American 
neighbors.  .  .  . 

The  important  thing  is  that  this  international  scandal 
be  disposed  of  for  all  time  before  the  canal  is  opened  and 
that  no  stain  be  left  on  the  American  title. 

Congress  owes  it  to  the  country  and  the  country  owes 
it  to  itself. 

In  the  enactment  of  the  Panama  Canal  Act  in 
1912,  Congress  placed  another  stain  on  the  enter- 
prise. The  tolls-exemption  provisions  of  that  act 
scrapped  the  commercial  provisions  of  the  Hay- 
Pauncefote  treaty.  Due  primarily  to  the  exalted 
moral  purpose  of  President  Wilson,  the  tolls-ex- 
emption provisions  of  the  Panama  Canal  Act  were 


Clear  Enterprise  of  Every  Stain  ly 

repealed  in  1914,  with  the  resuh  that  the  Hay- 
Pauncefote  treaty  was  restored  as  our  guide  in 
the  management  of  the  canal.  Instead  of  this 
treaty  being  now  a  scrap  of  paper ,  it  is  a  world- 
view  design — snatched  from  the  scrap  heap  and 
restored  as  the  vital  instrument  in  canal  adminis- 
tration. It  was  rescued  on  the  way  to  the  po- 
litical graveyard  in  which  are  interred  the  remains 
of  our  Treaty  of  1846,  and  over  which  hovers  a 
troubled  American  conscience.  Only  reparation 
to  Colombia  can  bring  relief.  Ratification  of  the 
pending  treaty  with  Colombia  by  the  Senate  will 
restore  American  honor  and  remove  from  our  flag 
an  otherwise  ineffaceable  stain. 

The  Hay-Pauncef  ote  treaty  is  a  solemn  engage- 
ment whose  meaning  is  self-evident.  Besides,  we 
have  documentary  evidence  which  establishes  that 
meaning  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt.  Willis 
Fletcher  Johnson,  an  able  newspaper  man,  inter- 
viewed Secretary  Hay  as  to  the  bearing  of  this 
treaty  on  our  intercoastal  trade.  This  was  before 
the  construction  of  the  treaty  became  the  subject- 
matter  of  political  controversy.  Therefore,  the 
opinion  expressed  in  this  interview,  if  properly 
corroborated,  absolutely  establishes  its  meaning. 
The  interview  is  published  in  official  documents 
and  reads : 


1 8  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

I  asked  Colonel  Hay  plumply  if  the  treaty  meant  what 
it  appeared  to  mean  on  its  face,  and  whether  the  phrase 
"vessels  of  all  nations,"  was  intended  to  include  our  own 
shipping,  or  was  to  be  interpreted  as  meaning  "all  other 
nations."  The  Secretary  smiled,  half  indulgently,  half 
quizzically,  as  he  replied: 

"All  means  all.  The  treaty  was  not  so  long  that  we 
could  not  have  made  room  for  the  word  'other'  if  we 
had  understood  that  it  belonged  there.  'All  nations* 
means  all  nations,  and  the  United  States  is  certainly  a 
nation." 

That  was  the  understanding  between  yourself  and  Lord 
Pauncefote  when  you  and  he  made  the  treaty?  I  pur- 
sued. 

"It  certainly  was,"  he  replied.  "It  was  the  under- 
standing of  both  Governments,  and  I  have  no  doubt  that 
the  Senate  realized  that  in  ratifying  the  second  treaty 
without  such  an  amendment  it  was  committing  us  to  the 
principle  of  giving  all  friendly  nations  equal  privileges  in 
the  canal  with  ourselves.     That  is  our  Golden  Rule." 

The  views  of  the  then  Secretary  of  State  are 
corroborated  by  our  Ambassador  to  Great  Britain 
at  the  time,  Joseph  H.  Choate,  who  in  an  address 
before  the  Chamber  of  Commerce  of  the  City  of 
New  York  on  February  13, 1913,  said: 

It  is  true  that  I  had  something  to  do  with  the  negotia- 
tion of  this  treaty.  In  the  summer  of  1901 — you  will 
remember  that  this  treaty  was  ratified  by  the  Senate  in 
December,  1901 — I  was  in  England  until  October,  and 
was  in  almost  daily  contact  with  Lord  Pauncefote,  who 
on  his  side  represented  Lord  Lansdowne,  the  foreign  sec- 
retary, and  was  also  in  very  frequent  correspondence  with 
Mr.  Hay,  our  Secretary  of  State,  under  whom  I  was  act- 
ing.   As  the  lips  of  both  of  those  diplomatists  and  great 


Clear  Enterprise  of  Every  Stain  19 

patriots,  who  were  each  true  to  his  own  country  and  each 
regardful  of  the  rights  of  the  other,  are  sealed  in  death, 
I  think  it  is  quite  proper  that  I  should  say  what  I  believe 
both  of  them,  if  they  were  here,  would  say  to-day — that 
the  clause  in  the  Panama  Canal  bill  exempting  coastwise 
American  shipping  from  payment  of  tolls  is  in  direct  vio- 
lation of  the  treaty. 

I  venture  to  say  that  in  the  whole  course  of  the  nego- 
tiations of  this  particular  treaty,  no  claim,  no  suggestion, 
was  made  that  there  should  be  any  exemption  of  any- 
body. 

Even  more  convincing  are  the  views  expressed 
by  the  late  President  McKinley.  They  are  found 
in  a  letter  from  Secretary  Hay  to  Senator  Cullom, 
of  which  the  following  is  an  excerpt : 

The  President  was  not  only  willing  but  desirous  that 
"the  general  principle"  of  neutralization  referred  to  in 
the  preamble  of  this  treaty  should  be  applicable  to  this 
canal  now  intended  to  be  built,  notwithstanding  any 
change  of  sovereignty  or  of  international  relations  of  the 
territory  through  which  it  should  pass. 

The  views  of  President  McKinley  are  ''the  gen- 
eral principle''  with  the  meaning  that  the  nego- 
tiators of  the  Hay-Pauncefote  treaty  attached  to 
it.  In  a  letter  dated  August  20,  1901,  Ambassa- 
dor Choate  stated  its  meaning  as  it  was  under- 
stood at  the  time  the  treaty  was  negotiated.  It 
was  in  effect — 

That  the  parties  constructing  or  owning  the  canal  shall 
impose  no  other  charges  or  conditions  of  traffic  than  are 


20  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

just  and  equitable ;  and  that  the  same  canals  or  railways, 
being  open  to  the  citizens  and  subjects  of  the  United 
States  and  Great  Britain  on  equal  terms,  shall  also  be 
open  on  like  terms  to  the  citizens  and  subjects  of  every 
other  State. 

The  foregoing  was  corroborated  by  Henry 
White,  Secretary  of  our  Embassy  in  Great  Britain 
during  the  negotiations  of  the  Hay-Pauncefote 
treaties.  Mr.  White  wrote  a  letter  to  Senator 
McCumber  in  which  he  told  what  Secretary  Hay 
understood  the  treaty  to  mean  relative  to  free 
transit  for  our  intercoastal  trade.  The  vital  part 
of  the  letter  reads  : 

( 1 )  That  the  exemption  of  our  coastwise  shipping  from 
the  payment  of  tolls  was  never  suggested  to,  nor  by,  any 
one  connected  with  the  negotiation  of  the  Hay-Paunce- 
fote treaties  in  this  country  or  in  England; 

(2)  That  from  the  day  on  which  I  opened  the  nego- 
tiations with  Lord  Salisbury  for  the  abrogation  of  the 
Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  until  the  ratification  of  the  Hay- 
Pauncefote  treaty,  the  words  "all  nations"  and  "equal 
terms"  were  understood  to  refer  to  the  United  States  as 
well  as  to  all  other  nations,  by  every  one  of  those,  whether 
American  or  British,  who  had  anything  to  do  with  the 
negotiations  whereof  the  treaty  last  mentioned  was  the 
result. 

Henry  White  had  at  the  date  of  writing  the 
above  a  more  minute  knowledge  of  the  negotia- 
tions leading  up  to  the  agreement  on  the  Hay- 
Pauncefote  treaty  than  any  other  person.     His 


Clear  Enterprise  of  Every  Stain  21 

statement  is,  therefore,  final  and  conclusive  as  to 
the  meaning  of  that  instrument 

It  does  not  take  much  erudition  to  know  what 
the  negotiators  intended  the  Hay-Pauncefote 
treaty  to  mean — to  know  what  the  Hay-Paunce- 
fote treaty  actually  does  mean.  It  means  what 
its  negotiators  intended  it  to  mean.  It  was  clearly 
the  intent  of  the  negotiators  that  the  charge  for 
the  commercial  use  of  the  Isthmian  Canal  which 
was  to  be  constructed  should  be  non-discrimina- 
tory and  without  distinction  of  flag.  This  is  con- 
firmed by  the  inclusion  of  this  sentence  in  the 
Hay-Pauncefote  treaty : 

Such  conditions  and  charges  of  traffic  shall  be 
JUST  and  equitable. 

Appreciating  the  fact  that  the  Panama  Canal 
is  a  public  utility,  our  public  vessels  are  entitled  to 
free  transit,  because  they  are  either  engaged  in 
maintenance  or  in  maneuvers  to  acquire  the  effi- 
ciency required  for  its  protection.  The  public 
vessels  of  the  Republic  of  Panama  pass  through 
free  as  an  offset  to  rent.  Similarly,  the  public 
vessels  of  Colombia  will  pass  through  free  if  the 
treaty  with  Colombia  now  pending  in  the  Senate 
is  ratified.  This  will  be  part  of  the  compensation 
incurred  to  secure  a  clear  title  to  the  Canal  Zone. 


22  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

All  the  commercial  traffic  through  the  canal 
must  pay  a  non-discriminatory  rate.  The  United 
States,  as  the  owner  of  the  canal,  is  entitled  to  a 
reasonable  return  on  its  investment — a  principle 
that  applies  in  the  regulation  of  national,  state^ 
and  municipal  utilities,  that  is,  domestic  utilities. 
It  is  empowered  to  collect  this  amount  from  the 
traffic  using  the  canal,  but  is  compelled  to  collect 
it  by  imposing  a  reasonable  and  non-discrimina- 
tory rate.  Realizing  that  this  is  what  the  fore- 
going sentence  of  the  Hay-Pauncefote  treaty 
means,  the  careful  student  of  public  utilities  and 
of  our  domestic  policy  in  relation  thereto  needs 
only  to  see  this  sentence  of  the  Hay-Pauncefote 
treaty  in  order  to  know  that  free  transit  for  our 
intercoastal  shipping  is  prohibited  by  that  instru- 
ment. 

It  is  now  clear  that  a  solemn  engagement  and 
the  nature  of  the  enterprise  prohibit  free  transit 
to  our  coastwise  shipping.  In  a  state  paper 
worthy  of  the  occasion,  President  Wilson,  there- 
fore, asked  the  Congress  to  repeal  the  tolls-ex- 
emption provisions  of  the  Panama  Canal  Act. 
We  give  it  in  full  below : 

Gentlemen  of  the  Congress :  I  have  come  to  you  upon 
an  errand  which  can  be  very  briefly  performed,  but  I  beg 
that  you  will  not  measure  its  importance  by  the  number 


Clear  Enterprise  of  Every  Stain         23 

of  sentences  in  which  I  state  it.  No  communication  I 
have  addressed  to  the  Congress  carried  with  it  graver 
or  more  far-reaching  impHcations  as  to  the  interest  of 
the  country,  and  I  come  now  to  speak  upon  a  matter  with 
regard  to  which  I  am  charged  in  a  particular  degree,  by 
the  Constitution  itself,  with  personal  responsibility. 

I  have  come  to  ask  you  for  the  repeal  of  that  provision 
of  the  Panama  Canal  Act  of  August  24,  19 12,  which  ex- 
empts vessels  engaged  in  the  coastwise  trade  of  the  United 
States  from  payment  of  tolls,  and  to  urge  upon  you  the 
justice,  the  wisdom,  and  the  large  policy  of  such  a  repeal 
with  the  utmost  earnestness  of  which  I  am  capable. 

In  my  own  judgment,  very  fully  considered  and  ma- 
turely formed,  that  exemption  constitutes  a  mistaken  eco- 
nomic policy  from  every  point  of  view,  and  is,  moreover, 
in  plain  contravention  of  the  treaty  with  Gre9,t  Britain 
concerning  the  canal  concluded  on  November  18,  1901. 
But  I  have  not  come  to  urge  upon  you  my  personal  views. 
I  have  come  to  state  to  you  a  fact  and  a  situation.  What- 
ever may  be  our  own  differences  of  opinion  concerning 
this  much  debated  measure,  its  meaning  is  not  debated 
outside  the  United  States.  Everywhere  else  the  language 
of  the  treaty  is  given  but  one  interpretation,  and  that  in- 
terpretation precludes  the  exemption  I  am  asking  you 
to  repeal.  We  consented  to  the  treaty;  its  language  we 
accepted,  if  we  did  not  originate  it;  and  we  are  too  big, 
too  powerful,  too  self-respecting  a  nation  to  interpret 
with  a  too  strained  or  refined  reading  the  words  of  our 
own  promises  just  because  we  have  power  enough  to  give 
us  leave  to  read  them  as  we  please.  The  large  thing  to  do 
is  the  only  thing  we  can  afford  to  do,  a  voluntary  with- 
drawal from  the  position  everywhere  questioned  and  mis- 
understood. We  ought  to  reverse  our  action  without  rais- 
ing the  question  whether  we  were  right  or  wrong,  and 
so  once  more  deserve  our  reputation  for  generosity  and 
for  the  redemption  of  every  obligation  without  quibble 
or  hesitation. 

I  ask  this  of  you  in  support  of  the  foreign  policy  of  the 


24  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

administration.  I  shall  not  know  how  to  deal  with  other 
matters  of  even  greater  delicacy  and  nearer  consequence 
if  you  do  not  grant  it  to  me  in  ungrudging  measure. 

The  high  moral  purpose  of  this  memorable 
state  paper  was  recognized  abroad.  Sir  Edward 
Grey,  the  British  Foreign  Secretary,  comple- 
mented it  in  a  speech  in  the  House  of  Commons. 
In  the  course  of  his  remarks,  he  exposed  misrep- 
resentation, and,  in  so  doing,  revealed  the  exalted 
moral  purpose  of  President  Wilson.  The  fol- 
lowing excerps  from  Sir  Edward  Grey's  speech 
should  have  the  widest  circulation : 

It  is  due  to  the  President  of  the  United  States  and  to 
ourselves  that  I  should  so  far  as  possible  clear  away  that 
misrepresentation.  It  was  stated  in  some  quarters  that 
the  settlement  was  the  result  of  bargaining  or  diplomatic 
pressure.  Since  President  Wilson  came  into  office  no 
correspondence  has  passed,  and  it  ought  to  be  realized  in 
the  United  States  that  any  line  President  Wilson  has 
taken  was  not  because  it  was  our  line,  but  his  own. 

President  Wilson's  attitude  was  not  the  result  of  any 
diplomatic  communication  siijce  he  has  come  into  power 
and  it  must  have  been  the  result  of  papers  already  pub- 
lished to  all  the  world. 

It  has  not  been  done  to  please  us  or  in  the  interests 
of  good  relations,  but  I  believe  from  a  much  greater 
motive — the  feeling  that  a  government  which  is  to  use  its 
influence  among  the  nations  to  make  relations  better  must 
never  when  the  occasion  arises  flinch  or  quail  from  inter- 
preting treaty  rights  in  a  strictly  fair  spirit. 

President  Wilson's  attitude  toward  the  tolls- 


Clear  Enterprise  of  Every  Stain         25 

exemption  clause  of  the  Panama  Canal  Act  was 
reaffirmed  in  his  address  at  Independence  Hall  on 
July  4,  1914.     It  is  reported  as  follows: 

I  say  that  it  is  patriotic  sometimes  to  prefer  the  honor 
of  the  country  to  its  material  interest.  Would  you  rather 
be  deemed  by  all  nations  of  the  world  incapable  of  keep- 
ing your  treaty  obligations  in  order  that  you  might  have 
free  tolls  for  American  ships  ?  The  treaty  under  which  we 
gave  up  that  right  may  have  been  a  mistaken  treaty,  but 
there  was  no  mistake  about  its  meaning. 

When  I  have  made  a  promise  as  a  man  I  try  to  keep 
it,  and  I  know  of  no  other  rule  permissible  to  a  nation. 
The  most  distinguished  nation  in  the  world  is  the  nation 
that  can  and  will  keep  its  promises  even  to  its  own  hurt. 
And  I  want  to  say,  parenthetically,  that  I  do  not  think 
anybody  was  hurt.  I  cannot  be  enthusiastic  for  sub- 
sidies to  a  monopoly,  but  let  those  who  are  enthusiastic  for 
subsidies  ask  themselves  whether  they  prefer  subsidies 
to  unsullied  honor. 

Our  own  former  ''Secretary  for  Foreign  Af- 
fairs/' William  Jennings  Bryan,  speaks  in  the 
same  tone  as  did  Sir  Edward  Grey,  both  viewing 
the  matter  from  the  standpoint  of  the  influence 
of  a  nation  in  international  affairs  if  it  keep  its 
solemn  engagements.  In  a  letter  dated  Septem- 
ber 4,  1 9 14,  quoted  elsewhere,  Secretary  Bryan 
wrote : 

The  position  taken  by  the  President  on  the  tolls  ques- 
tion aroused  more  opposition  at  that  time  than  it  would 
arouse  to-day,  subsequent  events  having  completely  vindi- 
cated the  wisdom  of  his  action. 


26  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

The  enviable  position  which  our  nation  occupies  to-day 
is  due,  in  part,  to  the  fact  that  it  has  allowed  no  doubt  to 
exist  as  to  its  purpose  to  live  up  to  the  stipulations  of  its 
treaty. 

There  were  economic  considerations  which  weighed 
heavily  in  favor  of  the  repeal  of  the  free  tolls  law,  but 
these  were  less  important  than  those  which  affected  the 
international  standing  of  our  nation. 

A  government  must  be  above  suspicion  in  the  matter 
of  good  faith.  No  pecuniary  advantage,  even  where  such 
an  advantage  actually  exists,  can  for  a  moment  justify 
the  violation  of  a  treaty  obligation,  and  violation  must 
be  the  more  scrupulously  avoided  if  the  question  is  one 
which  is  not  to  be  submitted  to  arbitration. 

In  international  matters  the  question  is  not  whether  we 
are  ourselves  certain  of  our  Government's  purpose  in  the 
position  taken,  but  whether  other  nations,  also,  have  con- 
fidence in  our  rectitude. 

The  President  set  a  high  standard,  and  the  support 
given  to  him  in  the  Senate  and  House  was  as  creditable 
to  Congress  as  it  was  complimentary  to  him.  The  pop- 
ular approval  which  is  now  accorded  to  both  the  Presi- 
dent and  Congress  on  this  subject  is  proof  positive  that 
the  people  can  be  trusted  to  pass  judgment  upon  the  merit 
of  international,  as  well  as  domestic,  questions. 

Especially  gratifying  is  any  appreciation  of  our 
President  by  Viscount  James  Bryce.  The  reason 
is  that  he  is  held  in  affectionate  esteem  by  all  well- 
informed  Americans.  Therefore,  his  views  have 
an  importance  among  us  that  does  not  attach  to 
those  of  any  other  foreigner.  At  the  Independ- 
ence Day  dinner  in  London  on  July  4,  1914, 
he  paid  the  following  tribute  to  President  Wil- 
son: 


Clear  Enterprise  of  Every  Stain  27 

Courage  is  a  virtue  rare  among  politicians.  What  we 
have  all  admired  in  the  President  is  his  courage  in  the 
matter  of  the  canal  tolls. 

Absolutely  no  pressure  was  brought  to  bear  by  Great 
Britain  to  obtain  repeal  of  the  tolls-exemption  clause  of 
the  Panama  Canal  Act. 

In  a  letter  commenting  on  a  book  designed  and 
prepared  by  the  writer  and  published  with  another 
as  co-author,  Lord  Bryce  expresses  appreciation 
of  President  Wilson  which  supplements  the 
foregoing.  The  following  therefrom  is  apro- 
pos: 

Besides  the  value  which  your  book  has  for  the  student 
as  a  collection  of  documents  bearing  upon  a  significant 
passage  in  diplomatic  history,  it  has  the  further  interest 
of  placing  on  record  the  admirable  example  set  by  Pres- 
ident Wilson  of  the  spirit  in  which  questions  affecting 
the  faith  of  treaties  ought  to  be  handled.  No  praise  can 
be  too  high  for  the  rectitude  and  the  courage  which  he 
showed  on  this  occasion.  Wisdom  also  he  showed  and 
clear  foresight.  He  perceived  that  one  of  America's 
greatest  assets  is  her  reputation  for  righteous  dealing  and 
for  loyalty  to  the  international  obligations  she  has  under- 
taken. He  understood  the  mind  and  conscience  of  the 
American  people,  and  knew  that  when  an  appeal  was 
made  to  them  in  the  name  of  good  faith  they  would  re- 
spond.    The  result  vindicated  his  judgment. 

Your  book  calls  attention  to  the  testimony  borne  by 
the  British  Foreign  Secretary  and  by  myself  (for  I  was 
Ambassador  at  Washington  when  Mr.  Wilson  entered  the 
White  House)  to  the  fact  that  no  pressure  whatever  was 
exerted  by  the  British  Government  in  the  matter.  To 
this  I  may  add  that  when  I  reported  to  my  Government 
the  last  conversation  I  had  with  Mr.  Wilson  in  which  the 


28  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

subject  was  mentioned,  I  expressed  to  them  the  confident 
belief  that  whenever  the  President  had  had  time  to  study 
and  master  the  issues  involved  he  would  do  whatever  he 
felt  to  be  right,  and  would  not  be  diverted  by  any  political 
considerations  from  what  he  might  hold  to  be  the  course 
that  honor  prescribed. 

Those  of  us  in  England  who  know  America  best  and 
love  her  most  rejoiced  at  the  approval  which  she  gave  to 
the  President's  policy  in  this  matter,  not  on  account  of 
any  British  interest  involved  but  because  it  showed  that 
to  be  true  which  we  had  often  declared — that  no  nation 
in  the  world  has  a  truer  love  of  peace  and  good-will  or  a 
higher  sense  of  international  honor  than  have  the  Ameri- 
can people. 

Especially  pertinent  at  this  time  is  this  appre- 
ciation because  of  the  violation  of  the  Treaty  of 
1839  by  Germany  and  the  storm  of  indignation 
it  aroused  in  neutral  countries.  This  ought  to 
impel  us  to  remove  the  stigma  attaching  to  our 
violation  of  the  Treaty  of  1846.  American  good 
faith  can  be  restored  only  by  the  ratification  of 
the  treaty  with  Colombia  now  pending  in  the 
Senate. 

President  Wilson  rendered  a  distinguished 
public  service  when  he  insisted  on  the  repeal  of 
the  provision  of  the  Panama  Canal  Act  which  ex- 
empted our  vessels  engaged  in  the  coastwise  trade 
from  the  payment  of  tolls.  He  stood  for  the  re- 
nunciation of  an  advantage  inconsistent  with  the 
interpretation    put    upon    the    Hay-Pauncefote 


Clear  Enterprise  of  Every  Stain  29 

treaty  by  the  men  who  framed  it.  He  had  to 
fight  down  serious  opposition  in  his  own  party 
to  square  our  record  with  that  of  honor. 

The  repeal  of  the  tolls-exemption  provisions  of 
the  Panama  Canal  Act  will  always  stand  high  on 
the  list  of  the  good  works  of  the  President,  for  the 
enactment  of  the  repeal  bill  was  due  to  his  great 
influence,  very  directly  exerted.  It  was  a  con- 
troverted question,  but  the  sound  opinion  of  the 
country  supported  the  President  in  his  endeavor 
to  get  Congress  to  do  its  plain  duty  and  to  set  the 
record  of  the  country  straight.  A  very  great 
majority  of  the  American  people,  and  practically 
all  of  those  who  were  in  a  position  to  judge  the 
matter  impartially,  held  that  the  exemption  act 
was  wrong,  that  the  repeal  was  right,  that  it  was 
an  act  of  justice  to  England,  and,  above  all,  to 
ourselves. 

The  opinion  of  all  well-informed  Americans  of 
high  character  was  voiced  by  Vice-President 
Marshall  when,  at  the  Panama-Pacific  Exposi- 
tion, San  Francisco,  on  March  24,  19 15,  he  said: 

In  justice  to  the  day,  Woodrow  Wilson  should  be 
here.  The  office  and  the  man  would  each  fittingly  grace 
this  occasion.  But  duty  said  to  him  that  justice  to  all 
the  people  bade  him  stay  in  Washington.  You  hope  for 
continued  peace.  Do  not  forget  that  he  is  your  greatest 
peacemaker.     May  the  truth  that  he  seeks  your  good, 


30  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

rather  than  his  own  or  your  pleasure,  lighten  the  disap- 
pointments of  this  hour.  .  .  . 

I  am  sure  that  I  express  the  thought  of  the  President 
and  the  hope  of  the  American  people  when  I  say  that 
our  canal  was  built  not  alone  for  glory  or  great  gain,  but 
with  a  sincere  desire  to  make  the  whole  world  kin.  There 
are  two  gospels  now  instead  of  one.  The  gospel  of  good 
will  has  been  supplemented  with  the  gospel  of  personal 
contact.  The  gospel  of  good  will  continues  to  be  su- 
preme, but  nothing  will  help  it  preach  as  loudly  as  those 
human  agencies  which  eliminate  distance,  blend  languages, 
and  give  us  sight  as  well  as  knowledge  each  of  the  other. 

I  am  quite  sure  that  I  am  but  one  of  a  countless  throng 
in  this  republic  who  regret  that  this  altruistic  work  has  a 
real  or  seeming  defect  in  the  charge  of  an  injustice  done 
a  sister  republic  to  the  south.  Let  us  not  be  too  much 
dismayed  this  day  by  reason  of  that  fact.  The  American 
people  are  wise,  and  they  know  he  is  not  wise  who  is  not 
just.  I  look  with  confidence  for  the  early  arrival  of  that 
good  hour  when  whatever  wrong  may  have  been  done 
shall  be  righted,  and  when  there  will  be  left  no  drop  of 
bitter  water  to  flow  in  that  channel  which  unites  the  seas. 

The  present  war  vitally  concerns  the  progress 
of  the  world's  civilization.  It  marks  an  epoch 
in  world  history  comparable  only  with  the  Fall  of 
the  Roman  Empire  or  the  Reformation.  Future 
history  will  date  from  it.  Ought  not  the  United 
States  to  start  the  new  era  without  a  stain  on  its 
good  name? 

Due  to  the  high  character  of  President  Wilson, 
the  tolls-exemption  provisions  of  the  Panama 
Canal  Act  are  in  the  scrap-heap.  Ratification  of 
the  pending  treaty  with  Colombia  is  as  vital  to 


Clear  Enterprise  of  Every  Stain  31 

the  restoration  of  American  national  honor  as 
was  the  repeal  of  tolls-exemption. 

As  already  stated,  the  tolls-exemption  pro- 
visions of  the  Panama  Canal  Act  have  been  re- 
pealed. The  good  work  should  be  completed  by 
making  reparation  to  Colombia.  That  would 
clear  the  canal  of  its  remaining  stain.  President 
Wilson  and  Secretary  Bryan  have  done  their  part. 
Let  the  people  of  the  United  States  insist  that  the 
Senate  do  its  part  by  demanding  that  it  ratify  the 
pending  treaty  with  Colombia,  thus  enabling  us 
to  start  the  new  era  with  a  chastened  conscience 
and  with  unsullied  honor. 


Chapter  II 

Roosevelfs  Article — ''The  Panama  Blackmail 
Treaty'' 

We  shall,  in  this  chapter,  subject  to  a  critical 
examination  an  article  by  Roosevelt  entitled  "The 
Panama  Blackmail  Treaty,''  which  appeared  in 
the  Metropolitan  Magazine  for  February,  191 5. 
The  article  advances  an  argument  against  the 
ratification  of  the  treaty  negotiated  with  Colombia 
by  the  Wilson  Administration  for  the  purpose  of 
reestablishing  friendly  relations  and  of  ^compen- 
sating that  country  for  loss  suffered  when  the 
Province  of  Panama  was  wrested  from  her  sov- 
ereignty by  the  United  States.  Not  only  is  the 
article  couched  in  language  that  is  lacking  in 
dignity,  but  it  is  positively  offensive.  Its  princi- 
pal arguments  will  be  answered  in  this  chapter 
and  the  remaining  ones  will  be  disposed  of  in 
other  chapters. 

We  shall  quote  excerpts  from  this  article  as 
the  discussion  proceeds  and  follow  them  with  an 
accurate  statement  of  facts  and  of  conclusions 

32 


The  Panama  Blackmail  Treaty  33 

based  on  them.     The  article  opens  with  these 
paragraphs : 

In  1903  a  shameless  and  sordid  attempt  was  made  by 
the  then  dictator  of  Colombia  and  his  subordinate  f  ellow- 
poHticians  at  Bogota  to  force  the  United  States  by  scan- 
dalously improper  tactics  to  pay  a  vastly  larger  sum  for 
the  privilege  of  building  the  Panama  Canal  than  had  been 
agreed  upon  in  a  solemn  treaty.  As  President  of  the 
United  States  I  resisted  this  attempt,  and  prevented  the 
United  States  from  being  blackmailed.  Had  I  not  suc- 
cessfully resisted  the  attempt,  the  Panama  Canal  would 
not  now  be  built,  and  would  probably  never  have  been 
built.  The  attempt  was  blackmail  then ;  and  to  yield  to  it 
now  is  to  yield  to  blackmail. 

Yet  the  present  Administration  now  proposes  to  pay 
Colombia  twenty-five  million  dollars,  and  to  make  what 
is  probably  an  apology  for  our  conduct  in  acquiring  the 
right  to  build  the  canal.  Apparently  this  is  done  on  the 
theory  of  soothing  the  would-be  blackmailers  and  making 
them  forget  the  mortification  caused  them  by  the  failure 
of  their  initial  attempt  to  hold  up  the  United  States. 

This  article  and  the  messages  to  the  Congress 
as  of  December  7,  1903  (part  devoted  to  Canal), 
and  of  January  4,  1904,  are  neither  fact  nor 
fiction.  They  are  a  gallery-playing  farce  in- 
tended to  dazzle  instead  of  to  instruct  the 
American  people.  They  may  sound  like  truth, 
but  in  reality  they  bear  false  witness  against 
a  sister  Republic,  retarding  the  formation  of 
a  correct  public  opinion  on  the  question  of  our 
duty  to  Colombia.     They  are  in  reality  a  plea  to 


34  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

keep  our  national  honor  in  pawn  so  that  the  poli- 
tical crime  of  1903  may  not  be  officially  disowned. 

The  charge  of  "blackmair'  is,  in  reality,  nothing 
more  than  a  pretext  to  justify  the  taking  of  the 
Canal  Zone  by  force.  Realizing  that  there  is  no 
justification  that  can  withstand  the  scrutiny  of 
historical  method,  Roosevelt  tries  to  withdraw 
attention  from  the  real  facts  by  this  unwarranted 
counter  charge.  What  proof  has  he  offered? 
Or  does  he  act  on  the  principle  that  if  you  throw 
mud  some  of  it  will  stick — at  least  in  the  minds 
of  the  unwary?  His  charge  is  serious,  but 
searching  inquiry  shows  that  it  is  absolutely  with- 
out foundation. 

When  it  became  evident  that  the  compensation 
for  the  canal  concession  could  not  be  satisfactorily 
arranged  by  diplomacy,  Colombia  suggested  that 
the  matter  be  referred  for  determination  to  an 
arbitral  tribunal  and  offered  to  enter  into  an  en- 
gagement which  would  provide  for  its  determina- 
tion in  this  way.  This  phase  of  the  canal  con- 
troversy is  admirably  stated  in  a  paragraph  of  an 
article  in  the  North  American  Review  for  Janu- 
ary, 1904,  by  Senor  Francisco  Escobar,  Consul 
of  Colombia  in  New  York: 

The  money  consideration  first  offered  by  Secretary 
Hay  was  far  from  satisfactory.     Minister  Concha  was 


The  Panama  Blackmail  Treaty  35 

right  when  he  said  that  the  Secretary  was  trying  to  drive 
a  sharp  bargain.  Yet  it  was  the  accepted  opinion  in  the 
United  States  that  Colombia  was  the  "sharper" ;  but  the 
best  proof  I  can  adduce  to  the  contrary  is  that  Minister 
Concha  proposed  to  leave  the  money  consideration  to  be 
adjusted  by  an  arbitrator  or  by  The  Hague  Tribunal. 

Mr.  Escobar  was  asked  by  the  writer  to  secure 
confirmation  of  the  foregoing  from  the  then 
Minister  Concha,  now  the  President  of  the  Re- 
public of  Colombia,  which  was  done.  It  is  con- 
tained in  the  following  cablegram : 

Bogota,  August  10,  191 5 
Francisco  Escobar,  New  York: 

By  article  XXV  of  the  memorandum  presented  to  the 
Department  of  State  on  April  18,  1902,  the  Colombian 
Legation  proposed  to  fix  by  means  of  arbitration  the 
amount  of  the  annuity  to  be  paid  Colombia.  On  April 
21,  Secretary  Hay  accepted  this  proposal  and  promised 
to  sign  a  covenant  in  accordance  therewith,  but  on  July 
18,  having  changed  his  mind,  proposed  an  option  [$7,000,- 
000  on  final  agreement  and  an  annuity  of  $100,000  or 
$10,000,000  and  an  annuity  of  $10,000]  instead  of  arbi- 
tration. The  memorandum  was  published  with  other 
state  papers  by  said  Department. 

Concha 

In  article  XXV  of  the  memorandum,  Colombia 
proposed  a  method  for  determining  the  value  of 
the  canal  concession  that  was  scientific.  This 
article  contains  the  following  sections: 

As  the  price  or  compensation  for  the  right  to  use  the 
zone  granted  in  this  convention  by  Colombia  to  the  United 


36  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

States  for  the  construction  of  a  canal,  together  with  the 
proprietary  right  over  the  Panama  Railroad,  and  for  the 
annuity  of  $250,000  gold,  which  Colombia  ceases  to  re- 
ceive from  the  said  railroad,  as  well  as  in  compensation 
for  other  rights,  privileges,  and  exemptions  granted  to 
the  United  States,  and  in  consideration  of  the  increase  in 
the  administrative  expenses  of  the  department  of  Panama 
consequent  upon  the  construction  of  the  said  canal,  the 
Government  of  the  United  States  binds  itself  to  pay  Co- 
lombia the  amount  of  $7,000,000  in  American  gold  on 
the  exchange  of  the  ratification  of  this  convention  after 
its  approval  by  the  legislative  bodies  of  both  countries, 
and  fourteen  years  after  the  date  aforesaid  a  fair  and 
reasonable  annuity,  that  shall  be  agreed  upon  by  the  con- 
tracting Governments  three  years  before  the  expiration  of 
the  above-mentioned  term  of  fourteen  years. 

In  fixing  this  fair  and  reasonable  annuity  there  shall 
be  taken  into  consideration  the  present  price  of  the 
usufruct  of  the  railway  as  well  as  the  compensation  that 
is  to  be  stipulated  for  the  use  of  the  zone  and  for  the 
additional  administrative  expenses  that  the  construction 
of  the  canal  will  impose  upon  Colombia;  and  also  the 
advanced  payment  of  $7,000,000  and  the  comparative  cost 
and  conditions  upon  which  the  United  States  reasonably 
could  have  expected  to  acquire  concessions  satisfactory  to 
it  in  respect  of  any  other  canal  route. 

Three  years  before  the  expiration  of  each  term  of  one 
hundred  years  the  annuity  for  the  following  term  shall 
be  fixed  in  a  similar  manner. 

But  in  the  event  that  the  parties  are  unable  to  come  to 
an  understanding  within  the  periods  above  referred  to  as 
to  such  fair  and  reasonable  annuity,  then  before  the  sec- 
ond year  prior  to  the  termination  of  the  periods  above 
referred  to,  the  contracting  parties  shall  proceed  to  con- 
stitute a  high  commission,  to  be  composed  of  five  mem- 
bers, of  whom  two  shall  Jbe  appointed  by  Colombia,  two 
by  the  United  States,  and  the  fifth  (who  shall  be  the 
president  of  such  high  commission)  shall  be  the  presi- 


The  Panama  Blackmail  Treaty  37 

dent,  for  the  time  being,  of  the  International  Peace  Tri- 
bunal of  The  Hague;  and  the  determination  reached  by 
said  commission,  by  a  majority  vote,  concerning  such 
fair  and  reasonable  annuity  that  is  to  be  paid  to  Colom- 
bia by  the  United  States  in  conformity  with  this  article, 
shall  be  binding  upon  the  contracting  parties. 

But  no  delay  nor  difference  of  opinion  in  fixing  such 
amount  shall  affect  nor  interrupt  the  full  operation  and 
effect  of  this  convention  in  all  other  respects. 

Minister  Concha  accompanied  the  memoran- 
dum with  a  letter,  which  contains  the  following 
paragraph : 

Confirming  the  conclusions  reached  as  the  result  of  the 
conference  held  between  yourself  and  Mr.  Cromwell,  and 
adopting,  as  far  as  practicable,  your  valuable  suggestions, 
I  beg  leave  to  hand  you  the  concessionary  convention  or 
treaty  (in  Spanish  and  in  EngHsh)  embodying  the  amend- 
ments agreed  upon  in  the  conference  referred  to. 

My  previous  communication  of  March  31,  1902,  pro- 
posing the  concessionary  convention  or  treaty  in  behalf 
of  my  Government,  and  the  expository  communications 
of  myself  and  Mr.  Cromwell  under  the  same  date,  apply 
equally  to  the  inclosures. 

The  following  paragraphs  are  the  contents  of 
the  letter  of  Secretary  Hay,  dated  April  21,  1902 : 

I  have  the  honor  to  acknowledge  receipt  at  your  hands 
of  a  communication  dated  the  31st  of  March,  1902,  and 
another  of  the  i8th  of  April,  inclosing  a  proposal  of  the 
Republic  of  Colombia  for  a  concessionary  convention  or 
treaty  between  the  Republic  of  Colombia  and  that  of  the 
United  States  of  America  respecting  the  completion, 
maintenance,  operation,  control,  and  protection  of  an  in- 
ter-oceanic canal  over  the  Isthmus  of  Panama. 


38  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

I  am  directed  by  the  President  to  inform  you  that  I 
shall  be  ready  to  sign  with  you  the  proposed  convention 
as  soon  as — 

First.  The  Congress  of  the  United  States  shall  have 
authorized  the  President  to  enter  into  such  an  arrange- 
ment; and 

Second.  As  soon  as  the  law  officers  of  this  Govern- 
ment shall  have  decided  upon  the  question  of  the  title 
which  the  New  Panama  Canal  Company  is  able  to  give 
of  all  the  properties  and  rights  claimed  by  it  and  pertain- 
ing to  a  canal  across  the  Isthmus  and  covered  by  the 
pending  proposal. 

That  Secretary  Hay  rejected  Colombia's  pro- 
posal of  April  18,  1902,  for  fixing  the  price  of  the 
canal  concession  by  arbitration  has  already  been 
stated.  In  January,  1903,  Acting  Minister  Her- 
ran  of  Colombia  renewed  the  proposal  of  his  Gov- 
ernment to  have  an  arbitral  tribunal  fix  the  an- 
nuity to  be  paid  Colombia.  Our  administration 
insisted  that  the  annuity  should  be  a  fixed  amount 
in  perpetuity  and  that  this  amount  should  be 
stipulated  in  the  treaty,  and  offered  for  the  canal 
concession  the  sum  of  $7,000,000,  and  an  annuity 
of  $100,000  during  the  life  of  the  engagement,  or, 
$10,000,000  and  an  annuity  of  $10,000.  Colom- 
bia asked  $7,000,000  for  the  concession,  and  an 
annuity  of  $600,000.  As  there  was  a  decided 
difference  in  the  amount  of  the  annuity  offered 
and  asked,  Colombia  proposed  that  it  be  settled 
by   arbitration,    but   our    Government   refused. 


The  Panama  Blackmail  Treaty  39 

America,  the  country  which  to-day  has  gone  the 
furthest  along  lines  of  international  arbitration, 
refused  as  recently  as  1903  to  arbritrate  the  price 
of  an  easement,  as  is  done  under  similar  circum- 
stances in  the  exercise  of  domestic  eminent  do- 
main if  the  matter  is  not  settled  by  mutual  agree- 
ment. America  enforces  upon  her  citizens  what 
she  declined  to  accept  as  a  member  of  the  family 
of  nations. 

The  spirit  in  which  Colombia  acted  during  the 
negotiation  of  the  canal  concession  is  found  in 
the  following  excerpt  from  a  letter  by  Minister 
Concha,  dated  March  31,  1902: 

The  Republic  that  I  represent  realizes  the  importance 
of  the  contemplated  interoceanic  waterway  for  the  civ- 
ilization and  progress  of  the  world,  and  since  nature  has 
placed  the  shortest  and  most  expeditious  route  within  the 
territory  of  the  Republic,  Colombia  widely  and  generously 
opens  her  doors  so  that  the  grand  work  may  be  achieved 
within  the  shortest  possible  time. 

If  the  people  of  the  United  States  evince  an  earnest 
desire  that  their  Government  apply  its  energies  and  treas- 
ure to  the  completion  of  the  canal,  Colombia  not  only 
will  not  place  any  obstacle  whatever  in  the  way  of  such 
a  purpose  or  keep  her  concessions  within  the  bounds  of 
those  previously  conceded  to  private  enterprise,  but  will 
enlarge  those  concessions  to  such  an  extent  as  to  re- 
nounce a  demand  for  the  ownership  after  the  lapse  of  a 
number  of  years  of  operation,  as  stipulated  in  the  French 
company's  contract ;  she  will  grant  the  use  of  a  much  more 
extensive  zone  than  that  originally  conceded  for  the  exe- 
cution of  the  work;  extend  facilities  in  all  the  ports  of 


40  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

the  Republic  for  cooperation  in  the  work  of  the  enter- 
prise, relinquish  her  proprietary  and  usufructuary  rights 
in  the  Panama  Railway,  and  lastly,  foregoes  a  fixed  par- 
ticipation in  the  proceeds  of  the  canal,  confining  her  de- 
mands to  a  fee  or  annuity  for  the  price  of  the  zone,  the 
revenues  of  the  railway,  and  the  heavier  expenses  put 
upon  the  public  administration  in  the  Isthmus  by  the  in- 
crease of  population  and  the  traffic  consequent  to  the 
work  on  the  canal  itself. 

Thus  does  Colombia  give  fresh  evidence  of  her  long 
standing  and  cordial  sentiments  of  friendship  toward  the 
United  States  and  evinces  in  a  clear  and  sincere  manner 
the  gratification  with  which  she  will  receive  the  indus- 
trious and  intelligent  citizens  of  your  Republic  in  her 
territory. 

Colombia  has  no  lust  of  unjust  gain  through  the  con- 
struction of  the  canal  in  her  territory,  and  a  final  con- 
vention on  this  subject  will  not  be  hampered  by  pe- 
cuniary considerations.  Her  pride  in  the  matter  is  bent 
on  having  the  neutral  waterway  between  the  two  oceans, 
that  idea  of  universal  peace  and  progress,  become  a  re- 
ality on  her  territory  and  under  the  protection  of  her  sov- 
ereignty. The  compensations  asked  by  Colombia  have 
special  importance  only  in  that  they  will  imply  a  practical 
and  constant  recognition  of  her  sovereignty. 

In  the  light  of  the  foregoing  official  documents 
or  of  excerpts  from  documents,  whose  conduct 
comes  under  the  dictionary  definition  of  attempted 
blackmail  ?  The  Standard  Dictionary  defines  this 
favorite  term  of  Roosevelt's  when  he  is  discussing 
the  acquisition  of  the  canal  title  as  "extortion  by 
intimidation;  especially,  extortion  of  money  by 
threats  or  accusations." 

With  this  definition  as  a  guide,  it  would  be 


The  Panama  Blackmail  Treaty  41 

more  truthful  to  say  that  the  manner  in  which 
our  Administration  secured  the  signature  of 
Herran  to  the  Hay-Herran  treaty,  and  attempted 
to  secure  its  ratification  by  the  Colombian  Con- 
gress, savors  of  blackmail  than  to  say  that  those  in 
official  control  of  Colombia  attempted  blackmail. 
The  characterization  of  their  actions  by  this  term 
is  wholly  inaccurate,  and,  as  already  indicated, 
is  a  deliberate  attempt  to  conceal  the  fact  that  our 
Administration  was  guilty  of  a  political  crime. 
The  facts  upon  which  this  statement  is  based  are 
given  in  detail  in  chapters  which  follow. 

Whatsoever  evidence  of  attempted  blackmail 
exists  is  contained  in  the  gossip  of  the  time.  It 
can  be  duplicated  at  any  session  of  our  Congress 
or  of  the  legislature  at  Albany.  The  council  of 
the  city  of  New  York  was  shorn  of  important 
powers  because  of  this  practice.  On  the  day  of 
writing  (March  23,  1915),  Hamilton  Fish 
charged  in  the  New  York  Assembly : 

The  Republican  Party  here  represented  is  acting  on 
this  bill  in  behalf  of  several  men  who  get  retainers  from 
casualty  companies  and  who  pull  down  the  levers  that 
operate  things  here  at  Albany.  You  are  acting  for  one  or 
two  men  who  are  in  the  employ  of  the  insurance  com- 
panies. .  .  . 

I  demand  an  investigation.  No  one  has  told  who  is 
behind  this  bill  that  we  rushed  through  without  a  hearing. 

I  stand  pat  on  my  statement  that  improper  influences 


42  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

put  the  Direct  Settlement  bill  through  this  House.     You 
have  the  investigators  named  and  I'll  give  the  proof." 

Van  Benschoten,  in  the  celebrated  Barnes- 
Roosevelt  libel  suit,  said : 

Investigation  after  investigation  had  shown  the  abso- 
lute rottenness  of  the  condition  of  many  of  the  depart- 
ments of  the  State.  Public  officials  had  been  indicted 
and  convicted  for  neglect  of  duty  and  for  conspiring  to 
defraud  the  State.  Other  officials  had  been  removed 
from  office.  The  newspapers  and  periodicals  were  filled 
with  the  details  of  the  conditions  which  had  for  some 
time  been  existing. 

"Blackmail!"  Have  not  some  United  States 
Senators  and  Congressmen  been  convicted  of 
crime?  Others  left  inadequate  footprints  and 
so  the  legal  evidence  was  wanting.  We  have  our 
own  "Black  Horse  Cavalry,"  and  some  of  them 
have  "done  time."  It  would  be  a  miracle  if 
Colombia  were  entirely  free  from  them. 

We  should  not  expect  a  virtue  there  that  we 
do  not  ourselves  possess.  Guilt  does  not  point 
to  the  Colombian  Congress  as  a  body.  It  is  safe 
to  say  that  in  the  history  of  civilized  diplomacy 
there  never  was  such  an  unwarranted  and  im- 
proper characterization  of  another  nation's  mo- 
tives as  is  contained  in  Roosevelt's  official  and  un- 
official arraignment  of  Colombia. 

Do  not  the  official  documents  here  presented 


The  Panama  Blackmail  Treaty  43 

prove  that  Roosevelt  has  wantonly  attacked 
Colombia's  national  character?  Do  they  not 
show  that  he  has  ruthlessly  assailed  the  charac- 
ter of  her  public  men  in  order  to  conceal  the  theft 
of  the  Canal  Zone  by  his  Administration?  A 
critical  examination  of  the  diplomatic  correspond- 
ence between  the  United  States  and  Colombia 
having  a  bearing  on  the  Hay-Herran  treaty  con- 
vinced the  writer  that  the  following  from  the  pen 
of  Ex-Minister  Du  Bois  is  a  correct  estimate  of 
the  character  of  the  governing  class  of  Colom- 
bia: 

An  impartial  investigation  at  Bogota,  running  over  a 
period  of  two  years  .  .  .  convinced  me  that,  instead  of 
"blackmailers"  and  '"bandits,"  the  public  men  of  Colom- 
bia compare  well  with  the  public  men  of  other  countries 
in  intelligence  and  respectability,  while  the  social  life  is 
as  refined  and  cultured  as  can  be  found  in  any  capital  in 
the  world.  Bogota  is  called  the  Athens  of  South 
America. 

The  New  York  World  is  authority  for  this 
statement : 

It  is  noteworthy  that  of  all  the  amendments  introduced 
into  the  Colombian  Senate,  there  was  not  one  relating  to 
the  compensations,  either  in  money  or  in  any  other  form, 
that  Colombia  was  to  receive  from  the  United  States  in 
exchange  for  the  concessions  granted  by  the  former  to 
the  latter  country.  There  is  not  the  ghost  of  a  shadow 
of  justification  for  the  oft-repeated  falsehood  that  Colom- 
bia was  trying  to  hold  up  the  United  States  for  more 
money. 


44  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

Calling  names  does  not  alter  facts.  To  shout 
"Blackmail!"  from  the  housetops  does  not  alter 
the  fact  that  Colombia  had  vested  interests  in  the 
Province  of  Panama  for  which  she  is  entitled  to 
compensation.  If  she  deserved  all  the  epithets 
hurled  at  her  by  Roosevelt,  her  infamy  would  not 
by  a  hair's  breadth  alter  our  duty.  No  man  has 
a  right  to  rob  a  person  just  because  the  latter  con- 
templated blackmail. 

The  writer  is  not  specially  interested  in  Colom- 
bia, and  has  no  ties  whatever  which  bind  him  to 
her,  but  he  is  vitally  interested  in  seeing  a  great 
power,  in  respect  to  whose  policies  he,  like  all 
citizens,  has  a  right  to  be  heard,  deal  justly  with 
a  small  nation  regardless  of  her  character. 

We  are  not  aware  that  Colombia  is  a  black- 
mailer. We  are  aware  that  the  United  States 
is  in  possession  of  a  stolen  canal  title,  which  will 
remain  tainted  until  our  Government  has  made 
reparation.  No  amount  of  rhetoric,  or  of  abuse 
of  Colombia,  will  alter  a  single  word  in  the  in- 
dictment against  the  United  States. 

The  charge  of  blackmail  is  reiterated  by  Roose- 
velt in  the  following: 

In  his  message  of  July  21,  Minister  Beaupre  reported 
that  the  Colombian  Government  had  sounded  both  Ger- 
many and  England  to  see  if  they  could  not  be  persuaded 


The  Panama  Blackmail  Treaty  45 

to  construct,  or  aid  in  the  construction  of,  the  canal  in 
place  of  the  United  States.  The  Government  of  Colom- 
bia, therefore,  not  only  sought  to  blackmail  us  and  to 
blackmail  the  French  company,  but  endeavored  to  put 
one  of  the  great  Old  World  powers  on  the  Isthmus  in 
possession  of  the  canal.  And  because  the  then  Adminis- 
tration refused  to  submit  to  such  infamy  on  the  part  of 
Colombia,  the  present  Administration  actually  proposes 
to  pay  the  wrongdoer  $25,000,000  of  blackmail. 

In  short,  it  was  a  crime  for  Colombia  to  seek 
reasonable  terms;  it  was,  however,  a  virtue  for 
the  United  States  to  do  so.  And,  of  course, 
Roosevelt — and  not  an  impartial  arbitral  tribunal 
— was  to  decide  what  were  proper  terms.  As 
already  stated,  Colombia  offered  to  submit  the 
entire  question  of  compensation  to  an  arbitral 
tribunal.  Therefore,  it  is  nearer  the  truth  to 
say  that  the  Roosevelt  Administration  sought 
through  coercion  and  duress  to  secure  an  unduly 
advantageous  bargain. 

As  to  blackmailing  the  French  company — no 
penetrating  student  of  corporation  finance  and  of 
stock  exchange  methods  will  lose  sleep  over  the 
spoliation  of  the  innocent  investors  in  the  French 
company;  they  had  already  been  despoiled.  It 
only  remained  to  determine  whether  the  "Black 
Horse  Cavalry"  of  finance  would  get  the  actual 
value  of  the  investment  or  whether  Colombia 
would  share  it  with  them  as  compensation  for  the 


46  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

right  to  transfer  title  to  a  sovereign  state  denied 
to  them  by  charter. 

It  is  safe  to  assume  that  at  the  collapse  of  the 
French  company,  the  wreckers  were  "out  from 
imder''  and  that  they  repurchased  the  securities 
for  a  "song"  when  these  reappeared  on  the 
market.  ''Set  the  table  over  again''  has  become 
an  art  in  high  -finance — an  art  in  which  the  small 
and  innocent  investors  are  fleeced.  It  is,  there- 
fore, not  clear  why  our  Administration  should 
have  been  so  much  concerned  about  the  holders 
of  the  securities  of  the  French  company.  At  its 
worst,  malefactors  of  great  wealth  would  have 
been  shorn  of  only  a  fraction  of  their  ill  gotten 
gains.  It  was  clearly  not  a  case  for  the  Roosevelt 
Administration  to  become  excited  over;  and  not 
a  case  that  warranted  the  applying  of  epithets  to 
a  friendly  nation. 

The  Roosevelt  Administration  voluntarily  came 
to  the  relief  of  the  investors — we  call  them  by 
that  name  as  a  matter  of  courtesy — in  a  company 
chartered  by  France.  It  is  nearer  correct  to  call 
them  financial  buccaneers — who  wrecked  the  pro- 
ject to  despoil  bona  Ude  investors — and  their  poli- 
tical "pals."  This  anxious  concern  of  the  Ad- 
ministration does  not  have  a  holy  look,  nor  does 


The  Panama  Blackmail  Treaty  47 

it  appear  entirely  disinterested.  An  impartial 
survey  of  all  attendant  facts  and  circumstances 
bars  the  inference  that  it  was  prompted  by  motives 
that  were  exalted. 

Instead  of  there  having  been  an  official  attempt 
at  blackmail  on  the  part  of  Colombia,  there  was 
ignorance,  there  was  impatience,  there  was  pas- 
sion on  the  part  of  our  Government.  As  for  the 
White  House  at  the  time,  one  could  hardly  say 
that  patience  and  calm  cold  reason  were  domiciled 
there.  There  was,  however,  no  official  attempt 
at  blackmail  on  the  part  of  the  United  States,  any 
more  than  on  that  of  Colombia.  If  Roosevelt 
insists  that  there  was,  we  will  not  strenuously  as- 
sert that  his  Administration  was  not  guilty.  As 
already  stated,  Colombia  offered  to  submit  the 
question  of  compensation  to  arbitration ;  our  Ad- 
ministration rejected  arbitration  as  a  solution. 
Whose  conduct  looks  suspicious?  Is  it  the  con- 
duct of  the  country  that  offers  to  arbitrate  the 
point  at  issue,  or  is  it  the  conduct  of  the  country 
that  sidesteps  arbitration? 

Roosevelt  seems  incapable  of  thinking  in  terms 
of  accounts,  finance  and  sovereignty.  If  it  were 
not  so  he  would  not  inflict  upon  his  readers  state- 


48  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

ments  which  destroy  his  prestige  among  the  well- 
informed.  The  following  is  introduced  merely 
as  a  sample  of  his  reckless  utterances : 

A  private  French  company  had  attempted  to  build  a 
canal  across  the  Isthmus  of  Panama,  and  had  failed  after 
making  only  a  beginning  of  the  work.  Various  proposi- 
tions for  a  trans-Isthmian  canal  to  be  undertaken  by  the 
United  States  Government  had  been  made.  .  .  . 

Congress  only  considered  seriously,  however,  the 
Panama  and  Nicaragua  routes,  and  was  in  much  doubt 
between  them.  A  commission  of  experts  appointed  by 
the  President  for  that  purpose  had  reported  that  if  we 
could  buy  the  rights  of  the  French  canal  company  for 
$40,000,000  we  ought  to  take  the  Panama  route,  but  that 
otherwise  we  should  take  the  Nicaragua  route.  ... 

The  French  had  real  rights.  They  had  spent  hundreds 
of  millions  of  dollars,  and  although  much  of  this  had 
been  wasted,  yet  we  received  at  least  $40,000,000  worth 
of  property  and  of  accomplished  work  for  the  $40,000,000 
we  agreed  to  pay  them.  Colombia  had  no  rights  that 
were  not  of  the  most  shadowy  and  unsubstantial  kind ;  and 
even  these  shadowy  rights  existed  only  because  of  the  ac- 
tion of  the  United  States.  .  .  .  Ten  million  dollars  repre- 
sented the  very  outside  limit  which  generosity  could  fix 
as  a  payment  to  Colombia  for  rights  which  she  was  im- 
potent to  maintain  save  by  our  assistance  and  protection, 
and  for  an  opportunity  which  she  was  utterly  unable 
herself  to  develop.  Nobody  of  any  consequence  in  the 
United  States,  within  or  without  Congress,  would  at  that 
time  for  one  moment  have  considered  agreeing  to  pay 
$25,000,000  or  any  sum  remotely  approaching  it. 

Sovereignty,  the  most  important  consideration, 
is  not  mentioned  by  Roosevelt  in  the  foregoing 
excerpt.    The  Hay-Herran  treaty  provided  for 


The  Panama  Blackmail  Treaty  49 

the  payment  of  $10,000,000  to  Colombia.  It 
must,  however,  not  be  forgotten  that  Colombia 
remained  the  sovereign  owner  of  the  whole 
Isthmus  of  Panama.  The  offer  of  $10,000,000 
and  the  right  to  retain  the  Isthmus  were  worth 
more  than  the  $25,000,000  which  are  now  offered. 
The  circumstances  of  the  Hay-Herran  treaty,  by 
virtue  of  which  Colombia  was  offered  the  $10,- 
000,000  before  she  lost  Panama,  were  entirely  dif- 
ferent from  those  which  obtain  now  when  she  is 
to  be  paid  $25,000,000,  after  having  lost  the 
Isthmus. 

The  $10,000,000  was  to  be  paid  for  leasehold 
rights  to  a  Canal  Zone  in  the  Province  of  Panama. 
The  $25,000,000  is  intended  as  part  payment  for 
the  loss  of  sovereignty — sovereignty  wrested  from 
Colombia  by  the  display  of  overwhelming  force 
in  Isthmian  waters.  It  is  part  payment  for  the 
loss  of  a  province  and  vested  interests  there 
located,  such  loss  being  the  result  of  collusion  be- 
tween the  Roosevelt  Administration  and  a  few 
separatists  on  the  Isthmus.  The  Hay-Herran 
treaty  provided  payment  only  for  rights  to  a  strip 
of  land.  The  present  treaty  provides  payment 
for  the  loss  of  ownership  of  a  whole  province  with 
its  concomitant  rights.  The  two  propositions  are 
as  far  apart  as  the  two  poles. 


so  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

Colombia  had  other  rights  in  the  Province  of 
Panama.  One  of  these  was  the  right  stipulated 
in  the  contract  with  the  French  company  to  take 
possession  of  the  partly  completed  canal  if  not 
completed  by  it.  The  contract  provided  specifi- 
cally that  if  within  a  certain  time  and  a  generous 
extension  of  time,  which  the  Colombian  govern- 
ment granted,  the  French  company  failed  to  con- 
struct the  canal,  the  whole  work  should  become 
the  property  of  the  Republic  of  Colombia.  By 
merely  waiting  the  necessary  time,  the  position 
of  Colombia  as  owner  of  the  work  would  have 
become  absolutely  solid.  Colombia,  however,  did 
not  take  advantage  of  that  right.  This  very  im- 
portant right  she  had  at  the  time  when  the  United 
States  was  negotiating  the  Hay-Herran  treaty. 

Further,  in  order  that  the  French  company 
might  sell  its  assets  to  the  United  States,  it  was 
necessary,  as  already  indicated,  first  to  secure  the 
consent  of  Colombia,  because,  in  the  concession 
granted  by  Colombia  to  that  company,  it  was  ex- 
pressly stipulated  (art.  21)  that  such  concession 
could  not  be  transferred  to  any  foreign  govern- 
ment. This  was  by  itself  a  right,  and,  therefore, 
Colombia  was  entitled  to  refuse  transfer  to  the 
United  States  Government  unless  a  fair  price  was 
paid  for  her  consent. 


The  Panama  Blackmail  Treaty  51 

In  addition  to  the  foregoing  rights,  Colombia 
had  a  reversionary  interest  in  the  Panama  Rail- 
road. It  was  to  become  the  property  of  Colombia 
at  the  end  of  the  period  for  which  the  concession 
was  granted. 

In  the  light  of  the  foregoing,  is  it  not  apparent 
that  the  $25,000,000  is  not  blackmail,  but  only 
part  payment  for  rights  unlawfully  wrested  from 
Colombia  by  our  Administration — for  vested  in- 
terests taken  from  her  by  force  when  we  estab- 
lished the  so-called  Republic  of  Panama  as  a  pro- 
tectorate of  the  United  States. 

The  bland  assertion  of  Roosevelt  in  the  article 
in  question  that  the  rights  of  Colombia  (of  the 
sovereign)  were  shadowy  and  that  they  existed 
only  because  of  the  protection  afforded  to  her  by 
the  United  States  is  interesting,  but  the  vital  fact 
is  again  omitted,  and  that  is  that  the  .United 
States  received  for  this  protection  a  liberal  quid 
pro  quo.  We  received  valuable  commercial  con- 
cessions, including  transit  across  the  Isthmus  on 
the  Panama  Railroad  on  the  same  terms  as  those 
granted  to  citizens  of  Colombia,  a  concession  that 
Roosevelt  wanted  to  deny  to  non-nationals  in  the 
commercial  use  of  the  Panama  Canal.  The 
burden  assumed  by  the  United  States  in  the 
Treaty  of  1846  was  a  mere  trifle  when  compared 


52  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

with  the  benefits  which  accrued  to  Americans  un- 
der that  treaty. 

This  point  is  well  stated  in  a  communication  to 
our  Department  of  State  by  the  resident  Minister 
of  Colombia,  dated  May  3,  191 3,  in  which,  speak- 
ing of  the  obligation  the  United  States  assumed 
in  the  Treaty  of  1846,  he  says: 

And  this  solemn  undertaking,  to  which  the  United 
States  pledged  its  public  faith,  was  not  a  burdening  ob- 
ligation, nor  a  gratuitous  protection,  in  favor  of  the 
rights  of  Colombia.  On  the  contrary,  the  undertaking 
to  guarantee  [the  sovereignty  of  Colombia  on  the 
Isthmus]  was  established  in  compensation,  in  payment, 
of  the  immense  advantages  which  the  United  States  ob- 
tained from  Colombia  by  the  said  treaty.  Your  Excel- 
lency knows  full  well  the  history  of  your  own  country, 
and  therefore,  it  is  not  necessary  for  me  to  remind  you 
that  the  great  development  of  California  and  of  all  the 
Pacific  coast  was  principally  due  to  the  free  and  untaxed 
transit  across  the  Isthmus  of  Panama  which  the  United 
States  secured  under  the  Treaty  of  1846.  .  .  . 

In  truth,  it  is  not  possible  to  find  any  other  interna- 
tional agreement  carrying  such  great  advantages  and  con- 
cessions to  one  of  the  contracting  parties  as  those  that 
the  United  States  obtained,  and  which  were  granted  to 
it  by  Colombia,  principally  with  a  view  to  obtaining  an 
impregnable  guarantee  of  her  undeniable  rights  of  sov- 
ereignty and  property  over  the  Isthmus  of  Panama. 
Such  was,  on  the  part  of  Colombia,  the  object  she  had  in 
mind,  the  intention  with  which  she  entered  into  the 
Treaty  of  1846. 

While  it  may  be  argued  that  the  interests  men- 
tioned belonged  to  Panama,  and  that  the  rights 


The  Panama  Blackmail  Treaty  53 

of  Colombia  became  automatically  vested  in 
Panama  after  the  establishment  of  the  new  Re- 
public, such  an  argument  is  not  supported  by  prec- 
edent. Colombian  sovereignty  on  the  Isthmus, 
however,  was  extinguished  not  by  the  revolt  of 
Panama,  but  through  the  collusion  of  the  Roose- 
velt Administration  before  the  event,  and  the  dis- 
play of  force  before  and  after  the  event.  This 
is  the  very  heart  of  the  question. 

It  was  the  solemn  duty  of  the  Qolombian  Con- 
gress to  reject  the  Hay-Herran  treaty  as  an  un- 
scientific instrument.  The  rights  of  neither  party 
were  set  forth  with  sufficient  definiteness  to  fore- 
shadow harmony  in  the  application  of  its  pro- 
visions in  administration.  Who  but  the  weaker 
nation  would  have  had  to  suffer?  Of  friction, 
Colombia  had  an  example  in  the  new  construc- 
tion placed  on  the  Treaty  of  1846  in  the  fall  of 
1902.  Simon  CreeFs  statement  in  the  New  York 
Sun  on  April  3,  1914,  is  apropos: 

A  leetle  country  never  misconstrues  a  treaty  with  a 
big  one;  that  is  contrary  to  self-preservation  and  the 
law  of  nations.  A  leetle  country  alius  construes  a  treaty 
with  a  big  one  jest  the  same  from  fust  to  last,  strictly 
in  accordance  with  its  original  meanin'  an'  intent;  but 
a  big  nation  aint  so  gol  blamed  hide-bound  ner  bigoted, 
not  by  a  long  sight. 

This  reflection  is  suggestive,  furnishing  the  key 


54  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

which  explains  Colombia's  anxiety — misinter- 
preted as  roguery — during  and  after  the  negotia- 
tion of  the  canal  treaty. 

But  the  United  States  benefited  enormously  by 
Colombia's  rejection  as  far  as  concerns  its  mate- 
rial interests.  In  the  present  treaty  with 
Panama,  the  United  States  is  the  de  facto  sov- 
ereign of  the  Canal  Zone,  and  will,  in  due  course, 
probably  become  the  de  jure  sovereign  at  the  re- 
quest of  Panama.  We  should,  therefore,  as 
already  stated,  be  more  than  willing  to  pay 
$25,000,000  additional  to  the  amount  stipulated 
in  the  Hay-Herran  treaty  for  these  additional 
benefits. 

In  the  provisions  embodied  in  the  present  canal 
treaty,  Panama  was  generous  to  a  fault.  It  is 
doubtful  if  a  more  one-sided  treaty  was  ever  ne- 
gotiated. Secretary  Hay,  with  the  consent  of  the 
Junta,  gave  the  United  States  so  much  latitude 
that  it  is  almost  equivalent  to  sovereignty.  The 
United  States  may  use  any  of  the  rivers  and  lakes 
in  the  Republic  necessary  to  the  canal,  and  it  may 
acquire  additional  land  outside  of  the  Canal  Zone 
if  it  is  needed  for  canal  purposes.  These  pro- 
visions are  broad  enough  to  permit  the  conversion 
of  the  Republic  into  an  adjunct  of  the  canal.  If 
Panama  cannot  preserve  order,  the  United  States 


The  Panama  Blackmail  Treaty  55 

may,  at  its  discretion,  use  its  own  military  forces 
to  maintain  it.  The  foregoing  and  other  pro- 
visions make  the  so-called  Republic  of  Panama  a 
protectorate  of  the  United  States. 

One  would  hardly  argue  that  this  increment 
in  the  value  of  the  rights  America  finally  acquired 
in  the  Canal  Zone  should  be  paid  to  Panama  if 
paid  at  all.  Panama  was  enabled  to  grant  the 
rights  to  the  Canal  Zone  and  in  the  canal  littoral 
that  she  did  only  because  our  Administration 
wrested  her  from  the  sovereignty  of  Colombia. 
Sovereignty  alone  has  value.  Because  of  the 
strategic  importance  of  the  Canal  Zone,  the  sov- 
ereignty of  the  Isthmus  has  tremendous  value. 
Of  this  value,  the  United  States  despoiled  Colom- 
bia. I  repeat,  the  $25,000,000,  if  paid  to  Colom- 
bia, will  reimburse  that  country  for  only  a  frac- 
tion of  the  value  of  which  she  was  despoiled. 

This  is  not  all.  The  $25,000,000  will  only  in- 
crease the  cost  of  the  canal  as  a  business  under- 
taking. As  it  is  a  proper  charge  to  cost,  it  can 
be  amortized  out  of  revenues. 

Roosevelt  argues  as  though  the  $25,000,000 
were  a  direct  charge  on  the  national  treasury. 
It  need  not,  ought  not,  and  will  not  be  if  the  canal 
is  managed  as  a  business  enterprise.  As  he  has 
only  a  superficial  knowledge  of  finance,  his  dis- 


56  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

cussion  of  this  phase  of  the  problem  is  especially 
weak  and  deserves  serious  attention  only  because 
of  his  prestige.  An  adequate  title  is  a  part  of 
cost.  The  $25,000,000  payment  provided  for  in 
the  pending  treaty  is  necessary  to  give  the  United 
States  a  clear  title  to  the  Canal  Zone.  It  is  there- 
fore a  proper  charge  to  investment  in  the  canal 
and  can  be  amortized  through  revenues.  The 
burden  will  then  be  borne  by  the  commerce  that 
uses  the  canal  and  the  commerce  of  the  United 
States  will  bear  only  its  proportionate  share. 

Roosevelt  maintains  in  his  article  that  the 
$10,000,000  stipulated  in  the  Hay-Herran  treaty 
represented  the  very  outside  limit  that  generosity 
could  fix.  This  observation  presumably  applies 
also  to  the  annuity  of  $250,000.  As  the  extent 
of  future  developements  is  unknown  even  to  the 
wisest,  it  is  impossible  to  say  that  the  amount  of- 
fered was  liberal.  The  arrangement  was,  to  say 
the  least,  grossly  unscientific.  The  State  is  pre- 
sumed to  live  forever  and  so  must  act  on  that 
basis.  This  fact  alone,  if  properly  understood, 
justified  Colombia  in  considering  the  compensa- 
tion stipulated  in  the  Hay-Herran  treaty  as  un- 
satisfactory. As  already  indicated,  the  Colombia 
Legation  in  Washington  and  the  Colombian 
Senate  suggested  periodic  revaluation  of  the  con- 


The  Panama  Blackmail  Treaty  57 

cession  and  adjustment  by  arbitration  if  not  set- 
tled by  diplomacy.  That  would  have  settled  the 
question  in  harmony  with  the  "square  deal,"  as 
that  expression  is  understood  among  experts  in 
public  utility  finance. 

Colombia  was  then  receiving  $250,000  a  year 
from  the  railroad,  which  was  merely  continued 
in  the  Hay-Herran  treaty.  She  had  a  reversion- 
ary interest  in  the  railroad  which  would  have 
vested  in  the  United  States  had  the  treaty  been 
ratified.  Therefore,  Colombia  was  to  receive 
only  $10,000,000  for  the  canal  concession  and  for 
its  reversionary  interest  in  the  railroad.  This 
$10,000,000  could  have  been  amortized  through 
revenue  so  that  it  would  ultimately  have  cost  the 
United  States  nothing.  The  $250,000  would  also 
have  been  a  charge  to  revenue.  Reliable  data 
show  that  the  whole  outlay  for  the  canal  as  a  busi- 
ness enterprise  can  be  amortized  in  about  seventy- 
five  years.  Yet  the  income  of  Colombia,  the 
sovereign,  would  have  remained  at  $250,000 
a  year ;  that  of  the  United  States  would  have  been 
limited  only  by  the  degree  of  its  self  respect. 

The  situation  just  described  would  have  been 
the  same  as  that  found  in  those  American  munic- 
ipalities where  perpetual  franchises  have  been  un- 
wisely granted,  and  where  hoards  of  unearned 


58  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

wealth  are  being  appropriated  by  private  con- 
cerns or  individuals.  Advanced  municipalities 
now  grant  only  indeterminate  franchises  subject 
to  periodic  revaluation,  so  that  the  unearned  in- 
crement in  the  value  of  the  franchise  will  be 
secured  by  the  municipality.  The  aim  is  to  allow 
only  a  reasonable  return  to  the  investors.  The 
value  of  the  franchise  is  created  by  the  commu- 
nity; the  return,  over  and  above  the  reasonable 
rate  on  the  investment,  is  therefore  appropriated 
by  the  municipality.  New  York  City  has  out- 
standing franchises  of  this  sort  amounting  to 
some  half  a  billion  dollars,  with  reversion  at- 
tached thereto.  This  city  now  makes  terms  with 
street-railway  corporations. less  liberal  than  those 
that  Colombia  was  willing  to  accept. 

Only  a  person  ignorant  of  the  elementary  prin- 
ciples of  finance  as  related  to  franchises  can  fail 
to  see  that  Colombia's  suggestion  of  periodic 
revaluation  was  exactly  in  line  with  the  methods 
of  modern  cities.  The  United  States  was  en- 
titled to  a  reasonable  return  on  the  actual  invest- 
ment. Colombia  was  entitled  to  reasonable  com- 
pensation for  the  site  and  a  reasonable  annuity 
in  proportion  to  the  increasing  value  of  the  site. 
The  remainder  belonged  to  collective  civilization 
— the  actual  creator  of  the  surplus  value.     This 


The  Panama  Blackmail  Treaty  59 

was  the  arrangement  desired  by  Colombia,  a  solu- 
tion suggested  by  common  sense ;  our  solution  was 
that  of  the  shot-gun — ''Ratify  the  Hay-Herran 
treaty  or  you  will  regret  it."  In  other  words, 
Colombia  was  informed  that  if  she  did  not  accept 
dictated  terms,  our  Administration  would  take 
the  Canal  Zone. 

As  already  indicated,  advanced  municipalities 
grant  only  indeterminate  franchises  subject  to 
periodic  revaluation  so  that  the  unearned  incre- 
ment in  the  value  of  the  franchise  will  be  secured 
by  the  municipality.  According  to  the  Hay-Her- 
ran treaty,  the  increment  in  value  was  to  be  ap- 
propriated by  the  United  States  in  perpetuity. 
Even  Colombia's  sovereignty  was  to  be  impaired 
in  perpetuity  instead  of  only  until  she  had  ad- 
vanced to  stability  in  administration.  She  hesi- 
tated and  desired  time  to  think.  She  is  now 
reviled  for  having  thus  attempted  to  safeguard 
her  just  rights.  She  was  weak  and  so  her  sov- 
ereign rights  were  hurled  into  the  scrap-heap  by 
the  use  of  our  gunboats. 

There  seems  to  have  been  an  obstinate  and  un- 
reasoning belief  on  the  part  of  the  Roosevelt  Ad- 
ministration that  the  terms  offered  to  Colombia 
were  liberal — generous  to  a  fault.  These  it  at- 
tempted to  force  Colombia  to  accept.     They  were 


6o  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

not  liberal.  They  did  not  take  into  consideration 
the  possibilities  of  the  future.  They  ignored  the 
fact  that  our  municipal  franchises  granted  in  per- 
petuity in  the  past  now  plague  us  and  that  colossal 
sums  of  unearned  wealth  are  being  appropriated 
by  private  interests  because  of  these  unwise 
grants.  Colombia  was  attempting  to  safeguard 
her  permanent  interests  against  such  a  blunder 
as  a  perpetual  grant  without  periodic  revaluation 
to  determine  the  amount  of  the  annuity  to  be  paid 
for  the  said  grant. 

Clearly  the  stand  taken  by  our  Administration 
was  highly  improper.  Colombia's  attitude  was 
right — was  the  only  position  that  an  intelligent 
and  self-respecting  nation  could  take.  When  we 
view  the  matter  from  the  policy  pursued  by  ad- 
vanced municipalities  in  granting  franchises — 
the  emphasis  that  they  place  on  periodic  revalua- 
tion— we  are  driven  to  the  conclusion  that  the 
Roosevelt  Administration,  in  its  attempt  to  force 
Colombia  to  accept  terms  that  our  own  cities  have 
outlawed,  acted  as  a  refined  grafter. 

Territory,  which  belongs  to  future  generations 
as  well  as  to  the  present,  should  never  be  sur- 
rendered in  perpetuity  by  any  government,  for 
otherwise  the  dead  hand  of  the  past  will  control 
the  future,  which  should  be  left  free  and  be 


The  Panama  Blackmail  Treaty  6i 

allowed  to  make  its  own  arrangements.  It  ap- 
pears conclusive  that  long-period  revaluation  of 
the  concession  was  the  only  equitable  arrange- 
ment. This  Colombia  proposed  and  our  Govern- 
ment refused.  In  the  light  of  the  foregoing,  who 
can  reasonably  be  charged  with  having  attempted 
blackmail  ? 

Were  a  railroad  company  to  do  what  the  Roose- 
velt Administration  perpetrated  on  the  Isthmus, 
it  would  be  summoned  before  a  court  of  com- 
petent jurisdiction.  Such  a  court  would  disre- 
gard the  amount  paid  to  the  partner  in  crime  and 
would  direct  that  the  value  of  the  property  taken 
from  the  lawful  owner  be  paid  to  him  with  lawful 
interest.  This  is  the  way  in  which  our  brig- 
andage on  the  Isthmus  in  the  fall  of  1903  would 
have  been  settled  if  there  had  been  a  tribunal  with 
power  to  determine  and  enforce  justice  between 
sovereign  states. 

Ex-Minister  Du  Bois  (to  Colombia)  is  author- 
ity for  the  following  statement  : 

It  is  a  matter  of  record  that  Colombia  never  seriously 
intended  to  seize  the  French  company's  property,  and 
everybody  knows  that  Colombia  wanted  the  canal  dug 
and  wanted  the  United  States  to  dig  it,  and  had  urged 
it  for  fifty  years. 

Sovereignty  adequately  safeguarded,  and  such 


62  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

compensation  as  an  impartial  and  competent 
tribunal  would  determine,  constituted  the  modest 
demands  of  Colombia. 

The  charge  of  blackmail  is,  I  repeat,  an  un- 
pardonable slander,  trumped  up  for  the  purpose 
of  concealing  the  robbery  of  a  weak  nation  by  one 
possessing  the  necessary  brute  force.  The  com- 
pensation provided  for  in  the  Hay-Herran  treaty 
was  not  only  not  liberal  but  inadequate.  The 
whole  official  correspondence  shows  that  Colombia 
would  have  accepted  financial  terms  that  were 
less  than  reasonable,  and  that  she  would  have 
been  reasonable  on  the  question  of  sovereignty. 
The  meddling  of  the  Roosevelt  Administration  in 
the  affairs  of  Colombia  and  its  concessionary  com- 
panies was  as  improper  as  it  was  reprehensible, 
and  I  venture  to  add  that  it  will  always  have  a 
suspicious  look. 

One  might  ignore  Roosevelt's  utterances  on  the 
subject  if  it  were  not  for  the  fact  that  our  national 
honor  and  the  interests  of  a  sister  Republic  are 
involved.  Absurdity  reaches  its  climax  in  the 
following  excerpt  from  the  article  under  review : 

Our  people  should  also  remember  that  what  we  were 
paying  for  was  the  right  to  expend  our  own  money  and 
our  own  labor  to  do  a  piece  of  work  which  if  left  undone 
would  render  the  Isthmus  of  Panama  utterly  valueless. 


The  Panama  Blackmail  Treaty  63 

If  we  had  gone  to  Nicaragua,  or  had  undertaken  to  build 
a  canal  anywhere  else  across  the  Isthmus,  then  the  right 
which  Colombia  was  so  eager  to  sell  for  $10,000,000 
would  not  have  been  worth  ten  cents.  The  whole  value 
was  created  by  our  prospective  action;  and  this  action 
was  to  be  taken  wholly  at  our  own  expense  and  without 
making  Colombia  or  any  one  else  pay  a  dollar,  and  this 
although  no  power  would  benefit  more  by  the  canal  than 
Colombia,  as  it  would  give  her  waterway  communication 
by  a  short  and  almost  direct  route  between  her  Caribbean 
and  Pacific  ports. 

It  is  difficult  to  believe  that  Roosevelt  is  merely 
ignorant.  Would  that  it  were  so!  It  is  a  pity 
that  one  who  has  held  the  high  office  of  President 
of  the  United  States  should  use  the  prestige 
thereby  gained  to  foist  upon  the  public  statements 
which  are  absolutely  untrue.  We  will  give  here 
only  a  bird's-eye  view  of  the  actual  facts,  develop- 
ing them  in  great  detail  in  several  chapters  of 
another  work  entitled  "America  and  the  Canal 
Tolls.'' 

In  order  to  think  clearly  on  this  subject  we 
must  differentiate  between  the  canal  as  a  business 
enterprise  and  the  canal  as  an  annex  to  our  pro- 
tective system — military  and  naval.  All  outlays 
for  the  canal  as  a  business  enterprise  should  be 
made  a  liability  of  the  canal  and  be  amortized 
through  its  revenues.  Therefore,  if  the  United 
States  properly  manages  the  canal,  the  business 
end  of  it  will  ultimately  cost  nothing.     It  is  only 


64  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

a  matter  of  loaning  the  country's  credit  until  the 
entire  cost  can  be  amortized  through  charges  to 
revenue.  The  outlay  for  canal  fortifications  and 
other  means  of  protection  is  more  apparent  than 
actual  because  a  given  amount  of  protection  with 
the  canal  v^ill  cost  less  than  the  same  amount 
would  cost  without  the  canal. 

The  outlays  of  the  United  States  for  the  canal 
as  a  business  enterprise  are  not  of  the  nature  of 
an  expenditure,  but  are  an  investment  to  be  re- 
turned at  compound  interest.  The  actual  outlay 
of  the  United  States  consists  of  the  expenditures 
for  the  canal's  protection.  As  the  canal  will  in- 
crease the  efficiency  of  our  navy  and  therefore 
make  possible  a  less  expenditure  for  national  pro- 
tection than  would  otherwise  be  necessary,  it  fol- 
lows that  the  canal  is  not  a  charge  to  the  national 
treasury  if  business  principles  are  adopted  and 
maintained  in  its  management. 

As  already  stated,  the  United  States  will  have 
merely  loaned  its  credit  to  the  enterprise,  suffer- 
ing no  loss  if  she  manages  it  properly,  becoming, 
rather,  the  gainer  because  as  large  expenditures 
for  protection  as  would  have  had  to  be  incurred 
will  not  have  to  be  incurred  because  of  the  canal. 

Thus,  if  one  scrutinizes  the  financial  aspect, 
and  substitutes  the  actual  for  the  apparent,  he 


The  Panama  Blackmail  Treaty  65 

will  obtain  a  correct  view  of  the  relation  of  the 
United  States  Treasury  to  the  canal.  Colombia 
would  have  furnished  the  site ;  the  United  States 
would  have  furnished  the  business  ability  for  pay, 
and  have  loaned  its  credit.  Our  outlay  is  more 
apparent  than  actual. 

To  sum  up,  Roosevelt  beclouds  fundamental 
issues  when  he  discusses  the  benefits  that  were  to 
accrue  to  Colombia,  but  prefers  to  remain  dis- 
creetly silent  as  to  the  sacrifices  Colombia  was 
asked  to  make,  as  we  have  shown.  In  addition 
he  exaggerates  the  sacrifices  that  the  United 
States  has  made.  His  statements  as  to  the  finan- 
cial aspects  of  the  negotiations  are  grotesque, 
failing  even  to  attain  the  dignity  of  half-truths. 
Colombia  merely  insisted  on  the  right  to  control 
her  own  actions  and  her  own  possessions,  subject 
only  to  the  equal  right  of  every  other  nation  to 
do  the  same;  the  United  States  sought  to  coerce 
her  into  granting  a  concession  of  her  most  valu- 
able possession  without  adequately  safeguarding 
her  permanent  interests. 

Even  though  the  United  States  had  proceeded 
with  the  construction  of  the  canal  by  the  Nica- 
ragua route,  the  concessionary  interest  of  Colom- 
bia in  the  railroad  would  have  remained  valuable. 
In  addition  to  this  her  reversionary  interest  in  it 


66  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

would  have  had  an  increasing  actuarial  value. 
The  route  would  have  continued  to  have  value  as 
that  of  a  potential  canal.  The  United  States  is 
willing  to  pay  a  price  for  all  available  canal  routes, 
as  the  pending  treaty  with  Nicaragua  shows,  and 
as  the  effort  to  secure  a  concession  on  the  Atrato 
route  proves.  Therefore  the  statement  that  the 
Panama  route  would  not  have  been  worth  ten 
cents  had  the  United  States  constructed  the  canal 
elsewhere  is  merely  picturesque. 

Colombia  could  have  voided  the  Treaty  of  1846 
and  then  in  the  course  of  time,  after  a  marked 
development,  have  disposed  of  the  route  to  a 
European  country.  The  United  States  could  not 
have  objected  with  good  grace  after  refusing  to 
pay  for  the  concession  the  price  determined  by  an 
arbitral  tribunal. 

Calling  attention  again  to  the  statements  of 
the  foregoing  excerpt,  we  will  ask  which  is  the 
more  important — the  canal  site  or  the  capital  used 
in  the  construction  of  the  canal  ?  Capital,  always 
subject  to  depreciation  and  obsolescence,  must  be 
renewed  through  charges  to  revenue.  The 
amount  invested  can  be  amortized  through  rev- 
enue. The  site  is  a  permanent  ensemble  of  values, 
the  amount  of  which  will  fluctuate  with  the  ebb 
and  flow  of  commercial  progress.     As  the  site 


The  Panama  Blackmail  Treaty  6y 

did  not  belong  to  the  United  States,  it  did  not 
have  the  right  to  determine  the  price.  To  fix  the 
price  belonged  to  the  owner,  who,  however, 
magnanimously  offered  to  leave  it  to  the  arbitra- 
ment of  a  neutral  third  party. 

Roosevelt's  argument  that  our  large  invest- 
ment there  alone  made  the  site  valuable  is  alto- 
gether unwarranted.  The  site  made  the  invest- 
ment possible  and  therefore  had  coordinate  im- 
portance with  the  capital  invested.  Our  former 
President  may  know  which  blade  of  a  pair  of 
scissors  is  the  more  important,  but  those  of  us 
who  are  not  equally  gifted  can  only  feel  that 
the  two  blades  are  of  coordinate  importance. 

We  prohibited  European  countries  from  co- 
operating in  the  construction  of  the  canal  by  the 
Panama  route,  thus  obligating  ourselves  to  join 
Colombia  in  submitting  the  question  of  the  com- 
pensation to  be  paid  for  the  concession  to  an  im- 
partial tribunal  if  it  could  not  be  arranged  by 
mutual  agreement.  This  our  Administration  re- 
fused to  do.  We  actually  barred  cooperation  by 
France  in  the  construction  of  the  Panama  Canal 
and  insisted  on  sale  of  the  route  to  us  on  terms 
dictated  by  us.  We  refused  to  acquiesce  in  the 
terms  proposed  by  Colombia,  though  they  seem 
reasonable  when  intelligently  scrutinized.     What 


68  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

is  our  attempt  to  force  our  own  terms  upon 
Colombia  but  an  unconscious  attempt  at  black- 
mail? 

Not  unlike  the  cry  of  "Stop  thief !"  on  the  part 
of  the  actual  culprit  who  seeks  to  divert  attention 
is  the  charge  of  blackmail  in  this  connection.  Re- 
sisting the  encroachment  of  the  United  States, 
Colombia  sought  to  preserve  her  sovereignty  over 
the  Isthmus,  thus  standing  for  the  maintenance 
of  international  law  and  adherence  to  the  funda- 
mental principles  of  justice.  The  United  States 
acted  as  the  Captain  Kidd  of  civilization.  Colom- 
bia sought  to  safeguard  her  rights  on  the  Isthmus 
and  requested  that  our  Administration  join  her 
in  submitting  compensation  for  leasehold  rights 
to  the  Canal  Zone  to  arbitration. 

The  solution  of  our  Government  was,  however, 
that  of  the  shot-gun — gunboats  in  Isthmian 
waters,  Colombia  was  telegraphed:  "Ratify 
the  treaty  [Hay-Herran]  or  you  will  regret  it." 
In  other  words,  Colombia  was  informed  that  if 
she  did  not  accept  the  terms  dictated  by  the 
Roosevelt  Administration,  the  latter  would  take 
the  Canal  Zone.  It  was  taken.  The  book  now 
in  the  hands  of  the  reader  tells,  in  unvarnished 
English,  the  story  of  how  '7  [Roosevelt]  took  the 
Canal  Zone," 


The  Panama  Blackmail  Treaty  69 

The  financial  terms  pressed  upon  Colombia 
were  unscientific.  Determination  by  an  impartial 
tribunal  of  the  amount  to  be  paid  her  was  refused. 
The  political  terms  insisted  upon  were  humihat- 
ing.  And  these  terms  were  to  be  in  perpetuity, 
and  not  subject  to  periodic  reconsideration  with 
provision  for  arbitration  if  not  mutually  arranged. 
The  critical  student  of  institutions  finds  nothing 
in  the  conduct  of  the  Roosevelt  Administration 
to  commend;  rather  does  he  find  much  to  con- 
demn. Under  a  veneer  of  respectability,  it 
secured  title  to  the  Canal  Zone,  sandbagging 
Colombia  and  despoiling  her  of  her  choicest  pos- 
session. 

Is  Colombia  entitled  at  the  present  time  to  com- 
pensation for  the  group  of  values  that  we  have 
enumerated?  We  will  let  Roosevelt  furnish  the 
key  with  which  to  answer  this  question.  In  a 
speech  delivered  at  the  University  of  California 
on  March  2^,  191 1,  he  said: 

I  am  interested  in  the  Panama  Canal  because  I  started 
it.  If  I  had  followed  traditional  conservative  methods 
I  should  have  submitted  a  dignified  state  paper  of  prob- 
ably 200  pages  to  the  Congress,  and  the  debate  would 
have  been  going  on  yet.  But  I  took  the  Canal  Zone, 
and  let  Congress  debate,  and  while  the  debate  goes  on 
the  Canal  does  also. 

'7  took  the  Canal  ZoneT    This  is  the  key; 


70  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

argument  is  unnecessary;  the  political  crime  is 
admitted,  leaving  nothing  to  arbitrate,  leaving 
only  damages  to  be  assessed.  They  should  be 
assessed  by  an  impartial  tribunal.  By  paying 
the  amount  determined  in  this  way  the  United 
States  can  restore  her  honor,  refusing  to  be 
satisfied  with  paying  less  than  the  amount  prop- 
erly determined.  Colombia  ought  not  to  be 
compelled  to  accept  less.  This  is  the  repara- 
tion that  a  man  of  high  character  would  make 
to  another  whom  he  had  injured.  Colombia 
is  powerless.  She  cannot  exact  justice.  Our 
adjustment  of  this  matter  is  the  measure  of  our 
national  character.     It  pays  to  be  just. 

By  way  of  closing  our  argument  on  the  charge 
of  blackmail,  we  commend  to  Roosevelt's  prayer- 
ful attention  the  following  excerpt  taken  from 
Shakespeare : 

Who  steals  my  purse  steals  trash ;  'tis  something,  nothing ; 
Twas  mine,  'tis  his,  and  has  been  slave  to  thousands; 
But  he  that  filches  from  me  my  good  name 
Robs  me  of  that  which  not  enriches  him 
And  makes  me  poor  indeed. 

The  Panama  route  was  merely  an  alternative 
one.  Roosevelt  discusses  the  provisions  in  the 
Spooner  law  which  directed  him  to  construct  the 
canal  by  the  Nicaragua  route  if  he  could  not 


The  Panama  Blackmail  Treaty  71 

secure  satisfactory  title  for  the  one  at  Panama. 
He  says : 

I  was  directed  to  take  the  Nicaragua  route,  but  only 
if  within  a  reasonable  time  I  could  not  obtain  control  of 
the  necessary  territory  of  the  Republic  of  Colombia  upon 
reasonable  terms;  the  direction  being  explicit  that  if  I 
could  not  thus  get  the  control  within  a  reasonable  time 
and  upon  reasonable  terms  I  must  go  to  Nicaragua. 
Colombia  showed  by  its  actions  that  it  was  thoroughly 
acquainted  with  this  fact,  and  eagerly  demanded  and 
entered  into  a  treaty  with  the  United  States,  the  Hay- 
Herran  treaty,  under  which  $10,000,000  was  the  price 
stipulated  to  be  paid  in  exchange  for  our  acquiring  the 
right  to  the  zone  on  which  to  build  the  canal. 

Are  the  facts  concerning  the  agreement  of  the 
representatives  of  the  two  countries  on  the  Hay- 
Herran  treaty  correctly  stated  by  Roosevelt? 
What  does  the  letter  of  Secretary  Hay  to  the 
charge  d'affaires  Herran  of  the  Colombian  Lega- 
tion indicate?  This  letter  is  dated  January  22, 
1903?  and  reads: 

I  am  commanded  by  the  President  to  say  to  you  that 
the  reasonable  time  that  the  statute  accords  for  the  con- 
clusion of  negotiations  with  Colombia  for  the  excavation 
of  a  canal  on  the  Isthmus  has  expired,  and  he  has  author- 
ized me  to  sign  with  you  the  treaty  of  which  I  had  the 
honor  to  give  you  a  draft,  with  the  modification  that  the 
sum  of  $100,000,  fixed  therein  as  the  annual  payment, 
be  increased  to  $250,000.  I  am  not  authorized  to  con- 
sider or  discuss  any  other  change. 

Was  it  the  United  States,  or  was  it  Colombia 


72  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

who  entered  eagerly  into  the  agreement  known 
as  the  Hay-Herran  treaty  ?  All  has  not  yet  been 
said.  The  New  York  World  is  authority  for  the 
statement  that  Cromwell,  representative  of  those 
interested  in  the  canal  company,  called  on  Herran 
the  same  day  that  he  received  the  foregoing  note 
and  informed  him  that  if  he  did  not  accept  the 
terms  offered  by  the  United  States,  Colombia 
would  lose  everything,  as  the  United  States  had 
decided  to  proceed  with  the  construction  of  the 
canal  by  the  Nicaragua  route.  How  did  Crom- 
well know  ?  Who  told  Cromwell  of  the  ultima- 
tum ?  Again,  how  did  he  know  the  day,  yea,  and 
the  hour,  that  the  ultimatum  was  dispatched? 
Can  it  be  that  financial  buccaneers  and  our  De- 
partment of  State  were  in  collusion  to  dragoon 
the  representative  of  Colombia  into  signing  an 
unsatisfactory  treaty  ? 

Cromwell  and  Herran  called  at  Secretary 
Hay's  private  residence  that  evening  and  there 
signed  the  Hay-Herran  treaty.  Three  days  later 
Dr.  Herran  received  this  telegram  from  his  Gov- 
ernment : 

Do  not  sign  canal  treaty.  You  will  receive  instruc- 
tions in  letter  of  to-day. 

The  writer  adopts  the  following  comment  of 
the  New  York  World  as  his  own : 


The  Panama  Blackmail  Treaty  73 

The  Colombian  Government  never  in  any  way,  shape 
or  form  approved  the  Hay-Herran  treaty.  It  maintained 
the  position  it  had  taken  from  the  first  that  the  canal  and 
railroad  companies  would  have  to  pay  Colombia  for  the 
right  to  transfer  their  concessions  to  the  United  States. 

Through  the  omnipresent  Cromwell  it  had  been 
ascertained  by  our  Government  that  the  acting 
Minister  of  Colombia  had  instructions  from  his 
Government  to  sign  the  projected  canal  treaty  if 
it  was  accompanied  by  an  ultimatum.  The  Hay- 
Herran  treaty  was  signed  by  Dr.  Herran  with 
the  reservation  that  it  would  be  submitted  to  the 
Colombian  Congress  for  its  untrammeled  action. 
Our  Government  knew  that  the  instrument  when 
signed  was  imsatisfactory  to  the  Colombian  Gov- 
ernment and  that  it  would  not  be  ratified  by  the 
Colombian  Congress  without  pressure,  if  at  all. 

Roosevelt  tells  us  that  as  early  as  August,  1903, 
he  commenced  to  consider  what  course  to  advise 
the  Congress  to  pursue  in  view  of  the  fact  that 
ratification  of  the  Hay-Herran  treaty  seemed  then 
improbable.  He  felt  that  several  situations  might 
develop.  They  are  stated  in  his  message  of  Jan- 
uary 4,  1904.  The  portion  of  his  statement  that 
proves  duplicity  reads : 

One  was  that  Colombia  would  at  the  last  moment  see 
the  unwisdom  of  her  position.  That  there  might  be  noth- 
ing omitted.   Secretary  Hay,  through  the   Minister  at 


74  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

Bogota,  repeatedly  warned  Colombia  that  grave  conse- 
quences might  follow  from  her  rejection  of  the  treaty.  .  .  . 
A  second  alternative  was  that  by  the  close  of  the  session 
on  the  last  day  of  October,  without  the  ratification  of  the 
treaty  by  Colombia  and  without  any  steps  taken  by 
Panama,  the  American  Congress  on  assembling  early  in 
December  would  be  confronted  with  a  situation  in  which 
there  had  been  a  failure  to  come  to  terms  as  to  building 
the  canal  along  the  Panama  route,  and  yet  there  had  not 
been  a  lapse  of  a  reasonable  time — using  the  word  reason- 
able in  any  proper  sense. 

In  January,  1903,  the  reasonable  time  had  ex- 
pired, and  so  Dr.  Herran  had  to  be  overawed  and 
had  to  be  induced  to  sign  a  treaty  without  first 
consulting  his  Government.  Seven  months  later 
the  reasonable  time  had  not  yet  elapsed  and  would 
not  elapse  until  the  Congress  had  been  consulted. 
And  this  slippery  method  of  securing  the  signa- 
ture of  Herran  to  the  Hay-Herran  treaty  we  are 
solemnly  assured  was  in  harmony  with  all  the  ac- 
cepted canons  of  ethics ! 

Roosevelt  feels  indignant  that  his  actions  which 
eventuated  in  our  securing  the  Canal  Zone  should 
be  condemned.  He  gives  voice  to  his  feelings  in 
the  following: 

There  are  in  every  great  country  a  few  men  whose 
mental  or  moral  make-up  is  such  that  they  always  try  to 
smirch  their  own  people,  and  sometimes  go  to  the  length 
of  moral  treason  in  the  effort  to  discredit  their  own 


The  Panama  Blackmail  Treaty  75 

national  government.  A  campaign  of  mendacity  was 
started  against  this  treaty  from  the  outset  by  certain 
pubHc  men  and  certain  newspapers.  One  of  the  favorite 
assertions  of  these  men  and  newspapers  was  that  the 
United  States  Government  had  in  some  way  or  other  in- 
stigated, and  through  its  agents  been  privy  to,  the  revolu- 
tionary movement  on  the  Isthmus.  The  statement  is  a 
deHberate  falsehood,  and  every  man  who  makes  it  knows 
that  it  is  a  falsehood.  .  .  . 

Even  had,  I  desired  to  foment  a  revolution — which  I 
did  not — it  would  have  been  wholly  unnecessary  for  me 
to  do  so.  The  Isthmus  was  seething  with  revolution. 
Any  interference  from  me  would  have  had  to  take  the 
shape  of  preventing  a  revolution,  not  of  creating  one. 
All  the  people  residing  on  the  Isthmus  ardently  desired 
the  revolution.  The  citizens  of  Panama  desired  it. 
Every  municipal  council,  every  governmental  body  the 
citizens  themselves  could  elect  or  control,  demanded  and 
supported  it. 

Not  only  does  Roosevelt  obstruct  the  restora- 
tion of  national  honor  by  opposing  the  making 
of  reparation  to  Colombia,  but  he  prevents  the 
truth  about  the  method  employed  to  secure  the 
Canal  Zone  from  becoming  known.  Therefore, 
criticism  of  him  persists.  It  will  persist  until  our 
national  honor  has  been  taken  out  of  pawn  in 
which  he  placed  it  when  he  "took"  the  Canal  Zone 
by  force. 

In  another  chapter  we  will  show  that  no  revo- 
lution on  the  Isthmus  was  projected  or  eventu- 
ated. The  Province  of  Panama  merely  estab- 
lished a  government  independent  of  that  of  Co- 


76  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

lombia  after  the  details  had  been  arranged.  Our 
Administration  used  the  navy  to  prevent  Colom- 
bia from  exercising  the  right  of  sovereignty  in 
this  Province  after  its  Declaration  of  Inde- 
pendence, and  interfered  with  its  exercise  before 
that  date. 

Let  there  be  no  misunderstanding.  There  v^as 
no  revolution  on  the  Isthmus  in  the  fall  of  1903. 
No  revolution  was  projected  and  none  eventu- 
ated. The  Province  of  Panama  seceded  from 
Colombia  after  assurance  from  our  Administra- 
tion that  it  would  protect  secession  within  forty- 
eight  hours  after  the  Declaration  of  Independ- 
ence. This  protection  was  extended  earlier  than 
agreed  to — on  November  3-5,  1903.  Colombia 
was  overawed  by  the  display  of  overwhelming 
force.  The  so-called  Republic  of  Panama  was 
organized  as  a  protectorate  of  the  United  States 
under  a  pretense  at  revolution.  Pretense  at 
revolution,  as  that  term  is  understood  in  history, 
is  not  revolution.  It  is  the  rape  of  a  weak  nation 
by  a  stronger  one.  It  is  international  burglary 
under  a  veneer  of  respectability. 

The  Isthmus  did  not  seethe  with  revolution. 
No  real  revolution  had  even  been  contemplated. 
Du  Bois,  our  Ex-Minister  to  Colombia,  states: 

I  say,  and  can  prove  it,  .that  a  handful  of  men,  who 


The  Panama  Blackmail  Treaty  yy 

were  to  be  the  direct  beneficiaries  of  the  revolution,  con- 
ceived it,  and  not  the  hundredth  part  of  the  inhabitants 
of  the  Isthmus  knew  of  the  revolt  until  an  American 
officer,  in  the  uniform  of  the  United  States  army,  raised 
the  flag  of  the  new  republic. 

An  excerpt  from  an  American  newspaper  pub- 
lished in  Colon  throws  light  on  the  subject.  It 
effectually  disposes  of  Roosevelt's :  "The  Isthmus 
was  seething  with  revolution."  It  reads  as  fol- 
lows: 

When  the  inhabitants  awoke  in  the  morning  [Novem- 
ber 4,  1903]  after  a  night  of  undisturbed  slumber,  they 
little  dreamt  that  their  tranquillity  would  be  disturbed  ere 
the  setting  of  the  sun.  But  it  is  the  unexpected  that 
often  occurs.  It  was  so  in  the  present  case.  With  the 
assurance  of  peace  in  the  country  there  was  nothing 
known  yesterday  to  the  public  of  Colon  to  have  aroused 
any  misapprehension.  But  the  disquieting  news  which 
had  been  flashed  across  the  wire  from  Panama  had  leaked 
out,  and  in  a  very  short  time  it  had  spread  throughout 
the  whole  town.  The  news  was  to  the  effect  that  Panama 
had  declared  its  independence  on  the  afternoon  of  the 
3d  instant.  To  one  and  all  the  news  came  like  a  bolt 
from  a  clear  sky.  No  one  cared  to  talk  or  express  an 
opinion.     Such  was  the  gravity  of  the  situation. 

This  newspaper  clipping  is  taken  from  a  speech 
delivered  in  the  Senate  by  the  late  Senator  Car- 
mack.  His  comment  in  connection  therewith  siz- 
zles with  irony,  an  excerpt  from  which  follows : 

That  was  the  condition  of  the  people  who  were  rising 
there  with  unexampled  unanimity,  rising  as  one  man 


78  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

against  the  terrible  tyranny  of  Colombia.  The  news  that 
they  were  conducting  a  revolution  came  to  that  people 
like  a  bolt  from  a  clear  sky.  No  inhabitant  dared  to 
express  an  opinion  about  the  revolution.  They  rose  as 
one  man  .  .  .  but  the  one  man  was  in  the  White  House. 

Evidence  of  this  character  should  be  cumula- 
tive. Elsewhere  we  will  give  data  which  match 
so  perfectly  with  those  given  here  that  the  con- 
clusion is  irresistible.  We  will  close  this  line  of 
evidence  with  the  following  clipping  from  the 
New  York  Tribune,  dated  December  28,  1903: 

The  secessionist  movement  began  with  three  men,  and 
was  executed  under  the  supervision  of  those  three  and 
four  others,  the  seven  working  under  the  advice  and 
counsel  of  four  Americans.  Before  the  coup  d'etat  others 
were,  perforce,  taken  into  the  secret ;  but  so  closely  were 
the  plans  guarded  that  those  who  were  really  in  the 
secret  and  knew  definitely  the  details  might  be  counted 
on  the  fingers  of  the  two  hands.  This  brings  us  to  the 
revolution  itself,  and  introduces  the  strongest  of  all  con- 
tradictions discoverable  in  connection  with  the  birth  of 
this  national  infant.  The  uprising  took  place  on  the  3d 
day  of  November,  being  initiated  by  the  arrest  of  Gen- 
erals Tovar  and  Amaya  and  Governor  Obaldia,  which 
took  place  in  the  City  of  Panama.  That  city  knew,  of 
course,  what  had  occurred  the  moment  the  arrests  were 
effected,  but  Colon  was  kept  in  ignorance  of  the  secession 
until  the  following  day.  It  was  on  the  4th  of  the  month 
that  the  public  meeting  was  held  in  the  cathedral  plaza, 
Panama,  the  independence  of  the  Republic  proclaimed, 
and  the  declaration  of  independence,  or  manifestation, 
as  they  call  it  here,  was  signed. 

Bearing  in  mind  the  fact  that  seven  men,  aided  by  the 
soldiers  and  others  whose  support  to  the  movement  had 


The  Panama  Blackmail  Treaty  79 

been  purchased  with  dollars,  were  alone  responsible  for 
the  sudden  revolution  in  the  political  status  of  Panama, 
one  may  wander  away  down  a  stretch  of  not  uninterest- 
ing inquiries.  Were  the  people  of  other  provinces  con- 
sulted as  to  what  it  was  proposed  by  the  secessionists  to 
do?  They  were  not.  Were  the  people,  speaking  in  gen- 
eral terms,  of  the  Provinces  of  Colon  and  Panama  let  into 
the  secret?  They  were  not.  They  knew,  by  general 
rumor,  that  a  revolution  was  on  the  tapis,  but  they  had 
not  been  consulted  nor  their  advice  asked  as  to  the  wisdom 
or  unwisdom  of  what  was  contemplated.  Was  a  pro- 
visional Congress  composed  of  delegates  from  the  several 
provinces  held  for  the  purpose  of  debating  the  project 
and  framing  a  bill  of  separation?  Nothing  of  the  kind 
was  ever  thought  of.  .  .  . 

The  little  band  of  secessionists  let  the  members  of  the 
city  council  of  Panama  into  their  secret  late  in  October, 
when  it  became  evident  that  a  blow  would  have  to  be 
struck  very  soon  or  be  forever  withheld.  These  city 
councilmen — eleven  in  number — were  willing  to  further 
the  project,  so  that  when  the  public  meeting  was  held  in 
the  Cathedral  plaza,  Panama,  on  November  4,  they  were 
all  in  attendance.  They,  too,  were  the  first  to  sign  the 
declaration  of  independence,  and  immediately  after  that 
formality  they  adjourned  across  the  street  to  the  munici- 
pal building  and  went  into  session  behind  closed  doors. 
Their  first  act  then  was  to  pass  the  declaration,  which 
had  already  been  engrossed  in  a  book  of  record,  and  to 
append  their  names  to  the  engrossed  copy.  This  done, 
the  city  council  appointed  the  three  members  of  the  pro- 
visional governing  junta,  authorizing  them  to  take  charge 
of  the  affairs  of  the  new  Republic.  The  junta  assembled 
at  once  and  named  the  members  of  the  provisional  cabinet, 
and  the  new  Republic  became  a  fact.  On  the  same  day 
Porfirio  Melendez  had  taken  charge  of  affairs  at  Colon 
as  provisional  governor  appointed  by  the  junta ;  but  out- 
side of  the  Cities  of  Panama  and  Colon  and  along  the 
line  of  the  Panama  Railroad  the  people  of  the  new  Re- 


8o  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

public  were  in  entire  ignorance  of  the  fact  that  they  were 
no  longer  subjects  of  Colombia. 

It  seems  almost  incredible  that  the  municipal  council 
of  a  city  of  fewer  than  25,000  people  should  take  unto 
themselves  the  right  to  create  a  Republic  out  of  a  terri- 
tory equal  in  area  to  the  State  of  Indiana  [population 
300,000]  ;  but  that  was  what  was  actually  done  in  this 
case.  Instead  of  a  provisional  congress,  the  city  council 
of  Panama  passed  the  act  of  independence.  Every  legis- 
lative formality  incident  to  the  creation  of  this  Republic 
was  performed  by  these  city  councilmen,  no  portion  of 
the  new  Republic,  except  the  City  of  Panama,  having  a 
voice,  by  representation,  in  what  was  done.  Nor  has 
any  other  portion  of  the  new  Republic  had  such  a  voice 
to  this  day.  No  congress  had  been  called  to  ratify  the 
secession,  nor  has  any  one  of  the  seven  provinces  been 
requested  to  assemble,  in  council  or  by  mass-meeting,  to 
pass  an  act  of  ratification.  .  .  . 

Immediately  after  the  creation  of  the  Republic  and  the 
appointment  of  the  junta  by  the  city  council  of  Panama, 
the  junta  took  steps  to  this  end.  Emissaries  were  sent 
into  the  different  provinces  to  proclaim  the  establishment 
of  the  Republic.  These  emissaries  were  effective  orators 
— as  are  nearly  all  the  people  of  these  southern  countries. 
They  toured  along  both  coasts,  east  and  west,  and  stopped 
at  the  principal  cities.  .  .  . 

In  each  of  these  cities  the  emissary  would,  upon  his 
arrival,  employ  the  local  band  of  musicians.  Taking  a 
stand  in  the  principal  plaza  he  would  draw  the  crowd  by 
the  band's  efforts,  and  when  a  number  sufficient  for  his 
purposes  had  assembled,  he  would  read  the  declaration 
of  independence.  Following  the  reading  would  come  his 
harangue,  the  burden  of  which  was  that  the  establishment 
of  the  Republic  meant  the  construction  of  the  ship  canal 
by  the  United  States  across  the  Isthmus,  and  that  the 
construction  of  this  canal  meant  that  the  United  States 
would  have  to  pay  to  the  Republic  a  sum  of  money  suffi- 
cient to  make  all  of  the  people  rich  and  prosperous.  .  .  . 


The  Panama  Blackmail  Treaty  8i 

He  never  failed  to  elicit  enthusiastic  responses  in  ap- 
proval of  what  had  been  done.  The  business  of  the 
emissary  was  then  to  report  to  the  junta  that  the  people 
of  that  city  accepted  the  Republic  and  gloried  in  its  crea- 
tion. 

And  all  the  people  resident  on  the  Isthmus  ar- 
dently desired  the  revolution!  We  are  not  told 
that  all  included  merely  all  of  an  inner  circle  in 
Panama  and  a  fringe  of  adventurers.  Had  not 
our  Administration  collaborated  with  that  inner 
circle  through  Bunau-Varilla  as  intermediary 
there  would  be  no  Republic  of  Panama  to-day. 

We  now  take  up  arguments  of  the  article  re- 
ferred to  in  the  title  to  this  chapter  which  are  not 
directly  apropos  to  the  main  theme  of  this  book, 
but  which  are  here  discussed  in  order  to  show 
more  fully  that  the  public  statements  of  Roose- 
velt concerning  the  acquisition  of  the  Canal  Zone 
must  be  discounted. 

Seeking  means  to  discredit  the  Wilson  Admin- 
istration, Roosevelt  takes  up,  in  this  article,  its 
policy  on  the  canal  tolls.  The  excerpt  which  fol- 
lows is  representative  of  his  inaccurate  and  mis- 
leading statements : 

The  Administration  has  succeeded  in  getting  Congress 
to  take  the  position  that  the  United  States  has  no  special 
rights  in  its  own  canal.     It  now  proposes  by  treaty  to  get 


82  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

Congress  to  give  to  the  one  nation  which  conspicuously 
wronged  us  in  connection  with  that  canal  special  rights 
which  it  would  deny  to  ourselves  and  to  all  other  countries. 
President  Wilson  denies  that  we  have  the  right  to  ex- 
empt our  own  vessels  engaged  in  peaceful  coast  commerce 
from  tolls,  and  yet  he  now  proposes  to  exempt  from  tolls 
the  war  vessels  and  transports  of  Colombia.  A  year  ago 
I  should  have  deemed  it  impossible  that  two  such  proposi- 
tions could  have  been  entertained  by  the  same  Administra- 
tion. 

Had  the  writer  been  told  a  year  ago  that  our 
foremost  private  citizen  was  knowingly  a  pur- 
veyor of  incorrect  information  he  would  have 
spurned  the  suggestion.  But  analysis  of  the 
foregoing  excerpt  and  of  excerpts  from  the  same 
source  which  follow,  together  with  comparison 
of  them  with  the  correct  information,  establish 
the  fact.  The  writer  is  aware  that  Roosevelt  has 
a  wider  range  of  superficial  information  than  any 
other  man  in  the  public  eye,  yet  he  is  constrained 
to  believe  that  even  Roosevelt  knows  the  differ- 
ence between  a  public  vessel  (vessel  of  war)  and 
a  vessel  engaged  in  coastwise  trade  (vessel  of 
commerce).  The  foregoing  statement  is  plainly 
intended  to  mislead.  If  it  were  not,  the  compari- 
son would  have  been  made  between  the  public 
vessels  of  Colombia  and  the  public  vessels  of  the 
United  States ;  between  the  vessels  of  citizens  of 
Colombia  engaged  in  the  coastwise  trade  and  the 


The  Panama  Blackmail  Treaty  83 

vessels  of  citizens  of  the  United  States  similarly 
engaged.  The  Wilson  Administration  merely 
proposes  to  give  to  Colombia  the  same  rights  in 
the  use  of  the  Canal  for  her  public  vessels  that 
the  United  States  possesses.  If  the  pending 
treaty  with  Colombia  is  ratified,  the  coastwise 
trade  of  Panama,  Colombia  and  the  United  States 
using  the  Canal  will  be  subject  to  tolls,  while 
their  public  vessels  will  be  exempt.  The  United 
States  is  the  only  country  that  has  any  special 
rights  in  the  use  of  the  Canal.  That  is,  in  the 
event  of  war,  she  can  shut  out  the  enemy  and  use 
the  canal  in  her  military  operations. 

Rooseveh  quotes  the  following  from  the  pend- 
ing treaty  with  Colombia : 

The  Republic  of  Colombia  shall  be  at  liberty  at  all  times 
to  transport  through  the  interoceanic  canal  its  troops, 
materials  of  war,  and  ships  of  war,  even  in  case  of  war 
between  Colombia  and  another  country,  without  paying 
any  charges  to  the  United  States. 

This  provision  has  the  same  meaning  and  is 
the  same  in  purpose  as  the  one  in  the  treaty 
drafted  during  the  Roosevelt  Administration.  It 
grants  no  privileges  whatsoever  to  the  vessels 
of  commerce  owned  by  citizens  of  Colombia  en- 
gaged in  coastwise  trade.  There  has  been  no 
change  whatsoever  in  the  right  of  the  United 
States  to  pass  its  public  vessels  through  the  canal 


84  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

without   charge.     Yet   Roosevelt   comments   on 
this  provision  in  the  treaty  as  follows : 

To  grant  such  a  right  to  both  Colombia  and  Panama 
was  permissible  so  long  as  we  also  insisted  on  exercising 
it  ourselves,  on  the  grounds  set  forth  by  the  then  Secre- 
tary of  State,  Mr.  Root,  in  his  note  to  the  British  Govern- 
ment of  January  16,  1909.  In  this  note  Secretary  Root 
took  the  ground  that  the  United  States  had  the  right  to 
except  from  "coming  within  any  schedule  of  tolls  which 
might  thereafter  be  established"  the  ships  of  the  powers 
entering  into  the  agreement  necessary  in  order  to  give 
title  to  the  land  through  which  the  canal  was  to  be  built, 
and  to  authorize  its  construction  and  the  necessary  juris- 
diction or  control  over  it  when  built.  These  nations  were 
Panama,  Colombia  and  the  United  States.  Since  then 
the  present  Administration  has  surrendered  the  right  so 
far  as  the  United  States  is  concerned;  and  yet  it  pro- 
poses to  give  to  the  most  envenomed  opponent  of  the 
building  of  the  canal  rights  to  its  use  which  are  denied 
to  the  power  giving  the  rights.  In  other  words,  the  Ad- 
ministration says  that  our  people  who  built  the  canal 
can  give  to  others  rights  which  they  dare  not  themselves 
exercise.     Such  a  position  is  a  wicked  absurdity. 

The  foregoing  statement  is  a  distortion  of  the 
truth.  It  is  so  unutterably  false  that  it  staggers 
belief.  In  the  note  of  Secretary  Root,  mentioned 
by  Roosevelt,  it  is  stated : 

The  United  States  has  found  it  necessary  to  renew 
the  reservation  of  the  specific  right  of  Colombia  to  send 
its  warships  through  the  canal  without  the  payment  of 
dues,  which  has  been  insisted  upon  by  that  country  in 
every  concession  and  treaty  she  has  made  regarding 
It*  •  •  • 


The  Panama  Blackmail  Treaty  85 

In  agreeing  to  accord  to  Colombia  this  reservation, 
the  United  States  is  not  deaHng  with  the  general  subject 
of  canal  tolls.  It  is  treating  Colombia,  for  the  reasons 
which  I  have  described,  as  being  in  a  wholly  exceptional 
position,  not  subject  to  the  rule  of  equality  of  the  Hay- 
Pauncefote  treaty  and  not  to  come  within  any  schedule 
of  tolls  which  may  hereafter  be  established,  which  must, 
of  course,  under  the  treaty,  be  equal  for  all  nations  to 
whom  the  rule  of  equality  is  properly  applicable. 

The  Root  note  and  the  treaty  drafted  in  con- 
formity therewith  merely  designed  to  exclude  the 
pubHc  vessels  of  Colombia  from  coming  within 
any  schedule  of  tolls  which  might  hereafter  be  es- 
tablished. The  public  vessels  of  Panama  were  al- 
ready excluded  by  treaty.  Those  of  the  United 
States  were  excluded  because  they  are  engaged  in 
maintenance  and  protection.  It  is  thus  clear  that 
the  Roosevelt  Administration  proposed  to  do  just 
what  the  Wilson  Administration  proposes  to  do, 
that  is,  grant  free  transit  to  the  public  vessels  of 
Colombia  in  the  use  of  the  canal. 

The  foregoing  excerpt  from  the  Root  note  can 
only  be  fully  understood  when  examined  in  con- 
nection with  the  subject  matter  to  which  it  refers. 
This  subject  matter  was  the  following  paragraph 
from  the  draft  of  a  treaty  then  negotiated  with 
Colombia  but  not  ratified: 

The  Republic  of  Colombia  shall  have  liberty  at  all  times 
to  convey  through  the  ship  canal  now  in  course  of  con- 


86  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

struction  by  the  United  States  across  the  Isthmus  of 
Panama  the  troops,  materials  for  war,  and  ships  of  war 
of  the  RepubHc  of  Colombia,  without  paying  any  duty 
to  the  United  States,  even  in  the  case  of  an  international 
war  between  Colombia  and  another  country. 

The  reply  to  the  Root  note  by  the  British  Gov- 
ernment shows  conclusively  that  only  the  public 
vessels  of  Colombia  were  under  consideration, 
and  that  Roosevelt's  distinguished  Secretary  of 
State  did  not  intend  to  include  in  the  contem- 
plated exemption  any  vessels  of  commerce.  In 
the  tolls-exemption  repeal,  nothing  was  surren- 
dered by  the  United  States.  It  merely  restored 
a  treaty  that  had  been  made  a  scrap  of  paper  by 
the  previous  Administration.  The  British  note 
reads : 

His  Majesty's  Government  are  content  to  note  that  the 
United  States  Government  hold  that  the  right  of  the  free 
passage  for  warships  which  the  present  treaty  proposes 
to  extend  to  Colombia  is  deemed  by  them  to  grow  out  of 
the  entirely  special  and  exceptional  position  of  Colombia 
toward  the  canal  and  the  title  thereto,  and  accordingly 
does  not  constitute  a  precedent,  and  will  not  hereafter 
be  drawn  into  a  precedent,  for  the  exception  of  any  other 
nation  from  the  payment  of  equal  dues  for  the  passage 
of  war  vessels  in  accordance  with  such  schedules  as  shall 
be  hereafter  constituted  in  conformity  with  the  Hay- 
Pauncefote  treaty,  or  for  any  other  concession  of  a  special 
nature  to  Colombia  or  to  any  other  power. 

I  have  accordingly  the  honor  of  stating  to  you  that  His 
Majesty's  Government  consider  that  they  can  forego  the 
making  of  such  a  protest  as  they  had  formerly  contem- 


The  Panama  Blackmail  Treaty  87 

plated,  and  that  they  accept  the  assurance  contained  in 
your  note. 

Nor  is  this  all.  The  claim  that  the  public  ves- 
sels of  the  United  States  could  not  pass  through 
the  canal  free  of  charge  was  never  put  forward 
by  Great  Britain.  In  order  to  remove  all  doubt 
on  this  point  Secretary  Knox  wrote: 

It  is  not  believed,  however,  that  in  the  objection  now 
under  consideration  Great  Britain  intends  to  question  the 
right  of  the  United  States  to  exempt  from  the  payment 
of  tolls  its  vessels  of  war  and  other  vessels  engaged  in 
the  service  of  this  Government.  Great  Britain  does  not 
challenge  the  right  of  the  United  States  to  protect  the 
canal.  United  States  vessels  of  war  and  those  employed 
in  Government  service  are  a  part  of  our  protective  system. 
By  the  Hay-Pauncefote  treaty  we  assume  the  sole  re- 
sponsibility for  its  neutralization.  It  is  inconceivable  that 
this  Government  should  be  required  to  pay  canal  tolls  for 
the  vessels  used  for  protecting  the  canal,  which  we  alone 
must  protect.  The  movement  of  United  States  vessels 
in  executing  governmental  policies  of  protection  are  not 
susceptible  of  explanation  or  differentiation.  The  United 
States  could  not  be  called  upon  to  explain  what  relation 
the  movement  of  a  particular  vessel  through  the  canal 
has  to  its  protection.  The  British  objection,  therefore, 
is  understood  as  having  no  relation  to  the  use  of  the  canal 
by  vessels  in  the  service  of  the  United  States  Govern- 
ment. 

Great  Britain  assented  to  this  construction  of 
the  Hay-Pauncefote  treaty.  Therefore,  the  right 
of  the  United  States  to  pass  its  public  vessels 
through  the  canal  free  of  charge  was  not  even 
questioned.     Vessels  engaged  in  the  coastwise 


88  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

trade  are  not  public  vessels,  and  so  do  not  come 
within  the  purview  of  the  Root  note. 

The  actual  canal  situation  is  as  follows :  The 
public  vessels  of  the  United  States  and  of  Panama 
are  exempt  from  the  payment  of  tolls.  It  is  pro- 
posed, in  the  pending  treaty,  to  extend  the  same 
right  to  the  public  vessels  of  Colombia.  The  pub- 
lic vessels  of  all  other  countries  must  pay  the  es- 
tablished rate.  The  vessels  of  commerce  of  all 
nations  are  on  the  same  footing  in  the  use  of  the 
canal — all  privilege  is  barred.  In  the  event  of 
war,  the  United  States  has  the  exclusive  use  of 
the  canal  for  military  purposes.  The  United 
States  is,  therefore,  the  only  nation  that  has  spe- 
cial rights  in  the  use  of  the  canal,  that  is,  during 
a  war  in  which  she  is  a  belligerent.  Accordingly 
the  situation  is  just  the  opposite  from  that  indi- 
cated by  Roosevelt. 

Equality  in  the  commercial  use  of  the  Panama 
Canal  is  provided  for  in  two  treaties:  One, 
signed,  ratified  and  proclaimed  (Hay-Paunce- 
fote  treaty) ;  the  other,  negotiated,  signed,  rati- 
fied and  proclaimed  (Hay-Bunau-Varilla  treaty) 
while  Roosevelt  was  President.  Roosevelt  is 
criticizing  an  Administration  which  is  merely  ob- 
serving the  treaties,  as  they  stand,  which  were 
entered  into  during  his  Administration. 


The  Panama  Blackmail  Treaty  89 

The  weakness  of  Roosevelt's  contention  in  the 
passages  so  far  quoted  in  this  chapter  is  found  in 
the  effort  he  has  ptft  forth  to  confuse.  Why  is 
not  this  effort  put  forth  to  clear  up  circumstances 
that  have  a  suspicious  look?  For  instance,  the 
cablegram  to  the  commander  of  the  Nashville  on 
October  30,  1903,  ordering  him  to  proceed  to 
Colon,  is  missing.  What  became  of  it?  And 
what  was  its  relation  to  the  journey  of  Bunau- 
Varilla  from  New  York  to  Washington  the  previ- 
ous night? 

We  deal  with  the  contents  of  some  of  the  fore- 
going excerpts  more  fully  in  other  chapters. 
Space  does  not  permit  us  to  deal  with  the  entire 
mass  of  stuff  that  has  been  injected  into  the  con- 
troversy for  the  purpose  of  concealing  the  theft 
of  the  Canal  Zone.  The  following  from  the 
article  is  typical: 

The  land  could  not  have  been  acquired  and  the  canal 
could  not  have  been  built  save  by  taking  precisely  and  ex- 
actly the  action  which  was  taken.  Unless  the  nation  is 
prepared  heartily  to  indorse  and  stand  by  this  action,  it 
has  no  right  to  take  any  pride  in  anything  that  has  been 
done  on  the  Isthmus  and  it  has  no  right  to  remain  on  the 
Isthmus.  If  there  is  a  moral  justification  for  paying 
Colombia  $25,000,000,  then  there  is  no  moral  justification 
for  our  staying  on  the  Isthmus  at  all  and  we  should 
promptly  get  ofif.  If  President  Wilson  and  Secretary 
Bryan  are  right  in  their  position,  then  they  have  no  busi- 
ness to  take  part  in  any  ceremony  connected  with  open- 


90  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

ing  the  canal ;  on  their  theory  they  would  be  engaged  in 
the  dedication  of  stolen  goods. 

We  cannot  see  that  a  work  of  art  ceases  to  be 
a  masterpiece  because  it  was  painted  on  stolen 
canvas.  The  painting  remains  a  thing  of  beauty 
without  regard  to  the  method  used  in  getting  the 
canvas  on  which  it  was  painted.  In  praising  the 
work  of  art  we  do  not  condone  the  act  of  the  bur- 
glar. It  is  merely  necessary  to  compensate  prop- 
erly the  original  owner  of  the  canvas.  We  are 
not  prevented  from  admiring  the  skill  of  our 
civil  and  sanitary  engineers  because  our  Admin- 
istration ''took"  (did  not  secure  by  due  process 
of  law)  the  Canal  Zone.  It  is  merely  necessary 
that  the  owner  be  compensated  for  loss  suffered. 

We  have  now  examined  a  number  of  excerpts 
from  the  article  under  consideration  and  have 
shown  that  they  are  grossly  inaccurate.  Simi- 
larly, the  whole  article  is  a  collection  of  garbled, 
inaccurate  and  misleading  statements.  It  de- 
ceives those  who  believe  it  to  be  a  truthful  ex- 
amination of  a  phase  of  our  foreign  policy.  It 
conveys  a  false  impression.  We  will  conclude 
direct  consideration  of  the  article  by  commenting 
on  its  closing  paragraph : 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  every  action  we  took  was  not  only 
open  and  straightforward,  but  was  rendered  absolutely 


The  Panama  Blackmail  Treaty  91 

necessary  by  the  misconduct  of  Colombia.  Every  action 
we  took  was  in  accordance  with  the  highest  principles  of 
national,  international,  and  private  morality.  The  honor 
of  the  United  States,  and  the  interest  not  only  of  the 
United  States  but  of  the  world,  demanded  the  building 
of  the  canal.  The  canal  could  not  have  been  built,  it 
would  not  now  have  been  begun,  had  our  Government  not 
acted  precisely  as  it  did  act  in  1903.  No  action  ever 
taken  by  the  Government,  in  dealing  with  any  foreign 
power  since  the  days  of  the  Revolution,  was  more  vitally 
necessary  to  the  well-being  of  our  people,  and  no  action 
we  ever  took  was  taken  with  a  higher  regard  for  the 
standards  of  honor,  of  courage,  and  of  efficiency  which 
should  distinguish  the  attitude  of  the  United  States  in 
all  its  dealings  with  the  rest  of  the  world. 

If  the  cause  of  the  United  States  was  so  just, 
why  did  not  Roosevelt  as  President  welcome  the 
opportunity  to  submit  it  to  arbitration?  On  De- 
cember 2^,  1903,  Colombia  proposed  that  the  en- 
tire matter  be  submitted  to  the  Arbitration  Tri- 
bunal of  The  Hague.  From  that  date  to  March 
4,  1909,  Roosevelt  had  the  opportunity  to  vindi- 
cate his  course  by  joining  Colombia  in  submitting 
the  matter  to  an  impartial  tribunal  for  adjudica- 
tion. He  refused — refused  to  submit  what  he 
calls  a  just  cause  to  an  arbitral  tribunal  for  de- 
cision. We  are  thus  warranted  in  asserting  that 
his  protestations  lack  sincerity. 

The  foregoing  paragraph  from  the  article  un- 
der review  reminds  one  of  an  observation  made 
by  Samuel  Weller  concerning  veal  pie : 


92  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

Werry  good  thing  is  weal  pie,  when  you  know  the  lady 
as  made  it,  and  is  quite  sure  it  ain't  kittens. 

Are  the  protestations  of  Roosevelt  what  they 
profess  to  be  ?  What  is  the  value  as  evidence  of 
statements  made  by  him  concerning  the  opera 
bouffe  revolution  on  the  Isthmus?  It  is  one  of 
the  purposes  of  this  chapter  to  answer  this  ques- 
tion. We  will  give  further  data  bearing  on  the 
question  from  his  discussion  of  the  Hague  conven- 
tions and  the  duty  of  the  United  States  in  regard 
to  their  enforcement.  In  the  Independent  of 
January  4,  1915,  he  writes: 

To  violate  these  conventions,  to  violate  neutrality 
treaties,  as  Germany  has  done  in  the  case  of  Belgium,  is 
a  dreadful  thing.  It  represents  the  gravest  kind  of  inter- 
national wrongdoing,  but  it  is.  really  not  quite  so  con- 
temptible, it  does  not  show  such  short-sighted  and  timid  in- 
efficiency, and  above  all,  such  selfish  indifference  to  the 
cause  of  permanent  and  righteous  peace,  as  has  been 
shown  by  the  United  States  (thanks  to  President  Wilson 
and  Secretary  Bryan)  in  refusing  to  fulfill  its  solemn  ob- 
ligations by  taking  whatever  action  was  necessary  in  order 
to  clear  our  skirts  from  the  guilt  of  tame  acquiescence  in 
a  wrong  which  we  had  solemnly  undertaken  to  oppose. 

If  I  had  for  one  moment  supposed  that  signing  these 
Hague  conventions  meant  literally  nothing  whatever  be- 
yond the  expression  of  a  pious  wish  which  any  power 
was  at  liberty  to  disregard  with  impunity  in  accordance 
with  the  dictation  of  self-interest  I  would  certainly  not 
have  permitted  the  United  States  to  be  a  party  to  such  a 
mischievous  farce.  President  Wilson  and  Secretary 
Bryan,  however,  take  the  view  that  when  the  United 


The  Panama  Blackmail  Treaty  93 

States  assumes  obligations  in  order  to  secure  small  and 
unoffending  neutral  nations  against  hideous  wrong,  its 
action  is  not  predicated  on  any  intention  to  make  the 
guarantee  effective. 

They  take  the  view  that  when  we  are  asked  to  redeem 
in  the  concrete  promises  we  made  in  the  abstract  our 
duty  is  to  disregard  our  obligations  and  to  preserve  ignoble 
peace  for  ourselves  by  regarding  with  cold-blooded  and 
timid  indifference  the  most  frightful  ravages  of  war  com- 
mitted at  the  expense  of  a  peaceful  and  unoffending 
country.    This  is  the  cult  of  cowardice. 

What  is  the  cult  of  Roosevelt?  Does  not  a 
shorter  word  than  "cowardice"  correctly  express 
it?  It  is  sad  that  a  person  of  so  great  prestige 
should  bear  false  witness  on  questions  of  foreign 
relations.  In  his  book  entitled  ''America  and  the 
World  War/'  Roosevelt  criticizes  President  Wil- 
son as  follows : 

In  his  over  anxiety  not  to  offend  the  powerful  who  have 
done  wrong,  he  scrupulously  refrains  from  saying  one 
word  on  behalf  of  the  weak  who  have  suffered  wrong. 
He  makes  no  allusions  to  the  violation  of  the  Hague  Con- 
ventions at  Belgium's  expense,  although  this  nation  had 
solemnly  undertaken  to  be  a  guarantor  of  those  conven- 
tions. 

What  are  the  facts  about  the  Hague  Conven- 
tions ?  What  are  the  obligations  assumed  by  the 
United  States  in  signing  some  of  them  ?  We  will 
let  William  Bayard  Hale  answer  these  questions : 

Thus  rashly  and  violently  writes  Mr.  Roosevelt.  Igno- 
rant of  the  fact  that  The  Hague  rules  regarding  neutral- 


94  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

ity,  .  .  .  regarding  everything  which  troubles  Mr.  Roose- 
velt and  saddens  us  all,  have  never  been  ratified  by  Great 
Britain,  nor  by  France,  nor  by  Belgium,  and  that  by 
their  own  provision  these  articles  are  binding  only  if 
ratified  by  all  belligerents;  ignorant  likewise  of  the  fact 
that  the  United  States,  in  ratifying  certain  of  The  Hague 
rules,  added  the  express  stipulation  that  the  action  was 
not  to  be  taken  as  involving  this  Government  in  any  way 
in  an  obligation  to  enforce  their  observance  on  other 
powers. 

Is  the  United  States  the  guarantor  of  the 
Hague  Conventions  ?  Or,  is  this  nation  only  ob- 
ligated to  observe  those  it  signed?  These  con- 
ventions were  signed  during  the  Roosevelt  Ad- 
ministration with  the  understanding  that  the 
United  States  was  under  no  obligation  to  enforce 
their  observance  by  others.  By  observing  those 
it  signed  the  United  States  complies  with  every 
obligation  assumed.  It  is  not  the  guarantor  of 
a  single  Hague  Convention. 

Does  not  Roosevelt  rely  on  the  absence  of  ac- 
curate information  among  his  readers  and  their 
inability  to  detect  garbled,  misleading  and  false 
statements  in  bearing  false  witness  against  the 
present  Administration?  His  arguments  in  the 
article  which  has  just  been  under  consideration 
rest  on  as  shadowy  a  foundation  as  his  assertions 
about  the  Hague  Conventions.  His  statements 
and  conclusions  contained  therein  are  an  affront 


The  Panama  Blackmail  Treaty  95 

to  readers  informed  on  vital  facts.  Prof.  Chan- 
cellor of  the  University  of  Wooster  supplements 
the  statement  of  William  Bayard  Hale  as  fol- 
lows: 

When  a  nation  is  a  party  to  a  guarantee  of  neutral- 
ity, whether  explicit  or  implicit,  such  participation  guar- 
antees only  the  action  of  the  nation,  and  does  not  bind 
such  a  nation  to  enforce  upon  other  nations  the  continued 
recognition  of  such  neutrality.  The  independence  of  na- 
tions is  a  more  complete  and  integral  independence  than 
that  of  individuals.  If  explicitly  or  implicitly  the  United 
States  has  ever  been  a  party  to  the  guarantee  of  Belgian 
neutrality,  all  that  this  means  is  that  for  ourselves  we 
should  recognize  that  neutrality.  It  might  be  conclu- 
sively shown  that  we  have  never  guaranteed  that  Belgian 
neutrality  must  be  recognized  by  Germany  and  Austria 
and  Hungary.  Here  former  President  Roosevelt  has 
fallen  into  pernicious  error.  Common  sense  is  against 
any  doctrine  of  international  law  that  should  make  one  na- 
tion the  keeper  of  the  consciences  of  other  nations.  The 
law  of  nature  is  against  any  undertaking  by  the  United 
States  to  regulate  the  morals  of  Germany,  of  Mexico,  and 
of  such  other  nations  as  may  from  time  to  time  or  syn- 
chronously lose  the  ability  to  consider  and  parley,  and  in 
sheer  default  of  thought  and  talk  seize  the  sword. 

The  conference  at  The  Hague,  in  1907,  elab- 
orated fifteen  Conventions.  The  delegates  of  the 
United  States  signed  only  twelve  of  these.  No 
nation  became  the  guarantor  of  any  of  these  con- 
ventions. That  was  neither  the  nature  nor  pur- 
pose of  the  conference.  The  signers  merely  ob- 
ligated themselves  to  obey  the  Conventions  they 


96  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

signed  under  the  general  reservation  determined 
by  the  conference  as  stated  in  the  foregoing  ex- 
cerpt by  William  Bayard  Hale.  One  of  these 
conventions  the  delegates  from  the  United  States 
signed  with  the  following  special  reservation : 

Nothing  contained  in  this  convention  shall  be  so  con- 
strued as  to  require  the  United  States  of  America  to  de- 
part from  its  traditional  policy  of  not  intruding  upon, 
interfering  with,  or  entangling  itself  in  the  political  ques- 
tions of  policy  or  internal  administration  of  any  foreign 
state;  nor  shall  anything  contained  in  the  said  Conven- 
tion be  construed  to  imply  a  relinquishment  by  the  United 
States  of  its  traditional  attitude  toward  purely  American 
questions. 

These  are  the  facts  concerning  the  Hague  Con- 
ventions. Is  Roosevelt  merely  mistaken  concern- 
ing their  import?  It  taxes  credulity  to  believe 
that  observations  similar  to  those  of  William 
Bayard  Hale  and  Professor  Chancellor  entirely 
escaped  his  notice.  Yet  we  find  in  his  statement 
at  or  near  the  Military  Instruction  Camp  at 
Plattsburgh  on  August  25,  19 15,  his  false  asser- 
tions about  our  obligations  under  The  Hague 
Conventions,  reasserted  in  the  following  form: 

Let  us  treat  others  justly  and  keep  the  engagements 
we  have  made,  such  as  those  in  The  Hague  Conventions, 
to  secure  just  treatment  for  others.  .  .  . 

Under  The  Hague  Convention  it  was  our  bounden  duty 
to  take  whatever  action  was  necessary  to  prevent  and, 


The  Panama  Blackmail  Treaty  97 

if  not  to  prevent,  then  to  undo,  the  hideous  wrong  that 
was  done  to  Belgium.  We  have  shirked  this  duty.  .  .  . 
For  thirteen  months  America  has  played  an  ignoble 
part  among  the  nations.  We  have  tamely  submitted  to 
seeing  the  weak,  whom  we  had  covenanted  to  protect, 
wronged. 

In  the  Metropolitan  Magazine  for  October, 
191 5,  Roosevelt  defends  his  earlier  assertions  con- 
cerning The  Hague  Conventions  as  follows : 

If  no  duty  had  been  expressly  imposed  upon  the  United 
States  in  this  matter,  we  ought  nevertheless  to  have  acted 
in  accordance  with  the  generous  instincts  of  humanity. 
But  as  a  matter  of  fact  such  a  duty  was  expressly  imposed 
upon  us  by  the  Hague  Conventions.  The  Convention, 
signed  at  The  Hague  October  i8th,  1907*  [footnote  re- 
fers to  pages  133-144  of  "The  Hague  Conventions  and 
Declarations"  edited  by  James  Brown  Scott],  begins  by 
saying  that  *'His  Majesty  the  German  Emperor,  King 
of  Prussia,"  and  the  other  signatory  powers,  including 
France,  Belgium,  Russia  and  the  United  States,  have 
resolved  to  conclude  a  Convention  laying  down  clearly 
the  rights  and  duties  of  neutral  powers  in  case  of  war  on 
land.  Article  i  runs:  "The  territory  of  neutral  powers 
is  inviolable."  Article  5  states  that  a  neutral  power 
"must  not  allow  belligerents  to  move  troops  across  its 
territory."  Article  10  states  that  "the  fact  of  a  neutral 
power  resisting  even  by  force  attempts  to  violate  its 
neutrality  cannot  be  regarded  as  a  hostile  act."  Article 
7  states  that  "a  neutral  power  is  not  called  upon  to  pre- 
vent the  export  or  transport  on  behalf  of  one  or  other  of 
the  belligerents  of  arms,  munitions  of  war  or  in  general 
of  anything  which  could  be  of  use  to  an  army  or  a  fleet." 
This  Convention  was  ratified  by  Belgium  on  August  8th, 
1910;  by  France  on  October  7th,  1910;  by  Germany,  the 
United  States  and  Russia  on  November  27th,  1909.  .  .  . 


98  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

A  treaty  is  a  promise.  The  signing  powers  make 
promises  each  to  the  others  and  each  to  each  of  the  others 
in  such  a  case  as  this.  Germany  had  promised  France, 
Belgium,  the  United  States  and  Russia  that  it  would  treat 
the  territory  of  a  neutral  power  (in  this  case  Belgium) 
as  inviolable.  Germany  violated  this  promise.  Belgium 
had  promised  Germany,  the  United  States,  France  and 
Russia  that  it  would  not  permit  such  violation  of  its  neu- 
trality as  Germany  committed.  Belgium  kept  its  promise. 
Germany  had  promised  that  if  a  neutral  power  (Belgium) 
resisted  by  force  such  an  attempt  as  it,  Germany,  made 
to  violate  its  neutrality,  Germany  would  not  regard  such 
an  act  as  hostile.  Germany  broke  this  promise.  When 
Germany  thus  broke  her  promises,  we  broke  our  promise 
by  failing  at  once  to  call  her  to  account.  The  treaty  was 
a  joint  and  several  guarantee,  and  it  was  the  duty  of 
every  signer  to  take  action  when  it  was  violated ;  above 
all  it  was  the  duty  of  the  most  powerful  neutral,  the 
United  States. 

An  exact  reproduction  of.  those  articles  of  The 
Hague  Conventions  which  are  vital  is  the  best 
answer  to  the  foregoing  excerpt  from  Roosevelt's 
article.  Therefore,  we  will  reproduce  them  and 
print  in  italics  the  paragraph  of  Article  5  which 
is  omitted.  This  paragraph  shows  that  the  in- 
tent of  this  Convention  (No.  5)  is  just  the  op- 
posite of  the  foregoing  assertion  by  him.  The 
articles  from  this  Convention  which  are  apropos 
follow : 

ARTICLE    I 

The  territory  of  neutral  powers  is  inviolable. 


The  Panama  Blackmail  Treaty  99 

ARTICLE  2 

Belligerents  are  forbidden  to  move  troops  or  convoys, 
whether  of  munitions  of  war  or  of  supplies,  across  the 
territory  of  a  neutral  Power. 

ARTICLE  4 

Corps  of  combatants  must  not  be  formed,  nor  recruit- 
ing agencies  opened,  on  the  territory  of  a  neutral  Power, 
to  assist  the  belligerents. 

ARTICLE  5 

A  neutral  Power  must  not  allow  any  of  the  acts  re- 
ferred to  in  Articles  2  and  4  to  occur  on  its  territory. 

It  is  not  called  upon  to  punish  acts  in  violation  of  the 
neutrality  unless  such  acts  have  been  committed  on  its 
own  territory. 

The  closing  paragraph  of  Article  5  shows  that 
the  United  States  is  not  the  guarantor  of  The 
Hague  Conventions  as  alleged  by  Roosevelt. 
Reiteration  does  not  convert  false  statements  into 
truth  whether  the  false  statements  are  due  to 
error  or  to  sinister  political  propaganda  to  dis- 
credit an  official  of  exalted  moral  purpose,  as  is 
this  propaganda  against  our  esteemed  President 
— propaganda  buttressed  by  falsehood  of  the 
basest  character.  The  United  States  is  not  the 
guarantor  of  the  Hague  Conventions.  This  is 
self-evident  to  a  student  of  American  diplomacy. 
Roosevelt  knows  something  about  diplomacy. 
We  are,  therefore,  warranted  in  inferring  that 
he  is  attempting  to  discredit  the  Wilson  Admin- 


lOO  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

istration  by  statements  knoWn  to  him  to  be  false. 
His.  conduct  seems  to  come  under  the  following 
condemnation  penned  by  himself : 

There  are  in  every  great  country  a  few  men  whose 
mental  or  moral  make-up  is  such  that  they  ...  go  to  the 
length  of  moral  treason  in  the  effort  to  discredit  their  own 
national  government. 

One  is  not  warranted  in  expecting  accuracy 
from  Roosevelt  where  nothing  is  recorded,  since 
he  makes  assertions  easily  contradicted  by  docu- 
mentary evidence.  In  order  to  have  value  as 
evidence,  it  is  apparent  that  any  statement  made 
by  him  relative  to  the  part  his  Administration 
played  in  the  creation  of  the  so-called  Republic 
of  Panama  must  have  substantial  corroboration. 

For  an  individual  to  tell  a  falsehood  and  re- 
peat it  in  various  ways  consistently  for  any  length 
of  time  is  difficult.  It  is  impossible  for  a  number 
of  individuals  to  do  so.  These  are  facts  not 
sufficiently  taken  account  of  by  Roosevelt  when 
his  Administration  cooperated  in  planning  the 
opera  bouffe  revolution  on  the  Isthmus.  It  is 
the  weakness  in  the  armor  used  to  defend  his  Ad- 
ministration. There  are  too  many  established 
facts  which  become  consistent  only  when  viewed 
in  the  light  of  an  understanding  between  his  Ad- 
ministration and  those  sponsor  for  the  secession 


The  Panama  Blackmail  Treaty        loi 

movement  on  the  Isthmus.  The  understanding 
was  oral — was  not  reduced  to  writing.  Oral 
understandings,  however,  result  in  historical 
facts.  The  meaning  of  these  facts  will  be  dis- 
closed by  historical  research.  Historical  re- 
search shows  that  our  Administration  in  1903 
was  in  collusion  with  the  separatists  on  the 
Isthmus  to  effect  the  secession  of  the  Province 
of  Panama  from  Colombia  in  order  to  establish 
it  as  a  protectorate  of  the  United  States. 

In  this  and  other  chapters  of  this  work,  we 
have  applied  the  method  suggested  by  President 
Wilson  in  an  address  delivered  before  the  United 
States  Chamber  of  Commerce: 

I  agreed  with  a  colleague  of  mine  in  the  Cabinet  the 
other  day  that  we  had  never  before  in  our  lives  attended 
a  school  to  compare  with  what  we  were  now  attending 
for  the  purpose  of  gaining  a  liberal  education. 

Of  course,  I  learn  a  great  many  things  that  are  not 
so.  But  the  interesting  thing  about  it  is  this:  Things 
that  are  not  so  do  not  match.  If  you  hear  enough  of  them 
you  see  there  is  no  pattern  whatever — it  is  a  crazy  quilt ; 
whereas  the  truth  always  matches,  piece  by  piece,  with 
other  parts  of  the  truth.  No  man  can  lie  consistently, 
and  he  cannot  lie  about  everything  if  he  talks  to  you 
long.  So  that  I  would  guarantee  that  if  enough  liars 
talked  to  you,  you  would  get  the  truth,  because  the  parts 
that  they  did  not  invent  would  match  one  another,  and 
the  parts  they  did  invent  would  not  match  one  another. 
If  they  talked  long  enough,  therefore,  and  you  saw  the 


I02  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

connections  clearly  enough,  you  could  patch  together  the 
case  as  a  whole. 

It  is  the  mature  judgment  of  the  writer  that 
statements  made  by  Roosevelt  concerning  the 
establishment  of  the  so-called  Republic  of  Panama 
must  be  corroborated  to  have  value  as  historical 
evidence.  Statements  not  corroborated  must  be 
discounted  or,  as  statisticians  v^ould  say,  be 
v^eighted  in  order  to  determine  their  value.  In 
this  work,  the  writer  has  given  statements  of 
Roosevelt  only  the  importance  which  analysis, 
criticism,  and  weighting  attach  to  them. 

The  writer  finds  substantially  his  own  view  ex- 
pressed by  Mark  Twain  in  a  letter  written  to  his 
friend.  Rev.  Joseph  Twichell,  and  given  a  place 
in  "Mark  Twain,  a  Biography''  by  Albert  Bige- 
low  Paine: 

Dear  Joe, — I  knew  I  had  in  me  somewhere  a  definite 
feeling  about  the  President.  If  I  could  only  find  the 
words  to  define  it  with !  Here  they  are,  to  a  hair — from 
Leonard  Jerome: 

"For  twenty  years  I  have  loved  Roosevelt  the  man,  and 
hated  Roosevelt  the  statesman  and  politician." 

It's  mighty  good.  Every  time  in  twenty-five  years  that 
I  have  met  Roosevelt  the  man  a  wave  of  welcome  has 
streaked  through  me  with  the  hand-grip;  but  whenever 
(as  a  rule)  I  meet  Roosevelt  the  statesman  and  politician 
I  find  him  destitute  of  morals  and  not  respect-worthy. 
It  is  plain  that  where  his  political  self  and  party  self  are 
concerned  he  has  nothing  resembling  a  conscience;  that 


The  Panama  Blackmail  Treaty         103 

under  those  inspirations  he  is  naively  indifferent  to  the 
restraints  of  duty  and  even  unaware  of  them;  ready  to 
kick  the  Constitution  into  the  backyard  whenever  it  gets 
into  his  way. 

The  bearing  of  false  witness  against  a  national 
administration  on  vital  questions  of  foreign 
policy  during  a  world-crisis  like  the  present  is 
as  repugnant  to  a  man  of  exalted  moral  purpose 
as  is  collaboration  with  separatists  of  another 
country  to  effect  the  secession  of  a  province. 
With  this  conclusion  in  the  foreground  we  will 
close  the  chapter  with  the  following  conclusion 
in  the  background.  If  Isthmian  events  point 
to  collusion  between  the  Roosevelt  Administra- 
tion and  the  separatists  on  the  Isthmus  to  effect 
the  secession  of  the  Province  of  Panama  from 
Colombia,  and  to  establish  it  as  a  protectorate  of 
the  United  States  called  a  Republic,  the  charac- 
ter of  the  President  is  not  a  bar  to  belief  in  such 
collaboration- 


Chapter  III 

President  Roosevelt  Attempted  To  Coerce 
Colombia 

In  this  chapter,  we  deal  primarily  with  the 
method  employed  to  secure  the  ratification  of  the 
Hay-Herran  treaty,  to  which  the  signature  of  the 
charge  d'affaires  of  Colombia  was  obtained 
through  an  ultimatum  that  should  have  been  ad- 
dressed to  his  Government.  The  method  was 
sui  generis.  We  believe  that  the  following  ex- 
cerpt from  the  pen  of  Roosevelt  warrants  the  con- 
clusion that  he  was  responsible  for  it: 

When  in  August,  1903, 1  became  convinced  that  Colom- 
bia intended  to  repudiate  the  treaty  made  the  preceding 
January,  under  cover  of  securing  its  rejection  by  the 
Colombian  Legislature,  I  began  carefully  to  consider 
what  should  be  done.  By  my  direction,  Secretary  Hay, 
personally  and  through  the  Minister  at  Bogota,  repeatedly 
warned  Colombia  that  grave  consequences  might  follow 
her  rejection  of  the  treaty. 

In  the  ultimatum  to  Colombia,  Secretary  Hay 

stated  that  the  President  had  directed  him  to  say 

what  the  note  contained.     Roosevelt  admits  re- 

104 


Roosevelt  Attempted  to  Coerce  Colombia     105 

sponsibility  for  equally  formidable  notes  to 
Colombia  commanding  her  to  ratify  the  Hay-Her- 
ran  treaty.  The  ultimatum  merely  blends  with 
the  notes  and  completes  the  story  of  coercion. 
Here  is  further  corroboration : 

The  Congress  as  well  as  the  Dictator  [President  Mar- 
roquin]  had  ample  warning  of  all  the  dangers  they  by 
their  action  were  inviting.  Representatives  from  Panama 
warned  the  Colombian  Administration  that  Panama  would 
revolt  if  the  treaty  was  rejected ;  and  our  Department  of 
State  in  the  gravest  manner  called  their  attention  to  the 
serious  situation  their  conduct  would  create. 

It  is  clear  that  the  coercion  of  Colombia,  from 
the  time  that  the  signature  of  her  acting  Minister 
to  the  Hay-Herran  treaty  was  secured  by  a 
method  that  is  common  on  the  "Bowery,"  to  the 
rejection  of  that  ill-fated  document  by  the  unani- 
mous vote  of  the  Colombian  Senate,  was  directed 
by  President  Roosevelt. 

It  would  appear  that  Roosevelt  contended  that 
an  act  forbidden  by  international  law,  by  a  solemn 
engagement,  and  by  ordinary  morality,  became 
honorable  provided  warning  was  given.  To  the 
connoisseur  in  ethics,  the  warning  adds  to  the 
offense  of  which  it  was  a  forerunner  in  that  it 
shows  premeditation.  The  warning  thus  be- 
comes a  part  of  the  offense,  proving  motive  for 
the  act  which  was  threatened.     It  strengthens  the 


io6  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

evidence  which  points  to  collusion  between  our 
Administration  and  the  separatists  of  Panama, 
as  that  was  the  only  way  in  which  the  threat 
could  be  carried  into  effect. 

Do  not  the  warnings  show  determination  to  lay 
violent  hands  on  Colombia  unless  she  surrendered 
in  perpetuity  her  choicest  possession  for  a  con- 
sideration that  has  ceased  to  be  respectable  in 
public  utility  regulation?  Viewed  from  the 
standpoint  of  international  law  and  of  correct 
financiering,  these  warnings  are  so  base  that  one 
is  surprised  at  the  moral  obtuseness  of  their 
author.  That  he  should  cite  them  in  exculpation 
of  the  rape  of  Colombia  seems  incomprehensible 
to  a  mind  sensitive  to  ethical  principles. 

We  will  now  proceed  to  a  detailed  considera- 
tion of  the  coercion  of  Colombia.  We  will  give 
official  documents  in  their  sequence  and  connect 
them  by  stating  their  apparent  meaning,  adding 
general  conclusions  which  we  derive  from  them 
after  the  documents  have  been  assembled  and  cor- 
related. Their  interpretation  by  the  writer  will 
be  found  in  the  closing  pages  of  the  chapter. 

While  the  Colombia  Congress  convened  June 
20,  1903,  interference  with  its  freedom  of  action 
commenced  as  early  as  April.  In  a  note  dated 
April  24,  our  Minister  to  Colombia  officially  in- 


Roosevelt  Attempted  to  Coerce  Colombia     107 

formed  the  Colombian  Minister  for  Foreign  Af- 
fairs : 

With  reference  to  the  interview  I  had  with  your  ex- 
cellency at  which  were  discussed  the  negotiations  for  the 
annulment  of  the  present  concessions  of  the  Panama  canal 
and  railroad  companies  and  other  matters,  I  have  the 
honor  to  inform  your  excellency  that  I  have  received  in- 
structions from  my  Government  in  that  respect. 

I  am  directed  to  inform  your  excellency,  if  the  point 
should  be  raised,  that  everything  relative  to  this  matter 
is  included  in  the  convention  recently  signed  between 
Colombia  and  the  United  States  on  the  22d  of  January 
last,  and  that,  furthermore,  any  modification  would  be 
violative  of  the  Spooner  Act,  and  therefore  inadmissible. 

How  negotiations  between  Colombia  and  her 
concessionary  corporations  could  be  in  violation 
of  the  Spooner  law  is  not  clear,  for,  most  as- 
suredly, the  American  Congress  would  not  pass 
an  act,  or  presume  to  have  the  right  to  pass  an 
act,  which  prohibited  Colombia  from  negotiat- 
ing with  concessionary  corporations  for  the  can- 
cellation of  concessions  granted  by  her  and  the 
surrender  of  her  reversionary  interests  in  these 
enterprises.  Such  a  prohibition  cannot  be  read 
into  a  treaty  unless  it  is  clearly  stated  therein. 
Save  by  a  construction  of  the  Hay-Herran  treaty 
which  violated  precedents,  it  is  not  found  in  that 
instrument,  with  the  most  obvious  result  that 
Colombia  and  the  United  States  placed  different 


io8  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

constructions  on  an  article  in  a  projected  solemn 
engagement  before  ratification.  After  ratifica- 
tion, the  United  States  would  have  enforced  its 
understanding  of  the  treaty — an  understanding 
determined  by  self-interest.  This  is  not  all.  No 
self-respecting  government  will  permit  another 
country  to  interpose  between  itself  and  corpora- 
tions to  whom  it  has  granted  concessions ;  nor 
will  a  self-respecting  government  offer  such  an 
affront  to  a  sister  republic.  The  mantle  of 
charity  is  not  large  enough  to  cover  the  acts  of 
the  Roosevelt  Administration  whereby  we  secured 
the  Canal  Zone.  This,  however,  is  merely  the 
beginning  of  insolence  to  which  Colombia  was 
subjected,  for,  on  June  13,  1913,  our  Minister 
handed  to  the  Colombian  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs  a  memorandum  which  reads : 

I  have  received  instructions  from  my  Government  by 
cable  in  the  sense  that  the  Government  of  Colombia  to 
all  appearances  does  not  appreciate  the  gravity  of  the 
situation.  The  Panama  Canal  negotiations  were  initiated 
by  Colombia  and  were  earnestly  solicited  of  my  Govern- 
ment for  several  years.  The  propositions  presented  by- 
Colombia  with  slight  alterations  were  finally  accepted  by 
us.  By  virtue  of  this  agreement  our  Congress  recon- 
sidered its  previous  decision  and  decided  in  favor  of  the 
Panama  route.  If  Colombia  now  rejects  the  treaty  or 
unduly  delays  its  ratification,  the  friendly  relations  be- 
tween the  two  countries  would  be  so  seriously  compro- 
mised that  our  Congress  might  next  winter  take  steps 


Roosevelt  Attempted  to  Coerce  Colombia     109 

that    every    friend    of    Colombia    would    regret    with 
sorrow. 

The  canal  negotiations  were  initiated  by  Wil- 
liam Nelson  Cromwell,  attorney  for  the  New 
Panama  Canal  Company.  At  first  acting  only 
as  intermediary,  he  finally  did  succeed  in  creat- 
ing the  situation  which  resulted  in  direct  negotia- 
tions between  the  two  governments.  To  say  in 
substance,  as  in  the  excerpt  quoted,  that  Colombia 
urged  upon  the  United  States  the  construction  of 
an  Isthmian  Canal  by  the  Panama  route,  is  en- 
tirely incorrect. 

We  will  now  show  that  the  sentence:  "The 
propositions  presented  by  Colombia  with  slight 
alterations  were  finally  accepted  by  us,''  is  both 
false  and  misleading.  This  can  be  most  effec- 
tively done  by  paraphrasing  an  excerpt  from  a 
memorandum  of  the  Colombian  Minister  for 
Foreign  Afifairs  addressed  to  our  Government  on 
June  18,  1903.  It  effectively  disposes  of  Secre- 
tary Hay's  contention  that  the  propositions  pre- 
sented by  Colombia,  with  slight  alteration,  were 
finally  accepted  by  the  United  States.  In  this 
memorandum,  the  Colombian  Minister  observes: 

There  is  a  notable  difference  between  some  of  the  prop- 
ositions presented  by  Colombia  and  the  modifications  in- 
troduced by  the  United  States. 


no  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

That  difference  becomes  apparent  when  we  compare 
the  memorandum  submitted  by  the  Colombian  Legation 
on  March  31,  19 13,  with  the  propositions  of  the  Secre- 
tary of  State.  This  is  especially  true  of  those  provisions 
which  refer  to  the  sovereignty  of  the  Canal  Zone,  judicial 
jurisdiction  in  it,  and  the  compensation  to  be  paid  for  the 
concession.  The  annuity  of  $250,000  stipulated  in  the 
Hay-Herran  treaty  was  merely  the  then  income  of  Colom- 
bia from  the  Railroad,  and  even  payment  of  this  amount 
was  not  to  commence  until  nine  years  after  ratification, 
although  the  railroad  was  to  become  the  property  of  the 
United  States  immediately.  In  the  memorandum  of  the 
legation  the  establishment  of  judicial  tribunals  in  the 
Canal  Zone  was  not  mentioned,  while  the  Secretary  of 
State,  in  the  project  sent  with  his  note  of  November  18, 
1902,  proposed  them.  In  this  project,  they  were  divided 
into  three  classes,  namely,  Colombian,  American,  and 
mixed. 

In  the  Colombian  memorandum,  the  sum  of  $7,000,000, 
American  gold,  was  asked,  and  an  annuity,  which  was  to 
be  fixed  by  arbitration  unless  otherwise  satisfactorily  ar- 
ranged. The  Secretary  of  State  only  offered  $7,000,000 
and  an  annual  rental  of  $100,000,  or,  if  preferred,  $10,- 
000,000,  and  an  annual  rental  of  $10,000.  The  Colom- 
bian Government  had  ordered  its  legation  to  accept  an 
annuity  of  $600,000.  The  Secretary  of  State,  in  a  note 
which  had  the  form  of  an  ultimatum,  reduced  it  to 
$250,000.  The  diminution  of  $350,000  in  a  period  of 
only  one  hundred  years  represents  a  difference  of 
$35,000,000,  and  as  the  convention  was  to  run  in  per- 
petuity, it  is  clear  that  the  difference  was  not  slight,  but 
was  very  great. 

It  is  also  well  to  note  another  item  of  substantial  differ- 
ence. In  the  Colombian  proposition,  the  canal  and  rail- 
road companies  could  not  transfer  their  privileges  to  the 
United  States  without  the  consent  of  the  Colombian  Gov- 
ernment. 


Roosevelt  Attempted  to  Coerce  Colombia     iii 

In  addition  to  the  observations  already  made 
in  this  paraphrase  of  an  excerpt,  it  should  be 
pointed  out  that  the  actuarial  value  of  $250,000 
at  the  interest  rate  of  the  then  Colombian  credit 
for  the  nine  years  that  Colombia  was  to  be  de- 
prived of  the  $250,000  was  approximately 
$2,870,000.  This  amount  must  be  deducted  from 
the  apparent  figures  contained  in  the  proposition 
of  Secretary  Hay  to  get  at  their  actual  value. 
The  actuarial  (real)  value  of  an  annuity  of 
$350,000  (amount  mentioned  in  the  paraphrased 
excerpt)  at  the  end  of  one  hundred  years  at  3 
per  cent  is  $212,550,000,  at  4  per  cent,  $433,170,- 
000,  and  not  $35,000,000,  as  stated  by  the  Colom- 
bian Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  who  was  ap- 
parently an  amateur  in  finance.  Note — the  treaty 
was  to  be  perpetual  and  not  merely  for  one  hun- 
dred years. 

It  is  already  clear  that  the  propositions  sub- 
mitted by  the  Colombian  legation  to  the  United 
States  were  not  accepted  with  "slight  altera- 
tions." Moreover,  the  Colombian  proposition 
safeguarded  her  sovereignty.  The  Hay-Herran 
treaty  impaired  her  sovereignty  to  such  an  ex- 
tent that  the  United  States  would,  by  construc- 
tion of  the  engagement,  have  become  the  de  facto 
sovereign  in  an  undefined  area  of  Colombia.     The 


112  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

difference  between  the  propositions  was  not  only 
'*not  slight/'  but  vital.  Note  particularly  the  fol- 
lowing : 

Our  Congress  might  next  winter  take  steps  that  every 
friend  of  Colombia  would  regret  with  sorrow. 

Congress  had  provided  the  Nicaragua  route  as 
an  alternative  one  in  the  Spooner  law.  So  con- 
struction of  the  canal  elsewhere  could  not  have 
been  meant.  Therefore,  it  could  only  have  had 
reference  to  laying  hands  on  Colombia.  This  is 
what  was  actually  done.  The  method  could  not 
be  disclosed,  so  the  Congress  is  referred  to  in 
order  to  make  the  warnings  effective.  These 
warnings  are  merely  the  forerunner  of  collusion 
between  the  separatists  of  Panama  and  our  Ad- 
ministration. We  will  discuss  this  in  detail  in 
the  next  chapter. 

On  June  13,  1903,  our  Minister  to  Colombia 
sent  the  following  telegram  to  Secretary  Hay: 

I  have  the  honor  to  advise  you  that  I  have  had  an  in- 
terview with  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  in  which 
I  communicated  to  him  the  substance  of  my  instructions, 
and  also  left  with  him  a  memorandum  containing  a  sub- 
stantial copy  of  said  telegram. 

The  minister's  first  question  was  as  to  what  action  by 
our  Congress  was  contemplated — whether  it  meant  action 
against  Colombia,  or  the  adoption  of  the  Nicaragua  route 
— to  which  I  replied  that  I  had  received  no  other  in- 


Roosevelt  Attempted  to  Coerce  Colombia     113 

structions  than  those  contained  in  the  telegram,  and  that 
I  could  not,  therefore,  aid  him  in  construing  it. 

He  said,  in  substance,  that  it  must  be  understood  that 
no  matter  what  the  Government's  actions  or  desires  may- 
have  been  in  the  preliminary  negotiations,  a  treaty  could 
not  be  made  without  the  approval  of  Congress ;  that  this 
was  true  in  the  United  States  as  well  as  Colombia ;  that 
the  Colombian  Congress  was  very  soon  to  meet,  and  that 
upon  it  would  devolve  the  consideration  of  all  these  mat- 
ters. 

Colombia,  left  in  doubt  as  to  the  meaning  of 
the  note  addressed  to  her,  was,  in  fact,  the  victim 
of  a  veiled  threat,  as  she  knew  what  was  expected 
of  her,  but  did  not  know  what  to  expect  should 
she  act  within  her  constitutional  and  other  legal 
rights,  and,  in  so  doing,  offend  her  powerful 
neighbor. 

We  will  conclude  this  phase  of  the  evidence  by 
stating  on  the  authority  of  Hannis  Taylor  and  of 
Ex-Minister  DuBois  that  a  cable  was  sent  to 
Bogota  saying:  ''The  treaty  must  not  be  m'odi- 
Hed  or  amended."  In  this  connection,  remember 
that  the  signature  of  the  acting  Minister  of 
Colombia  was  secured  by  strategy.  The  gentle- 
men named  above  also  state  that  this  cable  was  fol- 
lowed by  a  mandate  saying:  ''Ratify  the  treaty 
or  you  will  regret  it."  Again,  remember  that  Dr. 
Herran  signed  that  treaty  under  pressure.  Is  it 
any  wonder  Colombia  refused  to  ratify  the  Hay- 


114         America  and  the  Canal  Title 

Her  ran  treaty?  And  Roosevelt  calls  this  con- 
duct classic!  Contrast  these  warnings  with  the 
following  excerpt  from  an  address  delivered  by 
President  Wilson: 

For  the  interesting  and  inspiring  thing  about  America, 
gentlemen,  is  that  she  asks  nothing  for  herself  except 
what  she  has  a  right  to  ask  for  humanity  itself.  We  want 
no  nation's  property;  we  wish  to  question  no  nation's 
honor;  we  wish  to  stand  selfishly  in  the  way  of  the  de- 
velopment of  no  nation ;  we  want  nothing  that  we  cannot 
get  by  our  own  legitimate  enterprise  and  by  the  inspira- 
tion of  our  own  example,  and,  standing  for  these  things, 
it  is  not  pretention  on  our  part  to  say  that  we  are  privi- 
leged to  stand  for  what  every  nation  would  wish  to  stand 
for,  and  speak  for  those  things  which  all  humanity  must 
desire. 

How  different  are  the  foregoing  inspiring 
words  when  compared  with  the  following  by 
Roosevelt : 

I  am  interested  in  the  Panama  Canal  because  I  started 
it.  If  I  had  followed  traditional  conservative  methods 
I  should  have  submitted  a  dignified  state  paper  of  prob- 
ably two  hundred  pages  to  the  Congress  and  the  debate 
would  have  been  going  on  yet.  But  /  took  the  Canal  Zone, 
and  let  Congress  debate,  and  while  the  debate  goes  on  the 
canal  does  also. 

The  excerpt  from  the  address  by  President  Wil- 
son mirrors  the  underlying  spirit  of  his  Admin- 
istration and  exalts  righteousness  for  its  own 
sake;  while  the  excerpt  from  the  address  by 


Roosevelt  Attempted  to  Coerce  Colombia     115 

Colonel  Roosevelt  glories  in  having*  taken  the 
Canal  Zone  by  physical  and  mental  prowess. 

This  brings  the  narrative  down  to  June  20, 
1903,  when  the  Colombian  Congress  assembled. 
President  Marroquin  submitted  a  dignified  state 
paper  to  it,  which  dealt  with  the  ratification  of 
the  Hay-Herran  treaty,  as  follows : 

To  my  Government  has  been  presented  this  dilemma; 
either  it  lets  our  sovereignty  suffer  detriment  or  renounces 
certain  pecuniary  advantages,  to  which,  according  to  the 
opinion  of  many,  we  have  a  right.  In  the  first  case,  to 
consent  to  the  sacrifice  of  our  sovereignty  and  not  as- 
piring to  great  indemnification,  the  just  wishes  of  the 
inhabitants  of  Panama  and  other  Colombians  would  be 
satisfied  if  the  canal  were  opened,  but  the  Government 
would  be  exposed  to  the  charge  afterwards  that  it  did 
not  defend  our  sovereignty  and  that  it  did  not  defend  the 
interests  of  the  nation.  In  the  second  case,  if  the  canal 
is  not  opened  by  Panama  the  Government  will  be  accused 
for  not  having  allowed  Coiombia  that  benefit  which  is 
regarded  as  the  commencement  of  our  aggrandizement. 
I  have  already  allowed  my  wish  to  be  understood  that  the 
canal  should  be  opened  through  our  territory.  I  believe 
that  even  at  the  cost  of  sacrifices  we  ought  not  to  put 
obstacles  to  such  a  grand  undertaking,  because  if  is  an 
immensely  beneficial  enterprise  for  the  country,  and  also 
because  once  the  canal  is  opened  by  the  United  States 
our  relations  will  become  more  intimate  and  extensive, 
while  our  industries,  commerce,  and  our  wealth  will  gain 
incalculably.  I  leave  the  full  responsibility  the  decision 
of  this  matter  brings  with  Congress.  I  do  not  pretend 
to  make  my  opinion  weigh.  When  I  have  given  instruc- 
tions to  our  representative  in  Washington  it  has  been 
coupled  with  the  order  that  the  decision  of  this  important 


ii6  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

matter  must  be  left  with  Congress.  After  years  in  which 
the  question  has  been  treated  in  a  vague  way,  without 
precise  conditions,  it  is  now  presented  in  a  way  to  obtain 
practical  and  positive  results.  It  has  been  our  indisput- 
able diplomatic  triumph  that  the  Senate  and  Government 
of  the  United  States  should  declare,  notwithstanding 
every  effort  to  the  contrary,  the  superiority  of  the  Colom- 
bian route. 

Although  President  Marroquin's  motives  have 
been  impugned  by  Roosevelt,  we  will  inquire 
whether  he  was  sincere  in  the  foregoing  com- 
munication. Advices  from  our  Minister  to 
Colombia  will  furnish  the  answers.  We  read  in 
a  letter  from  him,  dated  August  30,  the  follow- 
ing: 

I  am  informed  authoritatively  that  to  assure  the  elec- 
tion of  Reyes,  Marroquin  has  already  changed  the  gov- 
ernors of  Bolivar,  Magdalena,  and  Panama,  nominating, 
respectively,  Insignares,  Barrios,  and  Senator  Obaldia. 
All  pledged  to  the  treaty  and  to  Reyes. 

It  is  to  be  noted  that  General  Reyes  was  the 
candidate  for  the  presidency  of  Colombia  who 
succeeded  at  the  election,  thus  making  it  evident 
that  President  Marroquin  was  using  the  power 
of  his  office  to  secure  ratification.  General  Reyes 
urged  ratification  of  the  Hay-Herran  treaty. 
The  next  day  our  Minister  to  Colombia  wrote  to 
Secretary  Hay: 


Roosevelt  Attempted  to  Coerce  Colombia     117 

I  had  an  interview  with  Senator  Obaldia  to-day.  He 
informed  me  that  he  is  wilHng  to  remain  as  long  as  there 
is  hope  for  the  treaty,  but  he  is  convinced  that  there  is 
none.  .  .  .  Confirms  General  Reyes'  statement  concern- 
ing presidential  candidate,  and  says  that  the  next  Senate 
was  made  certain  for  the  treaty;  that  he  bears  instruc- 
tions to  Governors  Insignares  and  Barrios  concerning  the 
elections  which  will  be  held  next  December;  that  in  ac- 
cepting governorship  of  Panama  he  told  the  President 
that  in  case  that  the  department  found  it  necessary  to 
revolt  to  secure  canal,  he  would  stand  by  Panama;  but 
he  added  if  the  Government  of  the  United  States  will 
wait  for  the  next  session  of  Congress,  canal  can  be  se- 
cured without  a  revolution.  Senator  Campo,  from  the 
Cauca,  is  about  to  leave,  thinking  the  treaty  gone. 

My  opinion  is  that  nothing  satisfactory  can  be  expected 
from  this  Congress.  Caro's  party  has  been  joined  by 
Velez  and  Soto  and  their  followers,  constituting  a  de- 
cisive majority  against  the  treaty.  General  Reyes  seems 
to  still  entertain  hopes. 

There  is  a  difference  in  the  influence  of  an 
incoming  and  of  an  outgoing  President.  Presi- 
dent Marroquin,  an  octogenarian,  was  retiring, 
and  General  Reyes  was  to  succeed  him.  Reyes 
favored  ratification  of  a  treaty  that  should  have 
been  rejected.  By  the  exercise  of  patience,  it  is 
thus  evident  that  agreement  on  a  treaty  granting 
the  United  States  an  adequate  title  to  the  Canal 
Zone  could  have  been  secured  from  Colombia,  but 
threats  were  substituted  for  restraint.  These 
threats  are  summarized  in  a  communication,  dated 
August  5,  1903,  which  our  Minister  to  Colombia 


ii8  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

sent  to  the  Colombian  Minister  for  Foreign  Af- 
fairs, from  which  the  following  is  taken : 

I  avail  myself  of  this  opportunity  respectfully  to  re- 
peat that  which  I  already  stated  to  your  excellency,  that 
if  Colombia  truly  desires  to  maintain  the  friendly  rela- 
tions that  at  present  exist  between  the  two  countries,  and 
at  the  same  time  secure  for  herself  the  extraordinary  ad- 
vantages that  are  to  be  produced  for  her  by  the  con- 
struction of  the  canal  in  her  territory,  in  case  of  its  being 
backed  by  so  intimate  an  alliance  of  national  interests  as 
that  which  would  supervene  with  the  United  States,  the 
present  treaty  will  have  to  be  ratified  exactly  in  its  present 
form  without  amendment  whatsoever.  I  say  this  because 
I  am  profoundly  convinced  that  my  Government  will  not 
in  any  case  accept  amendments. 

What  would  any  self-respecting  Government 
have  done  under  the  circumstances?  Would  it 
not  have  done  what  Colombia  did  ?  It  is  properly 
stated  by  General  Reyes  in  the  following : 

The  Congress  being  unable  to  accept  in  its  actual  word- 
ing at  least  one  of  the  stipulations  contained  in  the  treaty, 
because  inhibited  from  doing  so  by  the  Constitution,  no 
one  will  wonder  that  under  the  pressure  of  threats  so 
serious  and  irritating  and  in  presence  of  a  formal  notifi- 
cation from  the  party  which  had  authority  to  serve  it  that 
no  amendment  would  be  accepted,  preference  was  given 
to  disapproval. 

One  is  automatically  reminded  of  the  follow- 
ing characterization,  by  Sir  Edward  Grey,  of  the 
note  addressed  to  Servia  by  Austria: 


Roosevelt  Attempted  to  Coerce  Colombia     119 

I  had  never  before  seen  one  State  address  to  another  in- 
dependent State  a  document  of  so  formidable  a  character. 

It  is  to  be  observed  that,  while  there  was  no 
stipulation  for  the  absolute  cession  to  the  United 
States  of  the  Canal  Zone,  there  was  to  be  per- 
petual occupancy  and  jurisdiction,  i.  e.,  periods 
were  for  one  hundred  years,  with  the  option  of 
renewal  by  the  United  States,  but  no  option  of 
rejection  by  Colombia.  The  stipulations  in- 
cluded the  right  to  safeguard  the  canal  and 
granted  extensive  police  and  sanitary  control. 
The  constitutional  authorities  in  Colombia  held 
that  such  a  grant,  although  less  than  absolute 
cession,  was  contrary  to  the  nation's  organic  law. 

What  sovereign  state  would  have  lightly  rati- 
fied a  treaty  which  impaired  its  control  over  the 
most  valuable  section  of  its  domain  ?  Would  the 
Senate  of  the  United  States  have  held  otherwise 
in  case  it  had  been  proposed  to  grant  to  a  foreign 
power  a  similarly  endless  occupancy  and  jurisdic- 
tion of  a  part  of  our  national  domain?  Yet  it 
was  proposed  in  the  deliberations  of  the  Colom- 
bian Senate  to  amend  the  constitution  and  thereby 
remove  the  legal  objection! 

It  is  unquestionably  true  that  Colombia  re- 
jected the  Hay-Herran  treaty  because  it  involved 
an  impairment  of  her  de  facto  sovereignty  on  the 


120  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

Isthmus,  and  an  alienation  of  national  territory 
in  terms  believed  to  have  been  prohibited  by  the 
Colombian  constitution.  It  also  entailed  an 
abandonment,  by  Colombia,  of  concessionary  and 
reversionary  rights  in  the  Panama  Railroad  and 
in  the  projected  Isthmian  Canal,  and  made  no 
equitable  provision  for  settlement  with  Colombia 
by  the  canal  and  railroad  companies  to  secure  the 
release  of  her  concessionary  and  reversionary  in- 
terests such  as  were  contemplated  by  the  transfer 
of  their  rights  and  property  to  the  United  States. 
When  we  make  a  comprehensive  survey  of 
Colombia's  pecuniary  interest  in  the  then  exist- 
ing transit  arrangements  on  the  Isthmus,  and  the 
strategic  value  of  the  Isthmus  for  further  tran- 
sit development,  we  are  forced  to  conclude  that 
the  United  States  attempted  to  secure  unduly  ad- 
vantageous terms  by  duress. 

Colombia's  statesmen  were  looking  for  a  satis- 
factory solution.  They  were  conciliatory.  They 
wanted  the  canal  built  on  their  territory  and  were 
merely  endeavoring  to  secure  reasonable  terms. 
They  appealed  to  our  Government  in  terms  that 
would  have  wilted  a  heart  not  made  of  adamant. 
On  August  II,  1903,  Minister  Rico  of  the  De- 
partment for  Foreign  Affairs  addressed  our  Min- 
ister as  follows : 


Roosevelt  Attempted  to  Coerce  Colombia     121 

The  Colombian  Government,  fully  aware  that  justice 
and  equity  govern  the  course  of  the  United  States  in  its 
relations  with  all  powers,  and  that  its  respect  for  the 
autonomy  of  the  Spanish-American  countries  is  a  sub- 
stantial guaranty  of  the  stability  and  independence  of 
those  nations,  is  confident  that  the  principles  which  I  have 
adduced  in  favor  of  the  right  which  the  Colombian  Con- 
gress has,  not  only  to  propose  modifications  to  the  con- 
vention for  the  opening  of  the  canal,  but  also  to  refuse 
its  approval,  can  not  but  convince  your  excellency's  Gov- 
ernment that  the  exercise  of  that  right  can  not  in  any 
manner  entail  complications,  great  or  small,  in  the  rela- 
tions of  the  two  countries,  which  it  is  to  be  hoped  will 
continue  on  the  same  equal  footing  and  in  the  same  good 
understanding  which  has  happily  existed  until  now,  and 
that  they  will  facilitate  the  removal  of  the  difficulties 
which  have  retarded  the  final  agreement,  the  result  of 
which  is  to  accomplish  that  work,  of  such  great  impor- 
tance to  the  two  high  contracting  parties  and  to  the 
world's  commerce. 

Why  was  Colombia  so  cautious?  Was  there 
anything  in  our  construction  of  the  Treaty  of 
1846  that  warranted  it?  Had  we  recently  read 
into  that  solemn  engagement  something  that  war- 
ranted the  conclusion  that  our  public  men  re- 
garded national  honor  lightly  when  it  conflicted 
with  national  interests?  The  new  construction 
that  our  Adminstration  placed  on  the  Treaty  of 
1846  in  1902  is  the  answer.  In  a  letter  dated 
October  26,  1902,  the  Colombian  Minister  at 
Washington  wrote  to  Secretary  Hay : 

I  have  the  honor  to  address  your  excellency  for  the 


122  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

purpose  of  informing  you  that  on  the  24th  instant  I  re- 
ceived from  my  Government  supplementary  and  full  in- 
structions to  close  the  negotiations  for  the  construction  of 
the  Panama  Canal  which  have  been  progressing  between 
Colombia  and  the  United  States,  and  that  in  said  docu- 
ment are  comprised  all  the  points  to  which  your  excel- 
lency adverted  as  modifications  of  the  memorandum  pre- 
sented by  the  legation  to  the  Department  of  State  on  the 
2 1  St  of  April  last. 

The  instructions  to  which  I  refer  bear  date  of  Bo- 
gota, September  9,  1902,  before  the  action  was  taken  in 
the  Department  of  Panama  by  United  States  naval  offi- 
cers which  implies,  on  the  part  of  your  excellency's  Gov- 
ernment, a  new  interpretation  of  the  treaty  in  force  be- 
tween the  two  countries,  an  interpretation  concerning 
which  I  am  not  now  at  liberty  to  express  any  opinion,  for 
the  reason  that  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Relations  at 
Bogota  has  undertaken  to  discuss  it  directly  himself,  as 
your  excellency  is  aware;  but  which  would  essentially 
affect  the  convention  now  pending,  since  article  35  of  that 
treaty  is  incorporated  and  developed  therein. 

In  view  of  the  foregoing,  your  excellency  will  recog- 
nize that  it  is  just  now  impossible  for  me  to  act  in  pur- 
suance of  the  instructions  received,  in  consequence  of 
which  I  have  addressed  my  Government  by  cable,  stating 
the  circumstances,  to  the  end  that  it  may  decide  upon 
what  it  considers  most  proper. 

What  are  the  facts  in  this  connection?  Our 
Administration  had  just  prohibited  the  Panama 
Railroad  Company  from  transporting  Colombian 
troops  and  munitions  of  war  across  the  Isthmus 
in  its  attempt  to  suppress  an  insurrection.  The 
railroad  company  was  required  to  transport  them 
by  its   charter.     Our   Administration  acted  as 


Roosevelt  Attempted  to  Coerce  Colombia     123 

though  the  rights  of  the  United  States  took  pre- 
cedence over  those  of  the  actual  sovereign. 
Seward,  Hamilton  Fish,  and  Bayard  held  that  the 
rights  of  the  sovereign  were  supreme.  This 
phase  of  the  question  will  be  considered  in  another 
chapter.  Suffice  it  to  say  here  that  this  unwar- 
ranted construction  of  the  Treaty  of  1846  caused 
Colombia  to  act  with  extreme  caution  where  im- 
pairment of  her  sovereignty  was  to  be  affected 
by  the  projected  treaty.  It — it — and  not  at- 
tempted blackmail — prevented  final  agreement 
with  Colombia  on  a  canal  concession. 

In  order  to  arrive  at  correct  conclusions  in  this 
matter  we  must  distinguish  between  de  jure  and 
de  facto  sovereignty.  The  one  is  nominal  sov- 
ereignty; the  other  is  actual  sovereignty.  Nomi- 
nal sovereignty  may  be  held  in  suspense  while 
actual  sovereignty  is  being  exercised  by  a  foreign 
power  for  a  consideration.  Panama  is  at  pres- 
ent the  de  jure  sovereign  of  the  Canal  Zone.  The 
United  States  is  the  actual  sovereign  as  long  as 
she  pays  the:  consideration  named  in  the  treaty. 
De  jure  sovereignty  is  in  suspense — is  not  ex- 
ercised. That  Colombian  sovereignty  was  not  to 
be  impaired  in  the  Hay-Herran  treaty  is  the  as- 
sertion of  Roosevelt.  This  is  true  of  de  jure 
sovereignty,  but  is  not  true  of  de  facto  sover- 


124  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

eigniy.    Article  IV  of  the  Hay-Herran  treaty 
provided : 

The  rights  and  privileges  granted  to  the  United  States 
by  the  terms  of  this  convention  shall  not  affect  the  sov- 
ereignty of  the  Republic  of  Colombia  over  the  territory 
within  whose  boundaries  such  rights  and  privileges  are 
to  be  exercised. 

The  United  States  freely  acknowledges  and  recognizes 
this  sovereignty  and  disavows  any  intention  to  impair  it 
in  any  way  whatever  or  to  increase  its  territory  at  the 
expense  of  Colombia  or  of  any  of  the  sister  republics  in 
Central  or  South  America,  but  on  the  contrary,  it  desires 
to  strengthen  the  power  of  the  republics  on  this  continent, 
and  to  promote,  develop  and  maintain  their  prosperity  and 
independence. 

This  is  not  true  when  we  consider  de  facto  or 
actual  sovereignty.  That  which  is  the  substance 
of  sovereignty  was  vitally  impaired  in  the  pro- 
jected engagement.  We  will  mention  only  one 
of  a  number  of  provisions  to  illustrate  the  point. 
We  find  that  section  II  of  Article  XIII  of  the 
Hay-Herran  treaty  reads  as  follows: 

Subject  to  the  general  sovereignty  of  Colombia  over 
said  zone,  the  United  States  may  establish  judicial  tri- 
bunals thereon,  which  shall  have  jurisdiction  of  certain 
controversies  hereinafter  mentioned  to  be  determined  ac- 
cording to  the  laws  and  judicial  procedure  of  the  United 
States. 

Such  judicial  tribunal  or  tribunals  so  established  by  the 
United  States  shall  have  exclusive  jurisdiction  in  said 
zone  of  all  controversies  between  citizens  of  the  United 
States,  and  between  citizens  of  the  United  States  and 


Roosevelt  Attempted  to  Coerce  Colombia     125 

citizens  of  any  foreign  nation  other  than  the  Republic 
of  Colombia ;  and  of  all  controversies  in  any  wise  grow- 
ing out  of  or  relating  to  the  construction,  maintenance  or 
operation  of  the  canal,  railway  and  other  properties  and 
works. 

The  portion  printed  in  italics  contains  the 
joker.  It  is  the  elastic  clause  under  which  the 
permanent  interests  of  Colombia  would  have  suf- 
fered. 

Because  of  our  altered  interpretation  of  the 
Treaty  of  1846,  Colombia  decided  on  a  reconsid- 
eration of  the  whole  matter.  Its  Minister  for 
Foreign  Affairs  addressed  our  Minister  in  Bogota 
on  August  14,  1903,  as  follows: 

As  your  excellency  has  been  pleased  to  address  me  va- 
rious notes  relative  to  the  treaty  for  the  opening  of  the 
Panama  Canal  which  was  signed  in  Washington  the  22d 
of  January  last,  I  inform  your  excellency  that  the  Senate 
of  the  Republic  disapproved  that  pact,  by  the  unanimous 
vote  of  the  senators  present,  in  the  session  of  the  12th 
of  this  month,  and  the  day  following  approved,  also  unan- 
imously, the  proposition  which  I  have  the  honor  to  com- 
municate to  your  excellency,  and  which  is  as  follows : 

The  Senate  of  the  Republic,  in  view  of  the  disapproval 
given  to  the  treaty  signed  in  Washington  the  22d  of  Jan- 
uary of  the  present  year,  by  the  charge  d'affaires  of  Co- 
lombia and  the  Secretary  of  State  of  the  American  Union, 
and  taking  into  account  the  desire  of  the  Colombian  peo- 
ple to  maintain  the  most  cordial  relations  with  the  people 
of  the  United  States  of  America,  and  its  sentiment  that 
the  completion  of  the  interoceanic  canal  across  the  Isth- 
mus of  Panama  is  a  work  of  the  greatest  importance  for 


126  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

the  commerce  and  advancement  of  the  world,  as  well  as 
for  the  development  and  progress  of  the  American  na- 
tions, resolved: 

I.  That  a  commission  of  three  senators,  appointed  by 
the  president  of  the  Senate,  consulting  in  every  possible 
way  the  opinion  of  the  House  of  Representatives,  study 
the  manner  of  meeting  the  earnest  desire  of  the  Colom- 
bian people  touching  the  construction  of  the  Panama 
Canal,  in  harmony  with  the  national  interests  and  observ- 
ance of  the  law  by  which  the  Senate  was  ruled  on  this 
solemn  occasion. 

In  addition  the  Colombian  Senate  addressed  a 
communication  to  our  Government  wherein  it 
stated : 

A  treaty  of  this  nature  could  only  be  approved  by  a 
national  convention  or  by  a  reforming  act  of  the  Consti- 
tution. 

Other  portions  of  this  appeal  are  better  stated 
in  a  communication  handed  to  Secretary  Hay  by 
General  Reyes,  showing  how  anxious  Colombia 
was  to  have  the  canal  constructed  on  her  territory, 
and  how  desirous  she  was  of  finding  a  formula 
which  would  grant  to  the  United  States  an  ad- 
equate title  and  yet  properly  safeguard  Colom- 
bian interests.  It  is  expressed  by  General  Reyes 
as  follows: 

It  is  proper  to  observe  that  under  our  constitution  the 
Congress  is  the  principal  guardian,  defender,  and  inter- 
preter of  our  laws.  And  it  can  not  be  denied  by  any  one, 
I  take  it,  that  the  Hay-Herran  convention  provides  for  the 


Roosevelt  Attempted  to  Coerce  Colombia     127 

execution  of  public  works  on  a  vast  scale  and  for  the 
occupancy  in  perpetuity  of  a  portion  of  the  territory  of 
Colombia,  the  occupant  being  not  a  juridical  person  whose 
acts  were  to  be  governed  by  the  civil  law  and  the  Colom- 
bian code,  but  rather  a  sovereign  political  entity,  all  of 
which  would  have  given  occasion  for  frequent  conflicts, 
since  there  would  have  been  a  coexistence  in  Panama  of 
two  public  powers,  the  one  national,  the  other  foreign. 

Hence  the  earnest  efforts  evinced  by  the  Senate  in  as- 
certaining whether  the  American  Government  would 
agree  to  accept  certain  amendments  tending  especially  to 
avoid  as  far  as  practicable  any  restriction  in  the  treaty 
of  the  jurisdiction  of  the  nation  within  its  own  terri- 
tory. ... 

It  follows  that  the  Congress  of  Colombia,  which  is 
vested,  according  to  our  laws,  with  the  faculty  or  power 
to  approve  or  disapprove  the  treaties  concluded  by  the 
Government,  exercised  a  perfect  right  when  it  disap- 
proved the  Hay-Herran  convention.  This  course  did  not 
disqualify  the  Government  for  the  conclusion  of  another 
treaty  with  the  Government  of  your  excellency  and  it 
indeed  resolved  to  make  a  proposition  to  that  effect,  and 
Mr.  Herran,  whom  our  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  in- 
trusted with  that  duty  by  cable,  had  the  honor  of  bringing 
this  purpose  to  your  excellency's  knowledge.  Neither  did 
that  course  imply  any  slight  toward  the  Government  of 
the  United  States,  and,  on  the  contrary,  the  Senate,  ob- 
servant of  the  existing  friendly  relations,  relied  on  the 
sentiments  of  American  fraternity,  by  which  it  is  ani- 
mated, for  the  introduction  in  the  new  agreement  that 
was  to  be  made  of  stipulations  more  consonant  with  the 
notion  of  sovereignty  entertained  by  the  people  of  Co- 
lombia. 

Standing  upon  her  dignity  as  a  sovereign  state, 
Colombia  refused  to  be  coerced,  and  by  the  unani- 
mous vote  of  her  Senate,  treated  our  warnings 


128  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

with  the  contempt  they  deserved.  Our  Senate 
did  not  ratify  the  Hay-Pauncefote  treaty  of  1900. 
It  was  sought  by  us,  discussed  at  length  in  the 
Senate,  and  amended  by  it  in  vital  particulars." 
We,  however,  received  no  warning  note  from 
Great  Britain.  A  treaty  which  we  sought  and 
which  was  agreed  to  by  our  Government  was  not 
ratified  by  our  Senate.  This  action  was  not  rep- 
rehensible, but  when  the  Colombian  Senate  re- 
jected a  treaty  not  agreed  to  by  the  Colombian 
Government — wrested  from  her  charge  d'affaires 
by  stealth— Roosevelt  hurled  at  Colombia  epithets 
unparalleled  in  the  history  of  modern  diplomacy. 
The  reasons  which  prompted  the  adverse  ac- 
tion of  the  Colombian  Senate  were  properly  be- 
yond our  official  animadversion  or  even  official 
discussion.  High-minded  diplomacy  usually 
holds  in  courteous  respect  the  motives  which  may 
have  inspired  the  legislative  act  of  a  sovereign 
nation.  Yet  in  speaking  of  Colombia,  our  Ad- 
ministration ascribed  to  her  the  basest  of  motives. 
A  comprehensive  survey  of  all  trustworthy  evi- 
dence does  not  disclose  a  scintilla  of  evidence  that 
sinister  motives  prompted  Colombia's  official  ac- 
tion. In  short,  the  evidence  looks  like  a  boom- 
erang, showing  that  Colombia  stood  ready  to  ac- 
cept the  award  of  an  impartial  arbitral  tribunal. 


Roosevelt  Attempted  to  Coerce  Colombia     129 

The  United  States  insisted  on  dictating  terms 
which  history  will  pronounce  unfair. 

Because  of  our  conduct  under  the  Treaty  of 
1846,  Colombia  acted  with  caution.  Our  Gov- 
ernment at  that  time  (1902)  had  just  read  into 
that  treaty  a  prerogative  not  contained  in  it  when 
viewed  from  the  standpoint  of  its  construction 
up  to  that  time.  Up  to  that  time,  the  United 
States  assisted  only  in  keeping  Isthmian  transit 
open  at  the  request  of  the  sovereign  and  in  co- 
operation with  the  sovereign.  In  1902,  as 
already  mentioned,  the  United  States  prevented 
Colombia  from  using  the  railroad  for  the  trans- 
portation of  her  troops  when  it  was  required  to 
furnish  this  service  by  charter.  Therefore, 
Colombia  rightly  scrutinized  the  Hay-Herran 
treaty.  When  we  consider  that  the  United  States 
has  just  attempted  to  violate  the  Hay-Pauncefote 
treaty,  we  are  compelled  to  conclude  that  the  cau- 
tion with  which  Colombia  acted  was  more  than 
justified. 

Impairment  of  sovereignty  was  the  controlling 
factor  in  the  consideration  of  the  Hay-Herran 
treaty  by  the  Colombian  Senate,  and  so  the  warn- 
ings sent  to  Colombia  by  our  Government  were 
as  gratuitous  as  they  were  offensive.  They  were 
outside    the    circle    of    respectable    diplomacy. 


130  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

Colombia  wanted  the  canal  on  her  territory;  she 
was  merely  parleying  for  reasonable  terms.  A 
president  favorable  thereto  was  already  assured 
of  election.  Therefore,  only  differences  re- 
mained to  be  ironed  out  as  was  the  case  between 
the  United  States  and  Great  Britain  when  the 
first  Hay-Pauncefote  treaty  was  disapproved  by 
our  Senate  through  amendment. 

In  another  place,  the  writer  has  stated  that  the 
reason  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States 
finally  agreed  on  the  second  Hay-Pauncefote 
treaty  was  the  following: 

The  United  States  needed  the  Panama  Canal  as  a  mili- 
tary and  naval  asset,  and  therefore  sought  the  modifica- 
tion of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  with  that  end  in  view. 
Great  Britain  desired  the  construction  of  the  canal  be- 
cause of  its  large  commercial  interests.  The  one  sought 
ownership  and  control  as  a  military  necessity ;  the  other 
sought  conditions  and  charges  of  traffic  that  would  be 
just  and  equitable — that  would  be  equal  for  identical 
units  of  traffic  using  the  canal.  The  paramount  object 
desired  by  the  two  contracting  parties  was  different. 
Final  agreement  was  secured  by  writing  into  the  Hay- 
Pauncefote  treaty  the  controlling  object  of  each  of  the 
two  contracting  parties.  The  United  States  secured 
thereby  its  desired  military  and  naval  asset.  Great 
Britain  secured  thereby  the  assurance  of  equality  in  tolls 
between  our  nationals  and  its  own  subjects. 

In  the  canal  treaty  that  was  being  negotiated 
with  the  sovereign,  Colombia,  the  interests  to  be 


Roosevelt  Attempted  to  Coerce  Colombia     131 

reconciled  were  abridgement  of  sovereignty  and 
determination  of  the  proper  amount  to  be  paid 
to  the  de  jure  sovereign  for  the  concessions  which 
were  to  be  granted.  Both  countries  needing  the 
canal,  the  United  States  was  in  a  stronger  posi- 
tion than  Colombia  as  bargainer,  inasmuch  as  the 
Nicaragua  route  was  available.  Colombia  in- 
dicated willingness  to  undertake  the  amendment 
of  her  constitution  so  as  to  permit  impairment  of 
her  sovereignty  and  suggested  periodic  revalua- 
tion by  an  impartial  tribunal  as  the  proper  method 
to  determine  the  amount  to  be  paid  to  her.  It  is 
thus  evident  that  proper  results  could  have  been 
secured  by  further  negotiations  if  our  Adminis- 
tration of  that  time  had  merely  desired  proper 
adjustment  of  the  conflicting  interests. 

We  have  already  stated  that  General  Reyes  was 
the  most  formidable  candidate  for  the  Colombian 
presidency  at  the  election  that  was  to  be  held  in 
December,  1903.  He  favored  ratification  of  the 
Hay-Herran  treaty  with  all  of  its  objectionable 
features.  There  was  a  strong  minority  in  the 
Colombian  Congress  in  favor  of  its  ratification. 
Is  it  not  clear  that  General  Reyes,  with  the  power 
and  prestige  of  an  incoming  president,  could  have 
secured  ratification  of  a  treaty  granting  to  the 
United  States  an  adequate  title  to  the  Canal  Zone 


132  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

upon  reasonable  terms  ?  The  following  from  our 
Minister  to  Colombia,  dated  November  i,  1903, 
is  now  apropos : 

Yesterday  the  Government  issued  a  manifesto  to  the 
nation,  which  has  been  published  and  posted  on  the 
streets  this  morning.  It  severely  criticises  the  action  of 
Congress,  and  especially  that  of  the  Senate,  which  latter 
body  has  wasted  its  time  in  attacks  on  the  Executive  in- 
stead of  devoting  itself  to  the  consideration  of  measures 
necessary  to  the  well-being  of  the  country.  As  regards 
the  canal,  it  states  that  the  Government  has  decided  to 
resume  negotiations  in  the  hope  of  being  able  to  come  to 
a  fresh  agreement  which  shall  meet  with  the  approval  of 
the  next  Congress,  and  that  the  Colombian  charge  d'af- 
faires at  Washington  has  been  instructed  to  convey  this 
information  to  the  Government  of  the  United  States. 

The  Hay-Herran  treaty  was  not  a  satisfactory 
international  compact  because :  first,  the  franchise 
was  not  subject  to  revaluation  at  stated  intervals; 
second,  a  conflict  of  jurisdiction  within  the  Canal 
Zone  and  the  canal  littoral  was  inevitable  by 
reason  of  the  elasticity  of  some  of  the  provisions 
contained  in  it.  Who  but  the  weaker  nation, 
Colombia,  would  have  suffered?  Therefore,  it 
was  her  duty  to  act  with  caution.  She  was  justi- 
fied in  rejecting  the  Hay-Herran  treaty  on  the 
grounds  that  the  financial  provisions  were  un- 
scientific and  its  administrative  provisions  were 
charged  with  inevitable  conflict  in  their  applica- 


Roosevelt  Attempted  to  Coerce  Colombia     133 

tion,  without  including  a  provision  for  their  ad- 
judication by  an  impartial  tribunal. 

In  view  of  the  foregoing,  what  are  we  to  think 
about  the  threats  our  Administration  sent  to 
Colombia?  Let  us  reason  together.  An  appro- 
priate analogy  is  an  aid  to  clear  thinking  and  so 
we  will  use  the  following:  If  at  the  time  that 
the  United  States  Senate  was  considering  the  first 
Hay-Pauncefote  treaty,  Great  Britain  had  sent 
us  warnings  similar  to  those  we  sent  Colombia, 
what  would  our  Congress  have  done?  The 
Senate  would  have  peremptorily  rejected  the  Hay- 
Pauncefote  treaty,  and  Congress  would  have  im- 
mediately abrogated  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty. 
Congress  would  then  have  proceeded  with  the 
Isthmian  canal  project  in  complete  disregard  of 
Great  Britain.  Yet  our  Administration  in  1903 
addressed  communications  to  a  friendly  nation 
that  we  would  have  treated  with  scorn  if  they  had 
been  addressed  to  us.  These  warnings  were  rep- 
rehensible and  provocative  of  the  course  that 
Colombia  thereafter  pursued.  No  self-respect- 
ing nation  will  yield  to  coercion. 

What  did  Colombia  do  ?  She  declined  to  ratify 
the  Hay-Herran  treaty,  after  provocation.  We 
declined  to  ratify  the  first  Hay-Pauncefote  treaty. 
The  latter  caused  delay  in  entering  upon  canal 


134  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

construction.  History  shows  that  our  Senate 
acted  with  wisdom  when  it  amended  the  first  Hay- 
Pauncefote  treaty.  If  a  treaty  is  a  solemn  en- 
gagement, it  is  important  that  all  of  its  provisions 
should  be  properly  scrutinized — especially  if  it  is 
to  run  in  perpetuity  without  any  provision  for 
readjustment  of  its  terms.  Why  this  haste  on 
our  part?  Why?  It  is  now  evident  that  pro- 
cedure by  the  orderly  processes  of  public  law 
would  have  given  proper  results.  Colombia  de- 
sired to  do  what  we  did  when  we  amended  the 
first  Hay-Pauncefote  treaty.  Our  conduct,  of 
course,  was  beneficent;  that  of  Colombia  was 
base!  Who  commissioned  Roosevelt  to  be  the 
mentor  of  civilization? 

Coercion  solidified  Colombian  sentiment 
against  the  ratification  of  the  Hay-Herran  treaty. 
The  maintenance  of  Colombian  dignity  assumed 
paramount  importance  in  the  deliberations  of  the 
Colombian  Senate.  Both  friend  and  foe  of  the 
treaty  voted  against  ratification.  A  unanimous 
vote  against  ratification  was  the  answer  of  the 
Colombian  Senate  to  the  attempted  coercion  by 
our  Government.  History,  while  pointing  the 
unmoving  finger  of  scorn  at  our  Administration, 
will,  at  the  same  time,  vindicate  the  action  of  the 
Colombian  Senate. 


Roosevelt  Attempted  to  Coerce  Colombia     135 

The  Panama  Canal,  as  an  actuality,  is  a  monu- 
ment to  the  genius  of  our  engineers.  Would  that 
it  could  be  said  of  Roosevelt  that  he :  ''Nothing 
common  did  or  mean,  upon  that  memorable 
scene,"  when  he  took  the  Canal  Zone  and  let  the 
Congress  debate  the  act  after  the  deed !  Would 
that  it  could  be  said  that  he  exercised  the  patience 
of  Job  and  displayed  the  wisdom  of  Solomon  in 
the  negotiations  to  secure  an  adequate  title  to  the 
Canal  Zone !  As  already  stated,  an  adequate  title 
could  have  been  secured  by  the  proper  diplomatic 
methods  as  it  was  in  the  interest  of  Colombia  to 
come  to  an  understanding  with  the  United  States 
so  that  the  construction  of  the  most  colossal  en- 
terprise ever  undertaken  by  man  could  be  pros- 
ecuted with  vigor. 

It  is  infinitely  better  for  a  nation  to  forego  the 
construction  of  a  canal  on  its  territory  than  to 
lose  its  honor  and  self-respect  by  yielding  to 
coercion.  Craven  cowardice  is  an  unfailing  sign 
of  either  national  decadence  or  national  degen- 
eracy. A  nation  that  fails  to  protect  its  honor, 
a  nation  that  fails  to  restore  its  honor  when  sul- 
lied, can  not  be  the  important  factor  in  the  ad- 
vancement of  mankind  that  it  otherwise  would 
be.  Let  us  hope  that  the  United  States,  rich  and 
powerful,  will  take  its  honor  out  of  pawn  by  mak- 


136  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

ing  reparation  to  Colombia.  Unless  this  is  done 
she  is  likely  to  remain  an  Ishmaelite  among  the 
nations  of  the  Western  Hemisphere. 

The  dismemberment  of  Colombia  by  the  United 
States  was  an  offense  against  international  law, 
a  violation  of  a  solemn  engagement  and  an  embar- 
rassment to  Spanish-America.  It  is  an  offense 
which  is  not  in  the  slightest  degree  palliated  by 
the  warnings  to  Colombia.  A  warning  does  not 
excuse  an  unlawful  act ;  rather  does  it  aggravate 
the  deed ;  it  is  included  in  the  offense.  Our  warn- 
ings to  Colombia  are  merely  the  forerunner  of 
collaboration  with  the  separatists  on  the  Isthmus 
to  effect  the  secession  of  the  Province  of  Panama 
from  Colombia.  A  nation,  not  unlike  an  indi- 
vidual, that  resorts  to  coercion  is  on  dangerous 
ground.  Roosevelt  carried  it  to  the  point  where 
he  could  not  retreat  without  humiliation,  or  pro- 
ceed without  stultifying  his  Administration.  He 
had  to  make  good  according  to  his  ethics.  How 
could  he?  By  an  understanding,  direct  or  by 
proxy,  with  the  separatists  on  the  Isthmus.  This 
was  effected  through  Bunau-Varilla  as  inter- 
mediary, the  separatists  playing  the  part  allotted 
to  them,  and  our  Administration  doing  the  rest. 
Our  gunboats  were  the  means  employed  to  effect 
the  dismemberment  of  Colombia.     It  was  our 


Roosevelt  Attempted  to  Coerce  Colombia     137 

navy  that  made  possible  the  estabhshment  of  the 
so-called  Republic  of  Panama.  It  was  the  as- 
surance of  protection  by  the  United  States  that 
caused  the  separatists  to  proceed  with  the  pro- 
jected secession  of  the  Province  of  Panama  from 
Colombia.  These  statements  will  be  substanti- 
ated in  the  next  chapter.  They  are  the  fruit  of 
attempted  coercion — the  last  step  in  the  process 
of  using  chicane,  instead  of  the  method  approved 
by  modern  diplomacy,  to  secure  the  Canal  Zone. 
Try  coercion  on  your  neighbor  and  see  how  it 
works.  You  will  then  be  in  a  position  to  under- 
stand the  procedure  described  in  this  and  the 
three  following  chapters  which  tell  how  the 
Roosevelt  Administration  "took"  the  Canal  Zone. 


Chapter  IV 
The  "Vaudeville''  Revolution  on  the  Isthmus 

Was  there  a  real  revolution  on  the  Isthmus  of 
Panama  in  the  fall  of  1903  ?  This  is  a  vital  ques- 
tion. It  must  be  answered  before  passing  judg- 
ment on  the  Roosevelt  Administration.  If,  upon 
a  searching  examination,  it  appears  that  there 
was  only  a  make-believe  revolution  and  not  an 
actual  uprising,  the  conduct  of  our  Administra- 
tion at  that  time  becomes  brigandage  under  a 
veneer  of  respectability.  If  it  appears  that  there 
was  no  revolution  on  the  Isthmus  at  the  time,  the 
acts  of  our  Administration  must  be  disowned  and 
reparation  must  be  made  to  Colombia  or  the  act 
will  become  for  all  time  the  nation's  act.  We 
will  now  show  that  there  was  no  revolution  on 
the  Isthmus  at  the  time. 

As  already  stated,  there  was  no  real  revolu- 
tion in  the  Province  of  Panama  in  the  fall  of 
1903  when  the  latter  was  organized  into  an  in- 
dependent state  under  the  protection  of  the 
United  States.     Those  interested  in  secession  es- 

138 


The  Vaudeville  Revolution  on  Isthmus     139 

tablished  a  nominal  government  independent  of 
that  of  Colombia  on  November  4,  1903.  The 
independence  of  the  nominal  government  was 
recognized  by  the  United  States  on  November  6, 
1903.  This  was  two  days  before  the  Govern- 
ment of  Colombia  learned  of  the  secession  of  its 
choicest  province.  The  rape  of  Colombia  was 
completed  two  days  before  the  Colombian  Gov- 
ernment received  information  of  the  occurrences 
on  the  Isthmus.  American  vessels  of  war  were 
ordered  to  Isthmian  waters  before  the  event  to 
protect  secession  against  attack  by  Colombia, 
and  to  safeguard  the  establishing  of  a  govern- 
ment in  the  Province,  which  was  to  be  a  pro- 
tectorate of  the  United  States. 

Assurance  that  the  American  navy  would  be 
used  to  protect  secession  and  to  assure  its  suc- 
cess were  conveyed  to  the  Separatists  of  Panama 
by  Bunau-Varilla.  We  will  show  that  this  as- 
surance was  given  to  him  by  the  Roosevelt  Ad- 
ministration. Had  not  this  assurance  been 
given,  the  separatists  would  not  have  proceeded 
with  the  secession  of  the  Province  and  there 
would  be  no  so-called  "Republic  of  Panama"  to- 
day. 

The  foregoing  statement  is  a  severe  indict- 
ment of  our  then  Government.     It  is  so  far- 


140  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

reaching  that  it  is  an  unpardonable  libel  unless 
it  rests  on  a  basis  of  fact.  We  will  now  marshal 
the  facts  on  which  this  indictment  is  based. 

We  are  dealing  only  incidentally  with  the  post- 
secession  activities  of  our  then  Administration. 
We  are  dealing  primarily  with  its  ante-secession 
activities.  These  were  so  improper  that  it  sought 
to  conceal  them.  It  is  now  established  that  se- 
cession was  predicated  on  them  and  was  pro- 
ceeded with  only  because  of  the  arrival  of  the 
Nashville — tangible  evidence  of  assured  protec- 
tion. In  short,  there  was  no  revolution  or  inten- 
tion to  promote  a  revolution.  There  was  to  be 
secession  if  the  United  States  would  guarantee 
its  success.  Secession  eventuated  and  the  pro- 
tection was  furnished.  The  so-called  Republic 
of  Panama  is  mute  evidence  of  pre-arrangement 
(of  an  adequate  understanding)  between  the 
Roosevelt  Administration  and  the  separatists  of 
Panama. 

Some  statements  crystallize  a  story — ^give  it 
objectivity  so  that  it  can  be  seen  in  a  flash.  Such 
a  statement  is  the  one  made  by  Roosevelt  to  the 
students  of  the  University  of  California.  As  re- 
ported it  reads: 

I  am  interested  in  the  Panama  Canal  because  I  started 
it.     If  I  had  followed  traditional,  conservative  methods, 


The  Vaudeville  Revolution  on  Isthmus     141 

I  would  have  submitted  a  dignified  state  paper  of  prob- 
ably two  hundred  pages  to  Congress,  and  the  debate  on 
it  would  have  been  going  on  yet;  but  /  took  the  Canal 
Zone  and  let  Congress  debate ;  and  while  the  debate  goes 
on  the  canal  does  also. 

Another  such  statement  is  the  following  by 
Roosevelt  : 

I  did  not  lift  my  finger  to  incite  the  revolutionists. 
The  right  simile  to  use  is  totally  different.  I  simply 
ceased  to  stamp  out  the  different  revolutionary  fuses  that 
were  already  burning. 

These  statements  are  charged  with  informa- 
tion that  their  author  did  not  intend  to  disclose, 
but  which  a  mind  conversant  with  Isthmian 
events  of  the  time  automatically  supplies.  There 
were  no  revolutionary  fuses  on  the  Isthmus  at 
the  time.  There  was  merely  effort  to  secure  ad- 
vance assurance  of  protection  of  secession  by  the 
United  States.  It  succeeded.  Therefore,  the  ob- 
servation would  be  correct  if  it  had  stated  that 
the  separatists  were  assured  that  the  Ameri- 
can Administration  would  prevent  Colombia 
from  putting  out  the  fuse — that  secession  would 
be  protected  within  forty-eight  hours  after  the 
Declaration  of  Independence. 

Bunau-Varilla  was  in  conference  with  our  Ad- 
ministration on  October  16,  1903.     On  October 


142  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

17,  he  addressed  Doctor  Amador,  first  President 
of  the  RepubHc  of  Panama,  as  follows: 

I  CAN  GIVE  YOU  THE  ASSURANCE  THAT  YOU  WILL  BE 
PROTECTED  BY  THE  AMERICAN  FORCES  FORTY-EIGHT  HOURS 
AFTER  YOU  HAVE  PROCLAIMED  THE  NEW  REPUBLIC  ON  THE 
WHOLE  ISTHMUS. 

The  real  story  of  the  opera  bouffe  revolution 
on  the  Isthmus  in  the  fall  of  1963  can  best  be 
told  by  commencing  with  the  account  of  it  by 
Bunau-Varilla.  It  is  found  in  his  book: 
"Panama,  the  Creation,  Destruction  and  Resur- 
rection," pages  289-342. 

When  it  became  apparent  that  the  fate  of  the 
Hay-Herran  treaty  hung  in  the  balance,  an  inner 
circle  in  the  city  of  Panama  commenced  to  con- 
sider secession.  Their  first  endeavor  was  to  as- 
certain if  the  cooperation  of  the  United  States 
could  be  secured.  William  Nelson  Cromwell 
was  consulted.  He  undertook  to  arrange 
it. 

Results  were  satisfactory.  Warning  reached 
him  from  the  seat  of  government  of  Colombia. 
He  was  counsel  for  the  French  company.  Their 
interests  had  been  placed  in  jeopardy  by  his  ac- 
tivities. He  had  to  retire  from  ostensible  con- 
nection with  the  venture.  So  Bunau-Varilla 
was  summoned  from  France.    The  continuity 


The  Vaudeville  Revolution  on  Isthmus     143 

of  the  movement  was  not  interrupted.  Bunau- 
Varilla  started  where  Cromwell  left  off. 

What  transpired  at  the  conference  above  men- 
tioned is  not  of  record.  We  have  the  ipse  dixit 
of  Roosevelt.  Events,  however,  stand  in  a  causal 
relation.  Actions  speak  louder  than  words. 
The  events  that  followed  in  precise  coordination 
tell  the  story  as  clearly  as  though  a  full  record 
had  been  kept.  No  revolution  could  have  been 
planned  and  carried  out  with  such  clockwork  pre- 
cision without  a  perfect  understanding  between 
the  parties  in  interest.  The  separatists  of 
Panama  had  foreknowledge  of  the  intentions  of 
the  Roosevelt  Administration.  There  was  but 
one  person  who  could  have  given  them  that  fore- 
knowledge, and  that  was  the  Commander-in- 
Chief  of  the  Army  and  Navy. 

On  September  23,  the  Hay-Herran  treaty  ex- 
pired. It  had  been  rejected  August  12  by  the 
Colombian  Senate.  This  was  the  psychological 
moment  for  decisive  action.  So  Bunau-Varilla 
appears  on  the  scene.  Colombia  had  not  yielded 
to  coercion.  To  coerce  her  by  force  would  re- 
quire the  cooperation  of  the  Congress.  With  the 
Nicaragua  route  available,  Congress  would  hesi- 
tate and  would  probably  refuse  to  concur. 
Hence,  collaboration  with  the  separatists  offered 


144  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

the  solution.  Bunau-Varilla's  presence  offered 
the  opportunity.  Later  events  show  that  this 
was  the  method  adopted. 

Bunau-Varilla  states  in  the  book  named,  that 
he  inferred  what  the  action  of  the  Roosevelt  Ad- 
ministration would  be  in  the  event  of  an  upris- 
ing in  Panama.  He  gives  the  facts  on  which  he 
based  the  inference.  On  thorough  investigation, 
the  writer  finds  that  the  facts  are  other  than  as 
stated  by  the  author  named,  and  would  have 
forced  a  conclusion  other  than  the  one  given. 
The  actual  facts  would  have  compelled  the  infer- 
ence that  the  United  States  would  expect  Colom- 
bia to  maintain  free  and  uninterrupted  transit, 
and  that  she  would  be  given  a  free  hand  to  quell 
any  uprising.  This  is  what  had  transpired  there- 
tofore. Nothing  could  have  been  inferred  save 
that  the  United  States  would  respect  Colombia's 
sovereignty.  Therefore  he  could  have  got  the 
information  which  he  claims  to  have  possessed 
only  by  being  told.  Only  the  Commander-in- 
Chief  of  the  Army  and  Navy  could  have  told  him, 
either  directly  or  by  proxy,  that  is,  the  Presi- 
dent. 

Men  do  not  risk  their  lives,  their  property  and 
the  welfare  of  their  families  in  a  wild-goose  chase 
after  a  revolution;  nor  does  an  outsider  risk  prop- 


The  Vaudeville  'Revolution  on  Isthmus     145 

erty  and  all  that  others  hold  dear  on  a  mere  in- 
ference not  inferable  from  established  facts. 
The  known  facts  plainly  show  that  there  was  an 
understanding  between  our  then  Administration 
and  Bunau-Varilla,  and  that  the  latter  was  the 
intermediary  for  communicating  with  the  sepa- 
ratists of  Panama.  Bunau-Varilla's  explana- 
tion transforms  suspicion  into  knowledge,  and 
establishes  collusion  between  our  Administration 
and  the  separatists  of  Panama. 

The  status  of  secession  as  of  September  22, 
1903,  can  be  inferred  from  a  conversation  be- 
tween Bunau-Varilla,  who  had  just  arrived  in 
New  York  from  France,  and  an  M.  Lindo,  a 
merchant  of  New  York  and  Panama.  It  is  given 
in  Bunau-Varilla's  book  on  Panama.  We  will 
reproduce  it  in  the  form  of  a  dialogue,  preserv- 
ing the  exact  words  reported : 

Bunau-Varilla — Well,  is  the  rumor  true  that  the  peo- 
ple of  Panama  are  going  to  make  a  revolution? 

M.  Lindo — They  have  no  financial  means.  .  .  .  With- 
out money  a  revolution  cannot  be  brought  about  any 
more  than  a  war.  But  if  you  care  to  know  what  the 
situation  really  is,  I  will  ask  Amador  to  come  and  see  you. 
.  .  .  He  has  come  precisely  to  obtain  the  means  of  bring- 
ing about  a  revolution.  But  he  has  failed,  and  is  sailing 
for  Panama  in  a  few  days.  He  will  tell  you  all.  He  is 
in  despair. 

This  seems  to  show  that  something  resembling 


146  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

a  revolution  had  been  comtemplated,  and  that  it 
was  to  be  abandoned  for  lack  of  assured  support 
from  the  United  States.  But  the  time  limit  for 
the  ratification  of  the  Hay-Herran  treaty  expired 
the  next  day.  Perhaps  our  Administration  would 
after  that  give  the  desired  assurance. 

On  the  following  day  (September  23),  Bunau- 
Varilla  met  Doctor  Amador  in  conference.  In 
his  book,  Bunau-Varilla  tells  the  story  that  Doc- 
tor Amador  told  him.  The  following  is  a  cor- 
rect transcript  of  the  narrative  as  recorded  in  the 
section  of  the  book  devoted  to  demonstrating  that 
he  (Bunau-Varilla)  and  not  Roosevelt  is  the  fos- 
ter-father of  the  so-called  uprising  on  the  Isth- 
mus: 

During  the  past  year  a  group  of  citizens  of  the  Isth- 
mus, of  whom  I  was  one,  have  met  together  to  consider 
the  measures  to  be  taken  if  Colombia  rejected  the  Hay- 
Herran  treaty. 

We  one  and  all  agreed  that  such  a  decision  would  stop 
all  activity,  ruin  the  inhabitants,  and  within  a  few  years 
again  transform  the  Isthmus  into  a  virgin  forest. 

Confronted  by  a  decision  so  despotic,  we  decided  to 
prepare  for  an  armed  combat,  rather  than  submit  pas- 
sively to  the  tyrant's  sentence  of  death. 

But  Colombia  was  capable  of  crushing  all  resistance: 
as  its  power  is  enormously  superior  to  that  of  the  Prov- 
ince of  Panama.  Consequently  we  turned  our  eyes 
towards  the  great  American  Republic.  She  also  had  an 
interest  in  making  an  effective  protest  in  the  presence  of 


The  Vaudeville  Revolution  on  Isthmus     147 

the  extraordinary  tide  of  the  Colombian  sentiment 
against  the  execution  of  the  Canal. 

Why  should  not  this  great  Republic,  so  rich,  so  power- 
ful, give  the  necessary  cooperation  in  money  and  in  mili- 
tary force? 

This  idea  seemed  to  us  so  reasonable  that  we  decided 
to  entrust  with  a  mission  to  the  United  States  a  certain 
Beers,  more  generally  known  by  the  name  of  Captain 
Beers. 

He  was  an  employee  of  the  Panama  Railroad.  His 
mission  consisted  in  visiting  the  right  person  in  order  to 
learn  whether  this  double  support  could  be  obtained. 

The  persons  whom  Beers  saw  assured  him  that  noth- 
ing was  easier  and  they  promised  to  obtain  all  that  we 
asked  for.  Captain  Beers  came  back  to  Panama  to  tell 
of  the  happy  result  of  his  mission. 

Our  friends  then  decided  to  delegate  two  of  their  num- 
ber in  order  to  reach  a  final  understanding.  I  was  one 
of  the  two  delegates.  ...  As  soon  as  I  arrived  I  was 
received  with  open  arms  by  the  persons  whom  Captain 
Beers  had  seen.  I  was  to  go  to  Washington  to  see  Mr. 
Hay,  Secretary  of  State,  in  order  to  conclude  the  final 
transaction. 

But  suddenly  the  attitude  of  the  person  who  was  to 
take  me  to  Washington  entirely  changed. 

Whenever  I  went  to  see  him  strict  orders  had  been 
given  to  the  effect  that  he  was  not  in.  I  had  to  install 
myself  in  the  hall,  to  camp  there,  and,  so  to  speak,  besiege 
his  office.  Nothing  resulted  from  it.  And  there  I  am. 
All  is  lost.  At  any  moment  the  conspiracy  may  be  dis- 
covered and  my  friends  judged,  sentenced  to  death,  and 
their  property  confiscated.  I  at  first  decided  to  return 
to  Panama  to  share  their  fate.  But  I  am  hesitating.  If 
my  friends  are  shot  I  prefer  to  devote  my  life  to  aveng- 
ing them  on  the  man  who  will  have  been  the  cause  of 
their  deaths.  .  .  . 

There  is  to-day  only  a  weak  Colombian  garrison  at 


148  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

Panama.  Moreover,  these  men  who  have  been  living 
for  many  years  on  the  Isthmus  have  ceased  to  count  as 
foreigners  to  us.  Our  emotions,  our  aspirations,  are 
theirs.  Their  general,  Huertas,  a  valiant  soldier,  who 
has  his  troops  well  in  hand,  is  himself  shocked  at  the  way 
Colombia  is  behaving  towards  Panama. 

A  revolution  would  to-day  meet  with  no  obstacle. 
But  the  Colombians  have  the  command  of  the  sea;  their 
ships'  crews  are  loyal.  We  must  first,  therefore,  acquire 
a  fleet  to  prevent  Colombia  from  overwhelming  with  her 
troops  the  Province  of  Panama. 

Besides  this  we  want  arms.  It  was  to  obtain  ships  and 
arms  that  I  have  come  here.  Our  first  envoy,  Captain 
Beers,  had  been  assured,  and  the  same  pledge  was  re- 
peated to  me  when  I  came,  that  the  United  States  would 
give  us  all  the  money  we  needed  to  buy  arms  and  ships 
and  pay  the  troops.  .  .  .  We  need  $6,ooo,cx)0. 

Let  it  be  noted  that  it  was  September  22,,  1903, 
when  Dr.  Amador  told  the  story  just  described. 
At  that  time  only  a  few  citizens  of  the  Isthmus 
had  considered  revolution.  No  effort  had  been 
made  to  promote  discontent  on  the  Isthmus.  No 
effort  had  been  made  to  promote  a  general  upris- 
ing. No  preparation  had  yet  been  made  for  an 
organized  revolt.  Real  revolutions  are  not  the 
product  of  such  methods.  An  Isthmus  "seething 
with  revolution'*  was  not  an  element  of  th^  suc- 
cess. Protection  of  secession  by  an  adequate 
fleet  was  the  only  method  that  was  considered. 
Our  navy  had  such  a  fleet,  and  the  Canal  Zone 
was  in  the  Province  of  Panama.     The  only  prep- 


The  Vaudeville  Revolution  on  Isthmus     149 

aration  needed  was  a  bargain — an  understanding. 
Our  Administration  had  what  the  separatists  on 
the  Isthmus  needed  to  succeed  (a  fleet)  and  they 
offered  what  we  wanted  (the  Canal  Zone). 

The  secessionists  needed  warships  to  control 
the  sea  in  order  to  prevent  Colombia  from  land- 
ing troops  on  the  Isthmus.  There  was  no  other 
way  in  which  Colombia  could  send  troops  to 
maintain  her  sovereignty.  The  United  States 
had  the  warships.  The  money  in  the  provincial 
treasury,  with  the  amount  to  be  advanced  by 
Bunau-Varilla  ($ioo,QOo),  was  enough  to  pur- 
chase official  Colombia  domiciled  on  the  Isthmus. 
Therefore,  if  Colombia  could  be  prevented  from 
landing  additional  troops  on  the  Isthmus,  the  suc- 
cess of  secession  was  assured  in  advance.  This 
was  the  program.  There  was  no  need  of  the 
Isthmus  being  aflame  with  revolution  to  carry  it 
out.  It  was  only  necessary  that  our  Administra- 
tion should  be  "seething  with  revolution." 

The  foregoing  excerpt  shows  the  hopeless  con- 
dition of  the  so-called  revolution  on  September 
2^.  It  was  predicated  on  the  conditional  sup- 
port of  the  United  States.  Seemingly  no  assur- 
ance had  as  yet  been  secured.  Such  assurance 
was  necessary  to  give  it  vitality.     Was  it  secured  ? 

There  is  unmistakable  evidence  that  Bunau- 


ISO  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

Varilla  had  foreknowledge  of  adequate  military 
and  naval  support.  He  claims  to  have  played  a 
role  similar  to  that  of  Sherlock  Holmes,  and  to 
have  found  it  out  without  having  been  told.  His 
narrative,  however,  supplies  the  missing  links 
that  connect  our  Administration  with  the  col- 
laboration in  which  secession  was  arranged. 

In  the  time  intervening  between  September  23 
and  October  10,  Bunau- Varilla  sounded  our  Ad- 
ministration. He  tells  us  in  the  accounts  of  his 
conferences  what  he  wants  us  to  believe  and  not 
what  actually  transpired.  We  find  in  his  Sher- 
lock Holmes  tale  as  given  in  his  book  the  follow- 
ing: 

I  left  the  private  office  of  the  President  [October  10, 
1903]  in  possession  of  all  the  elements  necessary  for 
action. 

I  had  at  last  the  direct  confirmation  of  the  inductions 
which  thus  far  I  had  drawn  solely  from  pure  reasoning: 
the  President  of  the  United  States  was  holding  firm  for 
Panama. 

If  a  revolution  were  to  generate  new  conditions  favor- 
able to  the  acquisition  of  the  Canal  Zone  by  the  United 
States,  President  Roosevelt  would  immediately  seize  the 
opportunity  .  .  .  [interesting!  interesting!]. 

It  remained  for  me  to  discover  the  second  unknown 
quantity.  How  could  a  revolution  be  made  successfully 
at  Panama  without  the  financial  cooperation  of  the 
United  States,  and  without  the  express  promise  of  her 
military  support?  .  .  . 

The  great  and  apparently  unsurmountable  obstacle  was 


The  Vaudeville  Revolution  on  Isthmus     151 

the  obtaining  of  a  sum  of  $6,000,000  for  the  necessary 
armament.  In  trying  to  reduce  this  demand  of  Amador, 
the  light  suddenly  flashed  across  my  mind  during  my 
railway  journey  back  to  New  York. 

What  was  going  to  be  the  use  of  this  $6,000,000,  ac- 
cording to  Amador?  To  buy  ships,  which  would  be 
equipped  for  war  in  order  to  sink  Colombian  ships,  and 
to  prevent  the  transportations  of  troops ! 

But  where  were  these  military  movements  to  be 
feared?  Was  it  in  the  Isthmus  itself?  By  no  means, 
because  the  Treaty  of  1846  gave  the  United  States  the 
right,  and  imposed  upon  her  the  duty,  of  turning  any  bel- 
ligerents away  from  the  line  of  transit. 

Bunau-Varilla  concluded  that  the  $6,000,000 
were  not  needed  as  the  United  States  under  the 
Treaty  of  1846  was  obHgated  to  prohibit  fighting 
within  the  zone  of  the  railroad,  and  that  that 
would  automatically  prevent  Colombia  from 
maintaining  her  sovereignty  over  the  area  needed 
for  canal  purposes.  Is  this  construction  of  the 
Treaty  of  1846  correct  ?  Suffice  it  to  say  that  the 
construction  of  this  Treaty  from  its  adoption  to 
the  assumption  of  the  Presidency  by  Theodore 
Roosevelt  is  contained  in  a  letter  addressed  to 
our  Minister  in  Bogota  by  Secretary  of  State, 
Hamilton  Fish.     It  reads : 

By  the  Treaty  of  1846  with  New  Granada  this  Gov- 
ernment has  engaged  to  guarantee  the  neutrality  of  the 
Isthmus  of  Panama.  This  engagement,  however,  has 
never  been  acknowledged  to  embrace  the  duty  of  protect- 
ing the  road  across  it  from  the  violence  of  local  factions ; 


152  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

but  it  is  regarded  as  the  undoubted  duty  of  the  Colombian 
Government  to  protect  it  against  attacks  from  local  in- 
surgents. 

You  are  consequently  requested  to  address  a  repre- 
sentation upon  this  subject  to  the  Colombian  minister  for 
foreign  affairs,  and  to  ask  that  a  sufficient  force  be  kept 
on  the  Isthmus  to  deter  attacks  upon  the  road. 

Instead  of  it  being  the  duty  of  the  United 
States  to  exclude  the  sovereign,  Colombia,  from 
the  line  of  railroad  for  military  purposes  she  was, 
in  accordance  with  the  earlier  construction  of  the 
Treaty  of  1846,  obligated  not  to  interfere  with 
her  in  the  maintenance  of  order  on  the  Isthmus. 
If  the  guarantee  of  the  United  States  under  the 
Treaty  of  1846  during  the  fifty-five  years  that  it 
had  then  been  in  force  did  not  lead  to  independ- 
ence— especially  in  1885  and  in  1899- 1902,  when 
there  were  formidable  revolts — how  could  it  be 
expected  to  do  so  in  1903  without  any  prepara- 
tion whatever?  Bunau-Varilla  nowhere  ex- 
plains.    We  will  again  quote  from  his  book: 

I  had  myself  seen  the  United  States,  in  1885,  perform- 
ing her  duty  and  preventing  any  fighting  in  this  zone 
[between  the  watersheds  of  the  Chagres  and  of  the  Pana- 
man  Rio  Grande],  .  .  . 

It  may  be  remembered  that  in  1885  a  Revolutionary 
army  commanded  by  General  Aizpuru  had  seized  Pan- 
ama. The  town  once  taken,  the  American  troops  had 
entered  Panama  to  prevent  disorder.  But  when  it  was 
seen  that  the  Revolutionary  Government  was  maintain- 


The  Vaudeville  Revolution  on  Isthmus     153 

ing  order,  the  American  forces  were  withdrawn,  and 
they  confined  themselves  to  garrisoning  the  railroad  and 
its  wharf,  the  sole  [interesting  with  a?]  means  of  com- 
munication with  the  Pacific  Ocean. 

Some  days  later,  two  ships  laden  with  Government 
troops  tried  to  land  at  the  wharf. 

General  Reyes,  who  commanded  the  Colombian  troops, 
was  invited  to  withdraw,  and  the  landing  was  forbidden 
by  Commander  McCalla. 

I  had  seen  with  my  own  eyes,  therefore,  in  1885,  the 
Revolution  protected  from  the  aggression  of  the  Gov- 
ernment troops  by  the  American  military  authorities. 

The  foregoing  is  a  garbled  and  grossly  inac- 
curate account  of  the  Isthmian  events  in  the 
spring  of  1885.  It  shows  a  deliberate  attempt 
to  bear  false  witness  in  order  to  dissipate  the 
suspicion  resting  on  the  Roosevelt  Administra- 
tion for  complicity  in  the  Isthmian  disturbance 
of  1903.  We  will  let  official  documents  tell  the 
actual  story.  The  first  is  a  telegram  from  the 
Secretary  of  the  Navy,  Whitney,  to  Rear  Ad- 
miral Jouett,  dated  April  3,  1885.  It  was  sent 
because  an  American  steamship  had  been  seized 
at  Colon,  its  cargo  had  been  taken  from  her,  and 
her  officers  and  the  American  consul  had  been 
imprisoned.  The  parts  bearing  on  the  subject 
matter  under  consideration  read: 

The  duty  you  are  called  upon  to  perform  calls  for  the 
exercise  of  great  discretion.  The  object  of  the  expedi- 
tion is  the  protection  by  the  United  States  of  its  citizens. 


154  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

to  preserve  the  neutrality  and  keep  open  the  transit  from 
Colon  to  Panama,  and  further  to  protect  the  lives  and 
property  of  American  citizens.  .  .  . 

You  have  no  part  to  perform  in  the  political  or  social 
disorder  of  Colombia,  and  it  will  be  your  duty  to  see  that 
no  irritation  or  unfriendliness  shall  arise  from  your  pres- 
ence at  the  Isthmus. 

Thus  events  that  had  transpired  were  to  be 
adjusted  through  diplomatic  channels.  The 
Rear  Admiral  was  sent  to  protect  American  in- 
terests without  offense  to  the  sovereign,  Colom- 
bia. The  following  telegram  from  Rear  Admiral 
Jouett  to  Commander  McCalla,  dated  April  17, 
1885,  clinches  this  point: 

In  order  to  preserve  the  strict  neutrality  of  the  Isth- 
mus of  Panama,  and  to  avoid  interruption  to  the  transit, 
you  will  please  prevent  any  insurgent  force  from  landing 
or  operating  in  this  vicinity. 

The  United  States  clearly  recognized  that  the 
rights  of  the  sovereign  were  supreme.  Her  ef- 
forts to  protect  American  lives  and  property 
and  to  keep  the  line  of  transit  open  were  in  co- 
operation with  the  sovereign.  Only  the  in- 
surgents were  restrained.  This  point  is  reen- 
f orced  in  a  telegram  sent  by  Rear  Admiral  Jouett 
to  Secretary  Whitney,  dated  April  17,  1885.  In 
this  telegram,  the  Rear  Admiral  informed  the 
Secretary  of  his  arrival,  and  states : 


The  Vaudeville  Revolution  on  Isthmus     155 

As  Colonel  Ulloa  was  the  only  representative  of  the 
Colombian  Government  in  this  vicinity,  I  immediately 
addressed  a  letter  to  him,  informing  him  of  my  arrival 
and  requesting  his  permission  to  land  men  for  the  protec- 
tion of  American  lives  and  property  and  preserving  the 
free  transit  of  the  Isthmus.  He  replied  that  he  could 
see  no  objection  to  landing  the  men,  and  that  he  would 
forward  my  letter  to  the  Government  at  Bogota. 

In  1885  the  United  States  asked  permission  to 
land  forces  on  the  Isthmus.  The  rights  of  the 
sovereign  were  respected.  In  1903,  the  sovereign 
was  prohibited  from  landing  forces  on  the  Isth- 
mus for  the  maintenance  of  order.  In  1885  the 
sovereign  was  accorded  every  facility  to  establish 
order. 

Thus  the  official  documents  completely  dis- 
credit Bunau-Varilla.  He  had  advance  informa- 
tion that  the  United  States  would  protect  seces- 
sion within  forty-eight  hours  after  the  event. 
He  is  attempting  to  explain  how  he  came  thereby. 
Therefore,  the  importance  of  our  discrediting 
him  as  the  narrative  unfolds.  It  will  leave  him 
with  advance  information — unexplained  by  him. 
In  a  communication  to  Secretary  Whitney,  dated 
April  18,  1885,  Rear  Admiral  Jouett  clearly 
states  the  spirit  of  American  intervention: 

Panama  is  still  held  by  the  insurgents,  and  until  the 
Government  forces  reestablish  themselves  in  that  city, 
serious  disorder  is  likely  to  occur  there  at  any  time. 


156  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

It  is  probable  that  the  Government  troops  who  have 
put  down  the  revolution  in  the  interior  will  soon  come  to 
Panama  and  take  charge.  In  that  event,  I  would  advise 
the  immediate  withdrawal  of  one-half  of  the  force  sent 
by  steamer  from  New  York,  and  afterwards,  as  circum- 
stances permit,  the  gradual  reduction  of  our  force  to  an 
establishment  which  can  be  maintained  here  without  in- 
termission. 

Order  was  maintained  by  our  forces  until  the 
Government  succeeded  in  reestablishing  its 
authority.  This  also  shoves  that  Bunau-Varilla 
is  guilty  of  willful  misrepresentation. 

But,  General  Reyes,  who  commanded  the 
Colombian  troops,  was  prevented  from  landing 
certain  troops  just  arrived.  Again  an  official 
document  will  tell  the  true  story.  It  is  by  Com- 
mander McCalla  to  the  Commander-in-Chief  of 
the  Colombian  forces  at  Panama,  dated  April  28, 
1885,  and  reads: 

I  have  the  distinguished  honor  ...  to  inform  you  that 
for  the  protection  of  the  transit  across  the  Isthmus,  and 
for  the  protection  of  Americans  and  their  property,  I 
occupy  the  railroad  station  at  this  place  with  a  United 
States  naval  force. 

My  lines  for  this  purpose  necessarily  extend  from  the 
railroad  wharves  to  the  passenger  station  at  the  bridge. 

May  I  beg  leave  to  request  that  the  national  force  un- 
der your  command  may  be  directed  not  to  land  within 
my  lines. 

I  shall  take  the  first  opportunity  of  paying  my  respects 
to  you ;  meanwhile  I  shall  be  most  happy  to  place  my  per- 
sonal services  at  your  disposition. 


The  Vaudeville  Revolution  on  Isthmus     157 

The  note  from  which  the  last  quotation  is  made 
was  transmitted  by  the  agency  of  Lieutenant 
Reeder.  During  the  conversation,  General 
Reyes  stated  to  Lieutenant  Reeder  that  he  was 
having  the  Rio  Grande,  south  of  the  city,  ex- 
amined with  the  view  of  finding  out  whether  he 
would  be  able  to  land  his  forces  in  the  vicinity. 
They  did  land. 

On  the  following  day  there  was  a  conference 
attended  by  General  Reyes  for  Colombia,  General 
Aizpuru  for  the  insurgents,  and  Rear  Admiral 
Jouett,  The  conference  resulted  in  an  agree- 
ment being  signed  between  General  Reyes  and 
General  Aizpuru  by  which  the  latter  agreed  to 
surrender. 

This  shows  that  the  American  military  au- 
thorities did  not  protect  the  insurgents.  Bunau- 
Varilla's  inference  vanishes  as  the  actual  facts 
are  stated. 

Our  best  witness  is  Grover  Cleveland.  His 
word  was  as  good  as  his  bond  throughout  the 
length  and  breadth  of  the  land.  His  message  to 
the  Congress  in  the  following  December  leaves 
no  doubt  as  to  the  course  that  the  United  States 
pursued.  It  completely  disposes  of  the  preten- 
sions of  Bunau-Varilla,  and  with  it  vanishes  the 
inference.     The  section  of  the  message  devoted 


158  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

to  our  intervention  in  the  uprising  on  the  Isthmus 
states : 

Emergencies  growing  out  of  the  civil  war  in  the  United 
States  of  Colombia  demanded  of  the  Government  at  the 
beginning  of  this  Administration  the  employment  of 
armed  force  to  fulfill  its  guarantee  under  the  thirty-fifth 
article  of  the  Treaty  of  1846,  in  order  to  keep  the  transit 
open  across  the  Isthmus  of  Panama. 

Desirous  of  exercising  only  the  powers  expressly  re- 
served to  us  by  the  treaty,  and  mindful  of  the  rights  of 
Colombia,  the  forces  sent  to  the  Isthmus  were  instructed 
to  confine  their  action  to  ^'positively  and  efficaciously" 
preventing  the  transit  and  its  accessories  from  being  "in- 
terrupted or  embarrassed." 

The  execution  of  this  delicate  and  responsible  task  nec- 
essarily involved  police  control  where  the  local  authority 
was  temporarily  powerless,  but  always  in  aid  of  the  sov- 
ereignty in  Colombia. 

The  prompt  and  successful  fulfillment  of  its  duty  by 
this  Government  was  highly  appreciated  by  the  Govern- 
ment of  Colombia,  and  has  been  followed  by  expressions 
of  its  satisfaction.  .  .  .  The  restoration  of  peace  on  the 
Isthmus  by  the  reestablishment  of  the  constituted  Gov- 
ernment there  being  accomplished,  the  forces  of  the 
United  States  were  withdrawn. 

We  have  now  shown  that  events  on  the  Isth- 
mus in  the  spring  of  1885  were  other  than  as 
stated  by  Bunau-Varilla.  This  is  of  controlling 
importance  in  our  argument.  It  was  the  repre- 
sentations which  he  made  to  the  separatists  that 
caused  secession.  These  representations  indi- 
cated   foreknowledge    that    the    United    States 


The  Vaudeville  Revolution  on  Isthmus     159 

would  protect  secession.  These  representations 
caused  those  interested  in  secession  to  proceed 
with  the  project.  It  is  because  of  this  fact  that 
we  give  his  explanation  with  great  detail,  and 
answer  it  with  official  documents  woven  into  a 
narrative.  We  hope  to  leave  him  at  the  end  of 
our  argument  securely  in  possession  of  the  ad- 
vance information  which  resulted  in  the  estab- 
lishment of  the  so-called  Republic  of  Panama, 
and  with  a  demolished  explanation  as  to  how  he 
came  by  the  information. 

We  will  now  sidestep  the  story  of  Bunau- 
Varilla  until  we  have  presented  data  which  point 
to  the  correctness  of  the  conclusion  we  are  de- 
veloping. This  done,  we  will  conclude  the  story 
of  Bunau-Varilla  and  our  interpretation  of  it. 

We  will  commence  with  the  statement  made 
by  Dr.  Amador  to  General  Amaya  of  Colombia 
on  November  4,  found  in  the  report  of  the  latter 
to  the  Colombian  Minister  of  War  dated  Novem- 
ber 14,  1903: 

Dr.  Amador,  an  old  friend  of  mine,  came  to  see  me 
within  a  few  hours  of  my  being  placed  in  jail,  and  he  said 
to  me  textually,  "  You  must  understand  that  we  who 
started  this  movement  are  not  insane;  we  fully  appreci- 
ated the  fact  that  in  no  case  could  we  withstand  all  the 
rest  of  the  nation,  and  in  consequence  we  had  to  resort 


i6o  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

to  means  that,  although  painful,  were  indispensable. 
The  United  States  has  fully  entered  into  this  movement, 
and  the  Panamans  are  not  alone,  as  in  every  event  they 
will  back  up  our  actions.  Not  another  Colombian  sol- 
dier will  ever  disembark  again  on  any  of  the  coasts  of 
the  Isthmus,  and  our  independence  is  guaranteed  by  that 
colossus."  He  offered  me  his  services  and  said  that  he 
wished  to  present  his  respects  to  my  chief,  to  whom  I 
heard  him  make  similar  assertions,  which,  unfortunately, 
were  corroborated  by  the  increasing  number  of  warships 
of  that  power  in  both  seas,  and  by  the  disembarkation  of 
its  forces  to  mock  our  weakness. 

And  yet,  according  to  Roosevelt,  the  Isthmus 
was  "seething  with  revolution !"  We — some  ten 
— who  started  this  movement  are  not  mad! 
There  is  no  evidence  that  the  Isthmus  was 
"seething  with  revolution/'  There  is  only  evi- 
dence of  duplicity.  But,  truth  matches.  Those 
who  arranged  and  carried  out  secession  from 
Panama  to  Washington  cannot  blot  out  history. 
The  true  story  of  the  birth  of  the  so-called  Re- 
public of  Panama  is  being  recorded.  General 
Tovar,  in  his  report  to  the  Colombian  Minister 
of  War,  dated  November  20,  1903,  states: 

The  solitary  confinement  in  which  I  was  kept  from  the 
afternoon  of  the  3d  was  broken  on  the  evening  of  the  fol- 
lowing day  by  the  visit  which  Senor  Manuel  Amador 
Guerrero,  principal  leader  of  the  revolutionary  move- 
ment, paid  me  in  my  prison.  Dr.  Amador,  after  having 
spoken  with  General  Amaya,  had  me  brought  down  from 
the  room  I  occupied  at  police  headquarters,  and  informed 


The  Vaudeville  Revolution  on  Isthmus     i6i 

me  that  events  which  had  taken  place  on  the  previous 
evening  were  the  result  of  a  plan  for  a  long  time  con- 
ceived and  discussed  at  length  in  Panama  and  in  Wash- 
ington, and  executed  under  the  protection  and  guaranty 
of  the  Government  of  the  United  States  with  which  he 
personally  had  recently  come  to  an  understanding  .  .  . 
that  in  consequence  it  was  ridiculous  to  suppose  that  the 
Panamans  could  have  successfully  defied  the  rest  of  the 
republic,  and  for  the  same  reason  all  resistance  on  my 
part  would  be  quite  useless;  that  therefore  I  ought  to 
order  the  reembarkation  of  the  battalion  Tiradores  which 
remained  in  Colon,  taking  advantage  for  this  purpose  of 
the  royal  mail  steam  packet  Orinoco,  then  in  that  port, 
and  thus  avoiding  in  a  spirit  of  humanity  the  shedding 
of  blood.  At  the  same  time  he  informed  me  that  there 
were  in  Colon  several  American  warships  which  had 
come  to  protect  the  revolutionary  movement.  I  an- 
swered Sefior  Amador  that  I  would  take  no  account  of 
what  he  had  just  told  me,  as  my  duty  and  the  duty  of  the 
army  I  commanded  was  sufficiently  clear,  and  that  in 
consequence  no  human  force  could  drag  from  me  the 
order  that  he  desired.  I  considered  my  conference  with 
him  at  an  end,  and  turned  to  be  conducted  back  to  my 
prison,  where  I  learned  that  a  similar  proposition  had 
been  made  to  General  Amaya,  but  without  success. 

Dr.  Porras,  one  of  the  loyal  Colombians  on  the 
Isthmus,  was  also  arrested  and  confined  in  the 
police  barracks.  General  Aizpuru  of  the  muni- 
cipal council  of  Panama  called  on  him  and  told 
him  that  the  separatists'  movement  was  the  work 
of  only  a  few  leaders.  This  dialogue  as  re- 
corded in  the  hearings  before  the  House  Com- 
mittee on  Foreign  Relations  clinches  the  story  of 


1 62  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

collusion  between  our  Administration  and  the 
separatists  on  the  Isthmus.  It  starts  with  Gen- 
eral Aizpuru  saying: 

Yes ;  but  the  Republic  of  Panama  is  an  accomplished 
fact,  as  you  will  soon  be  convinced. 

I  cannot  believe  it  [answered  Doctor  Porras].  Co- 
lombia will  soon  call  Panama  to  account  for  her  temerity 
and  ingratitude. 

The  Government  of  Colombia  will  not  be  able  to  do 
anything  in  the  matter  [was  Aizpuru's  answer].  Pan- 
ama is  under  the  protection  of  the  United  States;  if  it 
were  not  it  would  have  recognized  its  helplessness  and 
would  not  have  attempted  its  freedom. 

We  are  now  in  a  position  to  see  why  the  newly 
arrived  Colombian  soldiers  acted  as  they  did.  In- 
stead of  the  entire  Isthmus  being  aflame  with 
revolution,  an  inner  circle  of  Panama  used  with 
telling  effect  their  assurance  of  the  support  of 
the  United  States  and  its  tangible  evidence — the 
presence  of  the  Nashville  and  the  refusal  of  the 
railroad  company  to  transport  troops.  So  Colo- 
nel Torres  decided  to  reembark  his  soldiers  for 
the  return  to  Cartagena.  The  following  tele- 
gram to  Secretary  Hay,  dated  November  5,  1903, 
speaks  for  itself: 

All  Colombian  soldiers  at  Colon  now,  7  p.  m.,  going  on 
board  Royal  Mail  steamer  returning  to  Cartagena.  Ves- 
sel, supposed  to  be  Dixie,  in  sight. 

What  was  the  effect  of  the  presence  of  the 


The  Vaudeville  Revolution  on  Isthmus     163 

American  marines  on  the  Colombian  troops  at 
Colon?  The  following  from  an  official  commu- 
nication of  Commander  Hubbard  of  the  Nash- 
ville, dated  November  5,  1903,  tells  the  story: 

I  am  positive  that  the  determined  attitude  of  our  men, 
their  coolness  and  evident  intention  of  standing  their 
ground,  had  a  most  salutary  and  decisive  effect  on  the 
immediate  situation,  and  was  the  initial  step  in  the  ulti- 
mate abandoning  of  Colon  by  these  troops  and  their 
return  to  Cartagena  the  following  day. 

Does  this  sound  like  keeping  the  line  of  transit 
open?  It  had  only  been  closed  to  the  sovereign 
up  to  that  time.  The  Isthmians  were  not  pre- 
pared for  military  operations,  and,  therefore, 
there  was  no  obstruction  to  transit  threatened  or 
imminent.  This  was  the  only  time  in  the  history 
of  the  Treaty  of  1846  that  troops  of  the  sovereign 
were  expelled  from  the  Isthmus  by  our  forces. 

Our  Administration  clearly  ordered  the  Nash- 
ville to  Colon  for  the  unlawful  purpose  of  inter- 
fering with  the  sovereign  rights  of  Colombia  and 
of  effecting  her  dismemberment.  This  is  as  re- 
pugnant to  morality  as  collaboration  with  the 
separatists  of  Panama  to  effect  the  dismember- 
ment of  Colombia  and  to  estabHsh  the  so-called 
Republic  of  Panama.  We  will  give  the  telegram 
to  the  commander  of  the  Nashville,  dated  Novem- 


164  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

ber  2,  1903,  because  of  its  significance  when  sub- 
jected to  careful  examination: 

Maintain  free  and  uninterrupted  transit.  If  interrup- 
tion threatened  by  armed  force,  occupy  the  line  of  rail- 
road. Prevent  landing  of  any  armed  force  with  hostile 
intent,  either  Government  or  insurgent,  either  at  Colon, 
Porto  Bello,  or  other  point.  Send  copy  of  instructions 
to  the  senior  officer  present  at  Panama  upon  arrival  of 
Boston.  Have  sent  copy  of  instructions  and  have  tele- 
graphed Dixie  to  proceed  with  all  possible  dispatch  from 
Kingston  to  Colon.  Government  force  reported  ap- 
proaching the  Isthmus  in  vessels.  Prevent  their  landing 
if  in  your  judgment  this  would  precipitate  a  conflict. 

On  November  2,  1903,  there  were  no  insurgents 
in  the  Province  of  Panama.  The  Roosevelt  Ad- 
ministration must  have  known — did  know — that 
the  separatists  had  no  ships  and  so  could  not 
project  a  military  movement  by  water.  The 
order  to  the  commander  of  the  Nashville,  there- 
fore, was  designed  to  prevent  Colombia  (the 
sovereign)  from  landing  troops  in  her  own  terri- 
tory. It  was  an  order  equivalent  to  assuring  the 
success  of  secession  before  there  was  secession 
— before  any  Isthmians  bore  arms.  The  sepa- 
ratists were  not  prepared  to  bear  arms.  It  was 
not  on  the  program  that  they  should.  Secession 
was  to  be  bloodless.  Therefore,  our  marines 
were  to  be  the  military  end  of  the  so-called  revo- 
lution.    To  hold  that  collaboration  is  not  the 


The  Vaudeville  Revolution  on  Isthmus     165 

prelude  to  the  foregoing  does  violence  to  reason 
and  to  common  sense. 

Before  dealing  with  the  change  in  the  tradi- 
tional American  Isthmian  policy,  we  will  take  a 
backward  look,  and,  in  so  doing,  get  our  bear- 
ings. Bunau-Varilla  states  that  he  assured  the 
separatists  that  the  United  States  would  protect 
secession.  We  learn  from  those  interested  in  se- 
cession that  they  acted  on  the  assurance  of 
Bunau-Varilla  when  it  was  supported  by  tangible 
evidence — the  arrival  of  the  Nashville  at  Colon 
on  November  2,  1903.  Dr.  Amador,  first  Presi- 
dent of  the  Republic  of  Panama,  stated  that  they 
knew  that  the  United  States  would  not  allow 
Colombia  to  attack  them.  The  history  of  the 
United  States  in  relation  to  the  Treaty  of  1846 
shows  that  she  would  not  intervene  to  keep  the 
transit  open  save  at  the  request  of  Colombia.  The 
traditional  American  policy  shows  that  Bunau- 
Varilla  could  not  have  inferred  that  the  United 
States  would  protect  secession,  as  the  evidence 
points  to  the  opposite  conclusion.  How  did  he 
become  informed  and  who  informed  him?  As 
already  stated,  the  separatists  staked  their  all  on 
this  knowledge.  We  know  that  their  request  for 
a  man-of-war  at  Colon  caused  Bunau-Varilla  to 


1 66  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

hurry  to  Washington.  He  went  to  Washington 
for  a  sufficient  reason,  and  not  for  a  breath  of 
Washington  ozone.  There  was  domiciled  there 
the  person  who  could  order  a  man-of-war  to 
Colon,  and  the  man-of-war  forthwith  hastened 
to  Colon  with  all  possible  speed.  The  conclusion 
is  apparent.  There  was  an  understanding  be- 
tween Bunau-Varilla  and  our  Administration. 
That  is  how  he  became  informed.  Isthmian 
events  from  November  2,  to  November  6,  1903, 
corroborate  this  conclusion.  The  military  end 
of  secession  was  on  our  gunboats,  the  civil  gov- 
ernment end  of  it  was  at  Panama.  Each  partv 
executed  its  allotted  part. 

The  separatists  at  first  thought  they  needed 
$6,000,000  for  an  effective  revolution.  They  had 
to  have  vessels  of  war  to  prevent  Colombia  from 
landing  her  troops  on  the  Isthmus.  Resistance 
was  otherwise  deemed  impossible.  This  shows 
a  well-thought-out  plan — a  plan  that  depended  for 
fulfillment  on  the  cooperation  of  an  adequate 
navy.  Suddenly  it  was  found  that  a  few  hun- 
dred thousand  dollars  (to  pursuade  official 
Colombia  on  the  Isthmus)  was  all  that  was 
needed.  Why  this  change?  There  is  a  reason. 
It  is  not  of  record.  It  is,  however,  as  indelibly 
written  as  if  it  had  been  committed  to  parchment. 


The  Vaudeville  Revolution  on  Isthmus     167 

Comparison  of  the  instructions  to  our  naval  offi- 
cers prior  to  those  of  November  2,  1903,  with 
those  from  and  after  that  date,  tell  the  story  as 
emphatically  as  any  written  record  could. 

The  so-called  revolution  was  designed  in 
Panama.  After  the  Hay-Herran  treaty  had 
been  rejected  by  Colombia,  the  finishing  touches 
were  put  on  the  project  at  Washington.  It  was 
coordinated  in  collaboration  with  our  Adminis- 
tration. The  only  discordant  note  in  its  smooth 
execution  was  the  appearance  of  Colombian 
troops  earlier  than  expected,  on  November  3, 
1903.  This  compelled  such  a  modification  of  the 
plan  that  footprints  were  left  which  reveal  col- 
laboration. 

We  will  now  deal  with  the  abandonment  of 
our  traditional  Isthmian  policy  under  the  Treaty 
of  1846.  We  have  already  given  the  instruc- 
tions to  our  naval  officers  in  Isthmian  waters  dur- 
ing the  administration  of  Grover  Cleveland. 
They  should  perhaps  be  reread  at  this  point  so 
that  the  contrast  between  them  and  those  of 
November  2,  1903,  may  be  clearly  seen.  During 
McKinley's  Administration  the  following  tele- 
gram, dated  July  25,  1900,  was  sent  to  our  Consul 
at  Panama : 


1 68  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

You  are  directed  to  protest  against  any  act  of  hostility 
which  may  involve  or  imperil  the  safe  and  peaceful  tran- 
sit of  persons  or  property  across  the  Isthmus  of  Panama. 
The  bombardment  of  Panama  would  have  this  effect,  and 
the  United  States  must  insist  upon  the  neutrality  of  the 
Isthmus  as  guaranteed  by  the  treaty. 

This  was  simply  a  protest  in  advance  of  harm. 
It  was  merely  a  request  that  Colombia  pursue  a 
certain  course.  In  it  we  find  no  evidence  that  it 
was  then  held  that  the  United  States  could  law- 
fully prevent  Colombia  from  landing  troops  on 
the  Isthmus. 

This  brings  the  dispatches  to  our  naval  officers 
in  Isthmian  waters  down  to  the  Roosevelt  Ad- 
ministration. The  telegram  of  November  20, 
1901,  to  our  Consul  at  Panama  first  demands 
attention : 

Notify  all  parties  molesting  or  interfering  with  free 
transit  across  the  Isthmus  that  such  interference  must 
cease  and  that  the  United  States  will  prevent  the  inter- 
ruption of  traffic  upon  the  railroad.  Consult  with  cap- 
tain of  the  Iowa,  who  will  be  instructed  to  land  marines, 
if  necessary,  for  the  protection  of  the  railroad,  in  accord- 
ance with  the  treaty  rights  and  obligations  of  the  United 
States.     Desirable  to  avoid  bloodshed,  if  possible. 

This  order  merely  demanded  that  interruption 
of  the  Isthmian  transit  cease,  and  provided  the 
means  for  the  order's  enforcement.  It  clearly 
recognized  the  duty  of  the  sovereign  to  protect 


I 


The  Vaudeville  Revolution  on  Isthmus     169 

the  transit  in  the  first  instance.  The  United 
States  would  intervene  only  in  case  of  necessity. 
The  order  sent  by  Secretary  Hay  to  Com- 
mander Perry  of  the  Iowa,  dated  November  20, 
1 90 1,  reads: 

Notify  all  persons,  including  leader  insurgents,  inter- 
ference with  transit  must  immediately  cease,  otherwise 
you  will  land  force  and  maintain  free  transit  and  tele- 
graphic communications. 

The  result  of  the  order  last  given  is  shown  in 
a  telegram  by  Commander  Perry  to  Secretary 
Long,  dated  November  21,  1901 : 

Everything  quiet.  No  further  interference  since  no- 
tification. Transit  and  telegraphic  communication  open. 
Shall  land  force  if  there  should  be  further  interference. 
Colon  in  possession  of  liberals  and  quiet. 

The  truth  of  the  matter  is  that  the  contending 
forces  feared  the  United  States  to  such  an  extent 
that  battles  would  halt  to  permit  trains  to  pass, 
and  be  resumed  when  these  were  beyond  the  zone 
of  conflict.  Because  of  this  fact,  it  was  found 
necessary  to  employ  American  forces  on  the  Isth- 
mus only  164  days,  from  the  date  of  the  supersed- 
ing of  the  New  Granada  government  by  that  of 
Colombia,  to  November,  1903.  During  the  164 
days  traffic  on  the  Panama  railroad  was  merely 
irregular,  but  not  suspended.     When  this  slight 


170  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

inconvenience  is  contrasted  with  the  benefits 
which  accrued  to  the  United  States  under  the 
Treaty  of  1846,  it  is  wholly  negligible. 

Such  was  the  situation  when  the  formidable 
telegrams  of  November  2,  1903,  were  sent  to  our 
naval  forces  in,  or  presently  to  be  in,  Isthmian 
waters.  Roosevelt's  wrath  toward  Colombia  can 
only  be  referred  to  as  "Much  Ado  About  Noth- 
ing.'' 

The  following  telegram  by  Commander  Mc- 
Crea  to  Secretary  Long,  dated  November  24, 
1 90 1,  is  apropos  as  it  occurred  during  the  Roose- 
velt Administration: 

Gunboat  Pinzon  here  with  600  troops.  Have  forbid- 
den bombardment  until  non-combatants  can  be  removed. 
Have  requested  Liberals  not  to  fire  on  Pinzon  without 
attempted  landing.  Shall  landing  with  incidental  firing 
be  permitted  at  American  wharves?  Request  instruc- 
tions. 

He  was  not  instructed  to  prevent  the  ves- 
sel named  from  landing  within  fifty  miles  of 
Panama!  The  Roosevelt  Administration  was 
not  seeking  title  to  the  Canal  Zone  from  insur- 
gents at  that  time.  What  a  difference!  The 
orders  and  instructions  to  the  fall  of  1902  (we 
will  deal  with  those  of  1902  in  another  chapter 
of  this  book)  were  in  accordance  with  Colombia's 
understanding  of  the   Treaty  of   1846.     They 


I 


The  Vaudeville  Revolution  on  Isthmus     171 

sought,  in  authorized  ways,  to  safeguard  Isth- 
mian transit  from  actual  interruption,  and  con- 
stituted no  assault  upon  either  the  supreme  juris- 
diction or  the  supremely  free  action  of  Colombia. 
The  instructions  of  November  2,  1903,  grossly 
violated  each  of  the  foregoing.  They  had  prime 
reference  to  a  mythical  political  insurrection 
against  Colombia's  territorial  integrity  and  na- 
tional control,  with  no  reference  whatsoever  to 
transit  interruption.  They  laid  violent  hands  on 
Colombia's  sovereignty  and  forcibly  prevented 
her  from  taking  precautionary  measures.  Co- 
lombia was  suddenly  and  peremptorily  restrained 
from  making  free  disposition  of  her  own  troops 
on  her  own  soil. 

The  separatists  of  Panama  knew  that  if  they 
would  go  through  the  trifling  acts  of  raising  a 
flag  and  of  adopting  a  Declaration  of  Independ- 
ence, the  American  Navy  would  do  the  rest. 
Then  they  could  proceed  to  organize  a  civil  gov- 
ernment while  the  American  Navy  would  patrol 
Isthmian  waters  and  prevent  Colombia  from  in- 
terfering with  the  establishment  of  the  so-called 
Republic  of  Panama.  And  this  is  the  Province 
of  Panama  that  was  ''seething  with  Revolution'' ! 
A  microscope  would  have  been  needed  to  discover 
it. 


172  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

The  altered  instructions  to  our  men-of-war  in 
Isthmian  waters  disclose  design.  The  lack  of 
domestic  preparation  for  resistance  to  Colombia 
shows  that  the  Junta  knew  the  design.  How 
did  they  become  informed  ?  Who  could  have  in- 
formed them?  There  was  but  one  person  that 
could  alter  the  traditional  instructions  to  our 
naval  commanders,  and  that  was  the  Commander- 
in-Chief  of  our  Army  and  Navy — the  President, 

The  Senate,  by  a  resolution  dated  January  22, 
1904,  asked  the  President  to  inform  them  as  to 
when  the  United  States  forces  were  used  in  ful- 
fillment of  the  Treaty  of  1846,  (i)  at  the  request 
of  the  sovereign,  (2)  on  its  own  initiative.  The 
reply  was  prepared  by  Acting-Secretary  of  State 
Francis  B.  Loomis.  It  shows  that  during  the 
fifty-five  years  that  the  treaty  was  in  force,  the 
American  forces  were  used  seven  times,  and  that 
only  once  were  they  landed  on  our  own  initiative, 
and  even  at  that  time  the  Colombian  Government 
was  duly  notified.  This  was  in  1902,  that  is,  dur- 
ing the  Roosevelt  Administration.  The  Colom- 
bian official  on  the  Isthmus  protested.  This  con- 
struction of  the  Treaty  of  1846  was  not  acquiesced 
in  by  Colombia,  and  was  the  controlling  reason 
for  its  rejection  of  the  Hay-Herran  treaty.  It, 
therefore,  cannot  serve  as  a  precedent  for  the 


I 


The  Vaudeville  Revolution  on  Isthmus     173 

action  of  1903,  which  is  indeed  without  a  pre- 
cedent. 

In  Senate  Document  No.  143,  Second  Session, 
Fifty-eighth  Congress,  we  find  Acting-Secretary 
Loomis'  summary  after  a  detailed  answer  to  the 
foregoing  request  of  the  Senate.  It  is  as  fol- 
lows: 

It  appears  from  the  correspondence  transmitted  here- 
with that  on  one  occasion  United  States  forces  were 
landed  solely  on  the  initiative  of  the  United  States — 
namely,  in  September,  1902 — when  the  Panama  authori- 
ties were  duly  notified  of  the  proposed  landing. 

The  telegrams  of  November  2,  1903,  are  with- 
out a  precedent  in  American  Diplomatic  history. 
For  them,  American  history  ofifers  no  counter- 
part and  international  law  no  sanction.  They 
are  sui  generis.  They  violated  the  constitution 
of  the  United  States,  international  law  and  the 
Treaty  of  1846.  This  will  be  shown  in  other 
chapters  of  this  book. 

While  the  separatists  on  the  Isthmus  were  still 
in  doubt — were  trying  to  resolve  the  unknown 
factor  in  the  situation,  that  is,  the  attitude  of  our 
Government,  the  Nashville  was  speeding  to 
Colon.  Sight  of  it  would  resolve  the  doubt  and 
precipitate  secession.  Before  their  decision  was 
rendered,  the  following  dispatches  were  sent  to 


174  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

the  Commanders  of  our  men-of-war  which  were 
to  be  in  Isthmian  waters  on  and  after  November 
2,  1903.     To  those  on  the  west  coast : 

Maintain  free  and  uninterrupted  transit.  If  interrup- 
tion is  threatened  by  armed  force,  occupy  the  line  of  rail- 
road. Prevent  landing  of  any  armed  force  with  hostile 
intent,  either  Government  or  insurgent,  at  any  point 
within  50  miles  of  Panama.  Government  force  reported 
approaching  the  Isthmus  in  vessels.  Prevent  their  land- 
ing if,  in  your  judgment,  the  landing  would  precipitate 
a  conflict. 

To  those  on  the  east  coast : 

Maintain  free  and  uninterrupted  transit.  If  interrup- 
tion is  threatened  by  armed  force,  occupy  line  of  rail- 
road. Prevent  landing  of  any  armed  force  with  hostile 
intent,  either  government  or  insurgent,  either  at  Colon, 
Porto  Bello  or  other  point. 

Rooseveh  characterizes  his  course  on  the  Isth- 
mus at  this  time  as  follows : 

Not  only  was  the  course  followed  as  regards  Panama 
right  in  every  detail,  but  there  could  have  been  no  varia- 
tion from  that  course  except  for  the  worse.  We  not 
only  did  what  was  technically  justifiable,  but  we  did  what 
was  demanded  by  every  ethical  consideration,  national 
and  international. 

Our  counterpart  of  this  characterization  is,  in 
the  words  of  Treitschke : 

A  thing  that  is  wholly  a  sham  cannot,  in  this  universe 
of  ours,  endure  forever.  It  may  endure  for  a  day,  but 
its  doom  is  certain. 


The  Vaudeville  Revolution  on  Isthmus     175 

The  explanations  of  Isthmian  events  by  Roose- 
velt and  by  Bunau-Varilla  are  wholly  a  sham. 
They  are  contravened  by  facts.  The  facts  have 
not  suffered ;  the  explanations  have  been  reduced 
to  historical  scrap. 

Bunau-Varilla,  Roosevelt,  Amador  and  others 
interested  in  Isthmian  secession  have  not  profited 
by  the  sage  advice  of  one  Bill  Devery,  'When 
caught  with  the  goods  on,  say  nothing/'  They 
have  talked  too  much.  As  already  shown,  that 
which  is,  true  matches — the  rest  is  scrap.  That 
which  matches  is  the  true  story  of  the  rape  of 
Colombia  by  the  United  States. 

We  will  now  resume  the  story  of  Bunau- 
Varilla.  He  was  telling  how  he  inferred  that 
the  Roosevelt  Administration  would  protect  se- 
cession. We  sidestepped  his  narrative  in  order 
to  introduce  data  in  support  of  our  contention 
that  his  story  is  an  invention. 

Bunau-Varilla  knew  what  the  Administration 
would  do  in  the  event  of  the  secession  of  the 
Province  of  Panama.  He  has  told  us  in  his  book, 
and  it  is  independently  established.  Statements 
by  several  of  the  separatists  show  that  they  acted 
upon  his  assurance.  This  is  corroborated  by  the 
character  of  Isthmian  preparation,  which  was 


176  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

preparation  for  taking  over  the  civil  government 
of  the  Province  of  Panama.  There  was  no  mili- 
tary preparation  such  as  we  find  when  a  real 
revolution  is  projected.  The  secession  of  the 
Province  of  Panama,  was,  therefore,  due  solely 
to  foreknowledge  that  the  Roosevelt  Administra- 
tion would  protect  secession. 

Bunau-Varilla  has  told  us  how  he  became  in- 
formed. We  are  showing  that  he  did  not  become 
informed  in  the  way  he  has  told  us.  His  state- 
ments crumble  when  examined  by  historical 
methods.  What  then  is  the  source  of  his  ad- 
vance information?  Established  facts  will  un- 
erringly reveal  the  source. 

The  revolution  was  to  be  bloodless,  we  are  told ! 
The  uprising  was  to  cover  the  Canal  Zone  and 
the  canal  littoral — the  line  of  the  railroad. 
Bunau-Varilla  is  our  authority.  Ah!  The 
Isthmus  was  not  "seething  with  revolution."  A 
few  men  could  determine  the  extent  of  the  terri- 
tory it  would  cover.  But  the  whole  Isthmus 
arose  as  one  man !  Roosevelt  has  told  us.  These 
are  statements  of  practical  men.  The  one  de- 
sired to  vindicate  Roosevelt;  the  other  sought  to 
justify  precipitate  intervention  by  showing  that 
an  entire  population  arose  and  threw  off  the  yoke 
of  oppression.     They  can't  have  it  both  ways. 


The  Vaudeville  Revolution  on  Isthmus     177 

If  the  Isthmus  was  "seething  with  revolution," 
Bunau-Varilla  did  not  tell  the  truth.  If  the  rev- 
olution could  have  been  confined  to  the  Canal 
Zone  and  the  canal  littoral,  Roosevelt  did  not  tell 
the  truth. 

We  will  let  Bunau-Varilla  continue  his  story. 
We  read  in  his  book  on  Panama : 

In  the  preceding  year  of  1902,  the  same  principle  had 
been  reenforced  at  the  very  moment  of  the  difficult  nego- 
tiations with  M.  Concha,  for  the  grant  of  the  canal  con- 
cession to  the  United  States.  .  .  . 

How  could  it  be  doubted  that  the  American  forces 
would  act  in  the  same  manner  one  year  later,  at  a  time 
when  Colombia  had  taken  a  decidedly  hostile  attitude? 

No  hesitation  was  possible.  The  solution  had  been 
found !  The  mysterious  problem  was  solved  !  The  final 
unknown  quantity  had  been  at  last  discovered  and  the 
equation  resolved,  as  the  French  mathematicians  say,  in 
the  most  elegant  manner. 

It  was  no  longer  necessary  to  spend  enormous  sums  for 
a  useless  war. 

It  was  no  longer  necessary  to  present  the  impossible 
request  for  protection  by  American  forces.  Such  a  thing 
was  indispensable  to  an  insurrection  covering  the  whole 
Province  of  Panama,  but  it  was  eliminated  entirely  if  the 
insurrection  was  limited  to  the  Isthmus,  properly  speak- 
ing. 

If  a  revolution  was  started  from  Colon  to  Panama,  the 
American  forces  were  automatically,  and  without  any 
anterior  understanding,  obliged  to  intervene. 

There  intervention  would  consist  in  forbidding  any 
armed  force  to  come  within  gunshot  of  the  line  of 
transit. 


178  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

All  the  villages,  all  the  houses,  all  the  inhabitants 
within  that  zone,  would  immediately  enjoy  all  necessary 
protection. 

Once  such  military  protection  was  secured,  the  new 
Republic  could  wait. 

These  statements  are  grotesque.  They  hardly 
need  refutation.  We  will  deal  with  the  Isthmian 
events  of  1902  in  the  next  two  chapters  which 
follow.  Suffice  it  to  say  here  that  Bunau- 
Varilla's  statement  of  Isthmian  events  in  1902  is 
as  false  as  was  his  statement  of  those  of  1885. 
There  was  to  be  no  revolution  in  the  fall  of  1903. 
Therefore,  no  military  preparation  was  neces- 
sary. If  there  was  no  military  force  in  Colon 
— there  was  none — what  justification  could  there 
be  for  the  United  States  keeping  out  Colombian 
troops!  Military  preparation  was  necessary  to 
warrant  intervention  on  the  part  of  the  United 
States,  if  intervention  could  be  warranted,  which 
we  deny.  Uprisings  had  not  eventuated  in  an 
independent  government  for  the  Isthmus  in  1885 
or  1902.  Why  now?  The  explanation  of 
Bunau-Varilla  explains  altogether  too  much.  It 
ignores  the  facts.  When  there  is  collision  be- 
tween facts  and  an  explanation,  it  is  the  explana- 
tion which  suffers  and  not  the  facts. 

It  was  clearly  known  to  Bunau-Varilla  that  the 
actual  revolution  was  to  be  on  the  American  gun- 


The  Vaudeville  Revolution  on  Isthmus     179 

boats.  He  does  not  tell  us  who  told  him — who 
gave  him  the  assurance.  His  story  is  interest- 
ing— interesting  in  a  way  other  than  it  was  in- 
tended to  be.  Especially  interesting  is  this  state- 
ment to  Dr.  Amador : 

Doctor  Amador,  the  moment  has  come  to  clear  the 
deck  for  action.  Be  satisfied  with  my  assertions.  There 
is  no  more  time  for  discussing  their  genesis. 

/  can  give  you  the  assurance  that  you  will  he  protected 
hy  the  American  forces  forty-eight  hours  after  you  have 
proclaimed  the  new  Republic  in  the  whole  Isthmus. 

That  secession  would  be  protected  by  American 
forces  was  communicated  to  Dr.  Amador,  a  rep- 
resentative of  the  separatists,  by  Bunau-Varilla, 
as  stated  above.  This  was  immediately  after  one 
of  his  trips  to  Washington.  Was  secession  pro- 
tected? This  question  is  easily  answered.  It 
had  been  arranged  that  the  Province  of  Panama 
was  to  declare  her  independence  on  November  4, 
1903.  This  was  actually  done.  The  Nashville 
arrived  at  Colon  on  November  2.  The  Dixie  (at 
Colon)  and  the  Boston  (at  Panama)  arrived  a 
few  days  later.  The  telegrams  to  their  comman- 
ders, dated  November  2,  1903,  quoted  on  an 
earHer  page,  show  that  the  protection  was  fur- 
nished exactly  as  promised  to  the  separatists  by 
Bunau-Varilla. 


i8o  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

The  question  at  once  arises  how  could  Bunau- 
Varilla  have  given  such  an  assurance?  Events 
show  that  it  was  carried  out  as  given.  Who  gave 
him  the  advance  information?  It  is  an  estab- 
hshed  fact  that  he  had  it.  He  told  us  in  his  book 
that  he  had  it.  After  giving  an  account  of  the 
movement  of  American  warships,  he  observes :  . 

Evidently  the  movements  of  Amador  had  been 
watched,  and  his  departure  for  the  Isthmus  after  his 
conference  with  me  had  raised  suspicions  of  an  early 
explosion  of  the  revolution  after  the  Colombian  Congress 
had  closed  its  session. 

The  sending  of  the  Dixie  to  Guantanamo  showed  the 
preoccupation  of  the  American  Government.  It  did  not 
disguise  its  preoccupation  in  its  communications  to  the 
press.  Does  not  this  simple  fact  in  itself  give  the  lie  to 
the  absurd  and  prejudiced  story  of  a  revolution  organ- 
ized by  the  United  States  Government  ? 

They  had  probably  at  Washington  associated  in  their 
minds  the  departure  of  Amador  and  the  prediction  I  had 
formulated  in  my  interview  with  President  Roosevelt  on 
the  9th  of  October,  and  with  Mr.  Hay  on  the  i6th  as  to 
the  imminent  peril  of  a  revolution.  The  conclusion 
which  must  have  been  reached  was  that  the  departure 
of  Amador  after  his  interviews  with  me  was  the  begin- 
ning of  revolutionary  operations. 

To  think  of  the  Government  at  Washington 
watching  the  movements  of  Amador!  Moving 
men-of-war  as  Amador  moved!  What  hypoc- 
risy !  Soldiers  and  munitions  of  war  were  needed 
for  a  real  revolution.     Therefore,  watching,  if 


The  Vaudeville  Revolution  on  Isthmus     i8i 

any,  would  have  been  on  the  Isthmus.  There 
was  no  watching.  Facts  controvert  the  supposi- 
tion. There  is  no  evidence  of  it.  Instead  of 
watching  there  was  a  dispatch  from  the  Isthmus 
calHng  for  an  American  man-of-war  at  Colon, 
and  making  compliance  a  condition  of  secession. 
Evidence  shows  that  the  Roosevelt  Administra- 
tion came  to  an  understanding  with  the  separa- 
tists through  Bunau-Varilla  as  intermediary  and 
that  it  was  not  engaged  in  watching  the  move- 
ments of  anybody. 

Dr.  Amador  encountered  difficulty  in  persuad- 
ing the  separatists  to  proceed  with  secession.  He 
had  only  oral  assurances  of  protection.  They 
expected  documentary  evidence.  They  insisted 
that  tangible  evidence  of  protection  by  the  forces 
of  the  United  States  should  precede  action.  We 
will  let  Bunau-Varilla  state  the  situation : 

One  of  them  [separatists]  must  have  arisen  and  said: 
"If  Bunau-Varilla  is  so  powerful,  let  him  prove  it.  He 
says  we  shall  be  protected  forty-eight  hours  after  estab- 
lishing the  new  Republic.  Well?  We  will  believe  him, 
if  he  is  capable  of  sending  an  American  man-of-war  to 
Colon  at  our  request."  .  .  .  The  whole  question  of  the 
life  and  death  of  the  canal  was  condensed  in  the  follow- 
ing words:  An  American  man-of-war  must  be  sent  to 
Colon. 

If  I  succeeded  in  this  task  the  canal  was  saved.  If  I 
failed,  it  was  lost.  ... 


1 82  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

I  could  just  as  well  think  it  over  in  the  train  [to  Wash- 
ington] as  in  my  own  room. 

On  October  29,  Bunau-Varilla  actually  re- 
ceived a  telegram  from  Dr.  Amador  to  the  effect 
that  an  American  man-of-war  must  be  sent  to 
Colon.  The  Nashville  was  ordered  to  Colon  on 
October  30th.  It  arrived  there  on  November  2. 
On  October  31,  Bunau-Varilla  telegraphed  Dr. 
Amador  from  Baltimore  that  a  man-of-war 
would  arrive  at  Colon  in  two-and-a-half  days. 
It  arrived  at  Colon  as  promised.  This  is  no  mere 
coincidence.  It  taxes  credulity  to  believe  it,  but 
let  Bunau-Varilla  continue  his  observations : 

The  revolution  was  made  because  the  connection  be- 
tween the  request  of  a  boat  to  me  and  the  arrival  of  the 
boat  materialized  in  the  eyes  of  the  confederates  the 
reahty  of  the  influence  which  Amador  had  asserted  to 
them  I  possessed  over  the  American  Government. 

Evidently  they  imagined  the  situation  to  be  quite  dif- 
ferent from  what  it  really  was.  They  believed  this  influ- 
ence to  be  of  a  direct  and  material  order.  They  could 
not  understand  matters  as  they  really  were.  They  could 
not  imagine  that  there  was  no  material  influence  exerted 
and  that  I  was  merely  correctly  and  mathematically  cal- 
culating [correctly  and  mathematically  calculating — what 
audacity !]  the  forces  at  play,  among  which  the  main  ones 
were  the  duty  and  the  interest  of  the  American  Govern- 
ment. 

The  arrival  of  the  Nashville  corroborated  the 
information  communicated  to  the  separatists  by 


The  Vaudeville  Revolution  on  Isthmus     183 

Dr.  Amador.  They  were  skeptical  until  the 
Nashville  appeared.  When  it  appeared  as  prom- 
ised they  were  convinced — in  short,  they  knew. 
The  Colombians  also  knew.  Now  it  is  inefface- 
able history,  with  a  meaning  other  than  that  which 
Bunau-Varilla  would  have  us  believe.  He  says 
in  his  book : 

Every  one  interpreted  the  Nashville's  arrival  as  a  de- 
termined intervention  of  the  United  States,  and  the  Co- 
lombians were  just  as  much  persuaded  of  this  as  were 
the  people  of  Panama.  This  carried  to  such  a  pitch  the 
enthusiasm  of  the  latter,  and  the  discouragement  of  the 
former,  that  the  Colombians  decided  to  withdraw  peace- 
fully. 

Is  the  so-called  Republic  of  Panama  the  out- 
come of  mathematically  calculating  the  forces  at 
play?  Does  a  sane  man  counsel  others  in  such 
a  grave  case  as  glibly  as  Bunau-Varilla  alleges 
he  did?  We  do  not  believe  his  own  indictment 
of  himself.  If  true,  it  would  make  him  a  degen- 
erate. There  is  no  evidence  of  degeneracy  in  his 
story.  We  find  in  it  only  evidence  of  calculated 
duplicity. 

Is  it  believable  that  Bunau-Varilla  advised  the 
separatists  in  Panama  to  proceed  with  secession 
with  no  other  assurance  of  protection  by  the 
United  States  than  his  inference  ?  There  was  at 
stake  for  the  separatists:  their  Hves,  their  prop- 


184  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

erty  and  the  welfare  of  their  families ;  for  Bunau- 
Varilla,  his  large  holdings  of  stock  in  the  New 
Panama  Canal  Company.  His  story  has  none  of 
the  earmarks  of  truthfulness.  It  is  a  crude  in- 
vention. It  is,  however,  necessary  to  conclude 
that  he  had  the  advance  information  that  he  com- 
municated to  the  separatists,  but  that  he  did  not 
come  by  it  as  he  would  have  us  believe. 
Swift  says : 

As  universal  a  practice  as  lying  is,  and  as  easy  a  one 
as  it  seems,  it  is  astonishing  that  it  has  been  brought  to 
so  little  perfection,  even  by  those  who  are  most  celebrated 
in  that  faculty. 

This  is  another  way  of  saying  that  the  mind 
cannot  create  a  substitute  for  reality.  Facts  are 
inexorable.  Reason  will,  in  due  course,  puncture 
the  inconsistency  in  a  pseudo-explanation,  and 
truth  will  stand  revealed  because  it  matches. 

Secession  was  to  be  effected  on  November  4. 
The  United  States  was  to  have  men-of-war  at 
Colon  and  at  Panama  to  protect  secession  within 
forty-eight  hours.  But  a  hitch  occurred.  It  be- 
came known  on  October  29  that  Colombian  forces 
not  expected  until  November  10  would  arrive  in 
about  five  days.  Panama,  although  ''seething 
with  revolution,"  as  Roosevelt  would  have  us  be- 
lieve, was  not  prepared  to  deal  with  an  unex- 


The  Vaudeville  Revolution  on  Isthmus     185 

pected  force  of  some  two  hundred  soldiers. 
Hence,  Dr.  Amador  telegraphed  Bunau-Varilla 
for  aid  on  October  29  : 

We  have  news  of  the  arrival  of  Colombian  forces  on 
the  Atlantic  side  within  five  days;  they  are  mere  than 
two  hundred  strong;  urge  warships  Colon. 

Upon  receipt  of  this  telegram,  Bunau-Varilla 
hurried  to  Washington.  The  Nashville  arrived 
at  Colon  one  day  before  the  Colombian  troops. 
Panama  called  for  help  seven  days  before  seces- 
sion, and  on  the  sixth  day  help  was  already  speed- 
ing to  Colon.  But  why  did  Bunau-Varilla  has- 
ten to  Washington  upon  receipt  of  the  above  tele- 
gram? It  would  seem  that  his  advance  informa- 
tion was  not  based  on  inference  after  all,  that  is, 
upon  nice  mathematical  calculation.  Such  calcu- 
lations are  best  worked  out  in  a  quiet  room  and 
not  in  a  noisy  train  to  Washington.  It  would, 
therefore,  seem  that  our  then  Administration  was 
the  source  of  his  knowledge. 

In  the  Independent  of  November  26,  1903,  Dr. 
Amador  states  that  the  separatists  of  Panama  be- 
lieved that  the  United  States  would  not  allow 
Colombia  to  suppress  secession.  He  states 
guardedly : 

Of  course,  we  expected  that  the  United  States  would 
not  let  the  Colombian  troops  attack  us,  because  of  the 


i86  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

effect  that  war  would  have  in  the  way  of  blocking  the 
traffic  across  the  Isthmus,  but  we  had  no  understanding 
with  the  Government  here,  nor  are  the  people  of  the 
United  States  at  all  responsible  for  the  revolution.  It 
was  our  own  act. 

This  statement  is  indicative  of  foreknowledge. 
It  could  not  have  been  inferred  from  previous  at- 
tempts at  secession.  Therefore,  there  must  have 
been  an  understanding  with  our  Administration. 
Will  the  latter  make  good?  That  was  the  final 
unknown  quantity  in  the  anxious  days  preceding 
secession.  Secession  was  held  in  abeyance  until 
tangible  evidence  appeared.  It  appeared  on  No- 
vember 2 — the  Nashville,  Thereupon  Shaler,  su- 
perintendent of  the  Panama  Railroad,  gets  into 
communication  with  Prescott.  What  transpired 
is  recorded  in  the  following: 

Have  just  wired  you  that  the  Nashville  had  been 
sighted.     This  I  presume  settles  the  question. 

It  did  settle  the  question.  It  was  to  be  seces- 
sion. It  also  settles  another  question.  It  shows 
that  our  then  Administration  was  the  foster- 
father  of  secession — gave  it  form  and  substance, 
and  became  its  controlling  spirit  just  before  and 
immediately  after  the  Declaration  of  Independ- 
ence. 

From  and  after  November  2,  1903,  the  follow- 


1 


The  Vaudeville  Revolution  on  Isthmus     187 

ing  warships  appeared  in  Isthmian  waters :  The 
Dixie,  Nashville,  Atlanta,  Maine,  and  Mayflower, 
at  Colon;  the  Boston; Marhlehead,  Concord,  and 
Wyoming,  at  Panama.  This  is  a  larger  number 
than  were  sent  on  previous  occasions  when  there 
was  actual  revolt.  Therefore,  their  object  was 
different.  On  all  previous  occasions  our  war- 
ships were  ordered  to  Isthmian  waters  to  protect 
the  lives  and  property  of  Americans  and  to  assist 
the  sovereign  in  maintaining  uninterrupted 
transit.  In  the  fall  of  1903,  they  were  sent  to 
protect  secession.  This  is  clearly  reflected  in  the 
telegrams  to  the  Nashville,  Dixie  and  Boston  on 
November  2,  1903. 

These  dispatches  were  not  sent  for  the  purpose 
of  protecting  Isthmian  transit,  but  for  the  pur- 
pose of  assuring  the  peaceful  birth  of  the  so- 
called  Republic  of  Panama,  and  maintaining  it 
after  birth.  In  short,  before  the  birth  of  the  so- 
called  Republic  of  Panama,  and  at  a  time  when 
Colombia  was  in  undisputed  possession  of  the 
Isthmus  and  exercised  undisputed  sovereignty 
over  it,  dispatches  were  sent  to  armed  vessels  of 
the  United  States  in  the  Atlantic  and  Pacific  in- 
structing them  to  prevent  the  Government  of  Co- 
lombia from  landing  troops  on  her  Isthmian  ter- 
ritory. 


1 88  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

We  have  given  complete  the  telegram  to  the 
commander  of  the  Nashville,  dated  November  2, 
1903.  The  vessel  named  was  the  first  warship  to 
arrive  in  Isthmian  waters  on  the  Atlantic  side. 
The  telegram  to  Rear  Admiral  Glass  of  the  Bos- 
ton, dated  November  2,  1903,  is  interesting  from 
the  fact  that  the  vessel  named  was  the  first  man- 
of-war  to  arrive  in  Isthmian  waters  on  the  Pa- 
cific side.     It  is  here  reproduced  in  full : 

Proceed  with  all  possible  dispatch  to  Panama.  Tele- 
graph in  cipher  your  departure.  Maintain  free  and  un- 
interrupted transit.  If  interruption  is  threatened  by 
armed  force  occupy  the  line  of  railroad.  Prevent  land- 
ing of  any  armed  force,  either  Government  or  insurgent, 
with  hostile  intent  at  any  point  within  50  miles  of  Pan- 
ama. If  doubtful  as  to  the  intention  of  any  armed  force, 
occupy  Ancon  Hill  strongly  with  artillery.  If  the  Wy- 
oming  would  delay  Concord  and  Marblehead,  her  dis- 
position must  be  left  to  your  discretion.  Government 
force  reported  approaching  the  Isthmus  in  vessels.  Pre- 
vent their  landing  if  in  your  judgment  landing  would 
precipitate  a  conflict. 

Collaboration  in  the  secession  of  the  Province 
of  Panama  is  no  worse  than  the  foregoing  tele- 
gram. Collaboration  is  merely  the  forerunner  of 
such  a  telegram.  The  policy  embodied  therein  is  a 
departure  from  our  traditional  Isthmian  policy. 
Collaboration  matches  with  this  and  other  tele- 
grams of  the  same  date.    An  Administration  ca- 


The  Vaudeville  Revolution  on  Isthmus     189 

pahle  of  sending  them  is  capable  of  collaboration 
because  the  two  are  clearly  complementary  and 
stand  on  the  same  ethical  plane.  The  collabora- 
tion planned  the  dismemberment  of  a  friendly 
state;  the  telegrams  directed  the  carrying  out  of 
dismemberment.  Why  balk  at  the  planning,  col- 
laboration, and  not  balk  at  the  act,  which  is  merely 
a  part  of  an  indivisible  whole?  The  one  is  a 
corollary  of  the  other.  We  know  that  our  then 
Administration  is  guilty  of  the  act  of  dismember- 
ment. We  believe  that  the  known  facts  warrant 
the  conclusion  that  it  collaborated  with  Bunau- 
Varilla  in  making  arrangements  for  protecting 
secession. 

Collaboration  to  effect  the  dismemberment  of 
Colombia  adds  no  sting  to  that  of  dismember- 
ment which  is  conceded.  In  November,  1902, 
three  provinces  in  revolt  for  some  three  years 
laid  down  their  arms.  In  November,  1903,  we 
are  asked  to  believe  that  one  of  them  actually 
projected  a  serious  uprising.  It  staggers  belief. 
Facts  show  that  there  was  no  intent  of  a  serious 
uprising  on  the  part  of  the  inhabitants  as  a  whole. 
They  also  show  that  if  advance  assurance  of  the 
cooperation  of  the  United  States  could  not  have 
been  secured,  there  would  have  been  no  secession. 
As  projected,   planned  and  executed,   the  ma- 


190  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

chinery  of  the  so-called  revolution  was  to  be  and 
actually  was  on  our  gunboats.  A  microscope 
does  not  disclose  any  other  preparation.  The  so- 
called  Republic  of  Panama  is  a  fact.  It  is  mute 
evidence  of  collaboration. 

Colombia  hesitated  about  curtailment  of  her 
sovereignty  in  the  Canal  Zone.  She  felt  that  if 
curtailment  were  to  be  acquiesced  in,  then  the 
compensation  offered  was  not  adequate  and  so 
she  was  seeking  a  formula  along  the  line  of 
abridged  sovereignty,  and  of  enlarged  compensa- 
tion through  long  period  re-valuation  of  the 
grant.  This  was  repugnant  to  our  Administra- 
tion. Panama  would  grant  all  that  it  wanted  and 
ask  no  questions.  Here  is  an  impelling  motive 
for  collaboration,  and  one  that  was  in  harmony 
with  the  desire  to  make  good  the  threats  made 
when  the  Hay-Herran  treaty  was  under  consid- 
eration. 

We  have  examined  several  telegrams  dated 
November  2,  1903.  We  have  seen  that  they  were 
not  designed  to  protect  transit  between  Colon  and 
Panama,  but  to  protect  secession.  Plans  do  not, 
however,  unfold  with  clockwork  precision.  The 
telegram  to  the  Commander  of  the  Nashville  was 
delayed  in  delivery,  and  so  the  landing  of  the  new 
contingent  of   Colombian  troops  already  men- 


The  Vaudeville  Revolution  on  Isthmus     191 

tioned  was  not  prevented.  It  is  shown  in  the  fol- 
lowing telegram  received  by  Secretary  Hay  from 
Colon,  dated  November  3,  1903 : 

Troops  from  vessel  Cartagena  have  disembarked;  are 
encamping  on  Pacific  dock  awaiting  orders  to  proceed  to 
Panama  from  commander-in-chief,  who  went  there  this 
morning.     No  message  for  Nashville  received. 

On  the  same  date  (November  3)  Commander 
Hubbard  of  the  Nashville  replied  to  the  telegram 
sent  him  November  2,  as  follows : 

Receipt  of  your  telegram  of  November  2  is  acknowl- 
edged. Prior  to  receipt  this  morning  about  400  men 
were  landed  here  by  the  Government  of  Colombia  from 
Cartagena.  No  revolution  has  been  declared  on  the  Isth- 
mus and  no  disturbances.  Railway  company  have  de- 
clined to  transport  these  troops  except  by  request  of  the 
governor  of  Panama.  Request  has  not  been  made.  It 
is  possible  that  movement  may  be  made  to-night  at  Pan- 
ama to  declare  independence,  in  which  event  I  will  .  .  . 
(message  mutilated  here)  here.  Situation  is  most  criti- 
cal if  revolutionary  leaders  act. 

Message  mutilated!  The  most  vital  part  of 
the  message  mutilated  so  that  its  contents  are  to 
remain  forever  unknown!  And  the  original 
message  to  the  Commander  of  the  Nashville  or- 
dering him  to  proceed  with  all  possible  speed  to 
Colon  missing!  We  will  not  indulge  in  infer- 
ence. The  reader  will  know  that  it  is  not  a  co- 
incidence— that  it  has  a  sinister  look.     In  his  of- 


192  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

ficial  report,  Commander  Hubbard  tells  us  why 
he  did  not  prevent  the  landing  of  the  Colombian 
troops  which  arrived  on  the  Cartagena  on  No- 
vember 3 : 

Inasmuch  as  the  Independent  party  had  not  acted  and 
the  Government  of  Colombia  was  at  that  time  in  undis- 
puted control  of  the  Province  of  Panama,  I  did  not  feel, 
in  the  absence  of  instructions,  that  I  was  justified  in  pre- 
venting the  landing  of  those  troops. 

If  Commander  Hubbard  of  the  Nashville  had 
had  the  telegram  sent  him  on  November  2,  the 
troops  and  administrative  officers  on  the  Carta- 
gena would  not  have  been  allowed  to  land.  In 
short,  Colombia  would  have  been  prevented  from 
landing  troops  on  a  part  of  her  territory  when 
there  was  no  disturbance  whatsoever.  And  that 
is  called  protecting  the  transit  and  maintaining 
order!  It  is  the  only  interruption  of  the  transit 
and  of  the  peace  that  there  was. 

As  already  stated,  there  was  no  revolution, 
there  was  no  uprising.  Certain  interested  per- 
sons merely  volunteered  to  organize  a  civil  gov- 
ernment in  the  Province  of  Panama,  independent 
of  that  of  Colombia,  if  assured  of  protection  by 
the  United  States.  The  protection  was  assured 
and  was  given.  The  purpose  was  to  enable  the 
one  to  grant  and  the  other  to  receive  title  to  the 


The  Vaudeville  Revolution  on  Isthmus     193 

Canal  Zone.  Colombia  was  to  be  barred  from 
interfering  by  the  display  of  overwhelming  force. 
That  is  what  was  planned,  and  that  is  what  event- 
uated. 

The  military  forces  of  Colombia  arrived  at 
Colon  in  fulfillment  of  her  obligations  under  the 
Treaty  of  1846  and  in  the  performance  of  the 
most  elementary  duty  of  a  sovereign  state.  Those  1  ^ 
of  the  United  States  were  there  to  interrupt  in  its"'**t/jp' 
most  sacred  use.  It  was  the  sovereign  right  of 
Colombia  to  secure  transit  from  Colon  to  Panama 
for  her  troops,  and  the  duty  of  the  Railroad,  un- 
der its  charter,  to  supply  it.  The  United  States 
did  interfere  without  a  scintilla  of  right  and  in 
violation  of  the  Treaty  of  1846.  Note  the  follow- 
ing telegram  to  the  Commander  of  the  Nashville 
at  Colon,  dated  November  3,  1903 : 

In  the  interests  of  peace  make  every  effort  to  prevent 
Government  troops  at  Colon  from  proceeding  to  Panama. 
The  transit  of  the  Isthmus  must  be  kept  open  and  order 
maintained. 

Peace  prevailed  in  the  Province  of  Panama  on 
the  date  of  this  telegram.  There  were  no  insur- 
gents. There  was  no  preparation  whatsoever  for 
an  uprising.  We  adopt  the  following  from  the 
pen  of  Leander  T.  Chamberlain  as  our  own : 

Yet  the  President  issued  an  order  preventing  Colom- 


194  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

bia  from  moving  her  own  troops,  via  her  own  railway, 
from  her  own  Colon  to  her  own  Panama!  So  far  as 
concerned  their  freedom  .to  go  to  the  scene  of  danger, 
Colombia's  troops  were  reconcentradoed  and  manacled! 
Let  it  still  be  borne  in  mind  that  there  was  no  interrup- 
tion of  transit  by  either  loyalist  or  insurgent.  Let  it 
be  taken  into  account  that  the  President,  himself,  under 
the  pretense  of  maintaining  peace  and  order  when  peace 
and  order  perfectly  prevailed,  violently  interrupted  free 
transit,  absolutely  closing  it  to  the  forces  of  sovereign 
Colombia,  a  treaty-bound  ally  of  the  United  States ! 

There  is  no  direct  evidence  known  to  the  writer 
that  the  Roosevelt  Administration  collaborated  in 
the  ante-secession  arrangements  to  wrest  the 
Province  of  Panama  from  Colombia.  The 
known  facts,  however,  point  overwhelmingly  to 
collaboration.  The  evidence  is  circumstantial, 
but  not  a  link  is  missing.  The  evidence  is  re- 
enforced  by  motive  on  the  part  of  the  Adminis- 
tration at  Washington.  Colombia  had  not  yielded 
to  solemn  warnings. 

We  read  on  page  564  of  Roosevelt's  autobi- 
ography : 

No  one  connected  with  the  American  Government  had 
any  part  in  preparing,  inciting,  or  encouraging  the  revo- 
lution, and  except  for  the  reports  of  our  military  and 
naval  officers,  which  I  forwarded  to  Congress,  no  one 
connected  with  the  Government  had  any  previous  knowl- 
edge concerning  the  proposed  revolution,  except  such  as 
was  accessible  to  any  person  who  read  the  newspapers 
and  kept  abreast  of  current  questions  and  current  af- 
fairs. 


The  Vaudeville  Revolution  on  Isthmus     195 

Small  provinces,  planning  a  revolution,  keep 
such  matters  secret  so  as  to  enable  them  to  make 
adequate  preparation  without  interference.  The 
foregoing  seems  to  indicate  that  there  was  prepa- 
ration on  the  Isthmus,  which  is  contrary  to  the 
facts.  If  it  were  true,  Colombia  must  have 
known.  Why  then  did  she  not  have  an  adequate 
force  on  the  Isthmus  ? 

The  separatists  of  Panama  knew  what  the 
Roosevelt  Administration  would  do  after  inde- 
pendence had  been  declared.  All  statements  as 
to  how  they  found  out  crumble  before  the  search- 
light of  historical  method.  The  sifting  process 
leaves  certain  established  facts  from  which  we 
can  draw  our  conclusion.  The  separatists  knew 
what  our  Government  would  do  and  the  line  of 
action  pursued  by  our  Administration  was  in 
accord  with  what  they  knew  and  with  what  they 
expected.  Tradition  forbids  inference  to  be  the 
source  of  their  enlightenment.  The  Commander- 
in-chief  of  the  Army  and  Navy  was  the  sole  and 
only  person  who  could  have  communicated  to 
Bunau-Varilla  information  of  so  formidable  a 
character  as  he  conveyed  to  the  separatists  of 
Panama. 

The  Roosevelt  Administration  gave  form  and 
substance  to  the  arrangements  for  the  secession 


196  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

of  Panama,  in  short,  gave  the  movement  the  vi- 
tality that  it  possessed.  Without  collaboration 
there  would  have  been  no  secession.  An  inner 
circle  in  Panama  were  the  Alpha  and  our  Admin- 
istration was  the  Omega  of  this  vaudeville,  with 
Bunau-Varilla  acting  as  Master  of  Ceremonies, 
that  is,  acting  as  the  coordinating  genius  who  ef- 
fected the  cooperation  of  those  interested  in  the 
performance.  Had  not  the  vessel  Cartagena, 
with  its  new  contingent  of  Colombian  soldiers, 
introduced  a  discordant  note  by  arriving  seven 
days  earlier  than  originally  expected,  the  per- 
formance would  have  become  history  exactly  as 
prearranged. 

The  aim  of  the  United  States  in  the  negotiation 
of  the  Hay-Herran  treaty  was  to  secure  de  facto 
sovereignty  over  the  Canal  Zone,  and  its  equiva- 
lent over  the  canal  littoral.  Colombia  desired 
that  the  United  States  should  become,  as  far  as 
concerned  the  canal,  a  corporation  sole  for  the 
purpose  of  constructing  and  operating  it  under 
her  own  sovereignty.  There  was  a  vital  conflict 
of  interests.  It  could  only  be  adjusted  by  com- 
promise. Colombia  asked  for  the  reopening  of 
negotiations  with  the  view  of  finding  a  workable 
formula.  The  Roosevelt  Administration  cut  the 
Gordian  knot  by  guaranteeing  the  success  of  the 


The  Vaudeville  Revolution  on  Isthmus     197 

secession  of  the  Province  of  Panama  from  Co- 
lombia. 

The  quotations  given  in  this  chapter  from 
Bunau-Varilla's  book  on  Panama  and  those  from 
otherwise  trustworthy  sources  point  unmistaka- 
bly to  the  conclusion  drawn  by  us  from  them. 
These  have^been  stated  as  the  narrative  pro- 
gressed. We  will  now  assemble  them  and  give 
them  a  setting  in  arguments  not  heretofore  fully 
presented.  In  doing  this  we  aim  to  show  more 
fully  than  we  have  done  so  far  that  there  was  col- 
lusion between  our  Administration  in  1903  and  a 
few  separatists  on  the  Isthmus,  and  that  this  con- 
clusion is  not  only  warranted  but  inescapable. 

Roosevelt  seeks  in  a  variety  of  forms  to  convey 
the  impression  that  conflict  was  imminent  on  the 
Isthmus  and  that  American  intervention  pre- 
vented it.  The  fact  is  just  the  opposite.  There 
was  no  preparation  on  the  Isthmus  for  physical 
combat.  We  hear  of  a  so-called  fire  department 
of  some  four  hundred  men  having  a  military  pur- 
pose. But  what  are  four  hundred  undisciplined 
men  against  Colombia's  more  or  less  trained  army 
of  some  ten  thousand ! 

The  unavoidable  conclusion  is  that  the  Roose- 
velt Administration  collaborated  with  the  sepa- 


198  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

ratists  of  Panama  through  Bunau-Varilla  as  in- 
termediary, gave  form  and  substance  to  seces- 
sion, and  was  its  controlling  spirit  just  prior  to 
and  immediately  after  the  Declaration  of  In- 
dependence by  the  council  of  the  City  of  Panama 
on  November  4,  1903.  Our  then  Administration 
and  the  separatists  in  the  City  of  Panama — the 
rest  of  the  province  was  not  consulted — under- 
stood each  other  before  the  Rubicon  was  crossed. 
Bunau-Varilla  positively  asserts  that  he  was  in 
possession  of  the  information  that  the  Roosevelt 
Administration  would  protect  secession  and  that 
the  act  of  secession  was  based  on  that  assurance 
and  shaped  to  conform  to  it.  We  have  shown 
that  the  data  on  which  Bunau-Varilla  alleged  he 
inferred  it  are  false.  With  it  crumbles  inference 
as  a  source  of  his  information.  He,  however, 
had  the  information.  He  said  so  in  his  book. 
Events  show  that  he  had  it.  That  proves  his 
statement.  He  could  have  gotten  it  in  but  one 
way  and  that  was  by  collaboration  with  our  Ad- 
ministration. He  has  shown  the  opportunity — 
conferences  with  members  of  our  Administration 
including  the  President.  It  is  now  the  province 
of  the  student  of  history  to  do  some  inferring  and 
that  inference  is  that  our  Administration  con- 
veyed to  Bunau-Varilla  the  information  that  he 


The  Vaudeville  Revolution  on  Isthmus     199 

says  he  arrived  at  in  an  elegant  manner  by  a  nice 
mathematical  calculation. 

The  statements  of  Bunau-Varilla  do  not  ring 
true.  When  viewed  as  a  whole,  they  sound  like 
an  attempt  to  explain  events  connected  with  the 
dismemberment  of  Colombia  so  as  to  disprove  ac- 
tual connection  of  the  Roosevelt  Administration 
with  it  as  far  as  concerns  its  planning.  In  this 
he  has  not  only  failed,  but  has  actually  furnished 
the  corroboration  needed  to  establish  it. 

When  statements — it  matters  not  with  what 
unction  they  are  uttered — conflict  with  established 
facts,  it  is  the  statements  which  suffer,  the  facts 
are  mute  evidence  that  the  statements  are  false. 
It  is  impossible  for  the  assurances  given  by 
Bunau-Varilla  to  the  separatists  of  Panama,  and 
subsequent  events  on  the  Isthmus,  to  have  been 
the  result  of  inference.  They  were  the  result  of 
information  communicated.  It  is  immaterial 
whether  it  was  conveyed  to  him  in  whole  or  in 
part,  direct  or  by  proxy.  Secession  and  the  or- 
ganization of  the  so-called  Republic  of  Panama 
were  based  on  it. 

We  may  well  ask  where  a  man  would  go  who 
was  basing  everything  on  inferences  derived  from 
facts.  Presumably  to  a  large  library  where  he 
would  have  access  to  the  facts  on  which  to  rest 


200  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

the  inferences  derived  by  refined  mathematical 
calculations.  Possessed  of  the  facts,  he  would 
perhaps  seek  the  quiet  of  a  dark  room  and  medi- 
tate undisturbed  by  distracting  noises  present  on 
a  train.  But  Bunau-Varilla  went  to  Washing- 
ton. Why?  There  was  domiciled  the  person 
who  could  order  a  warship  to  Colon.  The  Nash- 
ville was  ordered  to  Colon ! 

Isthmian  events  show  such  a  perfect  coordina- 
tion that  they  preclude  any  other  conclusion  than 
that  of  collaboration  between  the  Roosevelt  Ad- 
ministration and  the  separatists  of  Panama.  The 
coordination  was  too  perfect  to  permit  of  any 
other  conclusion.  The  discord  caused  by  the  ar- 
rival of  474  Colombian  soldiers  earlier  than  orig- 
inally expected  must  be  eliminated  to  see  the  plan 
as  pre-arranged,  and  this  additional  item  must 
then  be  fitted  in  to  give  us  the  true  story. 

The  original  plan  provided  for  the  prompt 
recognition  of  the  de  facto  government  of  the 
new  republic  by  the  United  States  after  the 
Declaration  of  Independence.  The  telegrams 
which  pertain  to  the  elimination  of  the  new  Co- 
lombian forces  which  arrived  on  November  3  are 
supplementary  thereto.  The  formidable  charac- 
ter of  these  telegrams  and  the  sayings  and  con- 
duct of  the  Isthmians  during  the  three  stirring 


The  Vaudeville  Revolution  on  Isthmus    201 

days  in  which  they  were  eliminated  are  now  mute 
evidence  of  pre-arrangement — that  a  workable 
understanding  existed  between  Bunau-Varilla 
and  our  Administration. 

Every  vital  statement  made  by  Bunau-Varilla 
on  which  he  claims  to  have  based  his  inference  is 
false.  This  disposes  of  the  nice  mathematical 
calculations  whereby  he  claims  to  have  arrived  at 
the  conclusions  on  which  the  separatists  acted. 
There  remains,  however,  the  fact  that  the  sep- 
aratists acted  in  the  confident  belief  that  the 
United  States  would  protect  secession  and  see  the 
movement  through.  She  did  as  they  believed. 
The  assurance  was  given  to  them  by  Bunau- 
Varilla.  He  did  not  come  by  the  knowledge  as 
he  alleges.  How  did  he  come  by  it  ?  How  could 
he  have  come  by  it?  As  it  involved  a  departure 
from  traditional  American  policy,  the  knowledge 
could  have  been  received  from  but  one  person — 
the  President.  No  subordinate  could  have  set  in 
motion  the  machinery  actually  set  in  motion 
whereby  the  success  of  secession  was  effected. 

All  the  details  of  this  discreditable  and  regret- 
table affair  cannot  yet  be  filled  in.  The  salient 
points  alone  are  known.  It  is  imlikely  that  the 
missing  details  will  alter  the  general  conclusion 
as  to  how  the  rape  of  Colombia  was  arranged  and 


202  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

effected.  It  may  alter  somewhat  the  connection 
between  Washington  and  Panama,  but  it  will  not 
sever  it  at  a  vital  point. 

Tracy  Robinson,  prominent  among  the  separa- 
tists and  author  of  a  book  on  Panama,  ventures 
this  statement  concerning  secession:  "The  de- 
tails would  afford  material  for  a  wonder  story." 
Clearly,  according  to  this,  all  is  not  recorded,  all 
has  not  been  told.  If  the  course  that  our  then 
Administration  pursued  was  honorable,  there  is 
nothing  to  conceal.  A  wonder  story  would  be  a 
good  seller.  The  separatists  would  figure  in  it  as 
heroes.  They  smote  the  oppressor,  threw  off  the 
yoke  of  oppression  and  founded  a  Republic  dedi- 
cated to  liberty  and  justice.  But  the  wonder 
story  is  not  yet  written.  The  fact  that  it  is  not 
written — that  those  who  know  the  facts  have  not 
recorded  them — is  mute  evidence  that  there  are 
facts  connected  with  the  secession  of  Panama 
that  would  not  look  well  in  print.  We  have  as- 
sembled the  known  facts  and  matched  them  so  as 
to  reveal  the  essentials  of  the  story. 

As  already  indicated,  Roosevelt  and  Bunau- 
Varilla  have  attempted  to  construct  a  substitute 
for  actual  history  in  their  accounts  of  the  seces- 
sion of  Panama.  They  have  attempted  the  im- 
possible.    Their  invented  facts  do  not  fit  into 


The  Vaudeville  Revolution  on  Isthmus    203 

their  assigned  places.  They  do  not  match  with 
the  actual  facts  and  with  one  another.  This  is 
the  weakness  of  their  explanation.  It  is  the  rock 
on  which  their  explanations  founder. 

If  we  take  the  known  facts  and  arrange  them  so 
that  they  match,  the  mind  automatically  supplies 
any  missing  link.  The  missing  link  in  the  history 
of  the  secession  of  the  Province  of  Panama  from 
Colombia  is  the  fact  that  an  understanding 
existed  with  our  then  Administration.  With 
that  supplied,  the  story  is  complete,  the  record  be- 
comes rational  and  the  events  stand  in  a  causal 
relation.  Roosevelt's  assertion,  ^7  took  the  Canal 
Zone/'  is  virtually  the  missing  link,  that  is,  it  is 
another  way  of  stating  that  an  understanding 
existed  between  our  Administration  and  the  sep- 
aratists on  the  Isthmus. 

The  writer  vacillated  between  suspicion  and 
conviction  until  he  had  read  Bunau-Varilla's  book 
on  Panama.  This  convinced  him  that  there  had 
been  an  informal  exchange  of  views  between  the 
Roosevelt  Administration  and  Bunau-Varilla,  and 
that  the  latter  was  informed  that  the  American 
navy  would  be  used  to  prevent  the  landing  of  Co- 
lombian soldiers  on  the  Isthmus  if  the  separatists 
in  Panama  would  take  over  the  civil  government 
of  the  province. 


204  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

That  those  who  sought  the  secession  of  the 
Province  of  Panama  from  Colombia  made  over- 
tures to  our  Administration  is  acknowledged. 
Secession  was  for  the  sole  purpose  of  creating  a 
state  capable  of  granting  to  the  United  States  the 
coveted  title  to  the  Canal  Zone.  Naturally,  such 
overtures  would  be  made.  It  was  not  necessary 
to  record  the  understanding  arrived  at.  The 
Declaration  of  Independence  on  November  4, 
1903,  recognition  of  Panama  as  a  sovereign  state 
on  November  6,  1903,  and  the  signing  of  the  Hay- 
Bunau-Varilla  treaty  on  November  18,  1903 — all 
in  two  weeks — tell  us  that  there  was  an  antecedent 
understanding,  regardless  of  pretensions  to  the 
contrary. 

The  separatists  of  Panama  spent  their  time 
designing  political  machinery  instead  of  prepar- 
ing to  overthrow  Colombian  sovereignty  by  force. 
They  acted  differently  in  1 899-1 902  when  there 
was  a  real  revolution.  Why  this  departure  from 
the  normal  course  ?  Because  coercion  of  Colom- 
bia by  the  United  States  had  failed,  and  our  Ad- 
ministration had  entered  into  the  calculations  of 
the  separatists,  either  direct  or  by  proxy.  At 
first  the  separatists  had  apparently  looked  for 
money  and  military  preparedness.  That  was 
abandoned  in  the  twinkling  of  an  eye.     Why! 


The  Vaudeville  Revolution  on  Isthmus    205 

Because  a  substitute  had  been  found.  The 
American  marines  would  be  there.  They  would 
be  sufficient.  Indeed  the  known  facts  connected 
with  the  secession  of  Panama  connect  our  Ad- 
ministration with  the  ante-secession  arrange- 
ments as  unmistakably  as  though  there  were  offi- 
cial documents  to  prove  it.  More  so  because 
documents  can  be  tampered  with,  but  events  can- 
not.    A  Persian  poet  has  well  said : 

The  moving  finger  writes,  and  having  writ 
Moves  on;  nor  all  your  piety  nor  wit, 
Shall  lure  it  back  to  cancel  half  a  line. 
Nor  all  your  tears  wash  out  one  word  of  it. 

The  action  of  General  Huertas  of  the  Colom- 
bian forces  at  Panama  and  of  the  officials  of  the 
Panama  railroad  in  the  stirring  days  prior  to  the 
Declaration  of  Independence  show  that  they  had 
foreknowledge  (convincing  proof)  of  what  the 
United  States  had  agreed  to  do.  General  Huer- 
tas committed  treason.  The  railroad  officials 
jeopardized  the  interests  of  the  stockholders  of 
the  property  in  their  care.  Are  steps  with  such 
grave  consequences  lightly  taken?  To  ask  the 
question  is  to  answer.  Pre-arrangement  with 
the  United  States  is  writ  large  over  the  portal  to 
Isthmian  events  which  resulted  in  the  estabHsh- 
ment  of  the  so-called  Republic  of  Panama.    In- 


2o6  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

sert  pre-arrangement  into  the  ensemble  of  Isth- 
mian events  and  they  match.  Without  it  they 
are  bizarre — discordant  facts. 

History  is  not  bizarre.  Human  beings  act  ac- 
cording to  law.  Tradition  is  their  guide  unless  it 
is  positively  and  efficaciously  set  aside  by  an  ante- 
cedent assurance.  Such  antecedent  assurance 
Bunau-Varilla  gave  to  those  directing  the  seces- 
sion movement  in  Panama.  They  acted  on  it. 
They  were  not  deceived.  Bunau-Varilla  did  not 
become  informed  as  he  states  he  did.  His  only 
source  of  information  could  have  been  the  Com- 
mander-in-Chief of  the  Army  and  Navy  of  the 
United  States,  either  direct  or  by  proxy,  and  he  is 
believed  to  have  been  too  shrewd  a  politician  to 
employ  a  proxy. 

Bunau-Varilla  gave  assurance  to  the  separat- 
ists that  the  United  States  would  protect  seces- 
sion. It  is  reported  that  when  the  time  for  action 
arrived,  Dr.  Amador  cabled  to  him  in  New  York 
to  verify  this  assurance  of  protection.  Dr. 
Amador  is  reported  to  have  said  as  he  wrote  the 
telegram : 

If  this  man  Varilla  can  bring  an  American  warship  to 
each  side  of  the  Isthmus,  then  we  may  proceed. 

The  answer  to  the  telegram  came : 


The  Vaudeville  Revolution  on  Isthmus     207 

Go  ahead.  American  warships  will  be  on  either  side 
of  the  Isthmus  in  forty-eight  hours. 

The  first  arrived  on  November  2,  and  the  others 
a  little  later.  They  did  not  arrive  as  the  result  of 
accident.  It  was  not  coincidence.  The  Bunau- 
Varilla  telegram  was  not  based  on  inference. 
This  is  confirmed  in  a  newspaper  article  of  the 
time.  Teague  writes  in  the  Washington  Post 
for  December  7,  1903 : 

It  is  an  indisputable  fact  that  the  conspirators  for  in- 
dependence at  Panama  believed  implicitly,  before  they 
made  a  single  open  move  for  independence,  that  advance 
assurances  of  support  had  been  given  by  the  Government 
at  Washington.  This  belief  is  so  fixed  that  those  in  the 
conspiracy  do  not  hesitate  to  say  that  the  first  move 
would  never  have  been  made  had  it  not  been  believed 
that  Washington  had  given  a  promise  of  support. 

These  statements  of  Teague  are  abundantly 
corroborated  by  other  journals.  We  read  in  the 
New  York  Evening  Post  of  December  8,  1903: 

The  Cartagena  outfit,  civil  and  military,  was  landed  at 
Colon.  Leaving  command  to  Colonel  Torres,  the  gen- 
erals (Amaya  and  Tovar)  boarded  a  train  for  Panama. 
This  city  was  in  a  ferment.  The  revolutionists  thought 
the  jig  was  up.  What  should  be  done?  Now,  General 
Huertas,  in  command  of  the  garrison,  had  fought  under 
General  Herbert  O.  Jeffries.  ...  He  said  to  Jeffries: 

"Will  you  stand  by  if  I  deliver  the  garrison  to  the 
revolutionists  ?" 

"Sure,"  answered  Jeffries. 

Then  Jeffries  went  to  the  nonplussed  revolutionists 
and  declared,  "You  have  arrived  at  the  time  described  in 


208  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

an  old  Spanish  proverb  saying — You  have  got  to  give 
birth  now,  or  burst."  ...  A  dispatch  came  from  Colon. 
...  It  said  that  the  Panama  Railroad  had  refused  to 
transport  the  Colombian  troops  across  to  Panama. 
Hearing  this,  the  revolutionists  took  heart.  They  would 
go  on.  At  five  o'clock  they  would  serenade  the  Colom- 
bian generals.  Then  after  dinner  the  generals  would  be 
seized,  and  the  same  band  which  had  welcomed  them 
would  sound  the  tocsin  of  the  revolution. 

On  the  evening  of  October  31,  1903,  there  was  a  final 
meeting  of  the  secessionists  at  the  home  of  Doctor  Ama- 
dor— eight  in  number. 

They  heard  that  Doctor  Amador  had  telegraphed  Va- 
rilla  that  everything  was  now  ready  for  the  overturning. 
They  adjourned  with  the  remark  that  *Tf  Varilla  could 
move  some  American  men-of-war  to  the  Isthmus,  he  is 
somebody,  and  we  can  go  ahead."  In  the  morning  [No- 
vember i]  arrived  a  reply  from  Varilla,  dated  October 
31,  saying  that  American  men-of-war  would  be  at  the 
Isthmus  immediately  to  keep  transit  open.  .  .  . 

November  4  was  fixed  on  as  the  date  for  "the  move- 
ment." The  work  of  enlisting,  the  aid  of  Government 
officers  had  progressed.  Admiral  Varon  of  the  Colom- 
gian  gunboat  Timnty-iirst  of  November  was  won  over 
with  all  his  forces.  General  Huertas,  commandant  of  the 
garrison,  was  found  easy  to  approach.  ...  To  rid  him- 
self of  officers  and  men  he  was  not  sure  would  enter  the 
plot  to  revolt,  he  pretended  to  have  had  a  dispatch  say- 
ing that  revolutionists  were  landing  at  Cocla,  down  the 
coast.  Then  he  sent  off  all  the  distrusted  officers  and 
men  to  put  down  Coda's  imaginary  insurrection. 

Senor  Melendez,  of  Colon,  was  called  to  Panama,  and 
asked  to  be  ready  to  take  the  governorship  of  Colon  on 
the  4th.  About  noon  on  the  2d  the  Nashville  arrived  at 
Colon.  Everything  was  favorable,  except  that  no  Amer- 
ican warship  had  yet  appeared  at  Panama.  Suddenly 
that  evening,  to  the  consternation  of  the  plotters,  the 
Colombian    warship    Cartagena    steamed    into    Colon, 


The  Vaudeville  Revolution  on  Isthmus     209 

bearing  some  500  soldiers,  50  clerks  and  a  new  gov- 
ernor. 

Further  confirmation  of  the  foregoing  is  fur- 
nished by  Teague  in  the  Baltimore  American  for 
December  12,  1903: 

The  promoters  of  the  revolution  are  compelled  by  ex- 
perience to  distrust  a  large  proportion  of  those  men  upon 
whom  they  are  now  forced  to  rely.  They  know  that  the 
army  and  police  force  were  purchased  to  support  the 
revolution,  and  knowing  that  these  factors  are  suscepti- 
ble to  corruption,  they  do  not  know  to-day  whether  the 
military  and  police  officials  are  true  or  untrue  to  the  re- 
public. .  .  . 

All  they  [the  real  revolutionists]  hope  for  is  that  they 
can  keep  things  going  as  they  now  are  until  after  the 
Canal  treaty  is  signed  by  the  members  of  the  junta. 
That  act  of  ratification  accomplished,  the  revolutionists 
will  have  little  interest  in  the  Republic.  .  .  .  The  revo- 
lutionists have  a  bland  and  childlike  faith  in  the  great 
American  Republic. 

It  matters  not  what  statements  may  be  made  at  Wash- 
ington or  what  stories  may  be  current  in  the  States,  all 
Panama  believes  that  the  revolution  was  made  possible 
by  Washington's  foreknowledge  of  what  was  proposed, 
and  an  expressed  determination  by  the  Government  at 
Washington  to  give  moral  and  physical  support  to  the 
revolutionists.  There  is  a  reason  for  this  belief,  for  it 
was  not  actually  decided  to  attempt  the  coup  which  re- 
sulted in  the  creation  of  the  Republic  until  advices  were 
received  from  the  State  to  the  effect  that  if  it  should  be 
attempted  the  United  States  would  back  it  up. 

These  advices  were  not  official,  so  far  as  the  Adminis- 
tration was  concerned,  but  they  were  of  such  a  character 
...  as  to  convince  the  revolutionists  that  all  they  had 
to  do  was  to  take  the  initiative  and  then  rely  on  the 
United  States  to  insure  the  success  of  the  project. 


2IO  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

These  excerpts  give  support  to  the  assertions 
already  made  that  the  Roosevelt  Administration 
expected  warships  to  reach  Isthmian  waters  in 
time  to  prevent  the  landing  of  any  new  contingent 
of  Colombian  troops,  and  that  the  separatists 
knew  that  all  they  needed  to  do  was  to  persuade 
($,  $)  the  Colombian  forces  then  on  the  Isthmus 
to  acquiesce  in  secession.  They  were  persuaded. 
This  was  the  part  that  the  separatists  were  to  play 
in  the  rape  of  Colombia.  Our  marines  were  there 
to  do  the  rest.  In  short,  Isthmian  cash  and  the 
American  navy  were  to  cooperate  to  effect  the 
success  of  secession. 

Obviously,  the  inner  circle  in  Panama  could 
not  have  proceeded  with  the  extreme  measures 
that  it  did  unless  it  had  made  adequate  local 
preparation  or  had  an  understanding  with  our 
Administration.  The  absence  of  local  prepara- 
tion will  be  discussed  in  Chapter  VI.  We  hear 
of  nothing  but  the  non-resistence  of  Colombia's 
troops  in  the  City  of  Panama,  and  their  yielding 
to  persuasion  of  a  pecuniary  kind.  Therefore,  it 
is  a  probability  amounting  to  a  certainty  that 
there  was  an  understanding  between  the  separat- 
ists and  the  Big  Brother  of  the  north.  The  Big 
Brother  acted  with  such  clockwork  precision  in 
the  scheme  that  doubt  is  transformed  into  con- 


The  Vaudeville  Revolution  on  Isthmus     211 

viction.  No  reasoning  along  the  ordinary  infer- 
ences of  human  life  can  arrive  at  any  other  con- 
clusion. 

It  was  plainly  the  understanding  that  the  Prov- 
ince of  Panama  should  declare  her  independence 
of  Colombia  and  simultaneously  assume  all  the 
functions  of  civil  government.  The  United 
States  was  to  recognize  the  independence  of 
the  new  republic  immediately.  Thereafter  the 
Treaty  of  1846  was  to  be  construed  as  in  force 
with  the  new  republic  and  Colombia  would,  ipso 
facto,  be  like  any  other  foreign  country  in  this 
respect.  American  warships  were  to  be  there  to 
prevent  the  landing  of  any  new  contingent  of 
Colombian  troops  on  the  Isthmus.  This  was  to 
be  done  under  the  pretense  of  complying  with  the 
Treaty  of  1846.  No  additional  Colombian  troops 
were  expected  until  the  entire  coup  was  com- 
pleted. Thus,  there  was  an  attempt  to  give  to  an 
unlawful  act  the  appearance  of  regularity  and 
legality. 

Malmros,  American  Consul  at  Colon,  in  his 
telegram  to  Secretary  Hay,  dated  November  3, 
1903,  states: 

Revolution  imminent.  Government  force  on  the  Isth- 
mus about  500  men.  Their  official  promised  support 
revolution.    Fire  department  Panama,  441,  are  well  or- 


212  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

ganized  and  favor  revolution.  Government  vessel,  Car- 
tagena, with  about  400  men,  arrived  early  to-day  with 
now  commander-in-chief,  Tovar.  Was  not  expected  un- 
til November  10. 

And  this  is  the  extent  of  the  preparation  for 
military  operations  in  a  province  that  is  "seething 
with  revolution'' !  A  political  fire  department  of 
some  400  men  and  some  other  patriots  whose  ad- 
hesion was  secured  by  the  cash-nexus.  Revolu- 
tion! Robbing  a  sister  republic  of  a  province 
under  a  cloak  of  respectability. 

The  seizure  of  the  Canal  Zone,  as  originally 
planned,  provided  for  the  persuasion  ($,  $)  of 
the  Colombian  garrison  and  officials  domiciled  on 
the  Isthmus  to  act  with  the  separatists  and  for  the 
United  States  to  have  an  adequate  naval  force 
near  enough  so  that  it  could  reach  Isthmian 
waters  in  time  to  prevent  Colombia  from  landing 
troops  to  reestablish  her  sovereignty.  This  plan 
was  frustrated  by  the  earlier  arrival  of  a  new  con- 
tingent of  Colombian  troops.  Had  these  troops 
not  arrived  before  the  plan  was  ready  for  execu- 
tion, Dr.  Amador  would  not  have  had  to  make 
the  representations  to  the  Colombian  generals  that 
he  did  make.  These  representations  match  with 
established  facts  and  are,  therefore,  conclusive  as 
evidence.     They  point  unmistakably  to  collusion. 


The  Vaudeville  Revolution  on  Isthmus    213 

The  events  connected  with  the  elimination  of  these 
Colombian  troops  tell  the  story  as  convincingly  as 
though  it  were  a  matter  of  official  record — signed, 
sealed  and  delivered.  They  prove  that  there  was 
no  revolution  projected.  They  prove  that  none 
eventuated.  They  prove  that  the  so-called  Re- 
public of  Panama  is  the  product  of  intrigue  be- 
tween Washington  and  Panama  through  the  good 
offices  of  Bunau-Varilla. 


Chapter  V 
Violation  of  the  Treaty  of  1846 

In  this  chapter,  we  will  show  that  President 
Roosevelt,  in  the  part  that  his  Administration 
took  in  the  vaudeville  revolution  on  the  Isthmus 
in  the  fall  of  1903,  violated  the  Treaty  of  1846, 
then  in  force  with  Colombia,  as  well  as  a  univer- 
sally recognized  principle  of  international  law. 
We  will  give  the  provisions  of  the  treaty  violated 
and  point  out  wherein  they  were  violated.  We 
will  conclude  with  an  appeal  for  a  more  sacred 
keeping  of  our  solemn  engagements  than  we  have 
done  in  the  case  of  our  Isthmian  Canal  treaties. 

The  foregoing  statement  of  faithlessness  on  the 
part  of  an  American  Administration  is  so  grave 
that  no  self-respecting  person  would  make  it 
lightly.  It  must  be  immediately  followed  by 
something  tangible  that  will  indicate  the  possibil- 
ity of  its  being  sustained  by  evidence.  Various 
utterances  of  Roosevelt  serve  the  purpose.  We 
will  begin  with  the  associated  press  report  of  a 

talk  by  Colonel  Goethals  before  the  University 

214 


Violation  of  Treaty  of  1846  215 

Club  of  Chicago  on  January  3,  191 5.  President 
Roosevelt  is  reported  to  have  said  to  Colonel 
Goethals  : 

Colonel,  I  think  Til  abolish  that  commission  and  con- 
centrate all  authority  in  you.  An  Executive  order  will 
do  it. 

Colonel  Goethals  mentioned  the  foregoing  to 
Secretary  of  War  Taf t,  who  responded : 

Yes,  that's  the  way  it  ought  to  be  done,  but  it  isn't  in 
accordance  with  the  law. 

Colonel  Goethals  stated  that  he  reported  the 
observation  of  Secretary  Taf  t  to  President  Roose- 
velt, who  remarked  characteristically : 

I  don't  care  a  hang  for  the  law,  I  WANT  THE 
CANAL  BUILT. 

A  public  official  who  does  not  care  a  hang  for 
statute  law  probably  does  not  care  a  hang  for  a 
treaty,  although  it  is  now  generally  considered  to 
be  a  solemn  engagement.  Roosevelt  has  practi- 
cally told  us  so.  Speaking  of  the  peace  treaties 
negotiated  by  the  Wilson  Administration,  he  says : 

There  is  no  likelihood  that  they  will  do  us  any  great 
material  harm,  because  it  is  absolutely  certain  that  we 
would  not  pay  the  smallest  attention  to  them  in  the  event 
of  their  being  invoked  in  any  matter  where  our  interests 
were  seriously  involved. 


2i6  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

He,  however,  observes  that  the  breaking  of  a 
treaty  would  do  us  harm  in  other  than  our  ma- 
terial interests.  We,  of  course,  would  unerringly 
pursue  our  material  interests  and  disregard  the 
moral.     He  says : 

But  it  would  do  us  moral  harm  to  break  them  even 
though  this  were  the  least  evil  of  two  evil  alternatives. 

The  foregoing  observations  by  Roosevelt  are 
vital  in  this  discussion.  The  Treaty  of  1846  and 
international  law  stood  in  the  way  of  our  material 
interests.  So  he  did  not  "pay  the  smallest  atten- 
tion to  them"  as  the  following  shows:  '7  took 
the  Canal  Zone/*  His  philosophy  permitted  him 
to  disregard  treaties  and  the  law  of  nations  and 
he  did.  It  is  seldom  that  a  man  boasts  of  faith- 
lessness, and  counts  it  a  virtue.  Roosevelt  has 
committed  himself  to  the  doctrine  that  a  treaty  is 
not  binding  if  our  "interests  are  seriously  in- 
volved." We,  therefore,  merely  charge  Roose- 
velt with  having  practiced  in  1903  what  he 
preached  in  1914.  Our  offset  to  the  foregoing  is 
that  our  duty  to  civilization  is  paramoimt.  This 
requires  that  we  keep  our  solemn  engagements 
even  though  our  material  interests  are  seriously 
involved. 

Roosevelt  has  told  us  what  the  United  States 


Violation  of  Treaty  of  1846  217 

would  do  if  a  situation  arose  where  a  treaty  seri- 
ously conflicted  with  its  material  interests.  In  so 
doing,  he  has  told  us  what  he  would  do  if  he  were 
President.  In  this  book  we  are  only  telling  what 
he  did  as  President,  and  it  is  merely  what  he  told 
us  that  he  would  do  if  he  were  President.  We 
have  also  told  how  it  was  done — this  is  not  con- 
firmed by  anything  that  he  has  said.  We  are 
merely  applying  his  philosophy  to  the  most  impor- 
tant event  of  his  Administration,  and  assert  noth- 
ing except  that  he  put  his  philosophy  into  practice 
in  the  fall  of  1903. 

Speaking  of  the  labor-capital  conflict  in  Col- 
orado, Roosevelt  is  reported  to  have  said  at  Union- 
town,  Pa.,  on  October  28,  19 14,  according  to  the 
New  York  World: 

It  becomes  the  duty  of  the  United  States  to  remove  the 
injustices  that  cause  that  disorder,  just  as  I  did  in  the 
anthracite  coal  strike.  I  finally  got  them  to  submit  to 
the  judgment  of  the  commission  which  I  appointed. 
There  was  a  laboring  man  on  that  commission,  inciden- 
tally. 

But  I  then  held  myself  ready  if  they  had  refused  to 
have  used  the  army.  I.  would  have  taken  possession  of 
the  mines.  I  would  have  put  a  complete  stop  to  all  law- 
lessness and  would  have  seen  that  the  mines  were 
worked;  but  I  would  have  had  a  Major-General  of  the 
United  States  run  the  mines  as  a  receiver. 

This  is  suggestive.     "I  would  have  taken  pos- 


2i8  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

session  of  the  mines."  By  what  authority,  hu- 
man or  divine?  We  are  not  told.  "1  don't  care 
a  hang  for  the  law.''  Enough  has  been  said. 
We  now  know  that  he  would  not  hesitate  to  vio- 
late a  treaty  or  to  disregard  fundamental  provi- 
sions of  international  law.  We  will  show  that  he 
practiced  in  1903  what  he  defended  in  theory  in 
1914. 

An  official  who  does  not  care  a  hang  for  statute 
law  probably  does  not  care  a  hang  for  interna- 
tional law  or  a  solemn  engagement  if  they  delay 
the  beginning  of  an  undertaking  which  he  is  de- 
termined shall  appear  in  the  galaxy  of  great  deeds 
to  his  credit.  Therefore  it  can  not  be  repugnant 
to  such  an  official  to  violate  a  treaty  (say  that  of 
1846)  if,  in  so  doing,  he  can  expedite  the  getting 
of  the  title  to  the  Canal  Zone  which  is  preliminary 
to  entrance  upon  canal  construction.  We  be- 
lieve that  the  philosophy  he  has  expressed  in  the 
abstract  covers  the  events  on  the  Isthmus  in  the 
fall  of  1903  as  history  is  recording  them. 

The  provisions  of  the  treaty  whose  violation  we 
allege  form  our  starting  point.  The  spirit  of  the 
treaty  is  found  in  the  preamble  and  in  Article  i. 
It  must  not  be  overlooked  that  the  treaty  was  not 
negotiated  with  Colombia,  but  with  the  Govern- 


Violation  of  Treaty  of  1846  219 

ment  which  exercised  authority  over  the  same  ter- 
ritory, namely,  New  Granada.  It  was  continued 
unimpaired  with  Colombia  until  the  Roosevelt 
Administration.  This  treaty  was  signed  Decem- 
ber 12,  1846,  ratified  and  proclaimed  in  June, 
1848.     The  preamble  and  Article  i  follow: 

The  United  States  of  North  America  and  the  Republic 
of  New  Granada  in  South  America,  desiring  to  make 
lasting  and  firm  the  friendship  and  good  understanding 
which  happily  exist  between  both  nations,  have  resolved 
to  fix  in  a  manner  clear,  distinct,  and  positive  the  rules 
which  shall  in  the  future  be  religiously  observed  between 
each  other,  by  means  of  a  treaty  or  general  convention 
of  peace  and  friendship,  commerce  and  navigation. 

Article  I 
There  shall  be  a  perfect,  firm,  and  inviolable  peace  and 
sincere  friendship  between  the  United  States  of  America 
and  the  Republic  of  New  Granada  in  all  the  extent  of 
their  possessions  and  territories,  and  between  their 
citizens  respectively  without  distinction  of  person  or 
places. 

We  claim  that  Article  XXXV  of  that  treaty 
was  violated.  We  will  give  this  article  in  full 
save  the  portion  dealing  with  the  supersession  of 
an  earlier  treaty.  The  bracketed  insert  gives  a 
condensed  summary  of  articles  IV,  V  and  VI, 
referred  to  in  article  XXXV.  This  insert,  the 
preamble  and  Article  I,  as  already  mentioned, 
give  the  spirit  underlying  Article  XXXV.  The 
latter  reads : 


220  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

The  United  States  of  America  and  the  Republic  of 
New  Granada,  desiring  to  make  as  durable  as  possible 
the  relations  which  are  to  be  established  between  the  two 
parties  by  virtue  of  this  treaty,  have  declared  solemnly, 
and  do  agree  to  the  following  points : 

1st.  For  the  better  understanding  of  the  preceding 
articles,  it  is  and  has  been  stipulated  between  the  high 
contracting  parties,  that  the  citizens,  vessels  and  mer- 
chandise of  the  United  States  shall  enjoy  in  the  ports  of 
New  Granada,  including  those  of  the  part  of  the 
Granadian  territory  generally  denominated  Isthmus  of 
Panama,  from  its  southernmost  extremity  until  the 
boundary  of  Costa  Rica,  all  the  exemptions,  privileges 
and  immunities  concerning  commerce  and  navigation, 
which  are  now  or  may  hereafter  be  enjoyed  by 
Granadian  citizens,  their  vessels  and  merchandise;  and 
that  this  equality  of  favors  shall  be  made  to  extend  to 
the  passengers,  correspondence  and  merchandise  of  the 
United  States,  in  their  transit  across  the  said  territory, 
from  one  sea  to  the  other.  The  Government  of  New 
Granada  guarantees  to  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  that  the  right  of  way  or  transit  across  the  Isthmus 
of  Panama  upon  any  modes  of  communication  that  now 
exist,  or  that  may  be  hereafter  constructed,  shall  be  open 
and  free  to  the  Government  and  citizens  of  the  United 
States,  and  for  the  transportation  of  any  articles  of  prod- 
uce, manufactures  or  merchandise,  of  lawful  commerce, 
belonging  to  the  citizens  of  the  United  States;  that  no 
other  tolls  or  charges  shall  be  levied  or  collected  upon  the 
citizens  of  the  United'  States,  or  their  said  merchandise 
thus  passing  over  any  road  or  canal  that  may  be  made  by 
the  Government  of  New  Granada,  or  by  the  authority  of 
the  same,  than  is,  under  Hke  circumstances,  levied  upon 
and  collected  from  the  Granadian  citizens;  that  any 
lawful  produce,  manufactures  or  merchandise,  belonging 
to  citizens  of  the  United  States,  thus  passing  from  one 
sea  to  the  other,  in  either  direction,  for  the  purpose  of 
exportation  to  any  other  foreign  country,  shall  not  be 


Violation  of  Treaty  of  1846  221 

liable  to  any  import-duties  whatever;  or,  having  paid 
such  duties,  they  shall  be  entitled  to  drawback  upon  their 
exportation;  nor  shall  the  citizens  of  the  United  States 
be  liable  to  any  duties,  tolls  or  charges  of  any  kind,  to 
which  native  citizens  are  not  subjected  for  thus  passing 
the  said  Isthmus.  And,  in  order  to  secure  to  themselves 
the  tranquil  and  constant  enjoyment  of  these  advantages, 
and  as  an  especial  compensation  for  the  said  advantages, 
and  for  the  favors  they  have  acquired  by  the  4th,  5th, 
and  6th  [That  is,  extend  to  each  other  the  most  favored 
nation  commercial  advantages  in  addition  to  the  mutual 
guarantees  contained  in  this  article,  XXXV,  concerning 
Isthmian  transit]  articles  of  this  treaty,  the  United 
States  guarantee,  positively  and  efficaciously,  to  New 
Granada,  by  the  present  stipulation,  the  perfect  neutrality 
of  the  before-mentioned  Isthmus,  with  the  view  that  the 
free  transit  from  the  one  to  the  other  sea  may  not  be  inter- 
rupted or  embarrassed  in  any  future  time  while  this 
treaty  exists ;  and,  in  consequence,  the  United  States  also 
guarantee,  in  the  same  manner,  the  rights  of  sovereignty 
and  property  which  New  Granada  has  and  possesses 
over  the  said  territory. 

2nd.  The  present  treaty  shall  remain  in  full  force 
and  vigor  for  the  term  of  twenty  years  from  the  day  of 
the  exchange  of  the  ratifications.  .  .  . 

3rd.  Notwithstanding  the  foregoing,  if  neither  party 
notifies  the  other  of  its  intention  of  reforming  any  of,  or 
all,  the  articles  of  this  treaty  twelve  months  before  the  ex- 
piration of  the  twenty  years  stipulated  above,  the  said 
treaty  shall  continue  binding  on  both  parties  beyond  the 
said  twenty  years,  until  twelve  months  from  the  time 
that  one  of  the  parties  notifies  its  intention  of  proceeding 
to  a  reform. 

4th.  If  any  one  or  more  of  the  citizens  of  either  party 
shall  infringe  any  of  the  articles  of  this  treaty,  such 
citizens  shall  be  held  personally  responsible  for  the  same, 
and  the  harmony  and  good  correspondence  between  the 
nations  shall  not  be  interrupted  thereby;  each  party  en- 


222  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

gaging  in  no  way  to  protect  the  offender,  or  sanction 
such  violation. 

5th.  If  unfortunately  any  of  the  articles  contained  in 
this  treaty  should  be  violated  or  infringed  in  any  way 
whatever,  it  is  expressly  stipulated  that  neither  of  the 
two  contracting  parties  shall  ordain  or  authorize  any  acts 
of  reprisal,  nor  shall  declare  war  against  the  other  on 
complaints  of  injuries  or  damages,  until  the  said  party 
considering  itself  offended  shall  have  laid  before  the 
other  a  statement  of  such  injuries  or  damages,  verified 
by  competent  proofs,  demanding  justice  and  satisfaction, 
and  the  same  shall  have  been  denied,  in  violation  of  the 
laws  and  of  international  right. 

6th.  Any  special  or  remarkable  advantage  that  one  or 
the  other  power  may  enjoy  from  the  foregoing  stipu- 
lation, are  and  ought  to  be  always  understood  in  virtue 
and  as  in  compensation  of  the  obligations  they  have  just 
contracted,  and  which  have  been  specified  in  the  first 
number  of  this  article. 

This  treaty  clearly  imposed  upon  the  sovereign 
the  duty  to  keep  the  transit  unobstructed.  If  the 
sovereign  was  unable  to  do  so  on  account  of  local 
disturbances,  the  United  States,  its  nationals,  or 
both,  were  entitled  to  compensation  for  dam- 
ages actually  sustained.  The  article  provided  a 
method  for  securing  reparation,  and  it  was  actu- 
ally applied  in  1857  when  damages  were  collected 
that  resulted  from  the  interruption  of  transit. 
The  treaty,  however,  from  the  preamble  to  the 
closing  article,  does  not  derogate  from  the  rights 
of  the  sovereign  and  none  of  the  rights  that  the 
United  States  acquired  by  it  supervened  those  of 


Violation  of  Treaty  of  1846  223 

the  sovereign  or  any  of  the  rights  of  sovereignty. 
This  blends  the  violation  of  this  treaty  with  that 
of  the  violation  of  international  law,  that  is,  the 
violation  of  the  rights  of  sovereignty,  under  the 
law  of  nations. 

What  fundamental  provision  of  international 
law  was  violated  ?  In  order  to  point  it  out  clearly, 
we  must  define  sovereignty.  Sovereignty  is  the 
sum  total  of  rights  which  attach  to  an  independent 
state  by  virtue  of  being  such.  What  then  is  a 
sovereign  state?  Stockton  defines  a  sovereign 
state  as  follows : 

A  sovereign  state  may  be  defined  in  general  terms  to 
be  a  fully  independent  and  civilized  community  of 
persons,  permanently  located  within  a  fixed  country, 
organized  under  common  laws  into  a  body  politic  for 
mutual  advantage,  exercising  the  rights  of  government 
over  all  persons  and  things  within  its  territory,  and 
capable  of  entering  into  relations  and  intercourse  with 
other  states  of  the  world. 

This  is  enlarged  upon  and  somewhat  amplified 
in  the  following : 

All  sovereign  states  within  the  purview  of  inter- 
national law  are  equal,  that  is,  equal  in  their  rights  and 
in  their  obligations,  equal  in  their  sovereignty,  and  in 
their  independence. 

From  the  foregoing  it  follows  that  sovereign 
states  have  two  paramount  rights : 


224  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

1.  The  right  of  self-preservation. 

2.  The  right  of  exclusive  jurisdiction  over  their 
territory. 

Sovereignty  is  a  combination  of  all  power,  that 
is,  power  to  do  anything  and  everything  in  a  state 
without  legal  accountability.  It  is  the  right  of  a 
nation  to  govern  itself  independent  of  any  foreign 
power.  This  includes,  of  course,  the  right  to 
suppress  insurrection  and  to  prevent  dismember- 
ment. Colombia  had  the  right  to  suppress  seces- 
sion without  interference  from  our  Government. 

Did  New  Granada  impair  or  intend  to  impair 
in  any  way  whatsoever,  either  of  the  foregoing 
rights  when  she  entered  into  the  Treaty  of  1846 
with  the  United  States?  If  not,  Colombia  had 
the  indisputable  right  to  use  force  to  preserve  her 
sovereignty  over  the  Province  of  Panama.  In- 
terference with  that  right  was  in  violation  of  in- 
ternational law. 

Whether  impairment  of  the  sovereignty  of  New 
Granada  was  intended  can  be  best  seen  in  official 
documents  connected  with  the  negotiation  of  the 
treaty,  the  most  important  of  which  is  the  follow- 
ing from  a  message  of  President  Polk : 

The  general  considerations  which  have  induced  me  to 
transmit  the  treaty  to  the  Senate  for  their  advice  may  be 
summed  up  in  the  following  particulars: 


Violation  of  Treaty  of  1846  225 

1.  The  treaty  does  not  propose  to  guarantee  a  terri- 
tory to  a  foreign  nation  in  which  the  United  States  will 
have  no  common  interest  with  that  nation.  On  the  con- 
trary, we  are  more  deeply  and  directly  interested  in  the 
subject  of  this  guaranty  than  New  Granada  herself,  or 
any  other  country. 

2.  The  guaranty  does  not  extend  to  the  territories  of 
New  Granada  generally,  but  is  confined  to  the  single  pro- 
vince of  the  Isthmus  of  Panama,  where  we  shall  acquire 
by  the  treaty  a  common  and  coextensive  right  of  passage 
with  herself. 

3.  It  will  constitute  no  alliance  for  any  political  object, 
but  for  a  purely  commercial  purpose,  in  which  all  the 
navigating  nations  of  the  world  have  a  common  interest. 

4.  In  entering  into  the  mutual  guarantees  proposed  by 
the  thirty-fifth  article  of  the  treaty,  neither  the  Govern- 
ment of  New  Granada  nor  that  of  the  United  States  has 
any  narrow  or  exclusive  views.  The  ultimate  object  .  .  . 
is  to  secure  to  all  nations  the  free  and  equal  right  of 
passage  over  the  Isthmus.  If  the  United  States,  as  the 
chief  of  the  American  nations,  should  first  become  a 
party  to  this  guaranty,  it  cannot  be  doubted  —  indeed,  it 
is  confidently  expected  by  the  Government  of  New 
Granada  —  that  similar  guarantees  will  be  given  to  that 
Republic  by  Great  Britain  and  France. 

All  that  the  United  States  secured  by  this  treaty 
on  the  Isthmus  was  a  common  and  coextensive 
right  of  transit  with  the  sovereign.  As  similar 
rights  were  to  be  extended  to  the  other  nations, 
according  to  the  excerpt  of  the  message  quoted, 
in  return  for  the  guarantees  embodied  in  Article 
XXXV,  it  follows  that  no  impairment  of  sover- 
eignty was  intended  by  the  negotiators  of  the 


226  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

treaty.  The  guaranteeing  powers,  according  to 
the  intent  of  the  treaty,  were  to  keep  transit  open 
against  obstruction  by  foreign  powers  and  to 
maintain  the  neutraHty  of  the  Province  of  Pan- 
ama under  the  sovereignty  of  New  Granada. 
New  Granada  remained  the  sole  protector  of  Isth- 
mian transit  against  domestic  obstruction.  Out- 
side intereference  without  her  consent  or  request 
would  be  in  violation  of  the  treaty  and  of  her 
rights  as  a  sovereign  state. 

That  the  treaty  was  merely  to  grant  to  the 
United  States  a  common  coextensive  right  of 
transit  with  the  sovereign  on  the  Isthmus  is 
further  shown  in  the  following  excerpt  from  an 
official  communication  of  Mallarino,  at  the  time 
Minister  of  New  Granada  at  Washington: 

On  account  of  these  reasons,  and  for  the  convenience 
of  not  awakening  international  jealousies  by  extraor- 
dinary and  special  treaties,  the  guaranty  of  territorial 
possession,  to  be  given  by  the  United  States,  ought  to  be 
incidentally  introduced  in  treaties  of  commerce,  as  a 
part  of  and  subordinate  to  them.  .  .  . 

This  end  is  simply  and  naturally  to  be  obtained  by 
stipulating,  in  favor  of  the  United  States,  the  total  repeal 
of  the  differential  duties,  as  a  compensation  of  the  obli- 
gation they  impose  upon  themselves  of  guaranteeing  the 
legitimate  and  complete  or  integral  possession  of  those 
portions  of  territory  that  the  universal  mercantile 
interests  require  to  be  free  and  open  to  all  nations. 

In   the   course   of   his   argument,   Mallarino 


Violation  of  Treaty  of  1846  227 

points  out  that  Great  Britain  would  be  at  a  com- 
mercial disadvantage — 

Unless  she  invited  New  Granada  to  alter  upon  the 
same  conditions,  the  British  treaty,  constituting  herself 
thereby,  also,  as  a  guaranteeing  power  of  New  Granada 
sovereignty  upon  the  Isthmus. 

It  is  clear  from  this,  as  well  as  from  the  treaty 
itself,  that  New  Granada  sought  the  guarantee  of 
her  sovereignty  over  the  Province  of  Panama, 
and  was  offering  as  compensation  a  common  and 
coextensive  right  of  transit  over  the  Isthmus,  and 
the  favored  nation  commercial  provision  in  her 
entire  territory.  Under  date  of  February  10, 
1847,  President  Polk,  in  a  special  message  to  the 
Senate,  said: 

There  does  not  appear  any  other  effectual  means  of 
securing  to  all  nations  the  advantages  of  this  important 
passage  but  through  the  guarantee  of  great  commercial 
powers  that  the  Isthmus  shall  be  neutral  territory.  .  .  , 

The  guarantee  of  the  sovereignty  of  New  Granada 
over  the  Isthmus  is  a  natural  consequence  of  this  neutral- 
ity. .  .  .  New  Granada  would  not  yield  this  province  that 
it  might  become  a  neutral  State ;  and  if  she  should,  it  is 
not  sufficiently  populous  or  wealthy  to  establish  or  main- 
tain an  independant  sovereignty.  But  a  civil  govern- 
ment must  exist  there  to  protect  the  works  which  shall  be 
constructed.  New  Granada  is  not  a  power  which  will 
excite  the  jealousy  of  any  nation. 

The  protection  of  the  works  to  be  constructed, 
canal  and  railroad,  was  to  be  under  the  exclusive 


228  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

jurisdiction  of  the  sovereign.  There  was  not 
only  no  intent  in  this  treaty  to  impair  any  of  the 
then  rights  of  sovereignty  of  New  Granada  over 
the  Province  of  Panama,  but  there  was,  on  the 
contrary,  a  clearly  defined  intent  to  safeguard  for 
her  that  sovereignty  in  perpetuity. 

The  Isthmus  has  always  had  strategic  value  and 
therefore  its  possession  has  been  coveted  by  other 
powers.  The  United  States  was  one  of  them. 
This  country  guaranteed  the  sovereignty  of  Co- 
lombia over  this  territory  in  the  Treaty  of  1846. 
It  gave  no  guarantee,  however,  against  the  suc- 
cess of  a  domestic  insurrection.  Therefore  the 
United  States  was  not  obligated  to  keep  transit 
open  during  a  domestic  uprising.  The  Treaty 
was  entirely  extra-domestic.  The  United  States 
could  intervene  to  keep  transit  open  during  a  do- 
mestic conflict  only  at  the  request  of  the  sovereign. 
Compensation  for  loss  suffered  during  an  inter- 
ruption of  transit  was  the  only  remedy  open  to 
the  United  States  under  the  Treaty  of  1846.  She 
was  clearly  estopped  from  being  the  revolution 
herself  under  the  cloak  of  a  few  separatists  domi- 
ciled in  the  City  of  Panama. 

One  of  the  reasons  advanced  for  the  adoption 
of  the  Treaty  of  1846  was  that  it  would  allay  sus- 
picion in  Spanish-America.     The  argument  ad- 


Violation  of  Treaty  of  1846  22(^ 

vanced  by  the  Minister  of  New  Granada,  Malla- 
rino,  clearly  showed  that  the  United  States  was 
believed  to  have  territorial  designs  there.  His 
argument  clearly  shows  that  one  of  the  purposes 
of  the  Treaty  was  to  secure  territorial  integrity 
for  New  Granada.  The  following,  by  the  Minis- 
ter named,  is  quoted  from  an  official  document  on 
record  in  the  State  Department : 

Other  reasons  are  relative  to  the  United  States*  own 
fame  and  reputation,  as  assuredly  nothing  would  so 
brilliantly  vindicate  them,  nor  acquire  them  greater 
augmentation  of  American  affection  than  the  fact  that 
they,  after  having  been  branded  as  the  oppressors  and 
future  conquerors  of  Spanish  American  republics  should 
present  themselves  as  the  most  jealous  protectors  of  the 
territorial  integrity  of  those  very  same  republics  in  whose 
preservation  they  would  appear  taking  an  open  and 
direct  interest. 

Did  the  sovereign  surrender,  or  intend  to  sur- 
render, the  right  of  protection  of  isthmian  transit 
to  the  United  States,  or  did  she  contract,  by  im- 
plication, for  the  right  to  call  on  this  country  for 
assistance  in  the  event  that  she  was  unable  to 
afford  protection?  As  already  shown,  the  intent 
of  the  negotiators  of  the  Treaty  of  1846  was 
clearly  not  to  derogate  from  the  sovereign  rights 
of  New  Granada,  but  to  secure  their  inviolability. 

In  the  light  of  the  foregoing,  read  the  telegrams 


230  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

of  November  2,  1903,  to  our  naval  forces  in  or 
soon  to  arrive  in  Isthmian  waters.  They  are  so 
vital  that  we  reproduce  vital  excerpts  from  them. 
To  the  Nashville  at  Colon : 

Maintain  free  and  uninterrupted  transit.  If  inter- 
ruption threatened  by  armed  force,  occupy  the  line  of 
railroad.  Prevent  landing  of  any  armed  force  with 
hostile  intent,  either  Government  or  insurgent,  either  at 
Colon,  Porto  Bello  or  other  point.  .  .  .  Government  force 
reported  approaching  the  Isthmus  in  vessels.  Prevent 
their  landing  if  in  your  judgment  this  would  precipitate 
a  conflict. 

To  the  Boston  at  Panama : 

Maintain  free  and  uninterrupted  transit.  If  inter- 
ruption is  threatened  by  armed  force,  occupy  the  line  of 
railroad.  Prevent  landing  of  any  armed  force  with 
hostile  intent,  either  Government  or  insurgent,  at  any 
point  within  50  miles  of  Panama.  .  .  .  Government  force 
reported  approaching  the  Isthmus  in  vessels.  Prevent 
their  landing  if,  in  your  judgment,  the  landing  would 
precipitate  a  conflict. 

When  these  telegrams  were  sent  to  our  naval 
commanders,  our  Government  read  into  a  solemn 
engagement  a  construction  not  warranted  by  its 
wording  or  the  intent  of  its  negotiators. 

The  Treaty  of  1846  would,  of  course,  not  have 
been  agreed  to  by  New  Granada  nor  would  it  have 
been  continued  by  Colombia  if  it  had  been  believed 
that  the  United  States  would  use  it  as  a  pretext 


Violation  of  Treaty  of  1846  231 

to  wrest  from  its  sovereignty  the  Province  of 
Panama.  The  construction  placed  on  this  treaty 
by  our  Government  in  1903  gave  the  United 
States  power  equivalent  to  that  of  de  facto  sover- 
eignty over  the  line  of  transit  and  its  littoral.  As 
applied  this  power  took  precedence  of  the  rights 
of  the  de  jure  sovereign.  This  construction  of 
the  treaty  is  without  precedent  in  American  di- 
plomacy and  without  sanction  in  international 
law. 

Contrast  the  foregoing  telegrams  with  the 
policy  pursued  by  our  Government  under  the 
Treaty  of  1846  previous  to  the  Roosevelt  Ad- 
ministration. Our  earlier  policy  is  well  stated  in 
a  letter  to  his  Government  by  Minister  Concha, 
dated  October  30,  1902.  In  this  letter  he  pro- 
tested against  the  new  construction  of  the  treaty, 
and  clearly  states  our  earlier  interpretations. 
The  portion  that  is  to  the  point  reads : 

When  for  the  first  time  the  United  States  used  the 
right  of  transit  via  the  Isthmus,  which  is  guaranteed 
them  by  the  existing  treaty,  it  was  with  the  simple  object 
of  sending  troops  to  Oregon  and  California;  that  was 
effected  by  disembarking  them  and  sending  them  across 
the  Isthmus  without  having  given  any  previous  notice  to 
the  authorities ;  for  that  our  Secretary  of  Foreign  Affairs 
presented  a  protest  in  Washington  through  the  legation, 
and  in  a  conference  in  September  of  1858  between  the 


232  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

Granadian  minister,  General  Herran,  and  the  Secretary  of 
State,  General  Casey,  it  was  agreed  that  in  future  when- 
ever it  was  necessary  to  send  American  forces  through  the 
territory  of  the  Isthmus  they  would  come  unarmed  and 
as  groups  of  private  individuals  "without  enjoying  the 
exemptions  which  are  customary  when  troops  pass 
through  foreign  territory,  but,  on  the  contrary,  being 
subject  to  the  territorial  jurisdiction  exactly  like  all  other 
strangers."  This  agreement  was  punctually  fulfilled 
during  the  American  war  of  secession  on  the  occasion 
when  forces  of  the  Government  of  the  United  States 
were  sent  to  the  Pacific.  To-day,  so  advanced  is  the 
interpretation,  that  American  forces  are  disembarked  in 
Panama  to  disarm  those  of  the  sovereign  of  the  territory. 
Whatever  more  extensive  comment  might  be  made  on 
this  point  would  be  redundant. 

Comparison  of  the  foregoing  excerpts  of  tele- 
grams to  our  naval  forces  with  the  previous  policy 
of  our  Government  shows  that  the  Treaty  of  1846 
was  scrapped  by  the  Roosevelt  Administration  in 
1903.  This  treaty  was  negotiated  by  New  Gra- 
nada and  continued  by  Colombia  for  the  purpose 
of  safeguarding  their  sovereignty  over  the  Isth- 
mus. It  was  violated,  and,  at  the  same  time,  used 
as  a  pretext  to  conceal  from  the  American  people 
the  rape  of  Colombia. 

When  the  telegrams  just  quoted  from  were 
sent,  there  was  peace  on  the  Isthmus.  Yet,  the 
sovereign  of  the  territory  was  forbidden  to  land 
troops  there  to  protect  her  sovereignty  and  was 
barred  from  the  use  of  the  Panama  railroad, 


Violation  of  Treaty  of  1846  233 

which  was  obhged  by  its  charter  to  transport 
Colombian  troops  from  one  side  of  the  Isthmus 
to  the  other  on  demand. 

On  November  9,  1865,  Secretary  Seward  sent 
a  communication  to  our  Minister  at  Bogota  which 
clearly  defined  the  duty  of  the  United  States  and 
that  of  the  sovereign  state  in  relation  to  the  pro- 
tection of  Isthmian  transit  if  obstruction  was 
threatened  as  a  result  of  domestic  trouble.  It 
reads : 

The  question  which  has  recendy  arisen  under  the 
thirty-fifth  article  of  the  treaty  with  New  Granada,  as  to 
the  obligation  of  this  Government  to  comply  with  a  req- 
uisition of  the  President  of  the  United  States  of 
Colombia  for  a  force  to  protect  the  Isthmus  of  Panama 
from  invasion  by  a  body  of  insurgents  of  that  country 
has  been  submitted  to  the  consideration  of  the  Attorney 
General.  His  opinion  is  that  neither  the  text  nor 
the  spirit  of  the  stipulation  in  that  article,  by  which 
the  United  States  engages  to  preserve  the  neutrality 
of  the  Isthmus  of  Panama,  imposes  an  obligation 
on  this  Government  to  comply  with  a  requisition  like 
that  referred  to.  The  purpose  of  the  stipulation  was 
to  guarantee  the  Isthmus  against  seizure  or  invasion 
by  a  foreign  power  only.  It  could  not  have  been  con- 
templated that  we  were  to  become  a  party  to  any  civil 
war  in  that  country  by  defending  the  Isthmus  against 
another  party.  As  it  may  be  presumed,  however,  that 
our  object  in  entering  into  such  a  stipulation  was  to 
secure  the  freedom  of  transit  across  the  Isthmus,  if  that 
freedom  should  be  endangered  or  obstructed,  the  employ- 
ment of  force  on  our  part  to  prevent  this  would  be  a 
question  of  grave  expediency  to  be  determined  by  cir- 


234  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

cumstances.     The  department  is  not  aware  that  there  is 
yet  occasion  for  a  decision  upon  this  point. 

For  the  purpose  of  comparison  with  the  fore- 
going telegrams,  the  following  by  Secretary 
Seward  is  even  more  to  the  point : 

THE  UNITED  STATES  DESIRES  NOTHING  ELSE,  NOTHING 
BETTER,  AND  NOTHING  MORE  IN  REGARD  TO  THE  STATE  OF 
COLOMBIA  THAN  THE  ENJOYMENT,  ON  THEIR  PART,  OF 
COMPLETE  AND  ABSOLUTE  SOVEREIGNTY  AND  INDEPEND- 
ENCE. IF  THOSE  GREAT  INTERESTS  SHALL  EVER  BE  AS- 
SAILED BY  ANY  POWER  AT  HOME  OR  ABROAD,  THE  UNITED 
STATES  WILL  BE  READY,  COOPERATING  WITH  THE  GOVERN- 
MENT AND  THEIR  ALLY,  TO  MAINTAIN  AND  DEFEND  THEM. 

We  will  now  throw  into  relief,  that  is,  contrast 
the  Roosevelt  policy  as  contained  in  the  telegrams 
quoted  above  with  the  policy  of  other  earlier  ad- 
ministrations. 

Secretary  Hamilton  Fish  declared  that  it  was 
the  duty  of  the  sovereign  under  the  treaty  to  pro- 
tect Isthmian  transit  from  domestic  interference, 
and  that  the  United  States  would  insist  upon  it. 
It  is  contained  in  the  following  communication 
addressed  to  our  Minister  at  Bogota: 

This  Government,  by  the  Treaty  with  New  Granada 
of  1846,  has  engaged  a  guaranty  of  neutrality  of  the 
Isthmus  of  Panama.  This  engagement,  however,  has 
never  been  acknowledged  to  embrace  the  duty  of  protect- 
ing the  road  across  it  from  the  violence  of  local  factions. 
Although  such  protection  was  of  late  efficiently  given  by 


I 


Violation  of  Treaty  of  1846  235 

the  force  under  the  command  of  Admiral  Almy,  it 
appears  to  have  been  granted  with  the  consent  and  at  the 
request  of  the  local  authorities.  It  is,  however,  regarded 
as  the  undoubted  duty  of  the  Colombian  Government  to 
protect  the  road  against  attacks  from  local  insurgents. 
The  discharge  of  this  duty  will  be  insisted  upon. 

Compliance  with  the  treaty  obligated  the  sov- 
ereign to  keep  an  adequate  force  on  the  Isthmus 
to  maintain  order  during  ordinary  times  and  to 
send  additional  forces  when  needed.  As  already 
stated,  there  is  not  the  slightest  suggestion  of  im- 
pairment of  sovereignty,  or  of  any  right  of  the 
United  States  to  prevent  the  sovereign  from  land- 
ing troops  on  any  part  of  the  Isthmus,  to  maintain 
order  or  shifting  them  on  the  Isthmus  as  emer- 
gency arose. 

The  telegrams  to  our  naval  officers  just  quoted 
were  sent  to  obstruct  transit  in  its  most  sacred 
use.  The  sovereign  was  to  be  barred  from  its 
legitimate  use.  These  telegrams  were  sent  to 
give  assurance  to  the  separatists  on  the  Isthmus 
that  secession  would  be  protected.  In  a  time  of 
profound  peace,  the  sovereign  was  to  be  barred 
from  the  use  of  a  railroad  in  his  own  dominion. 
This  would  hearten  the  separatists — galvanize  the 
movement — and  give  vitality  to  secession. 

In  an  earlier  chapter  we  gave  the  view  of 
Grover  Cleveland.     We  will  now  contrast  the 


236  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

telegrams  under  examination  with  the  following 
from  the  pen  of  his  Secretary  of  State,  Bayard: 

On  several  occasions  the  Government  of  the  United 
States,  at  the  instance,  and  always  with  the  assent  of 
Colombia,  has,  in  times  of  civil  tumult,  sent  its  armed 
forces  to  the  Isthmus  of  Panama  to  preserve  American 
citizens  and  property  along  the  transit  from  injuries 
which  the  Government  of  Colombia  might  at  the  time  be 
unable  to  prevent.  But,  in  taking  such  steps,  this 
Government  has  always  recognized  the  sovereignty  and 
obligation  of  Colombia  in  the  premises,  and  has  never 
acknowledged,  but,  on  the  contrary,  has  expressly  dis- 
claimed the  duty  of  protecting  transit  against  domestic 
disturbances. 

The  policy  pursued  during  the  Roosevelt  Ad- 
ministration is  without  a  sustaining  precedent. 
It  is  sui  generis.  It  stands  unique  in  its  isolation. 
Its  offspring  is  the  so-called  Republic  of  Panama. 
Its  heritage  is  the  ill-will  of  Colombia  and  of 
Spanish-America.  Its  by-product  is  national  dis- 
honor. Its  aftermath  is  a  stain  on  the  Roosevelt 
Administration  which  all  the  waters  of  the  canal 
can  never  wash  away. 

We  have  contrasted  the  action  of  the  Roosevelt 
Administration  in  1903  with  that  of  earlier  ad- 
ministrations. It  is  now  proper  to  contrast  it 
with  that  of  the  Roosevelt  Administration  in 
1902,  when,  hat  in  hand,  it  was  a  suppliant  at  the 
feet  of  Colombia  for  a  title  to  the  Canal  Zone. 


Violation  of  Treaty  of  1846  237 

We  will  do  so  in  detail  in  the  next  chapter.  A 
bird's-eye  view  serves  our  purpose  here.  The 
telegram  dated  October  16,  1902,  sent  by  Secre- 
tary Hay  to  our  Minister  at  Bogota  reads : 

This  Government  regrets  misunderstanding  which  has 
apparently  arisen  in  Panama.  No  intention  to  infringe 
sovereignty  or  wound  dignity  of  Colombia.  American 
commander  was  instructed  in  that  sense  October  10. 

This  telegram  concedes  that  Colombian  sover- 
eignty was  not  impaired  by  the  Treaty  of  1846. 
Is  not  that  which  is  conceded  in  1902  binding  in 
1903?  Therefore,  Colombia  had  the  unques- 
tioned right  in  1903  to  dispatch  her  forces  to  the 
Isthmus  to  maintain  order  and  to  protect  her 
sovereignty  over  the  Province  of  Panama.  It 
was  also  her  duty  to  do  so  under  the  Treaty  of 
1846.  The  United  States  prevented  her  from 
performing  her  duty  by  the  display  of  overwhelm- 
ing force.  In  so  doing  our  Administration  vio- 
lated the  Treaty  of  1846  and  the  principle  of  sov- 
ereignty as  defined  in  international  law. 

In  a  time  of  profound  peace  (November  2, 
1903),  the  United  States  forbade  the  actual  sov- 
ereign to  land  troops  to  keep  open  the  Isthmian 
transit  and  obstructed  transit  herself  in  its  most 
sacred  use,  that  of  preserving  territorial  integ- 
rity.    In  a  time  of  unsettled  conditions  ( Novem- 


238  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

ber  6,  1903),  the  United  States  ordered  the  de 
facto  sovereign  (Panama)  to  keep  open  Isthmian 
transit.  On  the  latter  date  Secretary  Hay  tele- 
graphed our  Consul  at  Panama : 

When  you  are  satisfied  that  a  de  facto  government,  re- 
publican in  form,  and  without  substantial  opposition 
from  its  own  people,  has  been  established  in  the  State  of 
Panama,  you  will  enter  into  relations  with  it  as  the  re- 
sponsible government  of  the  territory  and  look  to  it  for 
all  due  action  to  protect  the  persons  and  property  of  citi- 
zens of  the  United  States  and  to  keep  open  the  Isthmian 
transit  in  accordance  with  the  obligations  of  existing 
treaties  governing  the  relation  of  the  United  States  to 
that  territory. 

We  will  now  give  a  summary  of  the  changes 
{de  convenance)  in  the  interpretation  of  the 
Treaty  of  1846,  for  which  the  Roosevelt  Adminis- 
tration is  responsible.  In  1857,  as  already  seen, 
the  United  States  informed  New  Granada,  now 
Colombia,  that  it  was  her  duty  to  keep  Isthmian 
transit  unobstructed  and  because  she  failed  to  do 
so,  a  disinterested  tribunal  was  constituted  to 
assess  damages.  This  construction  of  the  treaty 
remained  in  full  force  until  some  time  after 
Roosevelt  became  President.  Thereafter  its  con- 
struction altered  as  did  the  exigencies  surround- 
ing the  title  to  the  Canal  Zone. 

In  1903,  from  November  2  to  November  6,  the 
United  States  for  the  first  time  held  that  it  was  its 


Violation  of  Treaty  of  1846  239 

duty  to  keep  the  line  of  transit  open  and  so  for- 
bade Colombia  to  land  soldiers  anywhere  on  the 
Isthmus  to  protect  her  sovereignty  over  the  Prov- 
ince of  Panama.  Again  in  1903,  from  Novem- 
ber 6  and  after,  as  just  seen,  the  United  States 
required  Panama  to  keep  the  line  of  transit  open. 
And  jet  there  is  no  more  honorable  chapter  in 
American  history  than  this  perfidious  somer- 
saulting in  the  construction  of  the  Treaty  of 
1846! 

If  the  obligation  to  keep  Isthmian  transit  open 
was  imposed  on  the  new-born  Government  of 
Panama  because  of  its  having  succeeded  to  the 
rights  and  duties  of  Colombia  under  the  Treaty  of 
1846,  then  in  the  name  of  all  that  is  sacred  how 
could  our  Government  honestly  deny  to  Colom- 
bia the  right  and  duty,  under  the  same  treaty,  to 
comply  with  the  same  obligation?  How  could 
she  deny  to  the  de  jure  and  the  de  facto  sovereign 
on  November  2, 1903,  when  peace  prevailed  on  the 
Isthmus,  what  she  imposed  on  the  de  facto  Gov- 
ernment (not  sovereign)  on  November  6,  1903? 
''Consistency,  thou  art  a  jewelT 

The  Treaty  of  1857  between  the  United  States 
and  New  Granada  throws  an  interesting  sidelight 
on  the  construction  placed  on  the  Treaty  of  1846, 


240  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

when  title  to  the  Canal  Zone  was  not  a  disturbing 
factor.  Transit  across  the  Isthmus  was  ob- 
structed in  1856.  This  treaty  was  negotiated  for 
the  purpose  of  enabling  citizens  of  the  United 
States  to  collect  damages  from  New  Granada  by 
reason  of  this  obstruction.  The  damages  were 
demanded  by  the  United  States  because  it  held 
that  it  was  the  duty  of  New  Granada  and  not  that 
of  the  United  States  to  keep  transit  open.  New 
Granada  admitted  that  this  was  the  correct  con- 
struction of  the  Treaty  of  1846.  Article  I  of  the 
Treaty  of  1857  reads: 

All  claims  on  the  part  of  .  .  .  citizens  of  the  United 
States  upon  the  Government  of  New  Granada  .  .  .  and 
especially  those  for  damages  which  were  caused  by  the 
riot  at  Panama  on  the  15th  of  April,  1856,  for  which 
the  said  Government  of  New  Granada  acknowledges  its 
liability  arising  out  of  its  privileges  and  obligation  to 
preserve  peace  and  order  along  the  transit  route. 

It  thus  clearly  appears  from  this  treaty  that  it 
was  held  to  be  the  duty  of  the  sovereign  to  pre- 
serve peace  and  order  along  the  line  of  transit; 
and  because  in  this  instance  the  sovereign  was  un- 
able to  preserve  it  as  it  had  guaranteed  to  do, 
United  States  citizens  claimed  and  collected  dam- 
ages. Could  there  have  been  a  more  solemn 
recognition  by  one  country  of  the  duty  of  another 
to  keep  open  the  latter's  own  line  of  transit  ? 


Violation  of  Treaty  of  1846  241 

Section  5  of  Article  XXXV  of  the  Treaty  of 
1846  is  so  important  that  we  quote  it  again.  It 
reads : 

If,  unfortunately,  any  of  the  articles  contained  in  this 
treaty  should  be  violated  or  infringed  in  any  way  what- 
ever, it  is  expressly  stipulated  that  neither  of  the  two 
contracting  parties  shall  ordain  or  authorize  any  acts  of 
reprisal,  nor  shall  declare  war  against  the  other  in  com- 
plaints of  injuries  or  damages,  until  the  said  party  con- 
sidering itself  offended  shall  have  laid  before  the  other  a 
statement  of  such  injuries  or  damages,  verified  by  com- 
petent proofs,  demanding  justice  and  satisfaction,  and 
the  same  shall  have  been  denied,  in  violation  of  the  laws 
and  of  international  right. 

It  required  the  aggrieved  party  to  notify  the 
other  party  of  its  grievance  before  using  force. 
On  November  2,  1903,  when  the  Roosevelt  Ad- 
ministration entered  upon  the  dismemberment  of 
Colombia,  the  United  States  had  not  notified  Co- 
lombia of  any  fault  or  delinquency  on  her  part  in 
observing  her  treaty  obligations.  This  omission 
in  itself  would  have  been  a  violation  of  this  solemn 
compact,  even  though  there  had  existed  a  bona  Ude 
grievance.  But,  as  already  stated,  none  worthy 
of  mention  existed.  Our  intervention  in  the 
secession  of  the  Province  of  Panama  rests  on 
some  other  ground  than  grievance  under  the 
Treaty  of  1846. 

The  de  jure  and  de  facto  sovereign  of  the  Isth- 


242  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

mus  had  maintained,  with  almost  negligible  ex- 
ceptions, unobstructed  transit  across  the  Isthmus 
for  fifty-five  years,  the  then  lifetime  of  the  Treaty 
of  1846.  International  law  does  not  permit  the 
destruction  of  sovereignty  in  order  to  prevent 
temporary  interruption  of  transit.  The  Treaty 
of  1846  provided  a  method  for  its  adjustment  in 
case  of  interruption.  More  important,  however, 
is  the  fact  that  civilization  will  suffer  more  from 
the  violation  of  a  treaty  than  from  an  interrup- 
tion of  traffic  only  ternporary  in  character.  The 
controlling  fact,  however,  is  that  in  1903  there 
was  no  intention  anywhere  to  interfere  with  Isth- 
mian transit  save  at  the  White  House,  and  that 
interference  was  aimed  at  the  sovereign,  Colom- 
bia. This  is  the  contra  of  what  was  expected 
under  the  treaty.  Under  it  one  would  have  ex- 
pected that  if  the  weaker  nation  was  temporarily 
incapable  of  a  perfect  fulfillment  of  its  guarantee, 
the  stronger  nation  would,  upon  request,  lend  as- 
sistance. 

By  the  law  of  nations  and  the  terms  of  the 
Treaty  of  1846,  Colombia,  as  the  lawful  successor 
of  New  Granada,  was  the  sovereign  peer  of  the 
United  States.  This  being  so  the  following 
from  the  pen  of  Leander  T.  Chamberlain  is  apro- 
pos: 


Violation  of  Treaty  of  1846  243 

Save  for  the  main  purpose  of  protecting  free  transit 
and  thus  safeguarding  her  own  interests  in  such  transit, 
the  United  States  might  no  more  land  her  forces  on  Co- 
lombia's soil,  or  even  threaten  such  landing,  than  she 
might  land  her  forces,  or  threaten  to  land  them,  on  the 
soil  of  Russia  or  Japan. 

Nor  is  even  this  the  full  measure  of  the  restraint 
which  the  Executive  of  the  United  States  was  bound  to 
recognize  and  respect.  It  has  been  conceded  that  the 
guaranteed  neutrality  and  sovereignty  had  reference  to 
foreign  powers.  But  it  is  to  be  borne  in  mind  that  in 
guaranteeing  Colombia's  neutrality  and  sovereignty  as 
against  foreign  powers,  the  United  States  distinctly  de- 
creed and  surpassingly  emphasized  her  own  exclusion 
from  acts  of  invasion.  She  determinately  erected  an 
impassable  barrier  against  her  own  interference  with 
Colombia's  independent  authority.  And  this,  in  the  sim- 
ple fact  that  she  herself  was  a  "foreign  nation"!  The 
treaty  inhibition  affected  her,  first  of  all.  She  virtually 
named  herself  in  the  guarantee;  and  the  guarantor,  be- 
ing thus  included  in  the  inhibition,  was,  beyond  all  oth- 
ers, forbidden  to  violate  its  terms. 

Hannis  Taylor,  an  authority  on  international 
law  and  the  history  of  diplomacy,  makes  the  fol- 
lowing observations  concerning  the  Treaty  of 
1846  and  its  violation  in  1903: 

Thus  by  the  most  solemn  guarantee  known  to  the  fam- 
ily of  nations  the  United  States  pledged  itself,  by  express 
contract,  to  respect  and  uphold  the  sovereignty  of  New 
Granada  over  the  Isthmus  of  Panama,  a  plain  duty  al- 
ready due  to  New  Granada  under  the  general  principles 
of  international  law.  In  emergencies  other  than  the  dis- 
turbance of  interoceanic  transit  or  peril  to  the  persons 
and  possessions  of  American  citizens,  there  might  be  no 


244  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

intervention  in  the  affairs  of  New  Granada,  reestab- 
lished as  the  United  States  of  Colombia  in  1863.  By 
the  terms  of  the  treaty,  and  by  the  principles  of  inter- 
national law,  Colombia,  as  the  successor  of  New  Gra- 
nada, was  the  sovereign  peer  of  the  United  States,  which, 
save  for  the  purpose  of  protecting  free  transit,  might  no 
more  land  forces  on  Colombian  soil,  or  even  threaten 
such  landing,  than  she  might  land  such  forces  on  the 
shores  of  France  or  England.  After  a  careful  exam- 
ination of  the  subject  a  competent  expert  has  said  that, 
during  the  40  years  that  intervened  between  the  estab- 
lishment of  Colombia  in  1863  and  the  Panama  imbroglio 
of  1903,  United  States  forces  were  employed  in  only 
seven  instances  and  for  a  total  period  of  164  days,  and 
in  each  instance  with  Colombia's  approval.  In  no  case 
was  there  fighting,  the  mere  precautionary  measures  be- 
ing sufficient. 

In  continuation  of  the  foregoing  we  may  ap- 
propriately observe  that  Colombia's  inherent  sov- 
ereignty, whether  guaranteed  or  not,  would  have 
given  her  a  right  paramount  to  the  right  of  even 
her  ally,  the  United  States.  In  fine,  in  the  emer- 
gency of  self-preservation,  the  control  of  Isth- 
mian transit  was  completely  Colombia's.  In  that 
case,  the  President  of  the  United  States  was  au- 
thorized to  do  no  more  than  see  to  it  that  Colom- 
bia's interruption  of  transit  was  neither  wantonly 
imposed  nor  unreasonably  prolonged.  Only-  on 
proof  of  such  wantonness  or  unreasonableness 
would  there  be  just  cause  for  offense.  To  hold 
otherwise  would  be  to  hold  that,  in  our  own  Civil 


Violation  of  Treaty  of  1846  245 

War,  foreign  nations  might  have  justly  com- 
plained because  our  blockade  of  an  insurgent  coast 
rendered  nugatory,  for  the  time  being,  their  long- 
standing right  to  navigate  our  ports  and  rivers. 

The  neutrality  of  the  Isthmus  guaranteed  to 
New  Granada  by  the  Treaty  of  1846  referred  to 
foreign  nations,  as  already  stated.  It  was 
against  interference  by  an  outside  government, 
interference  which  might,  among  other  evil  re- 
sults, interrupt  the  transit  from  the  one  to  the 
other  sea.  Similarly  the  guarantee  of  New 
Granada's  rights  of  sovereignty  and  property  was 
with  reference  to  an  invasion  by  a  foreign  power, 
which  might  imperil  the  Isthmian  transit.  Since 
the  paramount  issue  in  the  case  of  both  the  neu- 
trality and  sovereignty  which  the  United  States 
guaranteed  was  the  safeguarding  of  the  transit, 
there  was  a  valid  implication  that  the  United 
States,  on  due  occasion,  would  give  aid  to  prevent 
interruption  of  transit  from  any  source  whatever, 
whether  foreign  or  domestic.  This  had  been  the 
unbroken  policy  of  the  United  States  until  Roose- 
velt became  President,  when  the  precedent  was 
scrapped. 

Worst  of  all  is  the  fact  that  there  was  no  revo- 
lution planned  or  projected  on  the  Isthmus  at  the 
time.     There  was  a  movement  to  effect  the  seces- 


246  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

sion  of  the  Province  of  Panama  provided  the 
United  States  would  agree  to  protect  it.  Without 
this  assurance  it  was  not  to  be  attempted.  It  is 
thus  clear  that  there  was  no  need  whatsoever  of 
American  marines  on  the  Isthmus  at  that  time. 
They  were  the  revolution  by  the  grace  of  our  then 
President, 

For  the  orders  sent  in  the  telegrams  of  Novem- 
ber 2,  1903,  and  in  those  sent  immediately  there- 
after, designed  to  prevent  Colombia  from  landing 
troops  within  fifty  miles  of  Panama  on  the  west 
coast  of  the  Isthmus,  from  landing  troops  any- 
where on  the  east  coast,  and  from  moving  the  new 
contingent  of  troops  already  at  Colon  across  the 
Isthmus,  American  history  offers  no  counterpart 
and  international  law  no  sanction.  There  is 
nothing  in  American  history  resembling  the  opera 
houife  revolution  on  the  Isthmus  in  November, 
1903,  and  it  is  to  be  doubted  if  there  is  anything 
in  modern  history  resembling  it.  It  was  a  make- 
believe  revolution  for  the  purpose  of  giving  the 
appearance  of  respectability  to  the  method  em- 
ployed to  secure  the  Canal  Zone.  The  United 
States  prevented  Colombia  from  doing  what  she 
was  obligated  to  do  under  the  Treaty  of  1846  and 
what  it  had  insisted  on  her  doing  theretofore. 
Moorfield  Story  well  says: 


Violation  of  Treaty  of  1846  247 

New  Granada  agreed  to  protect  travelers  across  the 
Isthmus  against  interference,  and  to  pay  damages  in  case 
she  failed.  It  was  clearly  her  duty,  and  therefore  her 
right,  to  use  all  force  necessary  for  the  purpose.  In 
consideration  of  this,  the  United  States  agreed  to  help 
New  Granada  and  not  to  act  against  her.  It  is  impos- 
sible to  torture  language  so  as  to  find  in  the  treaty  any 
right  on  our  part  to  prevent  her  keeping  order  and  pro- 
tecting travel  on  her  own  territory. 

The  rule  laid  down  for  the  construction  of 
treaties  is  that  unless  the  treaty  is  so  clearly 
drawn  that  no  other  conclusion  is  warranted  it 
shall  not  be  held  that  any  government  intended  to 
surrender  any  control,  or  cede  to  another  power 
any  right  of  sovereignty  within  its  jurisdiction. 
In  this  connection,  the  following  excerpt  from  a 
speech  of  the  late  Senator  Carmack  is  apropos: 

We  have  protected  the  transit  again  and  again,  but 
never  before  was  the  claim  made  that  we  had  a  right  to 
exclude  Colombia  from  her  own  dominions.  Never  be- 
fore was  the  claim  made  that  we  had  the  right  under 
the  Treaty  of  1846  to  support  an  insurrection  against  the 
authority  of  Colombia.  You  do  not  have  to  read  the 
Treaty  of  1846  to  know  that  it  contains  no  such  prepos- 
terous provision.  No  nation  on  earth  ever  surrendered 
the  right  to  protect  its  own  soil  and  the  integrity  of  its 
own  domain  with  its  own  troops  or  surrendered  to  an- 
other government  the  right  to  prevent  or  to  suppress  an 
insurrection  against  its  authority.  No  such  thing  can 
be  found  in  the  Treaty  of  1846. 

The  language  of  the  treaty  speaks  for  itself. 


248  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

On  its  very  face  it  imports  an  engagement  by  the 
sovereign  to  protect  the  freedom  of  transit.  It 
has  been  so  construed  by  Presidents  Polk  and 
Cleveland;  also,  by  Secretaries  Seward,  Fish, 
Bayard  and  Hay  ( 1902) .  It  has  been  twice  con- 
strued by  treaties — the  Treaty  of  1857  and  the 
treaty  which  grew  out  of  it  because  of  unfinished 
work.  The  telegrams  of  November  2,  1903,  and 
those  of  like  import  later  reduced  the  Treaty  of 
1846  to  a  scrap  of  paper  as  ruthlessly  as  did 
the  conduct  of  Germany  reduce  the  Treaty  of 
1839. 

It  is  clear  that  the  right  and  duty  of  the  United 
States  were  supplementary  to  those  of  the  sov- 
ereign and  did  not  supersede  them.  Our  coun- 
try's duty  commenced  only  after  the  sovereign 
had  failed  to  maintain  transit  uninterrupted. 
Then  we  could  act  only  in  cooperation  with  and 
at  the  request  of  the  sovereign.  It  is  clear  that 
in  the  Treaty  of  1846  the  sovereign  did  not  abate 
any  of  her  rights  and  duties  or  subordinate  any  of 
them  to  those  of  the  United  States. 

The  only  thing  that  there  was  wrong  on  the 
Isthmus  at  the  time  was  the  presence  of  our  ma- 
rines and  their  exercising  military  control  over 
it  for  the  purpose  of  excluding  the  representatives 
of  the  sovereign.     That  was  nothing  more  and 


Violation  of  Treaty  of  1846  249 

nothing  less  than  the  conquest  of  the  Isthmus  in 
violation  of  the  Treaty  of  1846. 

And  yet  we  are  told  by  the  self-appointed  apos- 
tle of  righteousness : 

We  did  harm  to  no  one,  save  as  harm  is  done  to  a 
bandit  by  a  policeman  who  deprives  him  of  his  chance 
for  blackmail. 

What  will  be  the  verdict  of  history?  It  is  our 
mature  judgment  that  the  following  from  the 
pen  of  an  author  unknown  to  the  writer  accurately 
forecasts  it: 

The  policeman  himself  under  the  guise  of  friendship, 
he  smote  the  innocent  and  plundered  the  defenseless! 

What  do  other  nations  say  of  our  rape  of  Co- 
lombia ?     The  London  Graphic  stated  at  the  time : 

We  regret  exceedingly  that  President  Roosevelt  has 
allowed  the  fair  name  of  his  Administration  to  be 
smirched  by  a  transaction  so  utterly  at  variance  with  the 
most  elementary  principles  of  public  law  and  interna- 
tional morality.  We  cannot  conceive  a  more  lamentable 
outrage  on  the  public  conscience  of  the  civilized  world. 

General  von  Bernhardi  defends  the  rape  of  Bel- 
gium by  pointing  to  our  seizure  of  the  Canal  Zone 
by  the  display  of  overwhelming  force.  He  is 
quoted  by  the  New  York  World  as  saying : 

Your  seizure  of  Panama  was  only  justifiable  on  the 
ground  that  the  future  interests  of  the  American  people 


250  America'^and  the  Canal  Title 

are  higher  and  greater  than  the  abstract  principles  of  in- 
ternational law. 

In  its  editorial  on  the  above,  this  metropolitan 
journal  appropriately  observes : 

Mr.  Roosevelt  did  seize  Panama,  and  by  so  doing  we 
reduced  our  treaty  with  Colombia  to  a  scrap  of  paper, 
but  there  has  not  been  a  day  since  that  time  when  mil- 
lions of  Americans  were  not  in  protest,  and  there  is 
pending  at  Washington  a  treaty  calculated  to  right  the 
wrong.  .  .  . 

With  General  von  Bemhardi  throwing  our  wanton 
aggression  at  the  Isthmus  in  our  faces,  how  many  more 
sessions  of  the  United  States  Senate  must  there  be  be- 
fore that  body  will  make  the  honorable  amends  that  a 
great  power  owes  to  a  weak  and  injured  neighbor? 

Baron  von  Hengelmiiller,  Austrian  Ambas- 
sador to  the  United  States  in  1903,  defends 
the  rape  of  Belgium  by  pointing  to  the  seizure 
of  the  Canal  Zone  by  the  United  States.  The 
Nev^  York  World  deals  with  it  in  an  editorial  as 
follows : 

Nothing  that  has  developed  in  the  European  war  has 
stirred  Colonel  Roosevelt  to  such  indignation  as  the  vio- 
lation by  Germany  of  the  neutral  territory  of  Belgium. 
He  has  written  and  spoken  frequently  on  this  subject, 
always  blaming  the  Administration  at  Washington  for 
not  instantly  entering  a  protest,  and  sometimes  even  sug- 
gesting that  the  remonstrance  should  have  been  accom- 
panied by  shot  and  shell. 

Let  us  grieve,  therefore,  that  Baron  von  Hengelmiiller, 
once  Austrian  Ambassador  to  the  United  States,  now 
publishing  the  recollections  of  his  American  experience, 


Violation  of  Treaty  of  1846  251 

finds  in  all  the  annals  of  nations  no  such  glorious  justi- 
fication of  what  Germany  has  done  to  Belgium  as  is  to 
be  had  in  the  brie-^  and  simple  record  of  what  President 
Roosevelt  did  to  Panama  in  1903.  He  "took"  it  because 
he  wanted  it,  and  there  was  no  nonsense  about  treaties 
or  anything  else.  "The  good  of  the  state  meant  more  to 
him  than  the  letter  of  the  law." 

.  .  .  The  hair  shirt  thus  presented  to  Colonel  Roose- 
velt seems  to  us  to  be  a  snug  fit,  and  we  trust  that  he  is 
having  "a  bully  time"  wearing  it. 

South  American  opinion,  which  we  give  in  an- 
other chapter,  is  even  more  pronounced  than  the 
foregoing  from  the  old  world.  Colombia  rightly 
feels  toward  the  United  States  as  Belgium  feels 
toward  Germany. 

Any  violation  of  a  treaty  is  a  blot  upon  the 
character  of  the  nation  that  is  guilty.  Its  extent 
thereof  is  measured  by  the  importance  of  the 
event.  It  always  lowers  a  nation's  plighted  word. 
Ours  is  below  par  in  Spanish- America  because  of 
this  incident  and  will  remain  at  a  discount  until 
we  disown  the  act  and  recompense  Colombia  for 
loss  of  vested  interests. 

It  is  with  nations  as  with  men.  Let  a  man  go 
back  on  his  word,  and  henceforth  all  men  will 
sidestep  when  he  makes  overtures.  We  can  only 
restore  our  promises  to  par  by  making  reparation 
for  past  dereliction  and  by  jealously  keeping  our 


252  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

solemn  engagements  in  the  future.  There  are 
some  prices  which  nations  as  well  as  individuals 
cannot  afford  to  pay  for  success — our  violation  of 
the  Treaty  of  1846  is  one  of  them. 

James  Bryce,  who,  among  foreigners,  stands 
foremost  in  the  affection  and  esteem  of  the  Amer- 
ican people,  wrote  to  President  Thwing: 

The  awful  calamity  of  a  world-wide  war,  in  which 
more  than  half  of  the  human  race  are  involved,  compels 
us  to  study  more  earnestly  than  ever  before  the  means 
by  which  war  may  be  averted.  Chief  among  these 
means  are  two.  One  is  the  maintenance  of  the  faith  of 
treaties  as  the  guarantee  of  safety  to  small  nations. 

The  other  means  is  the  setting  up  of  arbitration  as  the 
proper  method  for  settling  international  disputes.  Your 
nation  has  led  the  world  in  this  worthy  cause;  and  both 
America  and  England  have  by  their  resort  to  this  method 
set  many  examples  and  given  many  proofs  of  their  belief 
in  its  value. 

Let  there  be  a  revival  in  the  keeping  of  the 
plighted  word,  in  the  observing  of  solemn  engage- 
ments. America  should  lead  the  way  by  making 
reparation  to  Colombia  for  the  violation  of  the 
Treaty  of  1846  and  for  wresting  from  her  her 
choicest  province  by  the  use  of  force. 

American  honor  cannot  be  fully  restored  until 
such  reparation  is  made  to  Colombia  as  an  impar- 
tial tribunal  would  impose.     Until  reparation  sat- 


Violation  of  Treaty  of  1846  253 

isfactory  to  Colombia  is  made  we  may  invoke  the 
solace  of  the  poet  who  taught  us : 

Yea,  and  though  we  sinned  and  our  rulers  went  from 

righteousness ; 
Deep  in  all  dishonor  though  we  stained  our  garment's 

hem; 
Oh,  be  ye  not  dismayed, 
Though  we  stumbled  and  we  strayed; 
We  were  led  by  evil   counselors — the  Lord  shall  deal 

with  them. 

The  excerpts  from  the  treaty  itself,  the  con- 
struction placed  on  this  treaty  by  all  Administra- 
tions called  upon  to  construe  it,  from  Polk  to 
Roosevelt,  and  the  story  of  the  opera  bouffe  revo- 
lution on  the  Isthmus  as  told  in  the  previous  chap- 
ter, conclusively  show  that  the  Treaty  of  1846  and 
international  law  were  ruthlessly  violated  in  the 
fall  of  1903  when  our  Administration  ''took''  the 
Canal  Zone  so  that  construction  of  the  canal 
might  go  on  simultaneously  with  the  debate  in  the 
Congress. 

Treaties  are  the  contracts  of  nations.  Increase 
in  the  number  of  points  of  contact  due  to  advanc- 
ing civilization  increases  dependence  of  one  na- 
tion on  another.  This  increase  in  solidarity  is 
embodied  in  treaties  not  enforcible  by  a  sover- 
eign. Maintenance  of  these  treaties  depends  on 
the  states  which  enter  into  them  keeping  the 


254  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

plighted  word.  Collective  well-being  is  advanced 
by  keeping  these  solemn  engagements  and  is  re- 
tarded by  their  violation.  We  know  that  domes- 
tic well-being  is  enhanced  by  the  maintenance  of 
private  contracts.  Treaties  are  as  important  in 
international  relations  as  contracts  are  in  domes- 
tic. Therefore,  they  should  be  maintained  in- 
violate. The  United  States  should  make  repara- 
tion to  Colombia  for  violation  of  the  Treaty  of 
1846. 

We  have  shown  conclusively  that  our  Adminis- 
tration in  1903  deliberately  and  willfully  violated 
the  Treaty  of  1846  and  the  law  of  nations  when 
it  ''took''  the  Canal  Zone.  In  the  next  chapter 
we  will  show  in  detail  that  the  Canal  Zone  was 
taken  by  force — stolen.  The  payment  of  $10,- 
000,000  to  the  partner  in  crime  and  an  annuity 
of  $250,000  in  perpetuity  to  the  said  partner  does 
not  clear  the  title  of  its  stain. 


Chapter  VI 
President  Roosevelt  ''Took''  the  Canal  Zone 

The  data  of  Chapter  IV,  which  show  that  there 
was  no  real  revolution  on  the  Isthmus  in  the  fall 
of  1903,  also  show  that  the  Roosevelt  Administra- 
tion ''took''  the  Canal  Zone  by  force.  The  pres- 
ent chapter  must,  therefore,  be  viewed  as  merely 
supplementary  to  the  earlier  chapter.  It  views 
the  event  from  a  different  standpoint. 

In  this  chapter  we  undertake  to  point  out  in 
additional  detail  that  Roosevelt  "took''  the  Canal 
Zone  by  force.  'Torce"  carries  with  it  the  idea 
of  war.  Did  Roosevelt  wage  war  against  Co- 
lombia in  the  fall  of  1903  ?  If  his  own  conception 
as  to  what  constitutes  war  is  correct,  he  did  wage 
war  against  Colombia.  His  idea  as  to  what  con- 
stitutes war  is  found  in  an  article  published  in  the 
New  York  Times  in  the  fall  of  19 14.  The  por- 
tion which  is  apropos  reads : 

An  astonishing  proof  of  the  readiness  of  many  persons 
to  pay  heed  exclusively  to  words  and  not  at  all  to  deeds 
is  supplied  by  the  statement  of  the  defenders  of  this  Ad- 

255 


256  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

ministration  that  President  Wilson  has  "kept  us  out  of 
war  with  Mexico"  and  has  "avoided  interference  in 
Mexico."     These  are  the  words. 

The  deeds  have  been:  first,  an  unbroken  course  of 
more  or  less  furtive  meddling  in  the  internal  affairs  of 
Mexico  carried  to  a  pitch  which  imposes  on  this  nation  a 
grave  responsibility  for  the  wrongdoing  of  the  victorious 
factions;  and,  second,  the  plunging  of  this  country  into 
what  was  really  a  futile  and  inglorious  little  war  with 
Mexico,  a  war  entered  into  with  no  adequate  object,  and 
abandoned  without  the  achievement  of  any  object  what- 
ever, adequate  or  inadequate. 

To  say  that  we  did  not  go  to  war  with  Mexico  is  a 
mere  play  upon  words.  A  quarter  of  the  wars  of  his- 
tory have  been  entered  into  and  carried  through  without 
any  preliminary  declaration  of  war  and  often  without 
any  declaration  of  war  at  all. 

The  seizure  of  the  leading  seaport  city  of  another  coun- 
try, the  engagement  and  defeat  of  the  troops  of  that  coun- 
try, and  the  retention  of  the  territory  thus  occupied  for  a 
number  of  months,  constitute  war;  and  denial  that  it  is 
war  can  only  serve  to  amuse  the.  type  of  intellect  which 
would  assert  that  Germany  has  not  been  at  war  with 
Belgium  because  Germany  never  declared  war  on  Bel- 
gium. President  Wilson's  war  only  resulted  in  the  sac- 
rifice of  a  score  of  American  lives  and  a  hundred  or  two 
of  the  lives  of  Mexicans;  it  was  entirely  purposeless, 
has  served  no  good  object,  has  achieved  nothing,  and 
has  been  abandoned  by  President  Wilson  without  obtain- 
ing the  object  because  of  which  it  was  nominally  entered 
into;  it  can  therefore  rightly  be  stigmatized  as  a  pe- 
culiarly unwise,  ignoble  and  inefficient  war;  but  it  is  war 
nevertheless. 

The  writer  is  not  in  sympathy  with  the  contents 
of  this  quotation.  It  is  given  merely  to  justify 
the  statement  that  the  Canal  Zone  was  taken  by 


Roosevelt  Took  the  Canal  Zone        257 

force.  The  foregoing  excerpt  from  the  pen  of 
Roosevelt  warrants  the  conclusion  that  in  order- 
ing five  men-of-war  to  Colon  and  four  to  Panama 
in  the  fall  of  1903  to  protect  the  secession  of  the 
Province  of  Panama  he  made  war  on  Colombia. 
He  has  told  us  that  it  was  done  for  the  purpose  of 
protecting  transit  by  rail  between  Colon  and  Pan- 
ama. But,  as  already  indicated,  he  here  merely 
uses  words.  There  were  no  Isthmians  under 
arms  or  prepared  to  bear  arms.  There  was  no 
interruption  of  transit  impending  excepting  on 
the  part  of  our  marines. 

Senator  Newlands  introduced  a  resolution  in 
the  Senate  at  the  time  which  states  the  views  of 
the  writer.  The  portions  of  the  resolution  which 
are  apropos  read :  ,f>  J 

/'- 

1.  The  instructions  of  the  Uni|cd  States  to  its  naval 

forces  not  to  permit  the  landing  M/the  Colombian  troops 
on  the  Isthmus,  and  the  intervention  of  the  armed  forces 
of  the  United  States  to  prevent  such  landing  and  the  use 
of  the  Panama  Railroad,  and  the  display  of  power  and 
force  which  overawed  Colombia  and  prevented  her  from 
defending  her  sovereignty  over  the  Isthmus,  and  thus 
secured  the  secession  of  Panama  and  the  dismemberment 
of  Colombia  and  the  creation  of  a  new  sovereignty  in 
Colombia's  territory,  sustained  and  supported  only  by 
the  armed  forces  of  the  United  States,  constituted  a  dec- 
laration and  prosecution  of  a  successful  war  upon  the 
part  of  the  United  States  against  Colombia. 

2.  That  such  action  constituted  a  breach  of  the  Treaty 


258  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

of  1846  in  this,  that  it  denied  Colombia's  sovereignty 
over  the  Isthmus  of  Panama,  expressly  acknowledged 
by  the  Treaty  of  1846. 

3.  That  it  also  violated  the  provision  of  the  Treaty  of 
1846,  which  declared  that  neither  of  the  two  contracting 
parties  should  ordain  or  authorize  any  act  of  reprisal 
nor  declare  war  against  the  other  on  complaint  of  in- 
juries or  damages  until  the  party  considering  itself  of- 
fended should  have  laid  before  the  other  a  statement  of 
such  injuries  or  damages  verified  by  competent  proofs, 
demanding  justice  and  satisfaction,  and  the  same  should 
have  been  denied  in  violation  of  the  laws  and  of  inter- 
national right. 

5.  That  the  armed  intervention  of  the  United  States, 
as  aforesaid,  was  making  war  against  Colombia  upon  the 
part  of  the  President  of  the  United  States  without  the 
sanction  of  the  Congress  of  the  United  States,  and  was 
in  violation  of  the  provisions  of  the  Constitution  which 
gives  to  Congress  alone  the  power  to  declare  war. 

The  section  of  the  Constitution  referred  to  by 
the  Senator  reads : 

Congress  shall  have  power :  To  declare  war  .  .  .  and 
make  rules  concerning  captures  on  land  and  water. 

It  will  be  recalled  that  we  stated  in  Chapter  IV 
that  on  November  2,  1903,  there  were  no  Isth- 
mians under  arms.  A  new  contingent  of  Colom- 
bian soldiers  was  about  to  arrive  in  order  to  as- 
sist in  repelling  a  mythical  invasion  to  oppose 
which  General  Huertas  had  dispatched  the  loyal 
Colombian  troops  on  the  Isthmus.  The  prospec- 
tive arrival  of  additional  troops  created  consterna- 


Roosevelt  Took  the  Canal  Zone        259 

tion  among  the  separatists.  They  wired  Bunau- 
Varilla  in  New  York  for  help.  He  hastened  to 
Washington.  Our  Administration  sent  the  help 
immediately. 

Our  statement  that  there  was  no  uprising  con- 
templated on  the  Isthmus  is  contradicted  by  an 
official  document.  It  is  claimed  certain  army  of- 
ficers reported  to  Lieutenant-General  Young  what 
they  saw  as  tourists  on  the  Isthmus.  The  report 
is  dated  October  16,  1903.  We  are  moved  to  ask 
if  it  is  mere  coincidence  that  this  is  the  same  date 
on  which  Bunau-Varilla  gave  Dr.  Amador  the  as- 
surance that  the  United  States  would  protect  se- 
cession within  forty-eight  hours  after  the  Decla- 
ration of  Independence  ?  We  will  give  the  report 
of  these  officers  as  summarized  by  Roosevelt  in 
his  message  to  Congress  dated  January  4,  1904: 

That  while  on  the  Isthmus  they  became  satisfied  be- 
yond question  that,  owing  largely  to  the  dissatisfaction 
because  of  the  failure  of  Colombia  to  ratify  the  Hay- 
Herran  treaty,  a  revolutionary  party  was  in  course  of 
organization  having  for  its  object  the  separation  of  the 
State  of  Panama  from  Colombia,  the  leader  being  Dr. 
Richard  Arango,  a  former  governor  of  Panama;  that 
when  they  were  on  the  Isthmus  arms  and  ammunition 
were  being  smuggled  into  the  city  of  Colon  in  piano 
boxes,  merchandise  crates,  etc.,  the  small  arms  received 
being  principally  the  Gras  French  rifle,  the  Remington, 
and  the  Mauser;  that  nearly  every  citizen  in  Panama 
had  some  sort  of  rifle  or  gun  in  his  possession,  with  am- 


26o  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

munition  therefor;  that  in  the  city  of  Panama  there  had 
been  organized  a  fire  brigade  which  was  really  intended 
for  a  revolutionary  military  organization;  that  there 
were  representatives  of  the  revolutionary  organization 
at  all  important  points  on  the  Isthmus ;  that  in  Panama, 
Colon,  and  the  other  principal  places  of  the  Isthmus  po- 
lice forces  had  been  organized  which  were  in  reality  revo- 
lutionary forces;  that  the  people  on  the  Isthmus  seemed 
to  be  unanimous  in  their  sentiment  against  the  Bogota 
Government,  and  their  disgust  over  the  failure  of  that 
Government  to  ratify  the  treaty  providing  for  the 
construction  of  the  canal,  and  that  a  revolution  might  be 
expected  immediately  upon  the  adjournment  of  the  Co- 
lombian Congress  without  ratification  of  the  treaty. 

This  report  is  intended  to  prove  that  the  Isth- 
mus was  "seething  with  revolution."  Does  it 
prove  it  ?  Or,  is  the  report  an  invention  ?  Let  us 
see !  A  report  reaches  the  Isthmus  that  some  two 
hundred  Colombian  soldiers  will  arrive  about  No- 
vember 3.  It  had  been  planned  to  declare  inde- 
pendence the  following  day.  Do  they  prepare  to 
deal  with  the  unwelcome  troops  on  arrival  ?  No ! 
The  request  goes  to  Washington  for  help.  Help 
arrives  on  November  2.  The  telegram  calling  for 
help  is  of  record.  It  shows  that  there  was  not 
sufficient  preparation  on  the  Isthmus  to  deal  with 
the  expected  two  hundred  fresh  Colombian 
troops.  Does  this  confirm  the  report  of  the  offi- 
cers just  quoted?     ^'Seething  with  revolution/' 


Roosevelt  Took  the  Canal  Zone        261 

yet  shrieking  for  help  to  deal  with  a  few  fresh 
Colombian  soldiers! 

The  scheme  required  that  the  impression  pre- 
vail throughout  the  United  States  that  the  Isth- 
mus was  "seething  with  revolution."  A  so-called 
report  of  the  two  army  officers  is  placed  on  file 
for  the  purpose  of  showing  it.  Later  events  show 
that  these  officers  could  not  possibly  have  seen  on 
the  Isthmus  what  they  stated  in  the  report.  This 
at  once  arouses  suspicion  as  to  the  source  of  the 
report  and  the  purpose  of  it.  It  was  clearly  de- 
signed for  the  purpose  of  justifying  the  disposi- 
tion of  the  fleet.  Numerous  men-of-war  were  in 
striking  distance  of  the  Isthmus.  Why  this  dis- 
position of  the  fleet  ?  To  prevent  Colombia  from 
interfering  with  the  secession  movement. 

It  is  stated  in  Roosevelt's  message  of  January  4, 
1904,  that  these  army  officers  were  on  the  Isthmus 
as  tourists.  The  files  of  the  war  department  show 
that  they  were  on  the  Isthmus  for  the  purpose  of 
taking  a  military  inventory  for  the  use  of  our 
army  should  the  taking  of  the  Canal  Zone  lead 
to  war.  As  the  occasion  for  their  being  on  the 
Isthmus  is  not  correctly  stated  in  the  message  in 
question,  one  is  warranted  in  scrutinizing  the 
foregoing  excerpt  from  it. 


262  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

If  the  excerpt  correctly  stated  Isthmian  prepa- 
rations, why  did  not  a  motley  array  of  insurgents 
rush  to  the  assistance  of  alleged  imperilled  Amer- 
icans at  Colon  on  November  4,  1903?  Why  did 
not  the  revolutionary  police  force  of  Colon  come 
forward?  Was  it  only  a  paper  organization? 
Why  was  not  the  trained  and  equipped  fire  de- 
partment (441  revolutionists  in  disguise!)  of 
Panama  rushed  to  Colon  to  fight  for  freedom's 
cause  ?  Why  did  not  insurgents  pour  in  from  the 
country  around  as  in  the  days  of  Bunker  Hill? 
None  of  these  things  happened.  It  was  not  on 
the  tapis  that  they  should  happen.  It  was,  how- 
ever, the  day  on  which  the  Isthmus  became  free 
from  Bogota  rule.  It  was  the  day  on  which  they 
are  alleged  to  have  declared  themselves  independ- 
ent. Yet  no  one  rushed  forward  to  protect  the 
American  men,  women  and  children  when  threat- 
ened with  being  killed  as  described  by  Roosevelt, 
though  they  were  innocent  of  any  intent  to  wrong 
Colombia.  Not  one  rushed  to  the  side  of  the 
forty-two  gallant  American  marines. 

The  American  marines  were  on  hand  for  the 
purpose  of  protecting  secession.  The  entire  revo- 
lution as  planned  and  executed  was  on  our  gun- 
boats. Had  not  the  White  House  "seethed  with 
revolution,"  the  ripple  on  the  Isthmus,  created  by 


Roosevelt  Took  the  Canal  Zone        263 

a  handful  of  financial  and  political  adventurers, 
would  have  sunk  into  a  state  of  innocuous  desue- 
tude without  even  the  sword  being  drawn  in  free- 
dom's cause.  The  report,  summarized  in  the  ex- 
cerpt, appears  to  be  a  frame-up.  It  does  not  ring 
true.  It  was  conceived  by  amateurs.  It  is  predi- 
cated on  a  degree  of  intelligence  on  the  Isthmus 
that  does  not  obtain  anywhere  in  the  world  in  a 
rural  community  or  any  other  community.  It  is 
another  striking  evidence  that  history  cannot  be 
manufactured.     It  can  only  be  recorded. 

As  already  indicated,  three  provinces  did  not 
succeed  in  the  three  years'  revolution  of  1899- 
1902.  Now  we  are  asked  to  believe  that  one  of 
them  planned  a  serious  uprising  less  than  twelve 
months  thereafter.  It  carries  with  it  its  own 
refutation. 

Who  paid  for  the  munitions  of  war  that  were 
smuggled  into  Colon,  according  to  the  excerpt,  for 
distribution  on  the  Isthmus?  Read  Bunau-Va- 
rilla's  account.  There  were  none  worthy  of  men- 
tion received  or  distributed.  We  have  already 
shown  that  no  such  preparations  for  an  uprising 
on  the  Isthmus  were  made  or  could  have  been 
made. 

We  have  direct  knowledge  as  to  the  extent  and 


264  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

character  of  Isthmian  preparedness.  It  is  found 
in  part  in  the  following  excerpts  from  the  testi- 
mony of  Mr,  Hall  before  the  Committee  of  For- 
eign Affairs  of  the  House  of  Representatives : 

In  the  cable  codes  you  will  find  a  provision  for  the 
sending  of  50  revolvers  of  small  caliber  which  the  mem- 
bers of  the  fire  department  were  to  use  in  their  early 
morning  arrests  of  any  citizens  loyal  to  Colombia.  .  .  . 

The  secret  cable  code  between  Amador  and  Bunau- 
Varilla  and  Joshua  Lindo  .  .  .  tends  strongly  to  cor- 
roborate the  testimony  of  various  Panamans  that,  so  far 
as  they  knew,  no  arms,  except  50  revolvers,  were  bought 
by  Amador  or  his  agent,  Bunau-Varilla. 

It  is  to  be  noted  that  the  Colombian  garrison  at 
Panama  under  General  Huertas  transferred  its 
allegiance  in  a  body  to  the  new  government,  those 
loyal  to  Colombia  having  been  dispatched  to  repel 
a  mythical  invasion  from  the  north.  This  car- 
ried with  it  the  transfer  of  the  military  supplies 
in  the  barracks.  Rear  Admiral  Glass  speaks  of 
the  preparedness  of  this  garrison  and  of  Isthmian 
preparedness  in  his  report,  dated  November  16, 
1903,  as  follows: 

They  are  well  armed  with  the  Gras  45-caliber  rifle,  and 
are  believed  to  have  plenty  of  ammunition.  As  to  the 
number  of  troops  the  Government  of  Panama  could  place 
in  the  field  in  the  event  of  hostilities,  the  information 
received  varies  greatly,  but  it  is  probable  that  while  be- 
tween 2,000  and  3,000  men  are  available,  only  600  could 
at  present  be  furnished  with  good  arms.     In  this  connec- 


Roosevelt  Took  the  Canal  Zone       265 

tion,  however,  it  is  understood  that  a  plentiful  supply  of 
arms  and  ammunition  has  been  purchased  and  is  ex- 
pected to  arrive  shortly. 

The  information  contained  in  the  excerpts  from 
official  reports  already  mentioned  corroborates 
and  is  corroborated  by  the  following: 

The  witnesses  called  to  testify  in  Panama  swore  that 
no  money  was  supplied  before  the  revolution,  and  that 
the  arms  on  which  they  depended  in  the  event  of  being 
compelled  to  fight  for  their  independence  were  none  other 
than  those  in  the  barracks  belonging  to  the  Colombian 
Government,  and  that  none  were  imported. 

It  is  only  necessary  to  quote  in  addition  to  the 
foregoing  excerpts  from  official  reports,  a  para- 
graph from  an  able  article  by  Henry  C.  Granger 
which  appeared  in  the  Independent  on  August  17, 
191 1,  in  order  to  dispose  of  the  rubbish  contained 
in  the  report  of  the  officers.     It  reads : 

In  view  of  the  official  telegrams  quoted,  it  is  not  neces- 
sary to  say  either  when,  or  in  presence  of  whom,  or 
what  United  States  naval  officer  at  the  Isthmus  during 
the  "secession"  told  me  that  "the  Panamanians  were  a 
set  of  sheep;  our  boys  had  to  do  it  all." 

The  condition  of  affairs  reported  to  have  ex- 
isted on  the  Isthmus  as  of  October  16,  1903,  by 
the  army  officers  as  described  in  the  quotation 
from  Roosevelt  are  also  contradicted  by  later 
events.     When  words  and  later  events  conflict  it 


266  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

is  the  words  and  not  the  events  which  suffer. 
The  cautious  investigator  goes  back  of  this  report, 
and  ascertains  from  other  sources  its  truth  or 
falsity.  It  has  earmarks  which  show  that  it  was 
invented.  The  desire  for  such  a  report  must  have 
been  the  inspiration  and  the  guide  of  its  authors. 

The  report  was  necessary  for  home  consump- 
tion. It  has  been  given  such  extensive  pubHcity 
that  it  has  created  a  domestic  atmosphere  at  vari- 
ance with  truth.  As  has  been  shown,  from  the 
Isthmus  came  divers  creditable  newspaper  and 
other  reports  which  are  of  different  import.  The 
utterances  of  the  inner  circle  of  separatists  (and 
they  knew  the  facts)  are  also  of  a  different  tenor. 
The  report  is  not  only  not  corroborated  but  is 
buried  under  an  avalanche  of  adverse  observa- 
tions. The  adverse  observations  match  with  es- 
tablished facts  while  the  report  does  not. 

The  writer  rejects  the  report  of  the  army  offi- 
cers quoted  by  Roosevelt.  When  it  is  compared 
with  the  creditable  newspaper  reports  already 
quoted  in  this  volume  and  other  reliable  data,  it 
looks  like  a  crude  invention.  Roosevelt  uses  it 
to  defend  his  Isthmian  policy  in  his  article  en- 
titled, "The  Panama  Blackmail  Treaty,"  from 
which  we  take  the  following: 

After  my  interview  with  the  army  officers  named,  on 


Roosevelt  Took  the  Canal  Zone        267 

October  16  I  directed  the  Navy  Department  to  issue  in- 
structions to  send  ships  to  the  Isthmus  so  as  to  protect 
American  interests  and  the  lives  of  American  citizens  if 
a  revolutionary  outbreak  should  occur.  Most  fortu- 
nately the  United  States  steamer  Nashville,  under  Com- 
mander Hubbard,  in  consequence  of  these  orders, 
reached  the  Isthmus  just  in  time  to  prevent  a  bloody 
massacre  of  American  men,  women  and  children. 
Troops  from  Bogota  had  already  been  landed  in  Colon 
on  November  3,  when  the  revolution  broke  out  on  the 
same  day.  On  November  4,  as  Commander  Hubbard 
officially  reported,  his  marines  were  landed,  in  view  of 
the  fact  that  the  American  Consul  had  been  notified  by 
the  officer  commanding  the  Colombian  troops  that  he  in- 
tended to  open  fire  on  the  town  of  Colon  at  2  p.  m.  and 
kill  every  United  States  citizen  in  the  place.  Accord- 
ingly various  men,  women  and  children  took  refuge  first 
in  the  shed  of  the  Panama  Railway  Company,  and  then 
on  a  German  steamer  and  a  Panama  Railway  steamer 
which  were  at  the  dock.  Commander  Hubbard  showed 
himself  loyal  to  the  best  traditions  of  the  American 
Navy.  He  brought  the  Nashville  close  up  to  the  water- 
front, landed  some  of  his  men  to  garrison  the  shed  of 
the  Panama  Railway  Company,  and  although  the  Co- 
lombians outnumbered  him  ten  to  one,  succeeded  in  pro- 
tecting the  lives  of  the  American  citizens  who  were  men- 
aced. Thanks  to  the  firmness  of  himself  and  his  men, 
he  so  impressed  the  Colombian  commander  that  next 
day  the  latter  reembarked  and  withdrew  with  his  troops 
to  Colombia.  So  far  from  there  having  been  too  much 
foresight  about  the  treaty  on  the  part  of  the  American 
Government,  this  plain  official  account  by  a  naval  officer 
of  what  occurred  on  November  4  showed  that  the  Amer- 
ican Government  had,  if  anything,  delayed  too  long  its 
orders  for  the  movement  of  American  warships  to  Pan- 
ama, and  that  it  was  only  the  coolness  and  gallantry  of 
forty-two  marines  and  sailors  in  the  face  of  ten  times 
their  number  of  armed  foes  that  prevented  the  carrying 


268  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

out  of  the  atrocious  threat  of  the  Colombian  commander. 
In  accordance  with  our  settled  principles  of  conduct  we 
refused  to  allow  the  transportation  of  troops  across  the 
Isthmus  by  either  the  Colombians  or  the  Panamanians, 
so  as  to  prevent  bloodshed  and  interference  with  traffic. 

There  are  ill-defined  rumors  of  things  that 
Dewey  threatened  to  do  in  Manila  Bay  under  less 
trying  circumstances  and  under  less  provocation 
than  those  to  which  Colonel  Torres  of  the  Colom- 
bian expeditionary  force  was  subjected  on  the  oc- 
casion described  in  the  quotation  just  given.  Col- 
onel Torres  was  bluntly  informed  that  the  Prov- 
ince of  Panama  had  seceded  from  Colombia,  and 
that  the  United  States  had  guaranteed  to  protect 
secession.  He  was  urged  to  reembark  his  troops, 
on  the  ground  that  he  was  confronting  over- 
whelming force.  If  he  did  actually  threaten 
Americans  in  Colon,  it  was  under  the  greatest  of 
provocations.  He  was  requested  to  submit  to, 
and  acquiesce  in,  Colombia's  dismemberment. 

The  information  of  the  threat  on  the  part  of 
Colonel  Torres  was  conveyed  to  the  American 
consul  at  Colon  by  the  provisional  governor  of  the 
province  in  which  Colon  is  located  and  was  not 
sent,  or  intended  to  be  sent,  to  the  consul  by  the 
officer  commanding  the  Colombian  troops,  as 
Roosevelt   asserts   in   the   foregoing  quotation. 


Roosevelt  Took  the  Canal  Zone        269 

Teague,  a  newspaper  man,  wrote  about  it  at  the 
time: 

It  was  at  this  juncture  that  Governor  Melendez  exe- 
cuted a  little  coup  of  his  own  to  which  American  inter- 
vention is  directly  traceable.  Melendez  invited  Colonel 
Torres,  the  Colombian  commander,  to  meet  him  in  con- 
ference at  the  Hotel  Washington.  .  .  . 

Employing  all  his  persuasive  abilities,  Melendez  urged 
Colonel  Torres  to  reembark  his  troops  and  sail  away, 
leaving  the  Isthmus  to  pursue  its  own  course.  This  line 
of  argument  only  increased  Torres'  bitterness.  He  be- 
came more  defiant,  even  bombastic,  and  at  12 130  made  a 
vehement  threat  that  if  Generals  Tovar  and  Amaya  were 
not  given  their  liberty  by  2  o'clock  he  would  turn  his 
battalion  loose  and  slaughter  every  American  in  Colon. 

The  threat  against  Americans  domiciled  in 
Colon  was  only  a  conditional  bluff,  and  warranted 
under  the  circumstances.  Roosevelt  does  not  cor- 
rectly state  the  situation.  He  seemingly  forgets, 
in  season  or  out  of  season,  that  half-truths  are 
more  misleading  than  falsehoods.  Colonel  Tor- 
res only  demanded  the  release  of  the  Colombians 
unlawfully  imprisoned  at  Panama  by  the  local  au- 
thorities with  the  moral  support  of  the  American 
Government.  What  more  natural  than  that  he 
should  have  moved  heaven  and  earth  to  free  his 
colleagues?  Who  would  not  have  resorted  to  a 
bluff — even  such  a  one  as  Colonel  Torres  is 
charged  with?    It  was  an  honorable  bluff.    No 


270  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

harm  was  done.  The  harm  that  is  done  consists 
in  the  deception  of  the  American  people.  Scott, 
in  his  book  entitled  "The  Americans  in  Panama" 
has  properly  said : 

The  Colombian  troops  on  November  4th  might  have 
wiped  out  the  American  defense  in  Colon,  swept  over  to 
Panama  and  crushed  the  Junta  and  street  mob  there,  and 
so  have  summarily  preserved  sovereignty  over  the  terri- 
tory. And  had  it  done  all  this,  it  would  have  been 
squarely  within  its  rights  as  a  sovereign  nation.  But 
they  knew  that  such  a  triumph  would  be  transient. 
They  realized  it  would  bring  down  upon  Colombia  the 
whole  devastating  force  of  the  mighty  United  States 
which  the  Spanish-American  War  so  recently  had  shown 
was  something  truly  to  be  feared.  Hence,  their  with- 
drawal was  prudent,  though  humiliating. 

As  already  stated,  the  presence  of  the  Nashville 
determined  the  separatists  to  proceed  with  seces- 
sion. Its  presence  was  for  the  purpose  of  giving 
tangible  evidence  that  the  United  States  had 
promised  to  protect  secession.  Therefore,  had 
the  Nashville  not  been  at  Colon,  there  would  have 
'  been  no  provisional  government  or  provisional 
governor  at  Colon.  Its  presence  could  not  have 
been  used  as  evidence  that  the  United  States  was 
back  of  secession  and  so  there  would  have  been 
no  occasion  for  the  threat  made  by  Colonel  Tor- 
res. The  Nashville  did  not  prevent  the  murder 
of  American  men,  women,  and  children,  as  Roose- 


Roosevelt  Took  the  Canal  Zone        271 

velt  alleges,  but  provoked  the  discord  that  oc- 
curred on  the  Isthmus.  The  Nashville  prevented 
nothing — it  induced  secession.  It  was  intended 
to  do  so.     It  was  at  Colon  for  that  purpose. 

We  will  now  sidestep  the  consideration  of  the 
report  of  the  army  officers  to  present  a  record  of 
what  occurred  at  conferences  after  the  return  of 
Dr.  Amador  to  the  Isthmus  on  October  2y,  1903. 
This  record  is  taken  from  the  testimony  of  Henry 
N.  Hall  of  the  New  York  World  before  the  Com- 
mittee on  Foreign  Affairs  of  the  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives. It  shows  that  the  so-called  revolu- 
tion was  to  be  on  our  gunboats  and  that  the  Roose- 
velt Administration  had  determined  to  take  the 
Canal  Zone  by  force  under  the  pretext  of  quelling 
an  Isthmian  uprising.  The  portions  of  the  testi- 
mony that  are  apropos  follow: 

Amador,  accompanied  by  Prescott,  immediately  went 
over  to  Panama.  On  the  way  over  Amador  told  Pres- 
cott that  everything  was  settled  and  that  all  the  arrange- 
ments had  been  completed  through  Bunau-Varilla,  who 
had  promised  to  have  American  warships  on  hand  to 
protect  the  revolutionists  after  they  had  declared  their 
independence.  Amador  expressed  to  Prescott  his  most 
implicit  confidence  in  the  fulfillment  of  Bunau-Varilla's 
promise  and  did  not  seem  to  apprehend  any  doubts  or 
hesitation  on  the  part  of  his  fellow  conspirators.  It  had 
been  decided  that  on  Amador's  arrival  in  Panama  the 
revolutionary  committee  should  meet  the  same  evening 


2^2  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

at  Federico  Boyd's  house  on  the  Cathedral  Plaza  and 
receive  Amador's  report. 

The  meeting  of  the  conspirators  was  held  at  Federico 
Boyd's  house  at  7  o'clock  on  the  evening  of  the  27th. 
At  it  there  were  present  all  the  members  of  the  revolu- 
tionary committee,  with  the  exception  of  Espinosa  and 
Obarrio.  Mr.  Prescott  was  the  only  American  present. 
Doctor  Amador  had  outlined  to  his  fellow  conspirators 
the  plan  agreed  upon  between  Bunau-Varilla  and  the 
authorities  in  Washington,  which  was  to  declare  inde- 
pendent only  the  Canal  Zone  and  the  cities  of  Panama 
and  Colon,  and  the  United  States  warships  and  marines 
would  be  both  at  Colon  and  Panama  to  prevent  the  Co- 
lombian forces  from  attacking  the  Panamans,  and  that 
as  soon  as  the  government  could  be  formed  the  United 
States  would  recognize  the  independence  of  Panama, 
which  was  to  take  its  place  among  the  nations  of  the 
world  as  the  "Republic  of  the  Isthmus." 

Amador  then  showed  his  fellow  conspirators  the  flag 
of  the  new  Republic.  It  was  merely  a  silk  American 
flag  .  .  .  with  the  jack  cut  out,  and  in  its  place,  on  a  blue 
silk  ground,  two  white  stars  joined  by  a  narrow  strip  of 
white  ribbon,  symbolical  of  the  canal.  It  had  been  de- 
signed by  Madam  Bunau-Varilla. 

When  Amador  pulled  out  this  flag  the  impatience  and 
disappointment  of  his  hearers,  which  had  been  growing 
steadily  throughout  the  narration,  found  vent  in  disap- 
proval of  the  proposed  emblem,  which  was  declared  to 
be  too  much  like  the  American  flag. 

These  Panamans  really  thought  that  Doctor  Amador 
was  coming  back  to  them  with  some  secret  treaty  signed 
by  Mr.  Hay  or  President  Roosevelt,  and  the  discussion 
of  the  merits  of  the  emblem  was  interrupted  by  Ricardo 
Arias.  .  .  .  He  made  a  strong  speech  in  which  he  ridi- 
culed and  denounced  the  plan  to  declare  independent  only 


Roosevelt  Took  the  Canal  Zone       273 

the  narrow  strip  of  land  in  the  vicinity  of  the  canal.  He 
pointed  out  that  he,  in  common  with  all  the  other  sub- 
stantial men  of  Panama,  had  large  estates  and  cattle  in- 
terests throughout  the  entire  department,  and  that  they 
would  all  be  ruined  if  their  property  was  not  protected 
from  the  Colombians.  His  remarks  met  with  unanimous 
approval,  and  it  was  then  and  there  agreed  that  if  the 
movement  were  to  take  place  at  all,  it  must  extend  to  the 
whole  State  of  Panama. 


It  was  then  decided  by  the  conspirators  to  send  men 
into  the  interior  to  initiate  the  revolutionary  propaganda, 
which  until  then  had  been  confined  solely  to  those  few 
people  in  the  City  of  Panama,  and  was  not  even  known 
to  the  men  who  later  led  the  movement  in  Colon,  and  to 
let  the  other  towns  know  that  a  movement  was  in  prog- 
ress. Amador  said  that  the  proposal  that  he  had  laid 
before  them  was  only  what  had  been  urged  by  Bunau- 
Varilla.  He  did  not  want  to  tell  his  fellow  conspirators 
he  had  agreed  to  sacrificing  their  interests.  Mr.  Bunau- 
Varilla  says  that  Amador  had  agreed  they  should  only 
declare  independent  the  50-mile  strip,  but  Doctor  Ama- 
dor told  his  fellow  conspirators — and  they  are  all  agreed 
on  this  point — that  pledges  given  by  the  American  Gov- 
ernment in  Washington  to  Mr,  Bunau-Varilla  were  such 
that  no  Colombian  troops  would  be  allowed  to  attack  the 
Panamans  anywhere  after  they  had  once  declared  their 
independence,  and  that  the  agreement  with  the  American 
authorities  was  such  as  to  cover  whatever  action  they 
might  take,  if  they  declared  a  larger  or  smaller  portion 
of  the  Isthmus  independent.  Thomas  Arias  and  Fede- 
rico  Boyd,  two  of  the  Junta,  however,  voiced  the  un- 
easiness of  the  conspirators,  who,  with  the  exception  of 
Prescott,  had  expected  that  Amador  would  bring  back 
with  him  some  secret  treaty  signed  by  the  United  States. 
They  were,  on  the  whole,  much  disappointed,  and  said  so 
in  unmistakable  terms,  because  Amador  had  absolutely 


274  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

nothing  to  show  them  in  writing  from  either  Mr.  Roose- 
velt or  Mr.  Hay. 

This  quoted  testimony  further  shows  that  our 
forces  were  to  be  the  revolution.  Our  compensa- 
tion was  to  be  an  untrammeled  title  to  the  Canal 
Zone.  Yet  we  are  told  that  the  Isthmians  longed 
to  fight  for  freedom.  Note  the  following  from 
a  message  of  Roosevelt,  quoting  a  native : 

We  looked  upon  the  building  of  the  canal  as  a  matter  of 
life  or  death  to  us.  We  wanted  that  because  it  meant, 
with  the  United  States  in  control  of  it,  peace  and  pros- 
perity for  us.  President  Marroquin  appointed  an  Isth- 
mian to  be  governor  of  Panama;  and  we  looked  upon 
that  as  of  happy  augury.  Soon  we  heard  that  the  canal 
treaty  was  not  likely  to  be  approved  at  Bogota ;  next  we 
heard  that  our  Isthmian  governor,  Obaldia,  who  had 
scarcely  assumed  power,  was  to  be  superseded  by  a  sol- 
dier from  Bogota.  ... 

Notwithstanding  all  that  Colombia  has  drained  us  of 
in  the  way  of  revenues,  she  did  not  bridge  for  us  a  single 
river,  nor  make  a  single  roadway,  nor  erect  a  single  col- 
lege where  our  children  could  be  educated,  nor  do  any- 
thing at  all  to  advance  our  industries.  .  .  .  Well,  when 
the  new  generals  came  we  seized  them,  arrested  them, 
and  the  town  of  Panama  was  in  joy.  Not  a  protest  was 
made,  except  the  shots  fired  from  the  Colombian  gunboat 
Bogota,  which  killed  one  Chinese  lying  in  his  bed.  We 
were  willing  to  encounter  the  Colombian  troops  at  Colon 
and  fight  it  out ;  but  the  commander  of  the  United  States 
cruiser  Nashville  forbade  Superintendent  Shaler  to  allow 
the  railroad  to  transport  troops  for  either  party.  That 
is  our  story. 

So  an  Isthmian  tells  us :    "We  were  willing  to 


Roosevelt  Took  the  Canal  Zone        275 

encounter  the  Colombian  troops  at  Colon  and  fight 
it  out."  Is  this  bemoaning  of  a  cruel  fate  sin- 
cere ?  Transportation  of  Colombian  soldiers  was 
prevented  by  the  Commander  of  the  Nashville! 
They  could  have  met  the  Colombian  troops  at 
Colon  if  they  had  refrained  from  sending  for 
help.  This  help  was  asked  for  on  October  29, 
1903,  and  dispatched  to  Colon  on  October  30.  At 
the  time  help  was  asked,  there  was  no  Nashville 
at  Colon  to  prevent  the  transit  of  troops  from 
Panama  to  Colon.  It  arrived  on  November  2, 
1903,  and  was  asked  for  in  order  to  do  just  what 
it  did.  The  Isthmians  were  not  prevented  from 
fighting  it  out  with  the  new  contingent  of  Colom- 
bian soldiers.  They  asked  for  American  gun- 
boats to  do  it.  The  Nashville  and  eight  others 
were  sent  there  for  the  purpose.  When  the  cry 
for  help  reached  Bunau-Varilla  on  October  29,  he 
hastened  to  Washington.  Forthwith  help  was 
speeding  to  Colon.  Prevented  from  fighting  it 
out  with  the  Colombian  troops  at  Colon!  Of 
course  we  are  not  expected  to  see  the  staging  of 
the  play  (vaudeville  performance)  that  was  acted 
far  from  home — on  the  Isthmus.  It  was  in- 
tended to  hoodwink  the  American  people.  Light 
is,  however,  dawning  and  we  are  seeing  the  epi- 
sode as  it  really  was. 


276  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

Roosevelt  has  taught  us  in  the  excerpt  at  the 
beginning  of  this  chapter  not  to  be  guided  by 
words,  but  by  deeds.  Deeds  are  the  real  thing. 
We  will  now  follow  his  instructions,  and  apply 
them  to  his  words  and  deeds  as  to  how  he  secured 
the  Canal  Zone.  Of  course  he  did  not  mean  it 
just  that  way.  We  should  look  at  deeds  as  he 
describes  them  where  President  Wilson  is  con- 
cerned, and  we  should  accept  Roosevelt's  words 
as  a  correct  representation  of  his  deeds  in  so  far 
as  he  is  concerned.  Unfortunately  we  have 
found  that  his  words  as  to  what  were  his  deeds 
and  his  deeds  do  not  match,  and  that  his  deeds 
speak  for  themselves. 

The  City  of  Panama  is  reported  to  have  had  a 
fire  department  of  441  men.  We  do  not  hear  of  it 
in  any  way  except  that  we  are  assured  that  it  had 
a  de  facto  existence.  We  are  not  told  that  it  was 
held  in  readiness  to  act  when  Colombia's  new  con- 
tingent of  soldiers  arrived  at  Colon.  There  was 
ample  time  for  them  to  have  been  transported  to 
Colon  before  the  arrival  of  the  Nashville,  Forty- 
two  American  marines  were,  however,  left  to  face 
474  Colombian  troops,  and  that  on  an  Isthmus 
"seething  with  revolution !"  Does  this  look  like 
willingness  to  fight  it  out  with  Colombia? 


Roosevelt  Took  the  Canal  Zone       2yy 

We  will  let  Roosevelt  tell  us  about  his  instruc- 
tions to  the  Navy  Department  based  on  the  report 
of  the  army  officers : 

In  view  of  all  these  facts  I  directed  the  Navy  Depart- 
ment to  issue  instructions  such  as  would  insure  our  hav- 
ing ships  within  easy  reach  of  the  Isthmus  in  the  event 
of  need  arising.  Orders  were  given  on  October  19  to 
the  Boston  to  proceed  to  San  Juan  del  Sur,  Nicaragua; 
to  the  Dixie  to  prepare  to  sail  from  League  Island;  and 
to  the  Atlanta  to  proceed  to  Guantanamo.  On  October 
30  the  Nashville  was  ordered  to  proceed  to  Colon.  On 
November  2,  when,  the  Colombian  Congress  having  ad- 
journed, it  was  evident  that  the  outbreak  was  imminent, 
and  when  it  was  announced  that  both  sides  were  making 
ready  forces  whose  meeting  would  mean  bloodshed  and 
disorder,  the  Colombian  troops  having  been  embarked  on 
vessels,  the  following  instructions  were  sent  to  the  com- 
manders of  the  Boston,  Nashville,  and  Dixie: 

Maintain  free  and  uninterrupted  transit.  If  inter- 
ruption is  threatened  by  armed  force,  occupy  the  line  of 
railroad.  Prevent  landing  of  any  armed  force  with  hos- 
tile intent,  either  government  or  insurgent,  either  at 
Colon,  Porto  Bello,  or  other  point.  Government  force 
reported  approaching  the  Isthmus  in  vessels.  Prevent 
their  landing  if  in  your  judgment  this  would  precipitate 
a  conflict. 

It  would  have  been  nearer  the  truth  had  the 
foregoing  telegram  to  the  Nashville  and  Dixie 
and  a  similar  one  to  the  Boston  read:  Prevent 
Colombia  from  landing  troops  within  50  miles 
of  Panama  on  the  west  coast,  and  at  Colon,  Porto- 


278  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

Bello  or  any  other  point  on  the  east  coast  if  their 
landing  will  interfere  with  the  establishing  of  a 
Republic  of  Panama  in  the  Province  of  Panama. 
The  essence  of  the  paraphrased  telegram  is  con- 
tained in  the  speech  delivered  by  Roosevelt  at 
Berkeley,  California,  on  March  23,  191 1  : 

I  am  interested  in  the  Panama  Canal  because  I  started 
it.  If  I  had  followed  traditional  conservative  methods  I 
should  have  submitted  a  dignified  state  paper  of  prob- 
ably two  hundred  pages  to  the  Congress,  and  the  debate 
would  have  been  going  on  yet.  But  /  took  the  Canal 
Zone  and  let  Congress  debate,  and  while  the  debate  goes 
on,  the  Canal  does  also. 

We  have  shown  that  Roosevelt  waged  war 
against  Colombia  in  the  fall  of  1903.  The  war 
was  to  be  waged  solely  by  our  marines.  There- 
fore, there  was  no  need  for  military  preparation 
on  the  Isthmus  and  events  as  of  that  time  show 
that  there  were  none.  The  so-called  Republic  of 
Panama,  however,  is  a  fact,  and  we  are  possessed 
of  a  title  to  the  Canal  Zone. 

''No  Colombian  blood  must  be  shedl"  By 
whom?  By  the  American  marines.  America 
would  not  stand  for  the  shedding  of  Colombian 
blood  to  secure  the  Canal  Zone.  Therefore,  there 
must  be  overwhelming  force  on  hand  to  overawe 
Colombia,  and  nine  American  gunboats  were  in 
Isthmian  waters.     This  incidental  statement  by 


Roosevelt  Took  the  Canal  Zone       279 

Dr.  Amador  tells  the  story.  It  is  not  invented. 
It  fits  in  with  the  events  that  transpired  on  the 
Isthmus.  It  shows  that  an  understanding  existed 
between  the  Roosevelt  Administration  and  the 
separatists  on  the  Isthmus.  This  understanding 
provided  for  the  wresting  of  the  Province  of 
Panama  from  Colombia  by  force.  Even  the  Ger- 
man soldier  and  writer,  Von  Bernhardi,  now 
taunts  us : 

Your  seizure  of  Panama  was  only  justifiable  on  the 
ground  that  the  future  interests  of  the  American  people 
are  higher  and  greater  than  the  abstract  principles  of 
international  law. 

What  else  can  this  mean  than  that  we  secured 
the  Canal  Zone  by  force?  Dr.  Amador's  letter 
to  his  son,  dated  October  18,  1903,  about  two 
weeks  before  the  Declaration  of  Independence, 
tells  the  story.     The  part  which  is  apropos  reads : 

I  received  your  telegram  that  you  are  not  coming,  as 
they  have  refused  you  permission.  .  .  . 

The  reason  for  your  coming  was  for  you  to  meet 
Bunau-Varilla,  to  whom  I  have  spoken  of  you.  He  said 
that  if  all  turns  out  well,  you  shall  have  a  good  place  on 
the  medical  commission,  which  is  the  first  that  will  begin 
work;  that  my  name  is  in  Hay's  office  and  that  certainly 
nothing  will  be  refused  you. 

The  plan  seems  to  me  good.  A  portion  of  the  Isthmus 
declares  itself  independent  and  that  portion  the  United 
States  will  not  allow  any  Colombian  forces  to  attack. 
An  assembly   is  called  and  this  given  authority  to  a 


28o  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

minister  to  be  appointed  by  the  new  Government  in  order 
to  make  a  treaty  without  need  of  ratification  by  that 
assembly.  The  treaty  being  approved  by  both  parties, 
the  new  RepubHc  remains  under  the  protection  of  the 
United  States  and  to  it  are  added  the  other  districts  of 
the  Isthmus  which  do  not  already  form  part  of  the  new 
Republic  and  these  also  remain  under  the  protection  of 
the  United  States. 

The  movement  will  be  delayed  a  few  days.  We  want 
to  have  here  the  minister  who  is  going  to  be  named,  so 
that  once  the  movement  is  made  he  can  be  appointed  by 
cable  and  take  up  the  treaty.  In  30  days  everything  will 
be  concluded. 

We  have  some  resources  on  the  movement  being  made, 
and  already  this  has  been  arranged  with  a  bank. 

As  soon  as  everything  is  arranged  I  will  tell  B.  V.  to 
look  out  for  you. 

He  says  if  you  do  not  wish  to  go  he  will  look  out  for  a 
position  for  you  in  New  York.  He  is  a  man  of  great 
influence.  .  .  . 

As  already  seen,  a  revolution  in  three  provinces 
in  1 899- 1 902  did  not  succeed.  But  in  1903  a 
revolution  in  one  of  these  three  provinces  was  to 
succeed  in  thirty  days.  We  are  told  the  reason 
in  this  letter.  Our  Government  had  agreed  to 
protect  secession. 

Dr.  Amador's  talk  to  the  soldiers  of  Colombia 
at  Panama  on  November  4,  1904,  is  further  evi- 
dence that  protection  was  promised  by  our  Gov- 
ernment. The  talk  which  follows  was  delivered 
from  written  notes,  and  taken  down  by  an  eye  wit- 
ness: 


Roosevelt  Took  the  Canal  Zone       281 

Boys,  at  last  we  have  carried  through  our  splendid 
work.  The  world  is  astounded  at  our  heroism.  Yester- 
day we  were  but  the  slaves  of  Colombia;  to-day  we  are 
free.  Have  no  fears.  Here  we  have  the  proof  [hold- 
ing up  some  sheets  of  paper  on  which  was  the  American 
coat  of  arms]  that  our  agent  in  the  United  States,  Senor 
Bunau-Varilla,  gave  us.  Panama  is  free.  The  cup  of 
gold  for  Bogota  has  been  drained;  therefore  the  United 
States  are  aiding  us.  Here  you  have  proof  of  their  word. 
President  Roosevelt  has  made  good,  for  there,  you  know, 
are  the  cruisers  which  defend  us  and  prevent  any  action 
by  Colombia.  They  have  worked  skillfully  in  order  to 
avoid  shedding  Colombian  blood,  for  in  no  other  way 
could  the  American  Government  aid  us.  Free  sons  of 
Panama,  I  salute  you.  Long  live  the  Republic  of 
Panama!  Long  live  President  Roosevelt!  Long  live 
the  American  Government! 

On  November  3,  1903,  Dr.  Amador  urged  Gen- 
eral Huertas  to  stick  to  the  agreement  then  exist- 
ing betv^een  him  and  the  separatists.  It  is  claimed 
that  the  following  is  a  verbatim  report  of  what 
Dr.  Amador  said: 

Huertas,  what  you  are  to-day  you  owe  to  Panama. 
From  Bogota  you  can  hope  for  nothing.  I  am  old  and 
tired  of  life ;  it  is  of  no  importance  to  me  to  die.  If  you 
will  aid  us,  we  shall  reach  to  immortality  in  the  history 
of  the  new  Republic.  Here  you  will  have  four  American 
warships.  There  will  be  the  same  number  in  Colon. 
[That  turned  out  to  be  absolutely  true.]  You  and  your 
battalion  can  accompHsh  nothing  against  the  superior 
force  of  the  cruisers,  which  have  their  orders.  Choose 
here,  glory  and  riches ;  in  Bogota,  misery  and  ingratitude. 

Immediately  thereafter  General  Huertas  sent  a 


282  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

letter  to  Commander  Leoncio  Tascon  at  Peno- 
nome.  The  following  excerpt  from  this  letter  has 
a  bearing  on  our  argument : 

There  having  broken  out  to-day  a  movement  for  the 
independence  of  the  Isthmus,  which  has  been  carried  into 
effect  without  the  shedding  of  a  single  drop  of  blood,  the 
Government  which  now  holds  sway  here  has  been  recog- 
nized. By  necessity,  in  order  to  avoid  their  taking  me  a 
prisoner  I  was  obliged  to  commit  to  prison  some  of  my 
superior  officers.  You  must  prepare  with  the  men  you 
have  with  you  to  come  here  as  soon  as  you  receive  this, 
my  order.  .  .  . 

You  are  hereby  appointed  chief  of  the  battalion.  I  re- 
peat that  you  are  to  accept  no  orders  except  from  me  or 
those  sent  to  you  by  Dr.  Manuel  Amador  Guerrero. 

In  Colon  there  are  two  American  warships  which  have 
disembarked  forces,  and  to-morrow  morning  two  more 
are  to  arrive  here.  Thus  this  movement  is  supported  to 
overflowing  by  the  Americans.  Any  effort  would  have 
been  a  useless  sacrifice.  Therefore  we  have  decided, 
after  careful  consideration,  to  recognize  the  Government 
of  the  Isthmus. 

General  Huertas'  statement  to  his  soldiers  the 
following  morning  shows  that  he  firmly  believed 
that  our  Government  had  agreed  to  protect  seces- 
sion. This  statement  was  preliminary  to  giving 
fifty  dollars  to  each  soldier.  His  speech,  as  re- 
ported, contained  the  following : 

We  are  free !  The  cruisers  which  are  here  remove  all 
our  fears.  Colombia  may  battle  with  the  weak,  but  she 
holds  her  peace  in  the  presence  of  the  United  States. 


Roosevelt  Took  the  Canal  Zone        283 

It  is  now  evident  that  secession  was  undertaken 
because  the  separatists  had  been  assured  protec- 
tion by  our  Government.  To  conceal  it,  publicity 
was  given  to  an  impending  revolution.  Excerpts 
from  inspired  newspaper  articles  could  be  used  to 
explain  the  presence  of  American  warships  within 
striking  distance  of  Isthmian  waters.  It  was 
staging,  and  many  were  deceived  by  it,  including 
the  writer.  Yet  it  is  now  clear  that  our  men-of- 
war  would  not  have  been  in  Isthmian  waters  in 
such  force  if  it  had  not  been  agreed  that  we  would 
take  the  Canal  Zone  by  force.  Our  Govern- 
ment had  decided  to  close  the  canal  negotia- 
tions— 

Upon  the  simple  plan, 

That  they  should  take  who  have  the  power. 

And  they  should  keep  who  can. 

It  must  not  be  forgotten  that  the  separatists 
were  guilty  of  treason  from  the  viewpoint  of  the 
sovereign.  Under  what  conditions  do  men  em- 
bark on  such  a  grave  venture?  Adequate  local 
preparation,  or  assurance  of  protection  from  a 
power  strong  enough  to  furnish  it.  There  was 
no  local  preparation.  No  evidence  of  any  ap- 
peared in  the  strenuous  days  of  November  3-6, 
1903,  on  which  later  date  the  independence  of 
Panama  was  recognized.     This  recognition  by  the 


284         America  and  the  Canal  Title 

United  States  was  construed  to  assure  the  sep- 
aratists the  protection  of  the  Treaty  of  1846.  All 
newspaper  reports  of  the  time  show  that  the 
Isthmians  relied  on  protection  from  the  United 
States  and  not  on  self-protection.  Complete  ab- 
sence of  local  military  activity  between  October 
29  and  November  6  conclusively  shows  that  the 
separatists  had  assurance  of  protection  from  the 
United  States.  It  also  shows  that  our  Adminis- 
tration ''took''  the  Canal  Zone  at  the  point  of  the 
bayonet.     It  is  stolen. 

Maladministration  of  Panama  by  Colombia  is 
given  by  Roosevelt  as  an  excuse  for  intervention. 
If  it  did  exist,  then  there  is  an  ineffaceable  stain 
on  his  Administration  for  having  interfered  with 
the  revolution  on  the  Isthmus  twelve  months 
earlier.  Unrest  is  not  always  the  sign  of  malad- 
ministration in  Spanish-America.  If  it  is,  then 
Panama  is  now  badly  governed,  and  our  interven- 
tion did  not  result  in  good  government.  We  read 
in  Scott's  "The  Americans  in  Panama" : 

On  three  occasions  already  the  Americans  have  pre- 
vented the  disruption  of  the  Republic.  In  1904,  Gen. 
Huertas,  who  had  assisted  the  Junta,  became  dissatisfied 
with  his  rewards,  and  started  to  overturn  the  adminis- 
tration by  force.  The  American  marines  had  to  disarm 
his  small  army.  In  1908  the  United  States  had  to  inter- 
fere to  insure  a  fair  election,  and  in  1912  this  writer  saw 


Roosevelt  Took  the  Canal  Zone        285 

the  presidential  campaign  reach  a  point  where  the 
American  marines  and  infantry  had  to  be  placed  at  the 
Panama  polls  to  prevent  rioting  and  fraud.  It  was  ob- 
vious that  if  the  United  States  had  not  been  present  in 
armed  force,  the  usual  Central  American  method  of 
changing  Administrations  by  a  revolution  would  have 
been  employed. 

Colombia  has  had  stability  of  administration 
since  the  secession  of  the  Province  of  Panama. 
Since  1904,  the  American  marines  have  thrice  in- 
tervened to  prevent  the  forcible  overthrow  of 
those  in  lawful  authority  in  the  Republic  of  Pan- 
ama. It  is  thus  clear  that  the  earlier  Isthmian 
disturbances  were  not  due  to  maladministration 
on  the  part  of  Colombia,  but  to  the  ambitions  of 
local  political  and  financial  adventurers.  There- 
fore, the  indictment  hurled  at  Colombia  by  Roose- 
velt should  have  been  hurled  instead  at  the  Isth- 
mians. For  him  to  continue  reviling  Colombia 
after  the  crushing  disproof  of  his  indictment 
based  on  maladministration  blends  his  acts  with 
those  we  associate  with  moral  cowardice. 

As  already  stated,  unrest  in  Spanish- America  is 
not  always  a  sign  of  maladministration,  but  may 
be  the  outward  expression  of  rival  ambitions  for 
control.  It  may  even  have  been  inspired  by  a 
corporation  seeking  privilege,  and  have  been 
financed  by  it.    When  Roosevelt  alleges  malad- 


286  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

ministration  by  Colombia,  he  gives  no  bill  of  par- 
ticulars. 

The  United  States  terminated  the  revolution 
in  Colombia  in  1902  and  reestablished  Colombian 
sovereignty  on  the  Isthmus.  We  were  to  guaran- 
tee its  sovereignty  of  the  Isthmus  in  perpetuity  in 
the  Hay-Herran  treaty.  Therefore,  the  seces- 
sion of  Panama  in  1903  and  our  recognition  of  its 
independence  two  days  later  cannot  have  been 
due  to  maladministration.  The  reason  for  our 
action  was  other  than  misgovernment  of  Panama 
by  Colombia.  It  was  the  refusal  of  Colombia  to 
ratify  the  Hay-Herran  treaty  and  that  alone.  It 
was  for  the  sole  purpose  of  abridging  the  time 
that  would  be  required  to  secure  title  to  the  Canal 
Zone  by  the  slow  process  of  diplomacy. 

The  proof  of  this  consists  in  our  mediation  to 
end  the  three-year  revolution  in  1902.  Our  Min- 
ister to  Colombia  sent  the  following  communica- 
tion to  our  Department  of  State,  September  11, 
1902: 

Minister  for  foreign  affairs  desires  me  to  inform  you 
that  his  Government  would  appreciate  your  good  offices 
to  bring  about  peace  in  the  country,  especially  on  the 
Isthmus,  where  the  revolution  is  strong.  .  .  .  Minister  for 
foreign  affairs  added:  "Not  only  is  the  question  of 
humanity  involved,  but  so  long  as  the  war  lasts  Congress 
will  not  be  convened,  and  therefore  the  continuance  of 


Roosevelt  Took  the  Canal  Zone       287 

war  will  delay  submission  of  the  Canal  matter  to  the 
Congress." 

This  message  indicated  that  continuance  of  the 
revolution  would  delay  action  on  the  treaty. 
Further,  intervention  would  put  Colombia  under 
obligations  to  us  which  she  would  be  expected  to 
pay  through  a  canal  concession.  Therefore,  no 
time  was  to  be  lost.  On  September  16,  1902,  the 
Department  of  State  informed  the  Secretary  of 
the  Navy  that  mediation  had  been  agreed  upon. 
The  communication  reads : 

I  have  received  from  the  President  a  telegram  approv- 
ing of  my  suggestion  as  to  intrusting  such  a  mission  to 
the  Commander  of  the  Cincinnati. 

The  precedents  in  which  our  naval  commanders  have 
lent  their  good  offices  to  bring  about  peace  in  Central 
America  during  the  past  years  will  serve  to  guide  Com- 
mander McLean  in  the  execution  of  such  instructions  as 
you  may  deem  proper  to  give  him  in  this  regard. 

While  Isthmian  affairs  were  in  this  unsettled 
condition,  the  United  States  representatives  pro- 
hibited the  use  of  the  Panama  railroad  for  the 
transportation  of  contraband  of  war.  This  was 
a  departure  from  the  traditional  American  policy. 
They,  however,  did  not  prohibit  the  sovereign 
from  landing  troops  on  the  Isthmus.  That  step 
was  reserved  for  1903.  Until  1902,  none  of  the 
American  acts  were  predicated  on  a  right  that 


288  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

took  precedence  over  those  of  the  sovereign.  Co- 
lombia promptly  protested  against  the  action 
named,  and  the  order  of  the  United  States  was 
modified.  Rear-Admiral  Casey  sent  the  protest 
to  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  who  in  turn  remitted 
it  to  Secretary  Hay.  The  communication  is  dated 
October  5,  1902,  and  reads: 

Governor  Salazar  returned  my  call  yesterday  and 
strongly  protested  against  any  restriction  of  Colombian 
Government  use  of  road  as  an  invasion  of  sovereign 
and  treaty  rights,  and  requested  transportation  of  con- 
signment arms  and  ammunition,  Colon  to  Panama,  re- 
ceived by  steamer  and  loaded  on  cars  before  my  order 
prohibiting  such  transportation. 

President  Marroquin  simultaneously  lodged  a 
protest  with  our  Minister  to  Colombia.  As  just 
stated,  the  order  of  Rear- Admiral  Casey  was  not 
in  accordance  with  our  settled  policy.  It  was  a 
departure  and  was  resented  by  Colombia.  It  bore 
its  natural  fruit  when  the  Hay-Herran  Treaty 
was  under  consideration  in  the  Colombian  Con- 
gress as  well  as  earlier  during  its  negotiation. 
But  the  protest  was  made  while  the  United  States 
was  preparing  to  use  its  good  ofBces  to  effect  peace 
on  the  Isthmus.  The  state  of  the  revolution  at 
the  time  is  shown  in  a  note  of  Rear  Admiral 
Casey,  dated  October  20,  1902,  and  written  only 


Roosevelt  Took  the  Canal  Zone        289 

eight  days  before  the  insurgents  submitted  to 
American  pressure: 

Judging  from  conditions  now  existing  and  from  infor- 
mation I  am  able  to  obtain,  there  seems  little  prospect 
of  a  speedy  termination  of  this  strife.  Panama  and 
Colon  are  practically  besieged:  troops  at  neither  place 
dare  to  go  beyond  their  intrenchments. 

I  firmly  believe  if  our  men  were  removed  from  shore, 
the  insurgents  would  be  in  Panama  in  forty-eight  hours. 
I  think  the  Government,  therefore,  is  very  willing  that 
they  should  remain,  making  occasional  mild  objections, 
which  really  it  does  not  mean  shall  be  taken  seriously. 

If  Panama  was  misgoverned  by  Colombia,  the 
United  States  was  nevertheless  willing  to  con- 
tribute to  its  continuance  for  uninterrupted  tran- 
sit on  the  Isthmus.  In  condemning  Colombia  it 
condemns  itself.  But  we  must  proceed  with  the 
project  for  mediation  which  was  to  prolong  mal- 
administration in  Panama  because  we  had  to 
hasten  greater  transit  convenience — the  Canal! 
Accordingly  Rear-Admiral  Casey  addressed 
Herrera,  chief  of  the  revolutionary  forces,  as  fol- 
lows: 

I  have  the  honor  to  inform  you  that  I  have  been 
authorized  by  my  Government  to  offer  my  friendly  serv- 
ices to  the  leaders  of  the  contending  parties  in  the  Re- 
public of  Colombia,  with  a  view  to  bringing  about  a 
friendly  meeting  between  them,  and  a  discussion  of  their 
differences,  to  the  end  that  they  mutually  agree  upon 
such  terms  as  will  put  an  end  to  the  strife  and  restore 
peace  and  tranquillity  in  the  Republic.  .  .  . 


290         America  and  the  Canal  Title 

I  have  the  honor  and  pleasure  to  offer  you  my  good 
offices  [Governor  Salazar  had  accepted]  for  a  friendly 
meeting  and  discussion  with  Governor  Salazar,  and 
would  be  most  pleased  to  have  you  meet  on  board  my 
flagship  Wisconsin,  at  anchor  off  Panama. 

The  final  reply  of  Herrera  is  dated  November 
3,  1902,  and  reads: 

I  wish  to  thank  you  very  much  for  the  interest  you 
manifest  in  the  well-being,  the  peace,  and  the  tranquillity 
of  Colombia,  of  which  you  have  given  undoubted  proofs 
in  your  former  actions  and  in  the  contents  of  your  kind 
communication  of  October  28,  which  I  have  just  received. 

In  a  note  dated  to-day  I  express  to  Gen.  Victor  M. 
Salazar  my  wish  to  confer  on  the  subject  of  peace  on 
board  the  battleship  Wisconsin  in  accordance  with  the 
kind  invitation  you  have  extended  to  us,  and  I  am  in 
hopes  that  he  will  make  the  necessary  arrangements  for 
my  transport  to  Panama  Bay. 

The  revolutionists  submitted.  America's  rep- 
resentatives tendered  only  their  good  offices.  But 
both  in  the  background  and  in  the  foreground  was 
"the  big  stick."  An  apparently  interminable  con- 
flict was  quelled  in  a  few  days  by  the  tendering  of 
good  offices.  The  venerable  Senator  Morgan 
later  commented  on  these  events  as  follows: 

On  the  return  of  the  victorious  liberals  from  Aqua 
Dulce,  fighting  occurred  on  the  railroad  between  Mata- 
chin  and  Colon. 

As  the  trains  would  pass  the  battle  was  suspended. 
A  party  of  liberals  occupied  Colon  without  any  disturb- 
ance of  the  people. 


Roosevelt  Took  the  Canal  Zone       291 

The  French  and  American  naval  commanders  agreed 
that  they  must  be  removed  from  Colon,  and  after  con- 
ferring with  General  de  la  Rosa,  their  commander,  and 
a  display  of  force,  he  surrendered  to  General  Alban, 
commanding  Marroquin's  forces. 

This  was  the  first  party  that  surrendered  under  the 
policy  adopted  by  our  Government.  .  .  . 

We  destroyed  the  liberal  army  in  Panama  in 
November,  1902,  to  keep  Marroquin  in  power  until  the 
Hay-Herran  treaty  could  be  ratified,  and  failing  in  that 
we  destroyed  Marroquin  and  Colombia  in  November, 
1903,  for  the  purpose  of  getting  a  canal  concession  on  the 
Isthmus. 

If  the  American  policy  just  described  is  not 
getting  the  Canal  Zone  by-force,  what  is  it  ?  The 
objective  seemingly  in  all  acts  of  our  Administra- 
tion was  the  Canal  Zone  on  our  own  terms  and  not 
better  government  on  the  Isthmus.  In  short,  the 
United  States  was  ready  to  rivet  Colombian 
sovereignty  on  the  Province  of  Panama  in  per- 
petuity for  an  easement  to  the  Canal  Zone. 
When  it  failed  to  secure  that  easement  as  rapidly 
as  desired,  Colombian  government  on  the  Isthmus 
became  simultaneously  in  the  mind  of  our  then 
chief  executive  so  bad  that  it  had  to  be  destroyed. 
It  would  seem  that  the  Roosevelt  Administration 
wrested  victory  from  Herrera  in  1902  and  sus- 
tained Marroquin  in  the  hour  of  defeat  in  order 
to  make  possible  the  negotiation  of  the  Hay-Her- 
ran treaty.     That  there  existed  such  an  under- 


292  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

standing  seems  to  be  all  but  established.  When 
the  treaty  was  later  rejected  by  the  Colombian 
Senate,  the  sting  of  ingratitude,  pictured  by 
Shakespeare  in  the  immortal  King  Lear,  was  felt. 
If  Roosevelt's  characterization  of  misgovern- 
ment  of  Panama  by  Colombia  is  true,  then  his  in- 
terference with  the  course  of  the  1 899-1 902  revo- 
lution when  it  was  at  the  height  of  its  military 
activity  is  a  political  crime  so  base  that  one  would 
have  to  search  the  English  language  to  find  a 
term  sufficiently  descriptive  to  characterize  it.  If 
Roosevelt  really  believed  that  Panama  was  as 
thoroughly  misgoverned  by  Colombia  as  he  al- 
leges in  an  excerpt  already  given,  then  he  com- 
mitted a  political  crime  in  1902  when  he  restored 
Colombia's  tottering  sovereignty  over  the  three 
provinces  then  in  formidable  revolt.  If  he  did  not 
believe  what  he  asserted,  then  the  dismemberment 
of  Colombia  in  the  following  year  was  a  political 
crime  without  an  extenuating  circumstance.  The 
conduct  of  Roosevelt  in  the  pursuit  of  the  title  to 
the  Canal  Zone  has  stained  American  diplomacy. 

Roosevelt  is  interesting  even  though  inaccurate. 
In  his  article  entitled,  "The  Panama  Blackmail 
Treaty,"  occurs  a  paragraph  which  is  now  apro- 
pos: 


Roosevelt  Took  the  Canal  Zone        293 

There  were  .  .  .  various  revolutionary  movements  on 
foot  in  the  Isthmus,  and  it  was  my  understanding  that 
there  was  considerable  jealousy  among  the  instigators  of 
these  movements  as  to  which  one  would  come  off  first 
and  would  be  effective.  On  information  received  after 
the  event,  I  believed  then,  and  believe  now,  that  the 
revolutionary  movement  which  actually  succeeded  was 
the  one  with  which  Mr.  Bunau-Varilla  was  connected. 
He  was  sent  by  the  Government  of  Panama  as  Minister 
to  this  country  as  soon  as  Panama  became  an  independent 
state,  and  he  then  made  no  secret  of  the  fact  that  he  had 
been  one  of  those  who  had  organized  the  successful 
revolution;  precisely  as  was  the  case  with  the  President 
and  other  officials  of  the  new  republic.  Neither  did  Mr. 
Bunau-Varilla  make  any  secret  of  the  fact  that  in  acting 
as  he  did  he  was  influenced  both  by  his  indignation  as  a 
resident  of  Panama  at  the  Colombian  treatment  of 
Panama,  and  also  by  his  indignation  as  a  Frenchman  at 
the  Colombian  proposal  to  blackmail  the  company,  and 
if  it  would  not  submit  to  blackmail,  then  to  confiscate  its 
possessions.  In  view  of  this  double  attitude  of  the 
Colombian  Government,  an  attitude  of  tyranny  toward 
Panama  and  of  robbery  toward  the  French  company, 
Mr.  Bunau-Varilla  conceived  it  to  be  his  duty  to  do  all 
he  could  to  aid  the  natives  of  Panama  in  throwing  off  the 
yoke  of  Colombia.  I  believe  his  attitude  was  entirely 
proper,  alike  from  the  standpoint  of  his  duty  as  a  resi- 
dent of  Panama,  from  the  standpoint  of  his  duty  as  a 
Frenchman  to  the  investors  and  property  holders  of  the 
French  company,  and  from  the  standpoint  of  his  duty 
as  a  citizen  of  the  world.  But  until  after  the  event  I  had 
no  knowledge  of  his  activities  save  the  knowledge  pos- 
sessed by  all  intelligent  men  who  had  studied  the  affairs 
of  the  Isthmus.     I  gave  him  no  aid  or  encouragement. 

We  will  let  the  late  Senator  Carmack  reply  to 
this  eulogy  of  Bunau-Varilla.     Carmack's  char- 


294  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

acterization  is  based  on  French  court  records,  and 
reads : 

Bunau-Varilla,  now  [February  9,  1904]  Minister  from 
the  State  of  Panama,  but  a  citizen  of  France,  was  one  of 
the  earliest  and  most  active  supporters  of  this  conspiracy 
against  the  integrity  of  Colombia.  This  much  we  know. 
This  man  was  connected  with  the  old  Panama  Canal 
Company,  and  the  official  records  of  his  own  country, 
including  the  reports  of  the  Minister  of  Justice,  show 
that  he  was  one  of  the  worst  of  the  crew  whose  thiev- 
ing operations  bankrupted  that  concern,  brought  the  gray 
hairs  of  De  Lesseps  in  shame  and  sorrow  to  the  grave, 
and  covered  the  French  Government  itself  with  odium 
and  disgrace. 

The  views  of  the  writer  are  in  complete  accord 
with  those  of  the  quotation  as  to  the  real  character 
of  Bunau-Varilla.  It  is  as  respectable  as  that  of 
Dr.  Jekyll  and  Mr.  Hyde,  and  there  exists  no  evi- 
dence that  there  was  an  attempt  on  the  part  of 
our  Administration  to  deal  with  the  doctor  while 
loathing  the  mister.  In  an  earlier  chapter  we 
have  shown  that  his  character  is  rather  like  that 
of  one  of  Dickens'  characters  known  as  Uriah 
Heap.  Yet  this  Ishmaelite  among  respectable 
people  is  accorded  a  certificate  of  character  by 
Roosevelt  in  order  to  bolster  up  his  tottering  de- 
fense of  the  rape  of  Colombia. 

This  good  and  great  Frenchman  of  exalted 
moral  purpose,  according  to  the  last  excerpt  from 


Roosevelt  Took  the  Canal  Zone        295 

Roosevelt,  and  of  the  penitentiary  crowd  accord- 
ing to  French  official  court  records,  has  told  us 
that  he  knew  that  the  United  States  would  protect 
secession  within  forty-eight  hours  after  the 
Declaration  of  Independence  by  the  Province  of 
Panama.  And,  being  good,  great  and  of  exalted 
moral  purpose,  according  to  Roosevelt,  he  must 
have  told  the  truth !  He  informed  the  separatists 
that  the  United  States  would  protect  secession  and 
they  acted  on  his  information — he  and  they  have 
said  so.  This  assurance  enabled  the  separatists 
to  dispense  with  preparations  for  military  opera- 
tions. They  were  to  be  on  our  gunboats.  These 
gunboats  were  in  Isthmian  waters  in  overwhelm- 
ing force.  They  overawed  Colombia.  Roose- 
velt was  accurate  when  he  said:  '7  took  the 
Canal  Zone." 

We  are  told,  however,  that  there  were  a  num- 
ber of  revolutionary  movements  on  the  Isthmus 
at  the  time,  and  that  there  was  rivalry  as  to  who 
should  lead  the  revolt  of  the  now  famous  seven 
with  an  attenuated  and  indefinite  outer  circle  of 
hangers  on  in  a  province  of  some  300,000  people 
against  an  armed  nation  of  some  5,000,000. 
There  was,  however,  only  a  single  movement  com- 
posed of  a  few  financial  and  political  adventurers 
with    Cromwell    as    their    first    intermediary. 


296         America  and  the  Canal  Title 

Warnings  from  Colombia  caused  him  to  seem- 
ingly sever  his  connection  with  the  movement. 
Bunau-Varilla  v^as  accordingly  summoned  to  suc- 
ceed Cromwell  as  intermediary.  Colombia  had 
rejected  the  Hay-Herran  treaty  when  he  arrived 
on  the  scene.  It  was  the  psychological  moment 
— the  time  for  action. 

It  was,  however,  the  same  group  of  separatists 
with  only  a  new  intermediary.  Soon  after  his 
arrival  Bunau-Varilla  assured  Dr.  Amador  that 
the  United  States  would  protect  secession  and 
urged  him  to  hasten  to  Panama  and  clear  the  deck 
for  action.  This  assurance  and  the  presence  of 
the  Nashville  as  tangible  evidence  of  good  faith 
set  the  machinery  in  motion  which  created  the  so- 
called  Republic  of  Panama  for  the  purpose  of 
transferring  to  us  the  Canal  Zone. 

On  November  6,  1903,  our  Government  recog- 
nized the  independence  of  its  own  offspring,  the 
so-called  Republic  of  Panama.  This  was  two 
days  before  the  news  of  secession  reached  Bogota. 
The  following  communication  was,  on  November 
6,  addressed  to  our  Minister  to  Colombia,  to  be 
by  him  officially  conveyed  to  the  Government  of 
Colombia : 


Roosevelt  Took  the  Canal  Zone        297 

The  people  of  Panama  having  by  an  apparently 
unanimous  movement  dissolved  their  political  connection 
with  the  Republic  of  Colombia  and  resumed  their  inde- 
pendence, and  having  adopted  a  government  of  their  own, 
republican  in  form,  with  which  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  of  America  has  entered  into  relations,  the 
President  of  the  United  States  in  accordance  with  the 
ties  of  friendship  which  have  so  long  and  so  happily 
existed  between  the  respective  nations,  most  earnestly 
commends  to  the  Governments  of  Colombia  and  of 
Panama  the  peaceful  and  equitable  settlement  of  all  ques- 
tions at  issue  between  them.  He  holds  that  he  is  bound, 
not  merely  by  treaty  obligations,  but  by  the  interests  of 
civilization,  to  see  that  the  peaceable  traffic  of  the  world 
across  the  Isthmus  of  Panama  shall  not  longer  be  dis- 
turbed by  a  constant  succession  of  unnecessary  and 
wasteful  civil  wars. 

We  have  already  commented  on  the  statement 
that  it  was  a  ''unanimous  movement."  It  would 
have  been  nearer  the  truth  if  the  telegram  had 
said  that  it  was  a  unitary  movement  outside  of 
the  Province  of  Panama  in  collusion  with  a  few 
financial  adventurers  on  the  Isthmus.  It  is  al- 
most unbelievable  that  a  Washington  Administra- 
tion would  stoop  to  this  level  for  a  mess  of  pottage 
— abridgment  by  a  few  months,  or  perhaps  by  a 
year,  of  the  beginning  of  the  construction  of  an 
Isthmian  canal. 

Leander  T.  Chamberlain  properly  describes  the 
so-called  Republic  of  Panama  which  was  snap- 


298         America  and  the  Canal  Title 

shotted  into  existence,  and  then  precipitately 
recognized  by  the  Roosevelt  Administration.  It 
is  so  apropos  that  we  adopt  it  as  our  own : 

A  popular  uprising,  at  a  single  point,  of  less  than  one- 
tenth  of  the  population  of  the  Province  of  Panama;  no 
revolutionary  committee  representing  the  other  five  dis- 
tricts of  the  province;  no  formulated  statement  of 
grievances ;  no  congress,  no  army,  no  navy,  no  courts  of 
justice,  no  financial  stability,  evidently  unable  to  with- 
stand the  forces  of  the  parent  country;  yet  an  admission 
to  the  great  sisterhood  of  nations !  Admitted  in  less  time 
than  measures  two  revolutions  of  the  earth  on  its  axis! 
It  is  ample  cause  for  thankfulness  that  the  annals  of 
civilization  are  sullied  by  no  sustaining  precedent. 

The  notice  quoted  above  was  dispatched  to  our 
Minister  in  Colombia  two  days  before  Bogota 
learned  of  the  secession  of  the  Province  of  Pan- 
ama. It  was  sent  to  a  nation  with  whom  we  had 
a  solemn  engagement  of  amity  and  friendship 
in  the  Treaty  of  1846.  This  solemn  engagement 
provided : 

If  unfortunately  any  of  the  articles  contained  in  this 
treaty  should  be  violated  or  infringed  in  any  way  what- 
ever, it  is  expressly  stipulated  that  neither  of  the  two 
contracting  parties  shall  ordain  or  authorize  any  acts  of 
reprisal,  nor  shall  declare  war  against  the  other  on  com- 
plaints of  injuries  or  damages,  until  the  said  party  con- 
sidering itself  offended  shall  have  laid  before  the  other  a 
statement  of  such  injuries  or  damages,  verified  by 
competent  proofs,  demanding  justice  and  satisfaction, 
and  the  same  shall  have  been  denied,  in  violation  of  the 
laws  and  of  international  right. 


Roosevelt  Took  the  Canal  Zone       299 

The  notice  was  sent  to  a  nation  whose  sov- 
ereignty of  the  Isthmus  we  had  guaranteed  in  a 
solemn  engagement.  By  this  solemn  engagement 
we  were  estopped  from  destroying  Colombian 
sovereignty  over  the  Isthmus.  The  notice  quoted 
virtually  informed  Colombia  that  we  had  done 
what  the  treaty  forbade,  and  that  we  would  de- 
fend our  act  by  force.  It  was  sent  while  a  treaty 
gasped  and  international  law  averted  her  aston- 
ished gaze.  Yet  Roosevelt  asks  us  to  believe 
that: 

The  United  States  has  many  honorable  chapters  in  its 
history,  but  no  more  honorable  chapter  than  that  which 
tells  of  the  way  in  which  the  right  to  dig  the  Panama 
Canal  was  secured. 

Honorable!  May  we  be  delivered  from  any 
more  honorable  chapters  in  our  history  like  this ! 
Such  a  statement  adds  hypocrisy  to  national  dis- 
grace. There  is  no  more  unsavory  chapter  in 
American  diplomatic  history  than  the  one  which 
tells  how  we  secured  the  right  to  dig  the  Panama 
Canal. 

It  automatically  reminds  one  of  the  exclama- 
tion of  the  venerable  Senator  Hoar  as  re- 
corded in  the  Autobiography  of  the  late  Senator 
Cullom : 

I  HOPE  I  MAY  NEVER  LIVE  TO  SEE  THE  DAY  WHEN 


30O         America  and  the  Canal  Title 

THE  INTERESTS  OF  MY  COUNTRY  ARE  PLACED  ABOVE 
ITS  HONOR. 

The  opera  bouffe  performance  on  the  Isthmus 
did  not  attain  the  dignity  of  a  made-to-order  revo- 
lution. It  was  a  sham.  There  was  not  a  scintilla 
of  respectability  to  it.  Financial  buccaneers  and 
political  adventurers  did  essay  to  create  a  repub- 
lic out  of  the  Province  of  Panama  so  that  they 
might  become  the  venders  of  a  canal  title.  Uncle 
Sam  granted  them  the  needed  protection  in  the 
undertaking.  This  assured  the  success  of  the 
venture,  and,  because  of  this  assurance,  it  was 
undertaken. 

We  are  clearly  warranted  in  characterizing  the 
foregoing  note  to  Colombia  as  one  of  the  most 
untruthful  diplomatic  documents  known  to  mod- 
ern history.  It  is  a  communication  such  as 
Machiavelli  and  Bismarck  were  wont  to  send  as 
occasion  arose,  but  there  is  not  another  like  it  in 
the  files  of  our  Department  of  State.  It  is  grossly 
insulting,  and  stands  as  a  continuing  insult  to 
Colombia.  It  must  be  disowned  in  order  to  re- 
store our  national  honor. 

This  note  was  not  sent  to  Colombia  for  the  pur- 
pose of  welcoming  into  the  sisterhood  of  sover- 
eign states  a  people  that  had  thrown  off  the  yoke 
of  oppression,  nor  of  requesting  her  to  acquiesce 


Roosevelt  Took  the  Canal  Zone        301 

in  what  had  been  determined  by  the  sword.  It 
was  sent  for  the  purpose  of  protecting  the  seces- 
sion that  had  been  abetted  by  our  Government. 
It  virtually  informed  Colombia  that  the  United 
States  would  maintain  by  force  what  had  been 
accomplished  by  the  display  of  force.  Its  pur- 
pose was  intimidation.  Its  tone  was  offensive. 
It  was  the  crowning  act  of  a  political  crime.  It 
added  insult  to  injury.  Our  course  on  the  Isth- 
mus belongs  to  the  same  class,  and  is  of  the  same 
character  as  the  rape  of  Belgium  by  Germany. 
Colombia  did  not  resist,  and  therefore  the  loss  of 
life  and  property  are  not  in  evidence — thanks  to 
Colombia  and  not  to  our  Administration. 

Notice  of  the  recognition  of  the  independence 
of  the  so-called  Republic  of  Panama  to  be  com- 
municated to  the  latter,  was  sent  to  our  Consul 
at  Panama.     It  reads : 

The  people  of  Panama  have,  by  an  apparently  unani- 
mous movement,  dissolved  their  political  connection 
with  the  Republic  of  Colombia  and  resumed  their  inde- 
pendence. When  you  are  satisfied  that  a  de  facto 
government,  republican  in  form,  and  without  substantial 
opposition  from  its  own  people,  has  been  established  in 
the  State  of  Panama,  you  will  enter  into  relations  with  it 
as  the  responsible  government  of  the  territory  and  look 
to  it  for  all  due  action  to  protect  the  persons  and  property 
of  citizens  of  the  United  States  and  to  keep  open  the 
isthmian  transit  in  accordanqe  with  the  obligations  of 


302  'America  and  the  Canal  Title 

existing  treaties  governing  the  relation  of  the  United 
States  to  that  territory. 

We  ask  again,  was  it  such  a  unanimous  move- 
ment? Let  us  see!  If  the  whole  Isthmus  was 
''seething  with  revolution,"  if  there  was  no  an- 
tecedent understanding  with  our  Government, 
why  were  there  not  enough  Isthmians  bearing 
arms  on  November  4,  1903,  to  deal  with  the  new 
contingent  of  a  few  hundred  Colombian  soldiers 
which  arrived  on  the  previous  day  ?  Only  a  few 
marines  of  the  Nashville  dealt  with  them.  There 
was  not  an  Isthmian  there  to  help!  There  was 
not  an  Isthmian  prepared  to  help !  Yet  it  was  the 
day  on  which  they  declared  their  independence. 
Shortly  thereafter  more  Colombian  soldiers 
would  naturally  appear.  And  yet  no  military 
preparation  whatsoever  was  in  progress.  There 
was  none  even  in  contemplation !  The  Isthmian 
facts  show  that  an  understanding  existed  with 
the  power  that  supplied  the  force  to  protect  seces- 
sion. These  are  facts — established  facts.  They 
cannot  be  consigned  to  the  scrap  basket  by  unc- 
tuous statements.  It  is  the  unctuous  statements 
which  are  the  scrap.  The  Isthmians  were  not 
fools.  Dr.  Amador  has  assured  us  of  that. 
They  knew  where  help  was  to  come  from.  They 
could  have  known  only  by  having  been  told.     Yet 


Roosevelt  Took  the  Canal  Zone        303 

we  are  asked  to  believe  that  the  whole  Isthmus 
was  ''seething  with  revolution !"  As  if  they  arose 
as  one  man  against  the  oppressor !  But,  as  a  mat- 
ter of  fact,  not  one  Isthmian  arose  in  Colon  on 
the  day  that  independence  was  declared  to  assist 
the  American  marines  under  trying  circum- 
stances. Does  this  look  like  a  popular  Isthmian 
uprising  ?  Or,  does  it  look  like  an  event  effected 
by  an  inner  circle  in  collaboration  with  our  Ad- 
ministration ? 

We  will  now  offer  additional  evidence  in  sup- 
port of  our  contention  that  the  Canal  Zone  was 
taken  by  force.  This  additional  evidence  is  found 
in  the  telegrams  which  were  sent  to  our  Gov- 
ernment by  the  committee  which  constituted  the 
executive  board  of  the  new  republic.  The  first 
was  sent  before  independence  was  declared.  It 
reads : 

We  take  the  liberty  of  bringing  to  the  knowledge  of 
your  Government  that  on  yesterday  afternoon,  in  conse- 
quence of  a  popular  and  spontaneous  movement  of  the 
people  of  this  city,  the  independence  of  the  Isthmus  was 
proclaimed  and,  the  Republic  of  Panama  being  instituted, 
its  provisional  government  organized  an  [executive] 
board  consisting  of  ourselves,  who  are  assured  of  the. 
military  strength  necessary  to  carry  out  our  determina- 
tion. 

The  second  is  dated  November  6,  1903,  and 
reads : 


304          America  and  the  Canal  Title 

The  board  of  provisional  government  of  the  Republic 
of  Panama  has  appointed  Senor  Philippe  Bunau-Varilla 
envoy  extraordinary  and  minister  plenipotentiary  near 
your  Government  with  full  powers  to  conduct  diplomatic 
and  financial  negotiations.  Deign  to  receive  and  heed 
him. 

No  such  telegrams  or  telegrams  of  a  similar 
nature  were  sent  to  our  Government  at  any  previ- 
ous uprising.  There  was  no  feeling  of  the  way 
in  these  telegrams.  The  tone  of  the  telegrams  is 
that  of  foreknowledge  as  to  how  they  would  be 
received.  They  are  mute  evidence  that  an  un- 
derstanding existed  between  the  separatists  of 
Panama  and  the  Roosevelt  Administration. 

The  communication  of  Bunau-Varilla  as  Min- 
ister of  Panama  to  Secretary  Hay  dated  Novem- 
ber 7,  1903,  tells  the  story  of  a  prior  understand- 
ing as  clearly  as  though  it  had  been  committed  to 
parchment.  No  such  communication  would  have 
been  written  without  its  author  knowing  more 
than  he  tells.  He  did  not  become  enlightened, 
November  4-7,  while  reading  uncertain  press  dis- 
patches from  the  Isthmus.  He  had  the  light 
from  which  the  events  from  November  4-7 
sprang.  Therefore,  he  was  in  a  position  to  pen 
the  contents  of  a  note  from  which  the  following 
excerpt  is  taken: 

I  congratulate  myself,  sir,  that  my  first  official  duty 


Roosevelt  Took  the  Canal  Zone        305 

should  be  to  respectfully  request  you  to  convey  to  His 
Excellency  the  President  of  the  United  States  on  behalf 
of  the  people  of  Panama  an  expression  of  th^  grateful 
sense  of  their  obligation  to  his  Government.  In  extend- 
ing her  generous  hand  so  spontaneously  to  her  latest  born, 
the  Mother  of  the  American  Nations  is  prosecuting  her 
noble  mission  as  the  liberator  and  the  educator  of  the 
peoples.  In  spreading  her  protecting  wings  over  the 
territory  of  our  Republic  the  American  Eagle  has  sancti- 
fied it.  It  has  rescued  it  from  the  barbarism  of  un- 
necessary and  wasteful  civil  wars  to  consecrate  it  to  the 
destiny  assigned  to  it  by  Providence,  the  service  of 
humanity,  and  the  progress  of  civilization. 

The  official  documents  from  the  fateful  tele- 
grams of  November  2,  1903,  to  and  including  the 
communications  of  the  provisional  government  of 
Panama  were  all  penned  with  the  antecedent  un- 
derstanding (not  of  record)  in  the  background, 
and  they  unmistakably  disclose  its  existence. 
They  match  too  perfectly.  Those  of  the  pro- 
visional government  are  communicated  with  so 
much  confidence  that  they  tell  a  story  not  ex- 
pressed. They  are  without  a  parallel  when  there 
were  bona  fide  uprisings.  The  critical  student  of 
history  finds  in  them  absolute  proof  that  our  Gov- 
ernment collaborated  with  some  Isthmian  adven- 
turers to  effect  the  dismemberment  of  Colombia. 

We  have  seen  that  there  were  no  preparations 
for  revolt  on  the  Isthmus  and  that  the  charge  of 
maladministration  of  Panama  by  Colombia  is 


3o6         America  and  the  Canal  Title 

without  merit.  We  are,  therefore,  compelled  to 
conclude  that  brute  force  was  invoked — stood 
guard  while  a  protectorate  of  the  United  States 
called  the  Republic  of  Panama  was  organized. 
This  is  conduct  that  one  would  expect  of  a  nation 
of  brigands  but  not  of  the  United  States.  Uncle 
Sam  can  disavow  it  and  redeem  his  honor  by  mak- 
ing reparation  to  Colombia,  or  he  can  decline  to 
make  reparation,  leave  his  honor  in  pawn  and 
appropriate  the  advantages  which  accrue  from  his 
stolen  canal  title.  What  will  he  do?  Will  he 
make  reparation  to  Colombia  and  remain  faithful 
to  the  ideals  of  civilization,  or  will  he  treat  with 
silent  contempt  the  clarion  voice  of  justice  ? 

In  order  to  more  fully  establish  the  argument 
that  our  Government  abandoned  its  traditional 
policy  in  order  to  take  the  Canal  Zone,  we  will  set 
over  against  each  other  two  official  documents. 
Both  belong  to  the  Roosevelt  Administration. 
Both  were  penned  by  members  of  the  Cabinet,  one 
in  1902 ;  the  other  in  1903.  They  speak  for  them- 
selves. They  tell  whether  the  wresting  of  the 
Province  of  Panama  from  Colombia  was  as  cred- 
itable an  act  as  is  recorded  in  American  history, 
or  whether  it  was  a  dastardly  political  crime. 
The  first  was  addressed  by  Secretary  Hay  to 


Roosevelt  Took  the  Canal  Zone        2Py 

Secretary    Moody,    and   is    dated   October    lo, 
1902: 

I  have  the  honor  to  acknowledge  tne  receipt  of  your 
letter  of  the  6th  instant,  communicating  copy  of  a 
telegram  from  Rear-Admiral  Casey,  dated  Panama, 
October  5,  in  relation  to  the  protest  of  the  Colombian 
commander,  General  Salazar,  against  any  restriction  of 
the  use  of  the  Panama  Railway  by  the  Government  of 
Colombia  for  transporting  troops  and  munitions  of 
war.  .  .  . 

Inasmuch  as  the  rights  of  the  United  States  upon  the 
Isthmus  in  respect  to  open  and  uninterrupted  transit 
are  specific  and  conventional,  derived  from  a  treaty  be- 
tween the  Governments  of  the  United  States  and 
Colombia  as  principals,  I  am  of  the  opinion  that  Admiral 
Casey  should  be  instructed  to  refrain  from  any  restric- 
tion of  the  right  of  Colombia  to  use  the  road  for  military 
transportation  up  to  the  point  where  such  use  may 
occasion  actual  and  imminent  hostilities  on  the  line  of  the 
road,  or  so  nearly  adjacent  as  to  cause  or  immediately 
threaten  interruption  of  transit. 

According  to  this  communication,  only  the 
transit  was  to  be  maintained  unobstructed. 
There  was  to  be  no  unnecessary  hampering  of 
the  sovereign  in  restoring  order.  The  Govern- 
ment was  not  forbidden  to  land  forces  on  the 
Isthmus.  No  such  right  was  claimed  by  the 
Roosevelt  Administration  in  1902.  The  use  of 
the  railroad  for  conveying  contraband  was  re- 
strained only  as  far  as  was  necessary  to  main- 
tain uninterrupted  transit.     Compare  the  fore- 


3o8  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

going  with  the  following  telegram  of  Acting-Sec- 
retary Darling  to  the  Commander  of  the  Boston, 
dated  November  2,  1903 : 

Proceed  with  all  possible  dispatch  to  Panama.  .  .  . 
Maintain  free  and  uninterrupted  transit.  If  interruption 
is  threatened  by  armed  force  occupy  the  line  of  railroad. 
Prevent  landing  of  any  armed  force,  either  Government 
or  insurgent,  with  hostile  intent  at  any  point  within  50 
miles  of  Panama.  If  doubtful  as  to  the  intention  of  any 
armed  force,  occupy  Ancon  Hill  strongly  with  artil- 
lery. .  .  .  Government  force  reported  approaching  the 
Isthmus  in  vessels.  Prevent  their  landing  if  in  your 
judgment  landing  would  precipitate  a  conflict. 

The  first  communication  was  clearly  designed 
to  reduce  interference  with  traffic  to  a  minimum. 
The  second  and  those  of  similar  import  were 
clearly  sent  for  the  purpose  of  protecting  seces- 
sion. The  first  recognized  the  superior  right  of 
the  sovereign.  The  second  disregarded  the 
fundamental  right  of  sovereignty.  It  and  others 
similar  to  it  dispatched  marines  to  the  Isthmus  to 
take  the  Canal  Zone.  This  conclusion  matches 
with  Roosevelt's  assertion  at  Berkeley,  California, 
'7  took  the  Canal  Zone," 

When  one  country  wrests  property  (territory) 
from  another  by  force,  it  has  been  called  conquest, 
and  the  actors  have  been  called  patriots.  The 
chief  actor  has  been  given  political  preferment 


Roosevelt  Took  the  Canal  Zone        309 

and  has  received  the  adulation  of  the  populace. 
When  an  individual  wrests  property  (land)  from 
another,  we  call  it  theft,  and  send  the  actor  to  the 
penitentiary.  America  ought  to  lead  the  way  in 
the  development  of  a  tradition  which  will  make 
the  former  as  abhorrent  as  the  latter.  To  do  so 
it  must  clear  its  title  to  the  Canal  Zone  of  its 
stain  by  paying  to  Colombia  an  amount  deter- 
mined by  due  process  of  law. 


Chapter  VII 

Acting  as  the  Mandatory  of  Civilization 

Criticism  of  the  method  adopted  to  secure  the 
Canal  Zone  has  not  abated.  Accumulation  of  re- 
liable data  has  converted  suspicion  into  convic- 
tion that  it  was  not  in  harmony  v^ith  the  Golden 
Rule.  The  sifting  and  weighting  of  evidence  is 
not  yet  complete.  It  has  proceeded  far  enough, 
however,  to  show  that  a  perfect  understanding 
existed  between  the  Roosevelt  Administration  and 
the  separatists  of  Panama  through  Bunau-Varilla 
as  the  intermediary.  We  will  set  over  against 
this  conclusion  the  testimony  of  Roosevelt.  In 
the  Outlook  of  October  7,  191 1,  he  writes  in  de- 
fense of  the  course  he  pursued : 

Not  only  was  the  course  followed  as  regards  Panama 
right  in  every  detail  and  at  every  point,  but  there  could 
have  been  no  variation  from  this  course  except  for  the 
worse.  We  not  only  did  what  was  technically  justifiable, 
but  we  did  what  was  demanded  by  every  ethical  con- 
sideration, national  and  international.  We  did  our  duty 
by  the  world,  we  did  our  duty  by  the  people  of  Panama, 
we  did  our  duty  by  ourselves.  We  did  harm  to  no  one 
save  as  harm  is  done  to  a  bandit  by  a  policeman  who  de- 

310 


Acting  as  Mandatory  of  Civilisatiofi     311 

prives  him  of  his  chance  for  blackmail.  The  United 
States  has  many  honorable  chapters  in  its  history,  but  no 
more  honorable  chapter  than  that  which  tells  of  the  way 
in  which  our  right  to  dig  the  Panama  Canal  was  secured. 

Roosevelt  felt  grieved  that  the  course  his  Ad- 
ministration pursued  to  secure  title  to  the  Canal 
Zone  provoked  a  storm  of  criticism.  He  clearly 
expected  his  course  to  be  approved.  In  this  he 
was  disappointed.  Consequently,  his  writings  on 
the  subject  show  an  increasing  bitterness  towards 
his  critics.  In  his  message  to  Congress  on  Jan- 
uary 4,  1904,  he  voices  his  resentment  as  follows : 

I  hesitate  to  refer  to  the  injurious  insinuations  which 
have  been  made  of  complicity  by  this  Government  in  the 
revolutionary  movement  in  Panama.  They  are  as  desti- 
tute of  foundation  as  of  propriety.  The  only  excuse  for 
my  mentioning  them  is  the  fear  lest  unthinking  persons 
might  mistake  for  acquiescence  the  silence  of  mere  self- 
respect.  I  think  proper  to  say,  therefore,  that  no  one 
connected  with  this  Government  had  any  part  in  pre- 
paring, inciting,  or  encouraging  the  late  revolution  on  the 
Isthmus  of  Panama,  and  that  save  from  the  reports  of 
our  military  and  naval  officers,  given  above,  no  one  con- 
nected with  this  Government  had  any  previous  knowl- 
edge of  the  revolution  except  such  as  was  accessible  to 
any  person  of  ordinary  intelligence  who  read  the  news- 
papers and  kept  up  a  current  acquaintance  with  public 
affairs. 

We  know  that  the  Roosevelt  Administration 
was  prepared  to  dismember  Colombia  before  the 
event  and  only  those  who  have  planned  to  do  a 


312  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

thing  can  be  prepared  to  do  it.  There  were 
several  times  as  many  men-of-war  in  Isthmian 
waters  in  November,  1903,  as  in  1902  when  there 
was  a  formidable  revolt  in  three  provinces. 
Therefore,  we  know  that  his  Administration  had 
planned  to  do  what  it  did.  In  his  speech  at  Berke- 
ley, California,  he  boastfully  said:  '7  took  the 
Canal  Zone."  He  has  not  told  us  the  antece- 
dents. They  are,  however,  evident  to  a  critical 
student  of  this  chapter  of  American  history. 

Can  the  method  employed  to  secure  the  Canal 
Zone  be  defended  if  it  should  appear  that  our  Ad- 
ministration acted  as  the  mandatory  of  civiliza- 
tion ?  Is  such  a  defense  possible  ?  The  defenses 
based  on  this  standpoint  predicate  a  system  of 
facts  other  than  those  that  history  is  recording 
with  unerring  accuracy.  Roosevelt  boldly  clairiis 
that  his  Administration  acted  as  the  mandatory 
of  civilization.  In  his  message  to  the  Congress, 
he  expresses  it  as  follows: 

The  possession  of  a  territory  fraught  with  such 
peculiar  capacities  as  the  Isthmus  in  question  carries  with 
it  obligations  to  mankind.  The  course  of  events  has 
shown  that  this  canal  can  not  be  built  by  private  enter- 
prise, or  by  any  other  nation  than  our  own;  therefore  it 
must  be  built  by  the  United  States. 

Every  effort  has  been  made  by  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  to  persuade  Colombia  to  follow  a  course 
which  was  essential  not  only  to  our  interests  and  to  the 


Acting  as  Mandatory  of  Civilisation     313 

interests  of  the  world,  but  to  the  interests  of  Colombia 
itself.  These  efforts  have  failed;  and  Colombia,  by  her 
persistence  in  repulsing  the  advances  that  have  been 
made,  has  forced  us,  for  the  sake  of  our  own  honor,  and 
of  the  interest  and  well-being,  not  merely  of  our  own 
people,  but  of  the  people  of  the  Isthmus  of  Panama  and 
the  people  of  the  civilized  countries  of  the  world,  to  take 
decisive  steps  to  bring  to  an  end  a  condition  of  affairs 
which  had  become  intolerable. 

Roosevelt's  claim  that  his  Administration  acted 
as  the  mandatory  of  civilization  is  specifically  ex- 
pressed in  the  following : 

If  ever  a  Government  could  be  said  to  have  received  a 
mandate  from  civilization  to  effect  an  object  the  accom- 
plishment of  which  was  demanded  in  the  interest '  of 
mankind,  the  United  States  holds  that  position  with  re- 
gard to  the  interoceanic  canal.  Since  our  purpose  to 
build  the  canal  was  definitely  announced,  there  have 
come  from  all  quarters  assurances  of  approval  and  en- 
couragement, in  which  even  Colombia  herself  at  one  time 
participated;  and  to  general  assurances  were  added 
specific  acts  and  declarations.  In  order  that  no  obstacle 
might  stand  in  our  way.  Great  Britain  renounced  im- 
portant rights  under  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  and 
agreed  to  its  abrogation,  receiving  in  return  nothing  but 
our  honorable  pledge  to  build  the  canal  and  protect  it  as 
an  open  highway. 

Another  observation  is  now  apropos.  Our 
Government  took  the  position  that  no  old-world 
power  should  build  the  Canal.  When  it  was  pur- 
posed in  France  to  come  to  the  aid  of  the  Canal 
Company,  the  United  States  Senate  passed  the 
following  resolution: 


314  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

That  the  Government  of  the  United  States  will  look 
with  serious  concern  and  disapproval  upon  any  connec- 
tion of  any  European  Government  with  the  construction 
or  control  of  any  ship  canal  across  the  Isthmus  of  Darien 
or  across  Central  America,  and  must  regard  any  such 
connection  or  control  as  injurious  to  the  just  rights  and 
interests  of  the  United  States  and  as  a  menace  to  their 
welfare. 

This  obligated  the  United  States  to  build  the 
canal.  It  did  not  obligate  her  to  secure  title  to 
the  Canal  Zone  by  force  if  the  orderly  processes 
of  diplomacy  did  not  secure  it  as  promptly  as  she 
desired.  The  obligation  to  build  the  canal  is 
stated  by  Roosevelt  in  the  following : 

Under  the  Hay-Pauncefote  treaty  it  was  explicitly 
provided  that  the  United  States  should  control,  police, 
and  protect  the  canal  which  was  to  be  built,  keeping  it 
open  for  the  vessels  of  all  nations  on  equal  terms.  The 
United  States  thus  assumed  the  position  of  guarantor  of 
the  canal  and  of  its  peaceful  use  by  all  the  world.  The 
guaranty  included  as  a  matter  of  course  the  building  of 
the  canal.  The  enterprise  was  recognized  as  responding 
to  an  international  need. 

The  Roosevelt  Administration  ''took''  the  ter- 
ritory in  which  the  canal  is  located.  We  are 
solemnly  told,  however,  that,  in  so  doing,  it  acted 
as  the  mandatory  of  civilization.  Acting  as  a 
mandatory  is  acting  as  a  trustee.  A  trustee  acts 
within  the  circle  prescribed  by  law.  Colombia 
acted  as  a  mandatory  of  civilization  when  she  of- 


Acting  as  Mandatory  of  Civilisation     315 

fered  to  accept  the  compensation  awarded  by  civ- 
ilization. By  refusing  to  accept  the  award  of  an 
arbitral  tribunal  the  Roosevelt  Administration 
violated  the  rules  prescribed  by  civilization  for  a 
mandatory.  A  peaceful  state  cannot  be  disrupted 
by  one  acting  as  the  mandatory  of  civilization  as 
was  Colombia.  The  Canal  Zone  belonged  to 
Colombia.  Civilization  could  only  demand  rights 
therein  by  paying  the  price  imposed  by  an  impar- 
tial tribunal.  That  is  all  Colombia  asked. 
''Mandatory''  cannot  be  used  as  a  cloak  to  con- 
ceal the  theft  of  the  Canal  Zone. 

Roosevelt  attempted  to  justify  his  summary 
procedure  on  the  Isthmus  on  the  theory  that  civil- 
ization had  the  right  of  transit  across  this 
strategic  zone  on  reasonable  terms.  This  is  not 
denied.  Colombia  has  not  denied  it.  In  short, 
Colombia  solemnly  affirmed  it.  She  merely  de- 
nied the  right  of  Theodore  Roosevelt  to  fix  the 
terms.  She  was  ready — she  offered  to  acquiesce 
in  the  terms  fixed  by  an  impartial  tribunal.  Civil- 
ization had  the  alleged  right  but  its  corollary  is 
the  right  to  fix  the  terms  as  in  the  case  of  domestic 
eminent  domain.  Civilization,  however,  had  a 
right  paramount  to  this  and  that  is  to  have  its 
treaties  obeyed  until  properly  abrogated.  This 
defense  has  no  merit  whatsoever. 


3i6  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

If  our  then  Government  had  acted  as  the  man- 
datory of  civilization,  it  would  have  invoked  the 
aid  of  civilization  to  determine  the  compensation 
to  be  paid  to  Colombia  for  the  right  of  way.  But 
Colombia  proposed  that  the  compensation  for  the 
right  of  way  be  determined  in  this  way.  There- 
fore, Colombia  and  not  our  Government  acted  as 
the  mandatory  of  civilization  in  this  instance.  If 
the  Roosevelt  Administration  acted  as  the  manda- 
tory of  civilization  in  the  canal  venture,  as  al- 
leged, civilization  must  be  given  something  to 
say  in  the  fixing  of  the  terms  for  its  use.  Those 
who  act  as  mandatory  for  a  state  in  the  above 
sense  (public  service  corporations)  must  con- 
form to  the  terms  imposed  by  the  state  as  to  rate 
and  service  and  as  to  the  terms  to  be  paid  for  the 
exercise  of  the  right  of  eminent  domain.  Colom- 
bia agreed  in  advance  to  accept  such  terms. 
Therefore  our  Administration  did  not  act  as  the 
mandatory  of  civilization. 

If  action  as  the  mandatory  of  civilization  is 
warranted,  who  is  to  determine  the  rights  of  the 
nations  in  interest  ?  Is  it  to  be  determined  by  the 
nation  that  is  powerful  or  by  an  arbitral  tribunal 
impartially  selected?  To  ask  the  question  is  to 
answer  it.  Our  Government  did  not  act  as  the 
mandatory  of  civilization.     The  fact  that  Roose- 


Acting  as  Mandatory  of  Civilisation     317 

velt  supported  tolls-exemption  for  our  inter- 
coastal  trade  proves  it.  The  tolls-exemption  pro- 
vision of  the  Panama  Canal  Act  violated  the 
fundamental  provision  of  that  trusteeship  which 
acting  as  the  mandatory  of  civilization  predicates, 
that  is,  a  non-discriminatory  rate  in  the  commer- 
cial use  of  the  canal.  In  short,  our  Government 
essayed  to  practice  in  its  administration  of  an  in- 
ternational utility  v^hat  it  has  made  criminal  if 
practiced  in  the  management  of  a  domestic  util- 
ity. Roosevelt  supported  a  policy  in  the  case  of 
tolls-exemption  that  is  the  very  antithesis  of  con- 
duct that  is  required  of  a  mandatory  of  civiliza- 
tion. 

Acting  as  the  mandatory  of  civilization!  It 
sounds  exalted !  It  is  exalted  if  the  Administra- 
tion that  makes  the  pledge  is  inspired  with  moral 
fervor.  Such  an  Administration  does  not  take  a 
Canal  Zone  by  force  but  obtains  it  by  due  process 
of  law.  Nor  do  those  who  controlled  the  policy 
of  such  an  Administration  advocate  the  grant- 
ing of  a  rebate  or  of  a  rake-off  to  our  inter- 
coastal  shipping  in  the  form  of  free  tolls.  Clearly 
the  claim  that  the  then  Administration  acted  as 
mandatory  for  civilization  is  pretense.  The 
method  adopted  for  fixing  the  price  of  the  privi- 
lege was  not  that  of  a  mandatory — had  absolutely 


3i8  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

nothing  in  common  with  it.  In  the  Outlook  of 
January  i8, 1913,  Roosevelt  comments  on  the  sub- 
mission of  the  tolls-exemption  provisions  of  the 
Panama  Canal  Act  to  arbitration  as  follows : 

I  quite  admit  that  it  would  be  a  difficult  thing  to  get  an 
arbitral  tribunal  which  will  not  have  some  bias  against 
us.  Switzerland  is  almost  the  only  community  which 
has  not  some  commercial  interest  in  the  Panama  Canal. 

If  in  a  little  country  with  a  little  commercial  in- 
terest there  is  not  to  be  found  a  citizen  who  will 
be  just  to  us  in  the  matter  of  tolls,  how  could  the 
author  of  the  foregoing  arrogate  to  himself  the 
capacity  to  be  just  when  his  country  had  an  in- 
finitely larger  interest  at  stake?  In  short,  it 
would  seem  that  he  held  that  he  was  the  vicegerent 
of  the  Lord — anointed  to  dispense  righteousness 
— but  that  in  the  wide,  wide  world  there  was  not 
another  like  unto  him.  Therefore,  his  is  the 
privilege  to  treat  a  treaty  as  a  scrap  of  paper,  to 
kick  the  Constitution  into  the  backyard,  to  treat 
international  and  statute  law  as  forgotten  lore 
and  to  consign  to  the  Ananias  Club  those  who 
differ  with  him. 

Scott,  a  critical  and  impartial  writer,  says  in 
his  book  on  "The  Americans  in  Panama" : 

We  have  the  admission  of  the  President  himself  that 
he  abandoned  the  regular  diplomatic  methods  of  securing 


Acting  as  Mandatory  of  Civilisation     319 

the  territory  needed  for  building-  a  canal  in  favor  of  the 
primitive  method  of  taking  it  by  force.  This  leads  to 
the  admission  that  we  set  up  the  Republic  of  Panama 
merely  to  make  an  otherwise  bald  steal  appear  to  bear 
some  evidence  of  justification.  .  .  . 

President  Roosevelt  exerted  the  full  capacity  of  his 
versatile  mind  to  cloud  the  situation,  so  that  the  moral 
sense  of  the  people  would  not  be  aroused,  until  it  would 
be  too  late  to  undo  his  act. 

He  pretended  that  the  treatment  Panama  had  received, 
as  a  kind  of  stepchild  of  Colombia,  warranted  the  same 
kind  of  action  we  took  in  Cuba.  His  Secretary  of  State 
advanced  the  strained  construction  of  our  solemn  treaty 
with  Colombia  that  we  were  under  obligations  to  main- 
tain the  neutrality  of  the  Panama  Railroad,  and  so  pre- 
vent the  soldiers  of  Colombia  from  striking  down  the 
revolution.  The  President  further  recognized  the  inde- 
pendence of  the  Republic,  and  insisted  that  it  was  an  act 
as  disinterested,  for  instance,  as  our  recognition  of  the 
new  Republic  of  China.  In  truth,  they  bear  no  similarity 
of  feature.  ... 

In  Panama  the  masses  of  the  people  not  only  did  not 
know  about  the  revolution  until  it  had  passed,  but  no 
more  than  an  ordinary  mob,  such  as  may  be  aroused  on 
an  hour's  notice  in  any  city,  participated  in  it. 

It  was  not  necessary  that  the  people  of  Panama  should 
know  about  it.  The  United  States  had  agreed  to  stand 
between  the  clique  of  Panaman  financiers  and  any  offen- 
sive act  Colombia  might  undertake.  Undoubtedly  there 
had  been  popular  uprisings  against  Colombia  in  Panama, 
but  the  revolution  of  November  3,  1903,  was  not  one  of 
them.  .  .  . 

The  rightful  owner  of  the  territory  we  desired  for  a 
canal  was  Colombia.  When  we  took  that  territory  we 
took  it  from  Colombia.  The  way  we  took  it  was  to 
participate  in  a  bogus  revolution,  engineered  by  a  Junta 
of  wealthy  Panaman  business  and  professional  men.  It 
turned  out  that  the  part  they  played  in  making  the  revo- 


320  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

lution  a  success  was  farcical,  while  the  part  the  United 
States  marines  played  was  vital.  .  .  . 

If  any  American  railroad  should  desire  property  for 
a  right  of  way  and,  instead  of  condemning  it  by  due  proc- 
ess of  law,  should  connive  with  a  neighbor  to  falsely 
claim  possession  of  the  property  and  then  buy  the  prop- 
erty from  the  illegal  owner,  the  action  not  iDuly  would 
not  stand  in  law,  but  it  would  outrage  public  opinion. 
That  precisely  is  the  course  we  followed  at  Panama. 
President  Roosevelt  did  not  dare  to  take  the  property  out- 
right from  Colombia,  the  compensation  to  be  fixed  by 
due  process  afterwards,  but  connived  with  a  revolu- 
tionary Junta,  through  his  Secretary  of  State,  to  have 
the  property  claimed  by  a  Republic  to  be  set  up  specific- 
ally for  that  purpose,  which  Republic  would  sell  the 
property  to  the  United  States.  .  .  . 

But  it  ought  to  be  set  down  as  a  maxim  of  canal 
management,  if  not  of  national  policy,  that  no  neighbor 
of  the  canal  should  be  allowed  to  remain  on  bad  terms 
with  the  Americans.  It  is  not  good  that  a  nation  so 
near  as  Colombia  should  be  in  a  hostile  frame  of  mind 
toward  the  United  States.  This  is  true,  not  so  much  for 
what  a  sense  of  injustice  rankling  in  the  minds  of  her 
citizens  might  precipitate,  but  because,  if  anything 
happened  to  the  canal,  Colombia,  in  the  event  blame  was 
not  promptly  fixed,  inevitably  would  have  to  bear  the 
burden  of  our  suspicion. 

But,  ultimately,  the  question  of  reparation  must  rest 
squarely  upon  a  moral  issue.  It  is  not  so  much  the 
rights  of  Colombia  that  should  impel  us  to  an  act  of 
reparation  as  a  desire  to  live  up  to  our  own  best  instincts. 
The  American  ideal  is  something  far  different  from  law- 
compelled  righteousness;  it  rises  to  the  grandeur  of 
righteousness  for  the  sake  of  righteousness.  Colombia 
suffered  materially  by  our  act,  and  an  enlightened  judg- 
ment would  be  that  we  suffer  most. 


Acting  as  Mandatory  of  Civilization     321 

Is  it  compatible  with  the  dignity  of  a  great  nation  like 
the  United  States  to  reverse  its  position  by  making 
reparation?  This  question  more  properly  should  read, 
Is  it  compatible  with  the  pride  of  a  great  nation  like  the 
United  States  to  make  reparation?  The  answer  is: 
The  United  States  has  no  dignity  to  uphold.  It  may 
restore  its  dignity  and  sense  of  righteousness  only  by 
reversing  its  willful  and  headstrong  action.  We  merely 
play  the  ostrich  in  sticking  our  head  in  the  sand  of  the 
Panama  revolution  and  fancy  our  action  is  hid.  .  .  . 

Those  Americans  who  balk  at  the  prospect  of  a  large 
money  indemnity  to  Colombia,  for  taking  Panama, 
should  ask  themselves  whether  any  mere  love  of  lucre 
should  stand  between  us  and  a  clear  conscience.  The 
situation  in  which  we  are  involved  may  cost  dearly  to 
straighten  out,  but  that  is  the  inevitable  price,  in  the 
individual  or  national  life,  of  walking  in  the  paths  of 
unrighteousness.  The  Colombian  claim  is  a  call  to  arms 
between  the  forces  of  good  and. evil  in  the  American 
national  character.  Do  we  stand  at  Armageddon,  and 
do  we  battle  for  the  Lord? 

Our  action  in  the  matter  of  reparation  to 
Colombia  will  tell  where  we  stand.  We  may 
preach  righteousness  from  the  housetops  and 
chant  holy — holy,  but  if  we  do  not  repent  of  the 
wrong  we  did  Colombia,  we  do  not  stand  at 
Armageddon  and  battle  for  the  Lord. 

American  public  opinion  would  have  insisted 
that  we  secure  the  Canal  Zone  by  lawful  means 
instead  of  by  warships  if  it  had  been  consulted. 
It  would  now  demand  that  adequate  reparation 


2^22  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

be  made  to  Colombia  if  it  were  informed — if  it 
knew  that  our  Administration  actually  sand- 
bagged Colombia  and  wrested  the  Province  of 
Panama  from  her  by  force. 

There  are  wrongs,  however,  which  cannot  be 
righted.  This  is  one  of  them.  The  strategic 
Isthmus  wrested  from  Colombia  by  the  display  of 
force  cannot  be  restored  to  her.  Too  many  newly 
created  vested  interests  forbid.  We  must,  how- 
ever, atone  for  the  political  crime  of  the  Roose- 
velt Administration  by  paying  the  penalty  im- 
posed by  an  impartial  tribunal. 

What  we  did  on  the  Isthmus  cannot  be  undone. 
There  can  be  no  adequate  reparation  for  the  wil- 
ful dismemberment  of  another  country  if  the  part 
wrested  from  her  is  set  up  as  an  independent 
State.  There  can,  however,  be  disavowal  of  the 
act  and  compensation  for  loss  suffered. 

If  the  Roosevelt  Administration  did  not  wrong 
Colombia,  why  not  let  an  impartial  arbitral 
tribunal  record  the  fact?  That  would  be  conduct 
becoming  a  mandatory  of  civilization.  If  wrong 
is  done  it  is  nobler  to  make  reparation  than  to  let 
history  record  it  as  an  unrequited  injury  done  to 
a  small  state  by  one  pretending  disinterestedness 
and  exalted  moral  purpose.  We  are  in  full  ac- 
cord with  the  following  excerpt  from  an  editorial 


Acting  as  Mandatory  of  Civilization     323 

which  appeared  in  the  New  York  World  on  Jan- 
uary 2y,  1912: 

If  Colombia  has  no  claim  to  indemnity,  that  fact  will 
be  established  by  a  full  and  fair  investigation.  If 
Colombia  has  a  claim,  that  claim  ought  to  be  satisfied. 
No  other  course  is  compatible  with  the  honor  and 
integrity  of  the  American  people.  Whether  the  contro- 
versy is  to  be  settled  by  a  congressional  investigation  or 
referred  to  The  Hague  tribunal  is  a  matter  of  detail. 
The  important  thing  is  that  this  international  scandal  be 
disposed  of  for  all  time  before  the  canal  is  opened,  and 
that  no  stain  be  left  upon  the  American  title.  Congress 
owes  that  to  the  country,  and  the  country  owes  that  to 
itself. 

Colombia  is  embittered — is  estranged.  Sus- 
picion and  coldness  are  now  enthroned  where  con- 
fidence dwelt.  It  is  difficult  to  restore  the  former 
cordial  relations.  It  could  easily  have  been  main- 
tained. It  merely  required  that  our  Government 
act  within  the  circle  prescribed  by  the  law  of  na- 
tions to  secure  the  Canal  Zone.  This  it  failed  to 
do.  It  has  lowered  our  standing  in  the  family  of 
nations. 

In  the  parliament  of  nations,  influence  is  more 
and  more  being  determined  by  character.  Char- 
acter is  the  product  of  material  and  spiritual  de- 
velopment. It  is  stained  by  robbing  others  under 
the  pretext  of  an  opera  bouffe  revolution.  Our 
Administration  will  be  held  responsible  when  this 


324  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

dark  chapter  of  American  diplomatic  history  is 
fully  recorded.  It  behooves  such  Americans  as 
love  truth  and  justice  to  demand  that  we  officially 
disavow  this  act  and  make  reparation  to  Colom- 
bia. 

In  1906,  Secretary  Root  visited  Latin- American 
countries.  One  of  the  purposes  of  this  visit  was 
to  make : 

A  frank  avowal  of  national  policy  and  sentiment  in  the 
relations  of  the  United  States  with  the  countries  of  Latin 
America,  to  remove  the  unfavorable  impressions  at  that 
time  widely  prevailing  and  so  bring  about  unity  of 
thought  and  feeling  among  all  the  nations  of  this 
continent. 

If  this  visit  had  been  preceded  by  an  act  of  jus- 
tice to  Colombia,  the  reception  would  not  have 
been  dimmed  by  misgivings.  Latin  America 
would  have  known  that  the  profession  of  good- 
will was  backed  by  deeds.  As  it  was,  they  knew 
that  Uncle  Sam  could  bear  the  visage  of  a  parson 
while  playing  the  role  of  a  bandit.  We  have  an 
observation  concerning  the  visit  to  the  Argentine 
Republic  in  the  following: 

After  his  first  public  utterances  in  the  capital  of  the 
Argentine  Republic,  it  became  evident  that  the  ex- 
planation of  the  presence  of  the  Secretary  of  State  of  the 
United  States  was  to  be  found  in  the  simple  desire  of  his 
country  to  cultivate  closer  and  more  friendly  intercourse 


Acting  as  Mandatory  of  Civilisation    325 

with  the  other  independent  States  of  America.  It  was 
seen  that  Secretary  Root  represented  that  America  of 
which  the  Argentine  people  had  seen  httle  and  heard  less ; 
the  America  that  thinks  on  the  lines  laid  down  by  the  Pil- 
grim Fathers ;  the  America  that  is  not  all  push  and  com- 
mercial activity  but  ....  a  powerful  section  of  the  vast 
population  governed  by  nobler  impulses  and  the  higher 
ranges  of  thought.  An  entire  revulsion  of  feeling  set  in 
and  one  of  the  greatest  triumphs  of  diplomacy  of  modem 
times  was  achieved. 

International  good-will  cannot  be  called  into 
being  with  a  magician's  wand.  Legerdemain 
cannot  create  it.  Mere  professions  of  a  distin- 
guished visitor  cannot  blot  out  an  unrepented  and 
unrequited  crime.  Good-will  is  the  product  of 
just  conduct — of  square  dealing — of  actual  deeds 
and  not  of  professions.  It  is  the  product  of  in- 
sight— of  correct  conduct  based  on  insight.  Only 
by  correct  conduct  can  we  restore  our  prestige  in 
Spanish- America. 

In  1903,  our  Administration  took  the  Canal 
Zone  by  the  prerogative  of  acting  outside  of  the 
law  of  nations  in  order  to  expedite  an  enterprise 
which  would  be  of  inestimable  benefit  to  collective 
civilization.  Spanish-America  knew  it  at  the 
time  of  the  Root  sojourn  among  them.  They 
knew  that  the  Administration  of  which  he  was 
then  a  part  had  treated  an  international  covenant 
as  a  scrap  of  paper. 


326  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

We  should  square  our  conduct  with  our  profes- 
sions before  proffering  friendship  to  Spanish- 
America.  Until  we  atone  for  the  rape  of  Colom- 
bia, our  proffer  of  friendship  is  an  affront.  It 
retards  the  growth  of  public  law.  Every  country 
is  menaced  when  obedience  to  public  law  is  flouted 
by  the  strong.  It  imperils  the  ''age's  slow-bought 
gain."  Obedience  to  public  law  is  not  altruism 
— the  world's  interest  is  our  interest.  Solidarity 
is  a  growing  fact.  Gains  therefrom  are  recipro- 
cal. The  United  States  ought  to  practice  obedi- 
ence to  public  law  and  solemn  engagements.  Then 
she  will  be  in  a  position  to  carry  the  message  of 
good-will  to  Spanish-America  without  an  affront 
to  its  intelligence. 

Never  before  had  an  American  Administration 
acted  on  the  principle  that  its  own  convenience 
took  precedence  of  a  solemn  engagement  and  of 
the  law  of  nations.  The  international  situation 
produced  thereby  cannot  be  permitted  to  become 
immutable  history.  To  do  so  is  to  aflirm  the  prin- 
ciple that  a  weak  nation  has  no  rights  that  a  strong 
nation  need  respect  if  it  contravenes  the  latter's 
convenience.  It  is  the  negation  of  the  finest  fruit 
of  civilization. 

In  order  that  a  treaty  may  be  a  vital  force,  it 
must  be  conformed  to  in  letter  and  in  spirit.    Not 


Acting  as  Mandatory  of  Civilisation     327 

only  no  way  of  escape  from  its  plain  intent  must 
be  sought  but  the  parties  in  interest  must  so  act 
that  other  peoples  cannot  misconstrue  their  intent. 
It  is  not  enough  that  motives  be  right.  The 
United  States  ought  to  act  so  that  others  cannot 
mistake  its  righteous  purpose.  This  the  United 
States  failed  to  do  in  her  pursuit  of  a  title  to  the 
Canal  Zone.  It  avails  her  nothing  to  pretend  to 
be  guided  by  the  morals  of  a  parson  until  she  has 
repented  of  her  conduct  as  a  bandit. 

There  can  be  no  doubt  in  the  mind  of  informed 
persons  that  the  Roosevelt  Administration  col- 
laborated with  separatists  in  Panama  to  dismem- 
ber Colombia  for  the  purpose  of  securing  a  degree 
of  control  over  the  Canal  Zone  that  Colombia  was 
loath  to  grant.  In  this  she  violated  those  rules  of 
fairness,  reason,  and  justice  which  are  the  crown- 
ing achievement  of  modern  civilization.  It  was 
the  act  of  their  agent  and  not  the  will  of  the 
American  people.  Unless  the  act  is  repudiated 
and  reparation  is  made  to  Colombia,  it  will,  how- 
ever, become  their  act. 

Seiior  S.  Perez  Triana,  in  a  letter  addressed  to 
President  Concha  of  Colombia,  published  in  the 
New  York  Times  of  December  13,  19 14,  states 
the  position  of  Spanish-America  with  clearness 
and  force.     We  will  quote  from  it  at  length : 


328  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

The  United  States,  while  preventing  the  conquest  of 
American  territory  by  European  nations,  has  not  been 
logical  nor  honest;  it  has  not  respected  the  essential 
equity  of  the  principle,  for  it  has  conquered  territory  by 
violating  the  sovereignty  of  other  American  nations. 

In  the  policy  of  the  White  House  there  has  become 
apparent  a  marked  change  regarding  Latin  America.  A 
good  man  has  come  into  power,  one  whose  honest 
conscience  makes  no  compromises  with  iniquity  and  re- 
fuses to  bow  to  the  historical  and  universal  doctrine  that 
it  is  allowable  for  a  nation  to  do  collectively  what  for  an 
individual  would  be  criminal. 

Mr.  Wilson  has  proclaimed  from  the  lofty  position 
which  he  occupies  that  the  moral  law  for  a  statesman,  as 
for  the  individual,  should  be  justice,  not  expediency. 
The  statesman  of  the  entire  world,  shackled  to  the  Gov- 
ernmental tradition  of  all  historical  epochs  and  stupefied 
before  such  audacity,  called  him  a  dreamer,  not  daring 
to  call  him  a  traitor. 

President  Wilson  has  not  confined  himself  to  words; 
he  has  passed  on  to  action.  He  gave  proof  of  this  to  his 
fellow-citizens  when,  appealing  to  the  national  honor,  he 
obtained  the  repeal  of  the  law  regarding  Panama  tolls, 
which  was  based  on  expediency,  not  justice.  And  it  was 
the  same  in  Colombia  with  the  treaty  of  April  6  of  this 
year,  which  made  good  the  injury  done  to  the  Republic 
of  Colombia  by  the  Administration  of  Roosevelt  in  so 
far  as  it  lay  within  human  power  so  to  do. 

The  Monroe  Doctrine,  which  has  been  our  defense 
against  European  conquest,  did  not  prevent  our 
spoliation.  Up  to  now  the  United  States  has  not  carried 
this  doctrine  to  its  extreme  limit  of  logical  development, 
viz.  the  prohibition  of  conquest,  which  is  robbery  and 
spoliation,  explicitly  as  such,  no  matter  who  may  perpe- 
trate it — an  American  republic,  a  European  monarchy, 
or  a  European  republic. 

Already  things  are  changing.  At  Mobile,  in  October 
of  last  year,  President  Wilson  declared,  in  the  name  of 


Acting  as  Mandatory  of  Civilization     329 

the  United  States,  that  the  latter  would  not  in  future 
acquire  territory  on  the  American  continent  by  means  of 
war  or  conquest.  Wilson  has  as  good  a  right  to  speak 
in  behalf  of  his  country  as  had  Monroe.  The  value  of 
this  promise  of  Wilson,  its  transcendental  importance, 
what  it  means  as  a  victory  for  the  principles  of  inter- 
national justice,  may  be  measured,  just  as  temperature 
is  measured  by  a  thermometer,  by  the  hysterical  and 
clamorous  rage  which  it  aroused  in  Roosevelt,  the  apostle 
of  imperialism,  the  butcher  of  Colombia. 

The  opportunity  which  now  presents  itself  is  pro- 
pitious for  obtaining  from  the  United  States  a  solemn 
ratification  of  the  principle  laid  down  by  President 
Wilson  at  Mobile.  If  anywhere  there  is  ill-feeling 
toward  the  United  States  on  account  of  the  past,  to  allow 
it  to  impair  judgment  would  be  an  unpardonable  mistake, 
now  that  Wilson  has  erased  the  past.  If  the  personal 
and  historical  elements  offered  by  the  present  time  are 
not  utilized  a  deplorable  error,  whose  results  are  beyond 
calculation,  will  have  been  committed. 

A  Monroe  Doctrine  carried  to  the  extreme  limit  of  its 
logical  development,  which  will  defend  the  continent,  as 
it  has  in  the  past,  against  the  voracity  of  Europe,  which 
will  tie  the  hands  both  of  Yankee  imperialism  and  of  the 
shameful  and  treacherous  imperialisms  already  arising 
in  Latin  America — there  would  be  an  element  of  tre- 
mendous import  in  achieving  peace  and  progress  for  all 
the  American  Continent. 

This  end  can  be  achieved  at  the  Pan-American 
Congress  about  to  meet  at  Santiago  de  Chile;  there  the 
necessary  agreement  between  the  nations  of  America 
should  be  adopted.  Without  doubt  it  will  be  necessary 
to  ratify  this  by  means  of  special  agreements  among  the 
various  Governments.  Some  nations — let  us  hope  not — 
might  oppose  the  moral  guaranteeing  of  the  territorial 
inviolability  of  each  and  all  of  the  American  nations  by 
each  and  all  of  the  rest.  This  would  reveal  the  existence, 
in  the  countries  making  such  opposition,  of  brands  of 


330  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

greed  and  cupidity  which  it  would  be  well  at  all  events 
to  lay  bare. 

The  personal  elements  of  the  present  hour  are  de- 
cisive; the  delegates  from  the  United  States  to  the  Pan- 
American  Congress  cannot  contradict  nor  fail  to  support 
the  principles  so  gallantly  proclaimed  before  the  world 
by  President  Wilson  at  Mobile.  The  ratification  of  this 
in  the  form  set  forth  above  would  be  an  obstacle  in  the 
path  of  imperialistic  attempts  in  case  the  old  tendency 
should  again  gain  the  upper  hand  in  the  United  States 
under  Roosevelt  or  some  other  like  him. 

The  Latin-American  nations  proclaiming  the  principle 
of  international  justice — that  the  sovereignty  of  the 
Latin-American  nations  cannot  be  violated  by  another  or 
others  of  these  nations,  nor  by  the  nations  of  other 
continents — dignifying  thus  the  Monroe  Doctrine  and 
completing  its  moral  integrity  would,  I  hold,  do  a  great 
work  in  the  cause  of  justice,  liberty,  and  democracy,  so 
grievously  threatened  in  this  black  and  turbulent  hour  of 
war  and  extermination  in  Europe. 

I  respectfully  ask  that  you  raise  the  banner  of  this 
noble  idea  in  order  that  the  delegates  from  Colombia  may 
present  it,  in  the  name  of  our  country,  before  the  coming 
Pan-American  Congress. 

There  will  be  some,  and  you  will  hear  them,  Mr.  Presi- 
dent, who  will  tell  you  and  the  republic  that  the  most  that 
may  be  attained  will  be  a  treaty  signed  by  all  the  nations 
of  North,  Central,  and  South  America,  but  that  this  will 
not  benefit  us  in  the  least,  because,  when  it  may  suit  the 
convenience  of  the  strong  in  the  future,  that  treaty  will 
be  torn  to  bits  just  as  was  the  treaty  between  Colombia 
and  the  United  States.  They  will  tell  you  that  to  put 
faith  in  written  words  and  in  signatures  of  nations,  after 
Germany  has  ground  under  her  horses'  heels  the  com- 
pacts, signed  by  all  Europe,  making  Luxemburg  and 
Belgium  neutral,  and  called  them  "scraps  of  paper,"  is 
an  unpardonable  piece  of  childishness.  They  will  tell 
you  that  the  only  strength  is  that  of  the  sword,  that  the 


Acting  as  Mandatory  of  Civilization     331 

only  voice  to  which  the  world  listens  is  the  voice  of 
cannon.  To  such  men  I  make  answer  that  theirs  is  the 
eternal  doctrine  of  Draconians  and  demagogues  for  ob- 
structing the  evolution  of  justice. 

We,  the  weak,  have  only  right  for  a  shield ;  if  we  our-» 
selves  make  haste  to  discredit  right  we  play  into  the  hands 
of  its  violators  and  show  them  the  road.  If  right  is  van- 
quished, it  is  not  for  us  to  cover  it  with  the  mud  of  vitu- 
peration and  mockery,  but  to  raise  it  up  from  the  dust 
high,  very  high,  as  the  Redeemer  raised  His  Cross,  so  that 
it  may  be  a  beacon  lighting  up  men's  consciences. 

To  submit  voluntarily  and  prematurely  to  deceit  and 
violence  is  to  make  ourselves  deserving  of  the  yoke  of 
slavery ;  it  is,  moreover,  a  crime  against  our  native  land. 
We  have  not  the  right  to  be  cowards  in  advance. 

We  have  neither  sword  nor  cannon;  let  us  then  rally 
to  the  right,  in  the  firm  conviction  that  right  must 
triumph  in  the  end. 

This  shows  hov^  Colombia  feels.  It  also  shows 
that  the  feeling  of  apprehension  on  the  part  of  the 
small  Latin-American  states  is  warranted.  It 
can  only  be  allayed  by  voluntarily  making  repara- 
tion to  Colombia.  Will  the  people  of  the  United 
States  deny  justice  to  Colombia  because  they  have 
the  physical  prowess  to  resist  the  promptings  of 
the  still  small  voice  within  which  urges  them  to 
repent  ? 

The  United  States  should  cooperate  whole 
heartedly  in  carrying  out  the  foregoing  sugges- 
tion that  the  principles  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
be  made  Pan-American.     Our  country  can  not 


332  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

expect  to  be  as  influential  as  it  would  be  in  cre- 
ating a  tradition  favorable  to  peace  and  justice  in 
the  Western  Hemisphere  if  it  insists  on  exclusive 
responsibility  for  the  maintenance  of  the  afore- 
mentioned policy. 

The  United  States  ought  to  do  right  because 
it  is  right  and  not  because  it  pays.  If  to  do  right 
also  pays,  the  argument  for  justice  is  reenforced. 
To  grant  justice  to  Colombia  will  pay.  We  quote 
from  Granger's  article  in  the  Independent,  "The 
Stain  of  Our  Flag'': 

As  Mr.  Barrett  said,  settlement  with  Colombia  would 
be  simply  bread  cast  on  the  waters  of  Latin-American 
trade,  which  would  come  back  to  us  in  short  order  in  the 
increased  commerce  that  would  result  from  the  good  feel- 
ing engendered. 

Since  the  "secession"  Colombia  has  had  as  its  motto 
"Peace  and  Work."  Its  government  is  representative  of 
both  political  parties.  Reyes  began  its  regeneration — 
he  doubled  the  price  of  Colombia's  bonds  on  the  London 
Exchange,  put  the  army  to  work  on  the  roads,  and  paid 
the  salaries  of  the  employees,  as  well  as  trebling  the 
number  of  schools.  Gonzales  Valencia,  who  succeeded 
Reyes,  kept  up  the  good  work.  Now  President  Restrepo 
has  placed  the  country's  credit  higher  than  ever  and 
shown  a  most  creditable  record. 

Colombia's  worst  drawback  is  her  fiat  money,  a  relic 
of  the  days  of  the  civil  war  (1899-1902)  that  all  agree 
shall  be  her  last.  With  this  redeemed  and  the  currency 
on  a  gold  basis,  she  would  soon  be  prosperous  indeed. 
Colombia  is  a  country  of  infinite  natural  resources  and 


Acting  as  Mandatory  of  Civilisation    333 

industrious  inhabitants,  and  a  brilliant  future  awaits  her 
as  soon  as  the  curse  of  valueless  paper  is  removed.  The 
prosperity  which  resulted  in  Argentina  when  the  basic 
element  of  circulating  medium  was  supplied  will  follow 
as  surely  in  Colombia. 

A  payment  to  Colombia  of  $25,000,000  and  a  new 
treaty  of  friendship  and  commerce,  would  be  an  excellent 
investment  for  us,  and  would  completely  wipe  out  the 
smirch  on  our  honor. 

Granger  quotes  a  New  York  merchant  as  fol- 
lows : 

On  account  of  the  feeling  against  us  in  Latin  America 
because  of  the  Panama  affair  we  have  lost  in  trade  more 
than  the  whole  canal  will  cost. 

The  views  of  the  writer  are  clearly  expressed 
in  the  following  taken  from  a  metropolitan  daily : 

Our  people  have  not  yet  appreciated  how  much  we 
need,  and  would  profit  by  closer  friendship  and  fuller 
understanding  with  the  peoples  of  the  other  American 
republics.  Every  one  of  the  efforts  now  being  made  to 
bring  those  peoples  nearer  to  us,  to  understand  more 
completely  their  point  of  view,  their  history,  their  Htera- 
ture,  their  institutions,  and  every  effort  to  break  down 
the  barrier  of  language  which  separates  us,  deserves  the 
heartiest  support.  The  relation  we  seek  with  them  is  not 
a  relation  in  which  we  are  to  exercise  power,  but  one  in 
which  we  and  they  together  are  to  exercise  an  influence 
that  is  higher  and  better  than  mere  power,  because  it  is 
the  outgrowth  of  our  common  devotion  to  democratic 
institutions  and  our  complete  and  sympathetic  under- 
standing of  what  the  very  word  "America"  typifies  and 
signifies. 


334  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

Our  Government  should  not  leave  a  word  un- 
said or  an  act  undone  that  is  necessary  to  make 
full,  complete,  and  ungrudging  reparation  to  Co- 
lombia. It  would  give  us  that  influence  in  the 
councils  of  the  Western  Hemisphere  to  which  we 
should  aspire.  Last  and  least  it  would  pay  in  dol- 
lars and  cents.  Latin  America  will  soon  have  a 
population  of  100,000,000.  Their  growth  in  pop- 
ulation will  continue.  Their  respect,  esteem,  and 
confidence  is  worth  more  than  its  pecuniary  cost. 
Ex-Minister  Du  Bois  has  well  said : 

The  time  is  not  distant  when  Latin  America  will  have 
a  hundred  million  of  people,  inspired  by  new  conditions 
of  national  and  commercial  life.  Those  now  living  feel 
that  the  Panama  incident  is  the  only  real  injustice  com- 
mitted by  the  United  States  against  the  Latin- American 
people.  The  Treaty  will  correct  that  feeling  and  greatly 
change  the  sentiment  that  is  now  running  heavily  against 
us  in  all  South  America,  and  place  this  country  and 
Colombia  upon  that  friendly  footing  so  greatly  desired 
by  the  people  of  both  nations. 

Spanish-America  is  suspicious  of  ultimate 
American  intentions.  It  is  not  without  reason. 
It  is  well  expressed  in  the  following  newspaper 
clipping  which  was  taken  from  Eder's  book  on 
Colombia : 

Even  in  this  enlightened  age  every  nation  seems  to 
have  a  bugaboo  of  an  impending  foreign  enemy — 
England,  Germany;  the  United  States,  Japan,  and  so 
forth.     So  Colombians  dread  a  Yankee  attempt,  sooner 


Acting  as  Mandatory  of  Civilization     335 

or  later,  to  overpower  South  America  and  believe  their 
land  to  be  the  outpost  which  will  be  first  attacked.  They 
have  already  felt  the  talon  of  the  Eagle ;  they  have  a  hys- 
terical dread  that  the  voracious  bird  will  again  swoop 
down  upon  their  country.  Hysterical  is  the  only  word. 
Suspicion  of  the  designs  of  the  American  Government  is 
carried  to  absurd  limits;  innocent  provisions  for  coaling 
rights;  a  proposed  treaty,  or  steps  by  American  com- 
panies to  acquire  tracts  of  land  for  timber  or  mining  in 
certain  sections,  or  purely  commercial,  railroad  or  bank- 
ing projects  are  misconstrued  to  be  an  opening  wedge; 
even  prospecting  American  engineers  have  been  suspected 
of  being  secret  spies. 

And  Americans  have  only  themselves  to  blame.  Ever 
since  the  annexation  of  Texas,  and  the  Mexican  War, 
there  has  been  latent  fear  of  Yankee  aggression  among 
the  Latin-American  peoples  and  a  certain  dislike  of  the 
Gringos.  The  events  of  1903,  in  the  ruthless  seizure 
by  President  Roosevelt  of  the  coveted  Panama  Canal 
strip  and  Colombia's  humiliation  at  having  her  protests 
and  demands  for  redress  ignored  have  carried  this  fear 
and  this  dislike  to  a  high  pitch.  .  .  . 

The  United  States  has  been  almost  blind  to  the  disas- 
trous consequences  to  itself,  both  political  and  commer- 
cial, of  the  gross  injustice  that  was  committed  and  the 
policy  of  indifference  it  has  since  pursued.  It  is  not  Co- 
lombia alone  that  has  been  affected ;  the  shock  of  the  tak- 
ing of  Panama  was  felt  throughout  Spanish  America;  a 
quiver  of  indignation  ran  through  the  southern  conti- 
nent, causing  spasmodic  outbursts  of  anti-American  feel- 
ing which  have  proved  detrimental  to  the  best  commer- 
cial interests  of  the  United  States  and  favorable  to  Euro- 
pean trade,  and  which  have  hampered  American  diplo- 
macy. 

Shall  we  have  an  ''Italia  Irredenta*'  bordering 
the  canal  littoral?     Shall  we  allow  an  Alsace- 


336  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

Lorraine  revanche  festering  to  the  south  of  this 
beneficent  enterprise  ?  It  is  for  our  Senate  to  de- 
termine.    We  read  in  the  Norfolk  Landmark: 

The  Republic  of  Colombia  has  adopted  as  an  official 
history  a  work  which  accuses  the  United  States  of  crim- 
inal intent  in  procuring  the  secession  of  Panama.  .  .  . 

It  is  said  that  each  child  in  the  Colombian  public 
schools  will  be  required  to  memorize  the  chapter  dealing 
with  the  secession  of  Panama.  This  will  mean  that  the 
republic  will  foster  for  years,  if  not  forever,  a  spirit  of 
antagonism  toward  the  United  States.  This  country 
cannot  afford  to  have  such  enmities  in  South  America. 
Panama  itself  is  hardly  worth  the  price. 

Elsewhere  we  find  the  very  essence  of  Colom- 
bia's indictment  of  our  moral  perfidy  and  how  it 
is  propagated.     It  reads: 

The  Colombian  Republic  was  physically  unable  to  pre- 
vent the  success  of  the  conspiracy  by  which  Uncle  Samf^ 
deprived  it  of  the  state  of  Panama.  But  it  is  apparently 
intelligent  enough  to  understand  the  modus  operandi  of 
the  game,  and  nervy  enough  to  tell  about  it  upon  all 
proper  occasions.  It  has  even  recently  gone  to  the  length 
of  providing  its  public  schools  with  histories  which  teach 
and  thoroughly  expose  the  wretched  part  played  by  the 
Washington  administration  in  fomenting  a  fake  rebel- 
lion on  the  Isthmus,  and  in  treacherously  lending  its  war- 
ships to  the  service  of  the  seceders.  Not  only  this,  but 
in  terms  and  by  name  do  these  school  books  outline  the 
perfidy  of  Theodore  Roosevelt,  who,  as  President,  was 
responsible  for  the  fact,  and  who  outraged  the  first  prin- 
ciple of  international  comity,  and  far  exceeded  his  right- 
ful jurisdiction  by  actively  exerting  himself  in  aid  of  the 
shameless  robbery  of  a  sister  Republic. 


Acting  as  Mandatory  of  Civilization     337 

Colombia's  wrongs  cry  to  heaven  for  redress. 
They  must  not  be  perpetuated.  Right  should  be 
the  unsullied  watchword  of  the  United  States. 
Colombia  asks  for  justice.  She  does  not  ask  for 
the  impossible.  Her  people  do  not  blame  the  peo- 
ple of  the  United  States.  Her  statesmen  respect 
our  statesmen  and  admire  Woodrow  Wilson. 
They  blame  Roosevelt.  They  know  that  he  and 
not  the  American  people  willed  Colombia's  hu- 
miliation. They  merely  ask  for  justice.  If  this 
is  granted,  they  will  again  extend  to  us  the  right 
hand  of  fellowship.  It  is  well  expressed  by  one 
of  her  great  men,  Triana.  The  New  York  Times 
of  June  6,  191 5,  printed  portions  of  an  address  of 
his  with  the  following  summary  of  it : 

During  the  recent  Pan-American  Conference  at  Wash- 
ington Mr.  Santiago  Perez  Triana  of  Colombia  delivered 
an  address  on  the  necessity  for  Americans,  North  and 
South,  letting  the  rest  of  the  world  understand  plainly 
that  the  Western  Hemisphere  is  to  he  retained  hy  Ameri- 
cans and  is  not  to  he  permitted  to  he  made  the  victim  of 
territory  grabbing  hy  European  powers — such  an  exten- 
sion of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  that  each  South  and  Cen- 
tral American  republic  will  adopt  that  doctrine  for  itself. 

Excerpts  from  this  noteworthy  address  which 
are  germane  at  this  point  of  our  discussion  read : 

The  hour  of  watchfulness  for  us  Americans  of  all  sec- 
tions has  only  just  begun,  and  we  would  be  unworthy  of 
the    men    who    achieved    our    emancipation    and    who 


338  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

founded  our  nationalities  if  through  neglect  or  sordid 
temporizing  we  were  to  jeopardize  the  patrimony  of  free- 
dom of  the  coming  generations.  The  first  element  for 
the  protection  of  the  continent  is  universal  harmony 
and  efficient  cooperation.  Financial  relationships  which 
signify  the  lifeblood  of  industry  and  commerce  are  of 
paramount  importance  in  this  connection,  but  there  are 
other  indispensable  steps  rendered  necessary  by  the  reve- 
lation of  the  present  hour. 

All  feelings  of  fear  or  of  distrust  must  disappear.  It 
is  necessary  that  all  the  nations  of  the  continent  should 
declare  in  a  solemn  manner  that  the  era  of  conquest  of 
territory  has  come  to  an  end  on  the  American  continent, 
alike  from  outsiders  as  from  other  nations  on  the  conti- 
nent, and  that  redress  whenever  it  can  be  accomplished 
should  be  carried  out;  but  it  is  often  impossible  to  re- 
trace steps  of  history,  and  in  such  cases  bygones  will  have 
to  be  bygones,  and  the  dead  past  will  have  to  buiT^  its 
dead.  The  attempt  to  straighten  the  course  of  history, 
following  the  current  up  the  stream  toward  its  source, 
would  be  idle  and  futile. 

It  is  the  future  that  concerns  us.  The  microbe  of  im- 
perialism is  one  of  easy  growth.  Men  assembled  in  col- 
lectivities called  nations  have  been  accustomed,  when 
occasion  has  arisen,  throughout  all  history,  to  accept  in- 
iquity as  their  guiding  principle,  and  the  honest  man  who, 
single-handed,  would  not  take  an  ear  of  corn  from  his 
neighbor's  field,  as  soon  as  he  finds  himself  armed  with  a 
collective  conscience,  will  not  only  take  the  ear  of  corn, 
but  the  whole  field,  and  the  life  of  his  neighbor  and  of  his 
neighbor's  family  to  boot.  And  then  he  will  present 
himself,  demanding  the  crown  of  patriotism  and  the  halo 
of  glory  in  recognition  from  the  future  generations. 

The  microbe  must  be  extirpated  from  the  continent. 
It  has  been  proclaimed  within  recent  days  from  the  high- 
est summit  of  executive  power  in  this  land  that  honesty 
and  justice  and  not  convenience  should  be  the  guiding 
principle  of  life,  alike  individual  and  national. 


Acting  as  Mandatory  of  Civilisation     339 

That  utterance  should  stand,  as  it  were,  as  the  pennant 
of  our  hopes  and  our  endeavors.  The  inviolabiHty  of 
the  continent  has  been  effective  for  outsiders,  but  not  so 
for  some  nations  of  the  continent.  I  do  not  speak  in  a 
spirit  of  complaint  or  of  censure;  I  simply  state  facts. 
Thus  a  spirit  of  distrust  has  been  created  which  it  is 
indispensable  to  eliminate.  The  atmosphere  of  cordiality 
throughout  the  continent  must  be  diaphanous,  without  a 
single  shadow  on  the  horizon. 

The  disappearance  of  distrust  will  permit  of  the  real 
union  in  sentiment  of  all  the  nations  of  America,  and  that 
union  will  mean  strength  for  the  protection  of  the  con- 
tinent and  of  the  ideals  of  liberty  and  democracy  to 
which  it  is  dedicated.  .  .  . 

It  becomes  of  paramount  and  vital  importance  for  the 
nations  of  America  that  it  should  be  known  that  through- 
out the  breadth  and  length  of  the  continent  they  are 
unanimous  in  sentiment;  that  the  continent  will  be  in- 
violate from  conquest  or  political  colonization;  that  it  is 
open  and  free  to  the  wandering  and  peaceful  multitudes, 
but  that  it  is  closed  to  the  conquering  flags. 

The  feeling  in  Colombia  and  to  a  certain  extent 
the  feeHng  in  Spanish-America  is  indicated  in  a 
petition  signed  by  representatives  of  seventy-six 
New  York  importing  houses  praying  that  the  Co- 
lombian treaty  be  ratified.  The  petition  ad- 
dressed to  Chairman  Stone  of  the  Committee  on 
Foreign  Relations  of  the  Senate  reads  as  follows : 

The  enormous  opportunities  for  the  expansion  of  our 
Latin  trade  that  have  been  opened  to  American  enter- 
prise by  the  European  war  make  it  imperative  that  the 
antipathy  and  distrust  which  have  unfortunately  grown 
out  of  the  secession  of  Panama  be  removed  at  once. 

We  believe  this  can  be  best  achieved  by  the  immediate 


340  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

ratification  of  the  Colombian  treaty,  which  would  insure 
the  restoration  of  the  century-old  friendship  formerly 
existing  between  our  two  countries  and  virtually  give  the 
United  States  the  foreign  trade  of  Colombia. 

The  facts  that  Colombia  is  the  nearest  of  the  South 
American  republics,  and  the  only  one  having  coasts  on 
both  oceans;  that  rapid  and  direct  steamship  communi- 
cations already  exist,  and  that  in  natural  wealth  and  un- 
developed resources  she  surpasses  all  her  neighbors  may 
be  mentioned  to  show  that  every  consideration  of  expedi- 
ency and  self-interest  is  added  to  those  of  justice  and  in- 
ternational good  will  invo-lved  in  the  final  settlement  of 
Colombia's  claims. 

With  every  confidence  in  the  far-seeing  statesmanship 
and  true  patriotism  of  the  Senate  Committee  on  Foreign 
Relations,  the  undersigned  merchants  doing  business  with 
Colombia  beg  most  respectfully  to  urge  the  prompt  rati- 
fication of  the  treaty  signed  at  Bogota  on  April  6,  19 14, 
between  the  United  States  and  the  Republic  of  Colombia. 

This  done,  then  the  Congress  should  investi- 
gate through  an  expert  committee  the  compensa- 
tion actually  due  Colombia  and  voluntarily  grant 
Colombia  the  full  measure  of  justice  due  her.  It 
would  exalt  the  United  States  in  Latin  America. 
It  would  transform  suspicion  into  confidence. 
Can  the  United  States,  which,  from  humanitarian 
motives,  returned  twelve  million  dollars  to  China 
and  spent  a  hundred  million  to  free  Cuba,  refuse 
equitably  to  compensate  Colombia? 

In  a  memorandum  dated  May  3,  191 3,  ad- 
dressed to  Secretary  Bryan  by  the  fhen  Minister 
of  Colombia  occurs  the  following: 


Acting  as  Mandatory  of  Civilisation     341 

Both  the  People  and  the  Government  of  Colombia 
have  felt  a  deep  satisfaction  on  learning  of  the  very  noble 
resolution  Your  Excellency  has  formed  to  cultivate  rela- 
tions of  sincere  friendship  with  the  Republics  of  Latin 
America  by  means  of  a  high-minded  and  just  policy;  the 
note  in  which  Your  Excellency  has  already  struck  in  that 
beautiful  thought: — 

"The    Lord    has    made    us    neighbors; 
Let  Justice  make  us  friends." 

Who  can  deny  that  the  beginning  of  a  new  era  of 
justice  should  be  marked  by  giving  to  my  country  that 
reparation  which  is  her  due?  Her  cause  is  eminently 
just.  Colombia  asks  for  the  fulfillment  of  sacred  obli- 
gations entered  into  by  solemn  treaty,  the  Treaty  of  1846, 
and  she  bases  this  appeal  on  a  fundamental  axiom  of  the 
Law  of  Nations,  which  declares  that  all  States,  great  or 
small,  are  equal  in  the  family  of  nations.  It  can  be  said 
that  the  case  of  Colombia  is  a  leading  case  in  the  inter- 
national life  of  the  New  World;  because  the  manner  in 
which  it  will  be  decided  will  show  whether  the  Great  Re- 
public, in  its  dealings  with  the  nations  of  America,  in- 
tends or  does  not  intend  to  abide  by  the  fundamental 
principles  of  international  law. 

This  simple  and  direct  appeal  for  justice  by 
Colombia  is  naturally  followed  here  by  an  ob- 
servation of  Viscount  James  Bryce  on  the  present 
European  situation.  It  is  so  apropos  that  it  might 
have  been  addressed  to  us : 

In  the  judgment  which  history  will  hereafter  pass  upon 
the  forty  centuries  of  recorded  progress  toward  civiliza- 
tion that  now  lie  behind  us,  what  are  the  tests  it  will 
apply  to  determine  the  true  greatness  of  a  people? 

Not  population,  not  territory,  not  wealth,  not  military 


342  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

power.  Rather  will  history  ask:  What  examples  of 
lofty  character  and  unselfish  devotion  to  honor  and  duty 
has  a  people  given?  What  has  it  done  to  increase  the 
volume  of  knowledge?  What  thoughts  and  what  ideals 
of  permanent  value  and  unexhausted  fertility  has  it  be- 
queathed to  mankind?  What  works  has  it  produced  in 
poetry,  music,  and  the  other  arts  to  be  an  unfailing 
source  of  enjoyment  to  posterity?  .  .  . 

Each-  race  has  something  to  give,  each  something  to 
learn;  and  when  their  blood  is  blended  the  mixed  stock 
may  combine  the  gifts  of  both.  .  .  . 

The  marie  of  an  advancing  civilization  has  been  the 
substitution  of  friendship  for  hatred  and  of  peaceful  for 
warlike  ideals.  That  small  peoples  have  done  and  can 
do  as  much  for  the  common  good  of  humanity  as  large 
peoples.  That  Treaties  must  be  observed,  for  what  are 
they  but  records  of  national  faith  solemnly  pledged,  and 
what  could  bring  mankind  more  surely  and  swiftly  back 
to  that  reign  oi  violence  and  terror  from  which  it  has 
been  slowly  rising  for  the  last  ten  centuries  than  the  de- 
struction of  trust  in  the  plighted  faith  of  nations  ? 

To  conciliate  Colombia  for  the  loss  of  Panama 
the  Taft  Administration  made  overtures  for  a 
concession  of  the  Atrato  canal  route  and  the  per- 
petual lease  of  certain  islands  for  coaling  stations 
and  other  purposes  and  actually  offered  for  them 
$10,000,000!  An  offer  of  a  mere  pittance  for 
valuable  concessions  to  right  a  colossal  wrong! 
President  Restrepo  promptly  replied  in  words  that 
ought  to  bring  the  blush  of  shame  to  self-respect- 
ing Americans : 

President  Roosevelt  took  Panama,  our  richest  asset, 
and  now  you  are  sent  here  to  take  our  islands,  and  the 


Acting  as  Mandatory  of  Civilisation     343 

only  canal  route  we  have  left.  Is  there  anything  else 
that  the  northern  Colossus  would  like  to  separate  us 
from? 

Read  the  foregoing  reply  by  President  Restrepo 
again  and  then  determine  for  yourself  whether 
the  Roosevelt  Administration  acted  as  the  manda- 
tory of  civilization  when  it  ''took"  the  Canal  Zone 
by  force,  and,  in  so  doing,  rent  asunder  the  Re- 
public of  Colombia,  an  ally  of  the  United  States 
by  the  Treaty  of  1846. 

This  action  of  the  Roosevelt  Administration 
was  a  challenge  to  civilization — a  determination 
to  secure  outside  of  the  methods  forged  by  civil- 
ization an  opportunity  to  prosecute  a  great  un- 
dertaking without  paying  the  price  that  civiliza- 
tion would  impose  by  due  process  of  law.  The  act 
was  anti-social.  It  was  the  negation  of  social 
justice.  Professor  Johnson  of  Denison  Univer- 
sity, in  his  criticism  of  German  lawlessness  in  the 
war,  has  expressed  the  views  that  the  writer  holds 
concerning  the  lawless  method  employed  to  se- 
cure the  Canal  Zone.     It  reads : 

This  is  no  more  nor  less  than  a  challenge  to  civilization 
itself.  Civilization  in  smaller  groups  is  the  habit,  or  art, 
of  living  together  as  individuals,  with  such  recognition 
of  the  interests  and  welfare  of  others,  such  restraint 
upon  the  promptings  of  mere  self-interest,  as  is  necessary 
to  make  organized  society  possible,  and  to  conduce  to  the 
greatest  feasible  happiness  and  prosperity  of  all  who  are 


344  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

willing  to  recognize  the  doctrine  of  mutual  rights  and 
obligations.  Such  a  society,  of  course,  requires  definite 
assent  to  a  certain  amount  of  restraint,  which  must  take 
the  form  of  **law."  The  man  who  refuses  to  live  in  ac- 
cordance with  this,  after  it  has  been  duly  agreed  upon,  is 
an  outlaw,  and  cannot  be  called  "civilized"  in  any  right 
sense  of  that  term. 

Civilization  in  the  larger  group,  where  the  nation  or 
State  is  the  individual,  is  essentially  the  same.  Human 
progress  had  not  gone  very  far  when  it  was  clearly  real- 
ized that  continued  progress  was  possible  only  as  indi- 
vidual States  would  recognize  a  theory  of  mutual  rights 
and  obligations  in  their  relations  with  each  other.  A 
"jus  gentium"  began  to  grow  up  in  the  Mediterranean 
basin,  where  civilization  achieved  its  earlier  growth,  and 
the  best  moral  sentiment  in  all  nations  began  to  condemn 
as  imperfectly  civilized,  even  by  the  crude  standards  of 
that  day,  any  individual  nation  which  deliberately  and 
knowingly  violated  this  "jus  gentium,"  or  Law  of  Na- 
tions. And  from  the  days  of  the  Greeks  and  Romans 
until  to-day,  that  feeling  of  condemnation  has  been 
strongest  wherever  and  whenever  the  roots  of  a  really 
sound  moral  and  intelligent  civilization  have  struck  deep- 
est. 

President  Wilson  undoubtedly  expressed  the 
sentiment  of  the  great  majority  of  the  American 
people  when  he  said : 

We  want  no  nation's  property;  we  wish  to  question 
no  nation's  honor;  we  wish  to  stand  selfishly  in  the  way 
of  the  development  of  no  nation;  we  want  nothing  that 
we  cannot  get  by  our  own  legitimate  enterprise  and  by 
the  inspiration  of  our  own  example;  and  standing  for 
these  things,  it  is  not  pretension  on  our  part  to  say  that 
we  are  privileged  to  stand  for  what  every  nation  would 


Acting  as  Mandatory  of  Civilisation     345 

wish  to  stand  for,  and  speak  for  those  things  which  all 
humanity  must  desire. 

It  is  entirely  apropos  from  the  lips  of  our  uni- 
versally esteemed  President.  He  secured  the  re- 
peal of  the  tolls-exemption  provisions  of  the  Pan- 
ama Canal  Act  and  thus  restored  our  plighted 
word  embodied  in  the  Hay-Pauncefote  treaty. 
He  has  negotiated  a  treaty  with  Colombia  which 
makes  reparation  to  that  country  for  a  wrong 
done  by  a  former  Administration.  He  is  putting 
into  practice  what  he,  as  the  spokesman  of  the 
American  people,  preaches  as  their  exalted  aim. 

The  United  States  took  the  Canal  Zone  by  force 
and,  in  so  doing,  despoiled  Colombia  of  her  most 
valuable  province.  This  done,  she  proceeded  to 
despoil  collective  civilization  of  its  inherent  right 
to  a  non-discriminating  and  reasonable  charge 
for  the  commercial  use  of  the  Panama  Canal. 
In  repealing  the  tolls-exemption  provisions  of  the 
Panama  Canal  Act  she  abandoned  the  projected 
spoliation  of  collective  civilization.  If  the  Sen- 
ate ratifies  the  pending  treaty  negotiated  with 
Colombia,  our  Government  will  have  made  some 
reparation  to  that  Republic  for  the  province  our 
agent  wrested  from  her. 

The  voluntary  repeal  of  the  tolls-exemption 
provision  of  the  Panama  Canal  Act  was  credit- 


346  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

able.  But  Great  Britain  was  strong.  Colombia 
is  weak.  Reparation  to  Colombia  will  be  more 
creditable.  It  will  restore  our  national  honor  and 
will  vindicate  our  claim  to  be  guided  by  exalted 
moral  purpose. 

When  Wilson  became  President,  he  found  our 
national  honor  in  pawn — twice  pawned.  One 
ticket  has  been  redeemed.  The  tolls-exemption 
provision  of  the  Panama  Canal  Act  has  been  re- 
pealed. Let  us  redeem  the  other  ticket.  It  can 
be  done  by  making  substantial  reparation  to 
Colombia.  This  done,  the  United  States  will 
start  the  new  era  of  world-history,  which  will 
follow  the  war,  with  a  clean  slate.  President 
Wilson  has  done  his  part.  He  is  a  President 
whom  all  Americans  of  high  character  delight  to 
honor,  to  whom  the  crowned  heads  of  Europe 
doff  their  hat,  and  in  whom  Spanish- America  has 
reposed  confidence.  Let  us  cooperate  with  him 
to  secure  some  measure  of  justice  to  Colombia  by 
inducing  our  Senate  to  ratify  the  treaty  negoti- 
ated with  Colombia,  dated  Bogota,  April  6,  1914. 
If  the  American  people  can  be  sufficiently  inter- 
ested to  inform  themselves  concerning  the  manner 
in  which  we  secured  the  Canal  rights  that  we  pos- 
sess, they  will  repudiate  the  duplicity,  cunning  and 
arrogance  whereby  they  were  secured  and,  being 


Acting  as  Mandatory  of  Civilisation     347 

sound  of  heart  and  steadfast  of  soul,  they  will 
make  adequate  reparation  to  Colombia.  That 
will  be  acting  as  the  mandatory  of  civilization. 

Henry  W.  Hall,  staff  correspondent  of  the  New 
York  World,  stated  in  his  testimony  before  the 
House  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations : 

I  have  seen  the  whole  face  of  the  Isthmus  changed  by 
the  labor  of  American  Army  engineers,  who  are  building 
the  Panama  Canal.  It  is  the  greatest  piece  of  engineer- 
ing work  ever  accomplished  anywhere  in  the  world,  and 
it  is  being  done  in  a  manner  which  reflects  the  utmost 
credit  upon  Colonel  Goethals  and  everybody  who  is  con- 
nected with  it.  The  Panama  Canal,  the  great  American 
highway  through  which  ships  of  all  nations  will  soon 
carry  the  commerce  of  the  world,  stands  for  all  time  as 
a  monument  to  the  constructive  genius  of  the  American 
people.  It  is  a  thing  to  be  proud  of;  an  achievement 
wherein  the  people  of  this  country  have  succeeded  after 
others  have  failed.  It  should  be  without  stain.  It 
should  be  born  into  its  usefulness  and  given  to  the  com- 
merce of  the  world  without  the  bar  sinister  of  rape  and 
lawlessness. 

The  writer  is  convinced  that  whenever  the 
United  States  is  ready  to  admit  the  truth,  to  pro- 
mulgate the  truth,  and  to  deal  with  Colombia  on 
a  basis  of  truth  and  law,  the  differences  between 
the  two  countries  will  be  satisfactorily  composed. 
In  the  White  House  is  a  just  man,  an  honest  man, 
a  truthful  man,  and  a  wise  man.  He  has  done  his 
duty.  The  Colombian  Government  has  negoti- 
ated with  his  Administration  a  treaty  to  compose 


348  America  and  the  Canal  Title 

their  differences  with  us.  The  Colombian  Con- 
gress has  ratified  it.  It  is  now  only  necessary  for 
our  Senate  to  ratify  this  treaty  to  reestablish 
friendly  relations  with  Colombia.  Will  our  Sen- 
ate do  its  duty? 

Until  it  does  Spanish-America  inaudibly  says 
to  us :  We  will  have  faith  in  you  only  when  you 
yourselves  restore  to  us  the  lost  grounds  which 
made  possible  such  faith.  In  order  to  do  this  you 
must  repent  as  a  nation,  and  bring  forth  fruits 
meet  for  repentance. 

Ungrudging  disavowal  of  '7  took  the  Canal 
Zone"  is  fruit  meet  for  repentance  it  accompanied 
by  unstinted  compensation  to  Colombia  for  loss 
suffered.  This  done,  Spanish-America  will  re- 
store to  us  the  legacy  of  faith-keeping  which  is 
the  ideal  of  all  Americans  of  high  character. 
Reparation  to  Colombia  would  be  an  act  becoming 
a  mandatory  of  civilization. 


APPENDICES 


FROM  PRESIDENT  ROOSEVELT'S  MESSAGE 
TO  CONGRESS  — DECEMBER  7,  1903 

By  the  act  of  June  28,  1902,  the  Congress  authorized 
the  President  to  enter  into  treaty  with  Colombia  for  the 
building  of  the  canal  across  the  Isthmus  of  Panama;  it 
being  provided  that  in  the  event  of  failure  to  secure  such 
treaty  after  the  lapse  of  a  reasonable  time,  recourse  should 
be  had  to  building  a  canal  through  Nicaragua.  It  has  not 
been  necessary  to  consider  this  alternative,  as  I  am  en- 
abled to  lay  before  the  Senate  a  treaty  providing  for  the 
building  of  the  canal  across  the  Isthmus  of  Panama. 
This  was  the  route  which  commended  itself  to  the  de- 
liberate judgment  of  the  Congress,  and  we  can  now  ac- 
quire by  treaty  the  right  to  construct  the  canal  over  this 
route.  The  question  now,  therefore,  is  not  by  which 
route  the  Isthmian  Canal  shall  be  built,  for  that  question 
has  been  definitely  and  irrevocably  decided.  The  ques- 
tion is  simply  whether  or  not  we  shall  have  an  Isthmian 
Canal. 

When  the  Congress  directed  that  we  should  take  the 
Panama  route  under  treaty  with  Colombia,  the  essence 
of  the  condition,  of  course,  referred  not  to  the  govern- 
ment which  controlled  that  route,  but  to  the  route  itself ; 
to  the  territory  across  which  the  route  lay,  not  to  the 

351 


352  Appendices 

name  which  for  the  moment  the  territory  bore  on  the  map. 
The  purpose  of  the  law  was  to  authorize  the  President 
to  make  a  treaty  with  the  power  in  actual  control  of  the 
Isthmus  of  Panama.     This  purpose  has  been  fulfilled. 

In  the  year  1846  this  Government  entered  into  a  treaty 
with  New  Granada,  the  predecessor  upon  the  Isthmus  of 
the  Republic  of  Colombia  and  of  the  present  Republic 
of  Panama,  by  which  treaty  it  was  provided  that  the  Gov- 
ernment and  citizens  of  the  United  States  should  always 
have  free  and  open  right  of  way  or  transit  across  the 
Isthmus  of  Panama  by  any  modes  of  communication  that 
might  be  constructed,  while  in  return  our  Government 
guaranteed  the  perfect  neutrality  of  the  above-mentioned 
Isthmus  with  the  view  that  the  free  transit  from  the  one 
to  the  other  sea  might  not  be  interrupted  or  embarrassed. 
The  treaty  vested  in  the  United  States  a  substantial  prop- 
erty right  carved  out  of  the  rights  of  sovereignty  and 
property  which  New  Granada  then  had  and  possessed 
over  the  said  territory.  The  name  of  New  Granada  has 
passed  away  and  its  territory  has  been  divided.  Its  suc- 
cessor, the  Government  of  Colombia,  has  ceased  to  own 
any  property  in  the  Isthmus.  A  new  republic,  that  of 
Panama,  which  was  at  one  time  a  sovereign  state,  and  at 
another  time  a  mere  department  of  the  successive  con- 
federations known  as  New  Granada  and  Colombia,  has 
now  succeeded  to  the  rights  which  first  one  and  then  the 
other  formerly  exercised  over  the  Isthmus.  But  as  long 
as  the  Isthmus  endures,  the  mere  geographical  fact  of 
its  existence,  and  the  peculiar  interest  therein  which  is 
required  by  our  position,  perpetuate  the  solemn  contract 
which  binds  the  holders  of  the  territory  to  respect  our 


Appendices  353 

right  to  freedom  of  transit  across  it,  and  binds  us  in  re- 
turn to  safeguard  for  the  Isthmus  and  the  world  the  ex- 
ercise of  that  inestimable  privilege.  The  true  interpreta- 
tion of  the  obligations  upon  which  the  United  States 
entered  in  this  Treaty  of  1846  has  been  given  repeatedly 
in  the  utterances  of  Presidents  and  Secretaries  of  State. 
Secretary  Cass  in  1858  officially  stated  the  position  of  this 
Government  as  follows : 

The  progress  of  events  has  rendered  the  inter-oceanic  route 
across  the  narrow  portion  of  Central  America  vastly  important  to 
the  commercial  world,  and  especially  to  the  United  States,  whose 
possessions  extend  along  the  Atlantic  and  Pacific  coasts,  and  de- 
mand the  speediest  and  easiest  modes  of  communication.  While 
the  rights  of  sovereignty  of  the  states  occupying  this  region  should 
always  be  respected,  we  shall  expect  that  these  rights  be  exercised 
in  a  spirit  befitting  the  occasion  and  the  wants  and  circumstances 
that  have  arisen.  Sovereignty  has  its  duties  as  well  as  its  rights, 
and  none  of  these  local  governments,  even  if  administered  with 
more  regard  to  the  just  demands  of  other  nations  than  they  have 
been,  would  be  permitted,  in  a  spirit  of  Eastern  isolation,  to  close 
the  gates  of  intercourse  on  the  great  highways  of  the  world,  and 
justify  the  act  by  the  pretension  that  these  avenues  of  trade  and 
travel  belong  to  them  and  that  they  choose  to  shut  them,  or,  what 
is  almost  equivalent,  to  encumber  them  with  such  unjust  relations 
as  would  prevent  their  general  use. 

Seven  years  later,  in  1865,  Mr.  Seward  in  different 
communications  took  the  following  position : 

The  United  States  have  taken  and  will  take  no  interest  in  any 
question  of  internal  revolution  in  the  State  of  Panama,  or  any 
State  of  the  United  States  of  Colombia,  but  will  maintain  a  per- 
fect neutrality  in  connection  with  such  domestic  altercations.  The 
United  States  will,  nevertheless,  hold  themselves  ready  to  protect 
the  transit  trade  across  the  Isthmus  against  invasion  of  either 
domestic  or  foreign  disturbers  of  the  peace  of  the  State  of  Pan- 
ama. .  .  .  Neither  the  text  nor  the  spirit  of  the  stipulation  in  that 
article  by  which  the  United  States  engages  to  preserve  the  neu- 


354  Appendices 

trality  of  the  Isthmus  of  Panama  imposes  an  obligation  on  this 
Government  to  comply  with  the  requisition  [of  the  President  of 
the  United  States  of  Colombia  for  a  force  to  protect  the  Isthmus 
of  Panama  from  a  body  of  insurgents  of  that  country].  The  pur- 
pose of  the  stipulation  was  to  guarantee  the  Isthmus  against 
seizure  or  invasion  by  a  foreign  power  only. 

Attorney-General  Speed,  under  date  of  November  7, 
1865,  advised  Secretary  Seward  as  follows: 

From  this  treaty  it  cannot  be  supposed  that  New  Granada  in- 
vited the  United  States  to  become  a  party  to  the  intestine  troubles 
of  that  government,  nor  did  the  United  States  become  bound  to 
take  sides  in  the  domestic  broils  of  New  Granada.  The  United 
States  did  guarantee  New  Granada  in  the  sovereignty  and  prop- 
erty over  the  territory.  This  was  as  against  other  and  foreign 
governments. 

For  four  hundred  years,  ever  since  shortly  after  the 
discovery  of  this  hemisphere,  the  canal  across  the  Isthmus 
has  been  planned.  For  two  score  years  it  has  been  worked 
at.  When  made  it  is  to  last  for  the  ages.  It  is  to  alter 
the  geography  of  a  continent  and  the  trade  routes  of  the 
world.  We  have  shown  by  every  treaty  we  have  nego- 
tiated or  attempted  to  negotiate  with  the  peoples  in  con- 
trol of  the  Isthmus  and  with  foreign  nations  in  reference 
thereto  our  consistent  good  faith  in  observing  our  ob- 
ligations ;  on  the  one  hand  to  the  peoples  of  the  Isthmus, 
and  on  the  other  hand  to  the  civilized  world  whose  com- 
mercial rights  we  are  safeguarding  and  guaranteeing  by 
our  action.  We  have  done  our  duty  to  others  in  letter 
and  in  spirit,  and  we  have  shown  the  utmost  forbearance 
in  exacting  our  own  rights. 

Last  spring,  under  the  act  above  referred  to,  a  treaty 
concluded  between  the  representatives  of  the  Republic 
of  Colombia  and  of  our  Government  was  ratified  by  the 


Appendices  355 

Senate.  This  treaty  was  entered  into  at  the  urgent  solici- 
tation of  the  people  of  Colombia  and  after  a  body  of 
experts  appointed  by  our  Government  especially  to  go  into 
the  matter  of  the  routes  across  the  Isthmus  had  pro- 
nounced unanimously  in  favor  of  the  Panama  route.  In 
drawing  up  this  treaty  every  concession  was  made  to  the 
people  and  to  the  Government  of  Colombia.  We  were 
more  than  just  in  dealing  with  them.  Our  generosity 
was  such  as  to  make  it  a  serious  question  whether  we  had 
not  gone  too  far  in  their  interest  at  the  expense  of  our 
own ;  for  in  our  scrupulous  desire  to  pay  all  possible  heed, 
not  merely  to  the  real  but  even  to  the  fancied  rights  of 
our  weaker  neighbor,  who  already  owed  so  much  to  our 
protection  and  forbearance,  we  yielded  in  all  possible  ways 
to  her  desires  in  drawing  up  the  treaty.  Nevertheless 
the  Government  of  Colombia  not  merely  repudiated  the 
treaty,  but  repudiated  it  in  such  manner  as  to  make  it 
evident  by  the  time  the  Colombian  Congress  adjourned 
that  not  the  scantiest  hope  remained  of  ever  getting  a 
satisfactory  treaty  from  them.  The  Government  of  Co- 
lombia made  the  treaty,  and  yet  when  the  Colombian 
Congress  was  called  to  ratify  it  the  vote  against  ratifica- 
tion was  unanimous.  It  does  not  appear  that  the  govern- 
ment made  any  real  effort  to  secure  ratification. 

Immediately  after  the  adjournment  of  the  Congress  a 
revolution  broke  out  in  Panama.  The  people  of  Panama 
had  long  been  discontented  with  the  Republic  of  Colom- 
bia, and  they  had  been  kept  quiet  only  by  the  prospect 
of  the  conclusion  of  the  treaty,  which  was  to  them  a 
matter  of  vital  concern.  When  it  became  evident  that 
the  treaty  was  hopelessly  lost,  the  people  of  Panama  rose 


356  Appendices 

literally  as  one  man.  Not  a  shot  was  fired  by  a  single 
man  on  the  Isthmus  in  the  interest  of  the  Colombian 
Government.  Not  a  life  was  lost  in  the  accomplishment 
of  the  revolution.  The  Colombian  troops  stationed  on 
the  Isthmus,  who  had  long  been  unpaid,  made  common 
cause  with  the  people  of  Panama,  and  with  astonishing 
unanimity  the  new  republic  was  started.  The  duty  of 
the  United  States  in  the  premises  was  clear.  In  strict 
accordance  with  the  principles  laid  down  by  Secretaries 
Cass  and  Seward  in  the  official  documents  above  quoted, 
the  United  States  gave  notice  that  it  would  permit  the 
landing  of  no  expeditionary  force,  the  arrival  of  which 
would  mean  chaos  and  destruction  along  the  line  of  the 
railroad  and  of  the  proposed  canal,  and  an  interruption 
of  transit  as  an  inevitable  consequence.  The  de  facto 
Government  of  Panama  was  recognized  in  the  following 
telegram  to  Mr.  Ehrman : 

The  people  of  Panama  have,  by  apparently  unanimous  move- 
ment, dissolved  their  political  connection  with  the  Republic  of 
Colombia  and  resumed  their  independence.  When  you  are  satis- 
fied that  a  de  facto  government,  republican  in  form  and  without 
substantial  opposition  from  its  own  people,  has  been  established  in 
the  State  of  Panama,  you  will  enter  into  relations  with  it  as  the 
responsible  government  of  the  territory  and  look  to  it  for  all  due 
action  to  protect  the  persons  and  property  of  citizens  of  the 
United  States  and  to  keep  open  the  Isthmian  transit,  in  accordance 
with  the  obligations  of  existing  treaties  governing  the  relations 
of  the  United  States  to  that  territory. 

The  Government  of  Colombia  was  notified  of  our  action 
by  the  following  telegram  to  Mr.  Beaupre: 

The  people  of  Panama  having,  by  an  apparently  unanimous 
movement,  dissolved  their  political  connection  with  the  Republic 
of  Colombia  and  resumed  their  independence,  and  having  adopted 


Appendices  357 

a  government  of  their  own,  republican  in  form,  with  which  the 
Government  of  the  United  States  of  America  has  entered  into  re- 
lations, the  President  of  the  United  States,  in  accordance  with  the 
ties  of  friendship  which  have  so  long  and  so  happily  existed  be- 
tween the  respective  nations,  most  earnestly  commends  to  the  Gov- 
ernments of  Colombia  and  of  Panama  the  peaceful  and  equitable 
settlement  of  all  questions  at  issue  between  them.  He  holds  that 
he  is  bound  not  merely  by  treaty  obligations,  but  by  the  interests 
of  civilization,  to  see  that  the  peaceful  traffic  of  the  world  across 
the  Isthmus  of  Panama  shall  not  longer  be  disturbed  by  a  con- 
stant succession  of  unnecessary  and  wasteful  wars. 

When  these  events  happened,  fifty-seven  years  had 
elapsed  since  the  United  States  had  entered  into  its  treaty 
with  New  Granada.  During  that  time  the  Governments 
of  New  Granada  and  of  its  successor,  Colombia,  have 
been  in  a  constant  state  of  flux.  The  following  is  a 
partial  list  of  the  disturbances  on  the  Isthmus  of  Panama 
during  the  period  in  question,  as  reported  to  us  by  our 
consuls.  It  is  not  possible  to  give  a  complete  list,  and 
some  of  the  reports  that  speak  of  "revolutions"  must 
mean  unsuccessful  revolutions. 

May  22,  1850. — Outbreak;  two  Americans  killed. 
War  vessel  demanded  to  quell  outbreak. 

October,  1850. — Revolutionary  plot  to  bring  about  in- 
dependence of  the  Isthmus. 

July  22,  1 85 1. — Revolution  in  four  Southern  provinces. 

November  14,  185 1. — Outbreak  at  Chagres.  Man-of- 
war  requested  for  Chagres. 

June  27,  1853. — Insurrection  at  Bogota,  and  consequent 
disturbance  on  Isthmus.     War  vessel  demanded. 

May  23,  1854. — Political  disturbances;  war  vessel  re- 
quested. 

June  28,  1854. — ^Attempted  revolution. 


358  Appendices 

October  24,  1854. — Independence  of  Isthmus  demanded 
by  provincial  legislature. 

April,  1856. — Riot,  and  massacre  of  Americans. 

May  4,  1856. — Riot. 

May  18,  1856.— Riot. 

Jime  3,  1856. — Riot. 

October  2,  1856. — Conflict  between  two  native  parties. 
United  States  forces  landed. 

December  18,  1858. — Attempted  secession  of  Panama. 

April,  1859. — Riots. 

September,  i860. — Outbreak. 

October  4,  i860. — Landing  of  United  States  forces  in 
consequence. 

May  23,  1 86 1. — Intervention  of  the  United  States  forces 
required,  by  intendente. 

October  2,  1861. — Insurrection  and  civil  war. 

April  4,  1862. — Measures  to  prevent  rebels  crossing 
Isthmus. 

June  13,  1862. — Mosquera's  troops  refused  admittance 
to  Panama. 

March,  1865. — Revolution,  and  United  States  troops 
landed. 

August,  1865. — Riots;  unsuccessful  attempt  to  invade 
Panama. 

March,  1866. — Unsuccessful  revolution. 

April,  1867. — Attempt  to  overthrow  Government. 

August,  1867. — Attempt  at  revolution. 

July  5,  1868. — Revolution;  provisional  government  in- 
augurated. 

August  29,  1868. — Revolution ;  provisional  government 
overthrown. 


Appendices  359 

April,  1 87 1. — Revolution;  followed  apparently  by 
counter  revolution. 

April,  1873. — Revolution  and  civil  war  which  lasted 
to  October,  1875. 

August,    1876. — Civil   war   which   lasted  until  April, 

1877. 

July,  1878.— Rebellion. 

December,  1878. — Revolt. 

April,  1879. — Revolution. 

June,  1879. — Revolution. 

March,  1883.— Riot. 

May,  1883.— Riot. 

June,  1884. — Revolutionary  attempt. 

December,  1884. — Revolutionary  attempt. 

January,  1885. — Revolutionary  disturbances. 

March,  1885. — Revolution. 

April,  1887. — Disturbance  on  Panama  Railroad. 

November,  1887. — Disturbance  on  line  of  canal. 

January,  1889. — Riot. 

January,   1895. — Revolution  which  lasted  until  April. 

March,  1895. — Incendiary  attempt. 

October,  1899. — Revolution. 

February,  1900,  to  July,  1900. — Revolution. 

January,  1901. — Revolution. 

July,  1901. — Revolutionary  disturbances. 

September,  1901. — City  of  Colon  taken  by  rebels. 

March,  1902. — Revolutionary  disturbances. 

July,  1902. — Revolution. 

The  above  is  only  a  partial  list  of  the  revolutions,  re- 
bellions, insurrections,  riots,  and  other  outbreaks  that  have 
occurred  during  the  period  in  question ;  yet  they  number 


360  Appendices 

53  for  the  57  years.  It  will  be  noted  that  one  of  them 
lasted  for  nearly  three  years  before  it  was  quelled,  another 
for  nearly  a  year.  In  short,  the  experience  of  over  half 
a  century  has  shown  Colombia  to  be  utterly  incapable  of 
keeping  order  on  the  Isthmus.  Only  the  active  inter- 
ference of  the  United  States  has  enabled  her  to  preserve 
so  much  as  a  semblance  of  sovereignty.  Had  it  not  been 
for  the  exercise  by  the  United  States  of  the  police  power 
in  her  interest,  her  connection  with  the  Isthmus  would 
have  been  sundered  long  ago.  In  1856,  in  i860,  in  1873, 
in  1885,  in  1901,  and  again  in  1902,  sailors  and  marines 
from  United  States  warships  were  forced  to  land  in  order 
to  patrol  the  Isthmus,  to  protect  life  and  property,  and 
to  see  that  the  transit  across  the  Isthmus  was  kept  open. 
In  1 86 1,  in  1862,  in  1885,  and  in  1900,  the  Colombian 
Government  asked  that  the  United  States  Government 
land  troops  to  protect  its  interests  and  maintain  order  on 
the  Isthmus.  Perhaps  the  most  extraordinary  request  is 
that  which  has  just  been  received  and  which  runs  as  fol- 
lows: 

Knowing  that  revolution  has  already  commenced  in  Panama  [an 
eminent  Colombian]  says  that  if  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  will  land  troops  to  preserve  Colombian  sovereignty,  and 
the  transit,  if  requested  by  Colombian  charge  d'affaires,  this  gov- 
ernment will  declare  martial  law;  and,  by  virtue  of  vested  con- 
stitutional authority,  when  public  order  is  disturbed,  will  approve 
by  decree  the  ratification  of  the  canal  treaty  as  signed ;  or,  if  the 
Government  of  the  United  States  prefers,  will  call  extra  session 
of  the  Congress — with  new  and  friendly  members — next  May  to 
approve  the  treaty.  [An  eminent  Colombian]  has  the  perfect  con- 
fidence of  vice-president,  he  says,  and  if  it  became  necessary  will 
go  to  the  Isthmus  or  send  representative  there  to  adjust  matters 
along  above  lines  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  people  there. 

This   dispatch   is   noteworthy    from   two   standpoints. 


Appendices  361 

Its  offer  of  immediately  guaranteeing  the  treaty  to  us 
is  in  sharp  contrast  with  the  positive  and  contemptuous 
refusal  of  the  Congress  which  has  just  closed  its  sessions 
to  consider  favorably  such  a  treaty ;  it  shows  that  the  gov- 
ernment which  made  the  treaty  really  had  absolute  con- 
trol over  the  situation,  but  did  not  choose  to  exercise  this 
control.  The  dispatch  further  calls  on  us  to  restore  order 
and  secure  Colombian  supremacy  in  the  Isthmus  from 
which  the  Colombian  Government  has  just  by  its  action 
decided  to  bar  us  by  preventing  the  construction  of  the 
canal. 

The  control,  in  the  interest  of  the  commerce  and  traffic 
of  the  whole  civilized  world,  of  the  means  of  undisturbed 
transit  across  the  Isthmus  of  Panama  has  become  of 
transcendent  importance  to  the  United  States.  We  have 
repeatedly  exercised  this  control  by  intervening  in  the 
course  of  domestic  dissension,  and  by  protecting  the  ter- 
ritory from  foreign  invasion.  In  1853  Mr.  Everett  as- 
sured the  Peruvian  minister  that  we  should  not  hesitate 
to  maintain  the  neutrality  of  the  Isthmus  in  the  case  of 
war  between  Peru  and  Colombia.  In  1864  Colombia, 
which  has  always  been  vigilant  to  avail  itself  of  its 
privileges  conferred  by  the  treaty,  expressed  its  expecta- 
tion that  in  the  event  of  war  between  Peru  and  Spain  the 
United  States  would  carry  into  effect  the  guarantee  of 
neutrality.  There  have  been  few  administrations  of  the 
State  Department  in  which  this  treaty  has  not,  either  by 
the  one  side  or  the  other,  been  used  as  a  basis  of  more 
or  less  important  demands.  It  was  said  by  Mr.  Fish  in 
1 87 1  that  the  Department  of  State  had  reason  to  believe 
that  an  attack  upon  Colombian  sovereignty  on  the  Isthmus 


362  Appendices 

had,  on  several  occasions,  been  averted  by  warning  from 
this  Government.  In  1886,  when  Colombia  was  under  the 
menace  of  hostiHties  from  Italy  in  the  Cerruti  case,  Mr. 
Bayard  expressed  the  serious  concern  that  the  United 
States  could  not  but  feel  that  a  European  power  should 
resort  to  force  against  a  sister  republic  of  this  hemi- 
sphere, as  to  the  sovereign  and  uninterrupted  use  of  a 
part  of  whose  territory  we  are  guarantors  under  the 
solemn  faith  of  a  treaty. 

The  above  recital  of  facts  establishes  beyond  question : 
First,  that  the  United  States  has  for  over  half  a  century 
patiently  and  in  good  faith  carried  out  its  obligations 
under  the  Treaty  of  1846;  second,  that  when  for  the  first 
time  it  became  possible  for  Colombia  to  do  anything  in 
requital  of  the  services  thus  repeatedly  rendered  to  it 
for  fifty-seven  years  by  the  United  States,  the  Colombian 
Government  peremptorily  and  offensively  refused  thus  to 
do  its  part,  even  though  to  do  so  would  have  been  to  its 
advantage  and  immeasurably  to  the  advantage  of  the 
State  of  Panama,  at  that  time  under  its  jurisdiction; 
third,  that  throughout  this  period  revolutions,  riots,  and 
factional  disturbances  of  every  kind  have  occurred  one 
alter  the  other  in  almost  uninterrupted  succession,  some 
of  them  lasting  for  months  and  even  for  years,  while  the 
central  government  was  unable  to  put  them  down  or  to 
make  peace  with  the  rebels;  fourth,  that  these  disturb- 
ances instead  of  showing  any  sign  of  abating  have  tended 
to  grow  more  numerous  and  more  serious  in  the  im- 
mediate past ;  fifth,  that  the  control  of  Colombia  over  the 
Isthmus  of  Panama  could  not  be  maintained  without  the 
armed  intervention  and  assistance  of  the  United  States. 


Appendices  363 

In  other  words,  the  Government  of  Colombia,  though 
wholly  unable  to  maintain  order  on  the  Isthmus,  has 
nevertheless  declined  to  ratify  a  treaty  the  conclusion  of 
which  opened  the  only  chance  to  secure  its  own  stability 
and  to  guarantee  permanent  peace  on,  and  the  construc- 
tion of  a  canal  across,  the  Isthmus. 

Under  such  circumstances,  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  would  have  been  guilty  of  folly  and  weak- 
ness, amounting  in  their  sum  to  a  crime  against  the  Na- 
tion, had  it  acted  otherwise  than  it  did  when  the  revolu- 
tion of  November  3  last  took  place  in  Panama.  This 
great  enterprise  of  building  the  interoceanic  canal  can  not 
be  held  up  to  gratify  the  whims,  or  out  of  respect  to  the 
governmental  impotence,  or  to  the  even  more  sinister  and 
evil  political  peculiarities,  of  people  who,  though  they 
dwell  afar  off,  yet,  against  the  wish  of  the  actual  dwellers 
on  the  Isthmus,  assert  an  unreal  supremacy  over  the  ter- 
ritory. The  possession  of  a  territory  fraught  with  such 
peculiar  capacities  as  the  Isthmus  in  question  carries  with 
it  obligations  to  mankind.  The  course  of  events  has 
shown  that  this  canal  can  not  be  built  by  private  enter- 
prise, or  by  any  other  nation  than  our  own;  therefore  it 
must  be  built  by  the  United  States. 

Every  effort  has  been  made  by  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  to  persuade  Colombia  to  follow  a  course 
which  was  essential  not  only  to  our  interests  and  to  the 
interests  of  the  world,  but  to  the  interests  of  Colombia 
itself.  These  efforts  have  failed;  and  Colombia,  by  her 
persistence  in  repulsing  the  advances  that  have  been  made, 
has  forced  us,  for  the  sake  of  our  own  honor,  and  of  the 
interest  and  well-being,  not  merely  of  our  own  people, 


364  Appendices 

but  of  the  people  of  the  Isthmus  of  Panama  and  the 
people  of  the  civilized  countries  of  the  world,  to  take 
decisive  steps  to  bring  to  an  end  a  condition  of  affairs 
which  had  become  intolerable.  The  new  Republic  of 
Panama  immediately  offered  to  negotiate  a  treaty  with 
us.  This  treaty  I  herewith  submit.  By  it  our  interests 
are  better  safeguarded  than  in  the  treaty  with  Colombia 
which  was  ratified  by  the  Senate  at  its  last  session.  It 
is  better  in  its  terms  than  the  treaties  offered  to  us  by  the 
Republics  of  Nicaragua  and  Costa  Rica.  At  last  the 
right  to  begin  this  great  undertaking  is  made  available. 
Panama  has  done  her  part.  All  that  remains  is  for  the 
American  Congress  to  do  its  part  and  forthwith  this  Re- 
public will  enter  upon  the  execution  of  a  project  colossal 
in  its  size  and  of  well-nigh  incalculable  possibilities  for 
the  good  of  this  country  and  the  nations  of  mankind. 

By  the  provisions  of  the  treaty  the  United  States 
guarantees  and  will  maintain  the  independence  of  the 
Republic  of  Panama.  There  is  granted  to  the  United 
States  in  perpetuity  the  use,  occupation,  and  control  of 
a  strip  ten  miles  wide  and  extending  three  nautical  miles 
into  the  sea  at  either  terminal,  with  all  lands  lying  out- 
side of  the  zone  necessary  for  the  construction  of  the 
canal  or  for  its  auxiliary  works,  and  with  the  islands  in 
the  Bay  of  Panama.  The  cities  of  Panama  and  Colon 
are  not  embraced  in  the  canal  zone,  but  the  United  States 
assumes  their  sanitation  and,  in  case  of  need,  the  main- 
tenance of  order  therein ;  the  United  States  enjoys  within 
the  granted  limits  all  the  rights,  power,  and  authority 
which  it  would  possess  were  it  the  sovereign  of  the  ter- 
ritory to  the  exclusion  of  the  exercise  of  sovereign  rights 


Appendices  365 

by  the  republic.  All  railway  and  canal  property  rights 
belonging  to  Panama  and  needed  for  the  canal  pass  to 
the  United  States,  including  any  property  of  the  respec- 
tive companies  in  the  cities  of  Panama  and  Colon;  the 
works,  property,  and  personnel  of  the  canal  and  railways 
are  exempted  from  taxation  as  well  in  the  cities  of 
Panama  and  Colon  as  in  the  canal  zone  and  its  depend- 
encies. Free  immigration  of  the  personnel  and  importa- 
tion of  supplies  for  the  construction  and  operation  of  the 
canal  are  granted.  Provision  is  made  for  the  use  of  mili- 
tary force  and  the  building  of  fortifications  by  the  United 
States  for  the  protection  of  the  transit.  In  other  details, 
particularly  as  to  the  acquisition  of  the  interests  of  the 
New  Panama  Canal  Company  and  the  Panama  Railway 
by  the  United  States  and  the  condemnation  of  private 
property  for  the  uses  of  the  canal,  the  stipulations  of  the 
Hay-Herran  treaty  are  closely  followed,  while  the  com- 
pensation to  be  given  for  these  enlarged  grants  remains 
the  same,  being  ten  millions  of  dollars  payable  on  ex- 
change of  ratifications;  and,  beginning  nine  years  from 
that  date,  an  annual  payment  of  $250,000  during  the  life 
of  the  convention. 


II 

PRESIDENT  ROOSEVELT'S  MESSAGE  TO  THE 
CONGRESS— JANUARY  4,  1904. 

I  lay  before  the  Congress  for  its  information  a  state- 
ment of  my  action  up  to  this  time  in  executing  the  act 
entitled  "An  act  to  provide  for  the  construction  of  a  canal 
connecting  the  waters  of  the  Atlantic  and  Pacific  Oceans," 
approved  June  28,  1902. 

By  the  said  act  the  President  was  authorized  to  secure 
for  the  United  States  the  property  of  the  Panama  Canal 
Company  and  the  perpetual  control  of  a  strip  six  miles 
wide  across  the  Isthmus  of  Panama.  It  was  further 
provided  that  "should  the  President  be  unable  to  obtain 
for  the  United  States  a  satisfactory  title  to  the  property 
of  the  New  Panama  Canal  Company  and  the  control  of 
the  necessary  territory  of  the  Republic  of  Colombia  .  .  . 
within  a  reasonable  time  and  upon  reasonable  terms,  then 
the  President"  should  endeavor  to  provide  for  a  canal  by 
the  Nicaragua  route.  The  language  quoted  defines  with 
exactness  and  precision  what  was  to  be  done,  and  what  as 
a  matter  of  fact  has  been  done.  The  President  was 
authorized  to  go  to  the  Nicaragua  route  only  if  within  a 
reasonable  time  he  could  not  obtain  "control  of  the  nec- 
essary territory  of  the  Republic  of  Colombia."  This  con- 
trol has  now  been  obtained ;  the  provision  of  the  act  has 

366 


Appendices  367 

been  complied  with ;  it  is  no  longer  possible  under  exist- 
ing legislation  to  go  to  the  Nicaragua  route  as  an  alterna- 
tive. 

This  act  marked  the  climax  of  the  effort  on  the  part 
of  the  United  States  to  secure,  so  far  as  legislation  was 
concerned,  an  interoceanic  canal  across  the  Isthmus.  The 
effort  to  secure  a  treaty  for  this  purpose  with  one  of  the 
Central  American  republics  did  not  stand  on  the  same 
footing  with  the  effort  to  secure  a  treaty  under  any 
ordinary  conditions.  The  proper  position  for  the  United 
States  to  assume  in  reference  to  this  canal,  and  there- 
fore to  the  governments  of  the  Isthmus,  had  been  clearly 
set  forth  by  Secretary  Cass  in  1858.  In  my  Annual  Mes- 
sage I  have  already  quoted  what  Secretary  Cass  said ;  but 
I  repeat  the  quotation  here,  because  the  principle  it  states 
is  fundamental: 

While  the  rights  of  sovereignty  of  the  States  occupying  this  re- 
gion (Central  America)  should  always  be  respected,  we  shall  ex- 
pect that  these  rights  be  exercised  in  a  spirit  befitting  the  oc- 
casion and  the  wants  and  circumstances  that  have  arisen. 
Sovereignty  has  its  duties  as  well  as  its  rights,  and  none  of  these 
local  governments,  even  if  administered  with  more  regard  to 
the  just  demands  of  other  nations  than  they  have  been,  would  be 
permitted,  in  a  spirit  of  Eastern  isolation,  to  close  the  gates  of 
intercourse  on  the  great  highways  of  the  world,  and  justify  the 
act  by  the  pretension  that  these  avenues  of  trade  and  travel  be- 
long to  them  and  that  they  choose  to  shut  them,  or,  what  is  al- 
most equivalent,  to  encumber  them  with  such  unjust  relations 
as  would  prevent  their  general  use. 

The  principle  thus  enunciated  by  Secretary  Cass  was 
sound  then  and  it  is  sound  now.  The  United  States  has 
taken  the  position  that  no  other  government  is  to  build 
the  canal.  In  1889,  when  France  proposed  to  come  to  the 
aid  of  the  French  Panama  Company  by  guaranteeing  their 


368  Appendices 

bonds,  the  Senate  of  the  United  States  in  executive  ses- 
sion, with  only  some  three  votes  dissenting,  passed  a  reso- 
lution as  follows: 

That  the  Government  of  the  United  States  will  look  with 
serious  concern  and  disapproval  upon  any  connection  of  any  Euro- 
pean government  with  the  construction  or  control  of  any  ship 
canal  across  the  Isthmus  of  Darien  or  across  Central  America, 
and  must  regard  any  such  connection  or  control  as  injurious  to 
the  just  rights  and  interests  of  the  United  States  and  as  a  menace 
to  their  welfare. 

Under  the  Hay-Pauncefote  treaty  it  was  explicitly 
provided  that  the  United  States  should  control,  police, 
and  protect  the  canal  which  was  to  be  built,  keeping  it 
open  for  the  vessels  of  all  nations  on  equal  terms.  The 
United  States  thus  assumed  the  position  of  guarantor 
of  the  canal  and  of  its  peaceful  use  by  all  the  world. 
The  guarantee  included  as  a  matter  of  course  the  build- 
ing of  the  canal.  The  enterprise  was  recognized  as  re- 
sponding to  an  international  need;  and  it  would  be  the 
veriest  travesty  on  right  and  justice  to  treat  the  govern- 
ments in  possession  of  the  Isthmus  as  having  the  right, 
in  the  language  of  Mr.  Cass,  "to  close  the  gates  of  in- 
tercourse on  the  great  highways  of  the  world,  and  justify 
the  act  by  the  pretension  that  these  avenues  of  trade  and 
travel  belong  to  them  and  that  they  choose  to  shut  them." 

When  this  Government  submitted  to  Colombia  the  Hay- 
Herran  treaty  three  things  were,  therefore,  already  set- 
tled. 

One  was  that  the  canal  should  be  built.  The  time  for 
delay,  the  time  for  permitting  the  attempt  to  be  made  by 
private  enterprise,  the  time  for  permitting  any  govern- 
ment of  anti-social  spirit  and  of  imperfect  development 


Appendices  369 

to  bar  the  work,  was  past.  The  United  States  had  as- 
sumed in  connection  with  the  canal  certain  responsibiHties 
not  only  to  its  own  people,  but  to  the  civilized  world, 
which  imperatively  demanded  that  there  should  no  longer 
be  delay  in  beginning  the  work. 

Second.  While  it  was  settled  that  the  canal  should  be 
built  without  unnecessary  or  improper  delay,  it  was  no 
less  clearly  shown  to  be  our  purpose  to  deal  not  merely 
in  a  spirit  of  justice  but  in  a  spirit  of  generosity  with 
the  people  through  whose  land  we  might  build  it.  The 
Hay-Herran  treaty,  if  it  erred  at  all,  erred  in  the  direc- 
tion of  an  overgenerosity  toward  the  Colombian  Govern- 
ment. In  our  anxiety  to  be  fair  we  had  gone  to  the  very 
verge  in  yielding  to  a  weak  nation's  demands  what  that 
nation  was  helplessly  unable  to  enforce  from  us  against 
our  will.  The  only  criticisms  made  upon  the  Administra- 
tion for  the  terms  of  the  Hay-Herran  treaty  were  for 
having  granted  too  much  to  Colombia,  not  for  failure  to 
grant  enough.  Neither  in  the  Congress  nor  in  the  public 
press,  at  the  time  that  this  treaty  was  formulated,  was 
there  complaint  that  it  did  not  in  the  fullest  and  amplest 
manner  guarantee  to  Colombia  everything  that  she  could 
by  any  color  of  title  demand. 

Nor  is  the  fact  to  be  lost  sight  of  that  the  rejected 
treaty,  while  generously  responding  to  the  pecuniary  de- 
mands of  Colombia,  in  other  respects  merely  provided 
for  the  construction  of  the  canal  in  conformity  with  the 
express  requirements  of  the  act  of  the  Congress  of  June 
28,  1902.  By  that  act,  as  heretofore  quoted,  the  Presi- 
dent was  authorized  to  acquire  from  Colombia,  for  the 
purposes  of  the  canal,  "perpetual  control"  of  a  certain 


370  Appendices 

strip  of  land;  and  it  was  expressly  required  that  the 
"control"  thus  to  be  obtained  should  include  "jurisdic- 
tion" to  make  police  and  sanitary  regulations  and  to  es- 
tablish such  judicial  tribunals  as  might  be  agreed  on  for 
their  enforcement.  These  were  conditions  precedent  pre- 
scribed by  the  Congress ;  and  for  their  fulfillment  suitable 
stipulations  were  embodied  in  the  treaty.  It  has  been 
stated  in  public  prints  that  Colombia  objected  to  these 
stipulations,  on  the  ground  that  they  involved  a  relinquish- 
ment of  her  "sovereignty" ;  but  in  the  light  of  what  has 
taken  place,  this  alleged  objection  must  be  considered  as 
an  afterthought.  In  reality,  the  treaty,  instead  of  re- 
quiring a  cession  of  Colombia's  sovereignty  over  the  canal 
strip,  expressly  acknowledged,  confirmed,  and  preserved 
her  sovereignty  over  it.  The  treaty  in  this  respect  simply 
proceeded  on  the  lines  on  which  all  the  negotiations  lead- 
ing up  to  the  present  situation  have  been  conducted.  In 
those  negotiations  the  exercise  by  the  United  States,  sub- 
ject to  the  paramount  rights  of  the  local  sovereign,  of  a 
substantial  control  over  the  canal  and  the  immediately 
adjacent  territory,  has  been  treated  as  a  fundamental  part 
of  any  arrangement  that  might  be  made.  It  has  formed 
an  essential  feature  of  all  our  plans,  and  its  necessity  is 
fully  recognized  in  the  Hay-Pauncefote  treaty.  The 
Congress,  in  providing  that  such  control  should  be  secured, 
adopted  no  new  principle,  but  only  incorporated  in  its 
legislation  a  condition  the  importance  and  propriety  of 
which  were  universally  recognized.  During  all  the  years 
of  negotiation  and  discussion  that  preceded  the  conclusion 
of  the  Hay-Herran  treaty,  Colombia  never  intimated  that 
the  requirement  by  the  United  States  of  control  over  the 


Appendices  371 

canal  strip  would  render  unattainable  the  construction  of 
a  canal  by  way  of  the  Isthmus  of  Panama ;  nor  were  we 
advised,  during  the  months  when  legislation  of  1902  was 
pending  before  the  Congress,  that  the  terms  which  it 
embodied  would  render  negotiations  with  Colombia  im- 
practicable. It  is  plain  that  no  nation  could  construct 
and  guarantee  the  neutrality  of  the  canal  with  a  less 
degree  of  control  than  was  stipulated  for  in  the  Hay- 
Herran  treaty.  A  refusal  to  grant  such  degree  of  con- 
trol was  necessarily  a  refusal  to  make  any  practicable 
treaty  at  all.  Such  refusal  therefore  squarely  raised  the 
question  whether  Colombia  was  entitled  to  bar  the  transit 
of  the  world's  traffic  across  the  Isthmus. 

That  the  canal  itself  was  eagerly  demanded  by  the 
people  of  the  locality  through  which  it  was  to  pass,  and 
that  the  people  of  this  locality  no  less  eagerly  longed  for 
its  construction  under  American  control,  are  shown  by 
the  unanimity  of  action  in  the  new  Panama  Republic. 
Furthermore,  Colombia,  after  having  rejected  the  treaty 
in  spite  of  our  protests  and  warnings  when  it  was  in  her 
power  to  accept  it,  has  since  shown  the  utmost  eagerness 
to  accept  the  same  treaty  if  only  the  status  quo  could  be 
restored.  One  of  the  men  standing  highest  in  the  official 
circles  of  Colombia,  on  November  6,  addressed  the  Ameri- 
can minister  at  Bogota,  saying  that  if  the  Government  of 
the  United  States  would  land  troops  to  preserve  Colom- 
bian sovereignty  and  the  transit,  the  Colombian  Govern- 
ment would  "declare  martial  law ;  and,  by  virtue  of  vested 
constitutional  authority,  when  public  order  is  disturbed, 
[would]  approve  by  decree  the  ratification  of  the  canal 
treaty  as  signed;  or,  if  the  Government  of  the  United 


372  Appendices 

States  prefers,  [would]  call  extra  session  of  the  Congress 
— with  new  and  friendly  members — next  May  to  approve 
the  treaty."  Having  these  facts  in  view,  there  is  no 
shadow  of  question  that  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  proposed  a  treaty  which  was  not  merely  just,  but 
generous  to  Colombia,  which  our  people  regarded  as 
erring,  if  at  all,  on  the  side  of  overgenerosity ;  which  was 
hailed  with  delight  by  the  people  of  the  immediate  locality 
through  which  the  canal  was  to  pass,  who  were  most  con- 
cerned as  to  the  new  order  of  things,  and  which  the 
Colombian  authorities  now  recognize  as  being  so  good 
that  they  are  willing  to  promise  its  unconditional  ratifica- 
tion if  only  we  will  desert  those  who  have  shown  them- 
selves our  friends  and  restore  to  those  who  have  shown 
themselves  unfriendly  the  power  to  undo  what  they  did. 
I  pass  by  the  question  as  to  what  assurance  we  have  that 
they  would  now  keep  their  pledge  and  not  again  refuse 
to  ratify  the  treaty  if  they  had  the  power ;  for,  of  course, 
I  will  not  for  one  moment  discuss  the  possibility  of  the 
United  States  committing  an  act  of  such  baseness  as  to 
abandon  the  new  Republic  of  Panama. 

Third.  Finally  the  Congress  definitely  settled  where 
the  canal  was  to  be  built.  It  was  provided  that  a  treaty 
should  be  made  for  building  the  canal  across  the  Isthmus 
of  Panama;  and  if,  after  reasonable  time,  it  proved  im- 
possible to  secure  such  treaty,  that  then  we  should  go  to 
Nicaragua.  The  treaty  has  been  made;  for  it  needs  no 
argument  to  show  that  the  intent  of  the  Congress  was  to 
ensure  a  canal  across  Panama,  and  that  whether  the  re- 
public granting  the  title  was  called  New  Granada,  Colom- 
bia, or  Panama  mattered  not  one  whit.    As  events  turned 


Appendices  373 

out,  the  question  of  "reasonable  time"  did  not  enter  into 
the  matter  at  all.  Although,  as  the  months  went  by,  it 
became  increasingly  improbable  that  the  Colombian  Con- 
gress would  ratify  the  treaty  or  take  steps  which  would 
be  equivalent  thereto,  yet  all  chance  for  such  action  on 
their  part  did  not  vanish  until  the  Congress  closed  at  the 
end  of  October ;  and  within  three  days  thereafter  the  rev- 
olution in  Panama  had  broken  out.  Panama  became  an 
independent  state,  and  the  control  of  the  territory  neces- 
sary for  building  the  canal  then  became  obtainable.  The 
condition  under  which  alone  we  could  have  gone  to  Nica- 
ragua thereby  became  impossible  of  fulfillment.  If  the 
pending  treaty  with  Panama  should  not  be  ratified  by  the 
Senate  this  would  not  alter  the  fact  that  we  could  not  go 
to  Nicaragua.  The  Congress  has  decided  the  route,  and 
there  is  no  alternative  under  existing  legislation. 

When  in  August  it  began  to  appear  probable  that  the 
Colombian  Legislature  would  not  ratify  the  treaty,  it  be- 
came incumbent  upon  me  to  consider  well  what  the  situa- 
tion was  and  to  be  ready  to  advise  the  Congress  as  to  what 
were  the  various  alternatives  of  action  open  to  us.  There 
were  several  possibilities.  One  was  that  Colombia  would 
at  the  last  moment  see  the  unwisdom  of  her  position. 
That  there  might  be  nothing  omitted,  Secretary  Hay, 
through  the  minister  at  Bogota,  repeatedly  warned  Colom- 
bia that  grave  consequences  might  follow  from  her  rejec- 
tion of  the  treaty.  Although  it  was  a  constantly  diminish- 
ing chance,  yet  the  possibility  of  ratification  did  not  wholly 
pass  away  until  the  close  of  the  session  of  the  Colombian 
Congress. 

A  second  alternative  was  that  by  the  close  of  the  session 


374  Appendices 

on  the  last  day  of  October,  without  the  ratification  of  the 
treaty  by  Colombia  and  without  any  steps  taken  by 
Panama,  the  American  Congress  on  assembling  early  in 
December  would  be  confronted  with  a  situation  in  which 
there  had  been  a  failure  to  come  to  terms  as  to  building 
the  canal  along  the  Panama  route,  and  yet  there  had  not 
been  a  lapse  of  reasonable  time — using  the  word  reason- 
able in  any  proper  sense — such  as  would  justify  the  Ad- 
ministration going  to  the  Nicaragua  route.  This  situa- 
tion seemed  on  the  whole  the  most  likely,  and  as  a  matter 
of  fact  I  had  made  the  original  draft  of  my  Message  to 
the  Congress  with  a  view  to  its  existence. 

It  was  the  opinion  of  eminent  international  jurists  that 
in  view  of  the  fact  that  the  great  design  of  our  guarantee 
under  the  treaty  of  1846  was  to  dedicate  the  Isthmus  to 
the  purposes  of  interoceanic  transit,  and  above  all  to 
secure  the  construction  of  an  interoceanic  canal,  Colom- 
bia could  not  under  existing  conditions  refuse  to  enter 
into  a  proper  arrangement  with  the  United  States  to  that 
end,  without  violating  the  spirit  and  substantially  repudiat- 
ing the  obligations  of  a  treaty  the  full  benefits  of  which 
she  had  enjoyed  for  over  fifty  years.  My  intention  was 
to  consult  the  Congress  as  to  whether  under  such  cir- 
cumstances it  would  not  be  proper  to  announce  that  the 
canal  was  to  be  dug  forthwith;  that  we  would  give  the 
terms  that  we  had  offered  and  no  others ;  and  that  if  such 
terms  were  not  agreed  to  we  would  enter  into  an  arrange- 
ment with  Panama  direct,  or  take  what  other  steps  were 
needful  in  order  to  begin  the  enterprise. 

A  third  possibility  was  that  the  people  of  the  Isthmus, 
who  had  formerly  constituted  an  independent  state,  and 


Appendices  375 

who  until  recently  were  united  to  Colombia  only  by  a 
loose  tie  of  federal  relationship,  might  take  the  protec- 
tion of  their  own  vital  interests  into  their  own  hands, 
reassert  their  former  rights,  declare  their  independence 
upon  just  grounds,  and  establish  a  government  competent 
and  willing  to  do  its  share  in  this  great  work  for  civiliza- 
tion. This  third  possibility  is  what  actually  occurred. 
Every  one  knew  that  it  was  a  possibility,  but  it  was  not 
until  toward  the  end  of  October  that  it  appeared  to  be 
an  imminent  probability.  Although  the  Administration, 
of  course,  had  special  means  of  knowledge,  no  such  means 
were  necessary  in  order  to  appreciate  the  possibility,  and 
toward  the  end  the  likelihood,  of  such  a  revolutionary 
outbreak  and  of  its  success.  It  was  a  matter  of  common 
notoriety.  Quotations  from  the  daily  papers  could  be 
indefinitely  multiplied  to  show  this  state  of  affairs ;  a  very 
few  will  suffice.  From  Costa  Rica  on  August  31a  special 
was  sent  to  the  Washington  Post,  running  as  follows : 

San  Jose,  Costa  Rica, 
August  31 

Travelers  from  Panama  report  the  Isthmus  alive  with  fires 
of  a  new  revolution.  It  is  inspired,  it  is  believed,  by  men  who, 
in  Panama  and  Colon,  have  systematically  engendered  the  pro- 
American  feeling  to  secure  the  building  of  the  Isthmian  Canal 
by  the  United  States. 

The  Indians  have  risen,  and  the  late  followers  of  Gen.  Ben- 
jamin Herrera  are  mustering  in  the  mountain  villages,  prepara- 
tory to  joining  in  an  organized  revolt,  caused  by  the  rejection 
of  the  canal  treaty. 

Hundreds  of  stacks  of  arms,  confiscated  by  the  Colombian  Gov- 
ernment at  the  close  of  the  late  revolution,  have  reappeared 
from  some  mysterious  source,  and  thousands  of  rifles  that  look 
suspiciously  like  the  Mausers  the  United  States  captured  in  Cuba 
are  issuing  to  the  gathering  forces  from  central  points  of  dis- 
tribution.   With  the   arms  goes   ammunition,   fresh   from   fac- 


2i7(>  Appendices 

tojies,  showing  the  movement  is  not  spasmodic,  but  is  carefully 
planned. 

The  government  forces  in  Panama  and  Colon,  numbering  less 
than  1,500  men,  are  reported  to  be  a  little  more  than  friendly 
to  the  revolutionary  spirit.  They  have  been  ill  paid  since  the 
revolution  closed,  and  their  only  hope  of  prompt  payment  is 
another  war. 

General  Huertes,  commander  o^  the  forces,  who  is  ostensibly 
loyal  to  the  Bogota  Government,  is  said  to  be  secretly  friendly 
to  the  proposed  revolution.  At  least,  all  his  personal  friends  are 
open  in  denunciation  of  the  Bogota  Government  and  the  failure 
of  the  Colombian  Congress  to  ratify  the  canal  treaty. 

The  consensus  of  opinion  gathered  from  late  arrivals  from 
the  Isthmus  is  that  the  revolution  is  coming,  and  that  it  will  suc- 
ceed. 

A  special  dispatch  to  the  Washington  Post,  under  date 
of  New  York,  September  i,  runs  as  follows : 

B.  G.  Duque,  editor  and  proprietor  of  the  Panama  Star  and 
Herald,  a  resident  of  the  Isthmus  during  the  past  twenty-seven 
years,  who  arrived  to-day  in  New  York,  declared  that  if  the  canal 
treaty  fell  through  a  revolution  would  be  likely  to  follow. 

"There  is  a  very  strong  feeling  in  Panama,"  said  Mr.  Duque, 
"that  Colombia,  in  negotiating  the  sale  of  a  canal  concession  in 
Panama,  is  looking  for  profits  that  might  just  as  well  go  to 
Panama  herself. 

"The  Colombian  Government,  only  the  other  day,  suppressed  a 
newspaper  that  dared  to  speak  of  independence  for  Panama.  A 
while  ago  there  was  a  secret  plan  afoot  to  cut  loose  from  Co- 
lombia and  seek  the  protection  of  the  United  States." 

In  the  New  York  Herald  of  September  10  the  follow- 
ing statement  appeared : 

Representatives  of  strong  interests  on  the  Isthmus  of  Panama, 
who  make  their  headquarters  in  this  city,  are  considering  a  plan 
of  action  to  be  undertaken  in  cooperation  with  men  of  similar 
views  in  Panama  and  Colon  to  bring  about  a  revolution  and 
form  an  independent  government  in  Panama  opposed  to  that  in 
Bogota. 


Appendices  Z77 

There  is  much  indignation  on  the  Isthmus  on  account  of  the 
failure  of  the  canal  treaty,  which  is  ascribed  to  the  authorities  at 
Bogota.  This  opinion  is  believed  to  be  shared  by  a  majority 
of  the  Isthmians  of  all  shades  of  political  belief,  and  they  think 
it  is  to  their  best  interest  for  a  new  republic  to  be  formed  on  the 
Isthmus,  which  may  negotiate  directly  with  the  United  States  a 
new  treaty  which  will  permit  the  digging  of  the  Panama  Canal 
under  favorable  conditions. 

In  the  New  York  Times ,  under  date  of  September  13, 
there  appeared  from  Bogota  the  following  statement : 

A  proposal  made  by  Senor  Perez  y  Sotos  to  ask  the  Executive 
to  appoint  an  anti-secessionist  governor  in  Panama  has  been  ap- 
proved by  the  Senate.  Speakers  in  the  Senate  said  that  Senor 
Obaldia,  who  was  recently  appointed  Governor  of  Panama,  and 
who  is  favorable  to  a  canal  treaty,  was  a  menace  to  the  national 
integrity.  Senator  Marroquin  protested  against  the  action  of  the 
Senate. 

President  Marroquin  succeeded  later  in  calming  the  Congress- 
men. It  appears  that  he  was  able  to  give  them  satisfactory  rea- 
sons for  Governor  Obaldia's  appointment.  He  appears  to  realize 
the  imminent  peril  of  the  Isthmus  of  Panama  declaring  its  in- 
dependence. 

Seiior  Deroux,  representative  for  a  Panama  constituency,  re- 
cently delivered  a  sensational  speech  in  the  House.  Among  other 
things  he  said: 

"In  Panama  the  bishops,  governors,  magistrates,  military  chiefs, 
and  their  subordinates  have  been  and  are  foreign  to  the  depart- 
ment. It  seems  that  the  government,  with  surprising  tenacity, 
wishes  to  exclude  the  Isthmus  from  all  participation  in  public  af- 
fairs. As  regards  international  dangers  in  the  Isthmus,  all  I  can 
say  is  that  if  these  dangers  exist  they  are  due  to  the  conduct  of 
the  national  government,  which  is  in  the  direction  of  reaction. 

"If  the  Colombian  Government  will  not  take  action  with  a  view 
to  preventing  disaster,  the  responsibility  will  rest  with  it  alone." 

In  the  New  York  Herald  of  October  26  it  was  reported 
that  a  revolutionary  expedition  of  about  70  men  had 
actually  landed  on  the  Isthmus.  In  the  Washington 
Post  of  October  29  it  was  reported  from  Panama  that  in 


37^  Appendices 

view  of  the  impending  trouble  on  the  Isthmus  the  Bogota 
Government  had  gathered  troops  in  sufficient  numbers  to 
at  once  put  down  an  attempt  at  secession.  In  the  New 
York  Herald 'oi  October  30  it  was  announced  from 
Panama  that  Bogota  was  hurrying  troops  to  the  Isthmus 
to  put  down  the  projected  revolt.  In  the  New  York 
Herald  of  November  2  it  was  announced  that  in  Bogota 
the  Congress  had  indorsed  the  energetic  measures  taken 
to  meet  the  situation  on  the  Isthmus  and  that  6,000  men 
were  about  to  be  sent  thither. 

Quotations  like  the  above  could  be  multiplied  indefi- 
nitely. Suffice  it  to  say  that  it  was  notorious  that  revolu- 
tionary trouble  of  a  serious  nature  was  impending  upon 
the  Isthmus.  But  it  was  not  necessary  to  rely  exclusively 
upon  such  general  means  of  information.  On  October 
15  Commander  Hubbard,  of  the  navy,  notified  the  Navy 
Department  that,  though  things  were  quiet  on  the  Isthmus, 
a  revolution  had  broken  out  in  the  State  of  Cauca.  On 
October  16,  at  the  request  of  Lieutenant-General  Young, 
I  saw  Capt.  C.  B.  Humphrey  and  Lieut.  Grayson  Mallet- 
Prevost  Murphy,  who  had  just  returned  from  a  four 
months'  tour  through  the  northern  portions  of  Venezuela 
and  Colombia.  They  stopped  in  Panama  on  their  return 
in  the  latter  part  of  September.  At  the  time  they  were 
sent  down  there  had  been  no  thought  of  their  going  to 
Panama,  and  their  visit  to  the  Isthmus  was  but  an  un- 
premeditated incident  of  their  return  journey;  nor  had 
they  been  spoken  to  by  any  one  at  Washington  regarding 
the  possibility  of  a  revolt.  Until  they  landed  at  Colon 
they  had  no  knowledge  that  a  revolution  was  impending, 
save  what  they  had  gained  from  the  newspapers.     What 


Appendices  379 

they  saw  in  Panama  so  impressed  them  that  they  reported 
thereon  to  Lieutenant-General  Young,  according  to  his 
memorandum — 

that  while  on  the  Isthmus  they  became  satisfied  beyond  question 
that,  owing  largely  to  the  dissatisfaction  because  of  the  failure 
of  Colombia  to  ratify  the  Hay-Herran  treaty,  a  revolutionary 
party  was  in  course  of  organization  having  for  its  object  the 
separation  of  the  State  of  Panama  from  Colombia,  the  leader 
being  Dr.  Richard  Arango,  a  former  governor  of  Panama;  that 
when  they  were  on  the  Isthmus  arms  and  ammunition  were  being 
smuggled  into  the  city  of  Colon  in  piano  boxes,  merchandise 
crates,  etc.,  the  small  arms  received  being  principally  the  Gras 
French  rifle,  the  Remington,  and  the  Mauser;  that  nearly  every 
citizen  in  Panama  had  some  sort  of  rifle  or  gun  in  his  possession, 
with  ammunition  therefor ;  that  in  the  city  of  Panama  there  had 
been  organized  a  fire  brigade  which  was  really  intended  for  a 
revolutionary  military  organization;  that  there  were  representa- 
tives of  the  revolutionary  organization  at  all  important  points  on 
the  Isthmus;  that  in  Panama,  Colon,  and  the  other  principal 
places  of  the  Isthmus  police  forces  had  been  organized  which 
were  in  reality  revolutionary  forces;  that  the  people  on  the 
Isthmus  seemed  to  be  unanimous  in  their  sentiment  against  the 
Bogota  Government,  and  their  disgust  over  the  failure  of  that 
government  to  ratify  the  treaty  providing  for  the  construction  of 
the  canal,  and  that  a  revolution  might  be  expected  immediately 
upon  the  adjournment  of  the  Colombian  Congress  without  rati- 
fication of  the  treaty. 

Lieutenant-General  Young  regarded  their  report  as  of 
such  importance  as  to  make  it  advisable  that  I  should 
personally  see  these  officers.  They  told  me  what  they 
had  already  reported  to  the  Lieutenant-General,  adding 
that  on  the  Isthmus  the  excitement  was  seething,  and  that 
the  Colombian  troops  were  reported  to*  be  disaffected. 
In  response  to  a  question  of  mine  they  informed  me  that 
it  was  the  general  belief  that  the  revolution  might  break 
out  at  any  moment,  and  if  it  did  not  happen  before,  would 


380  Appendices 

doubtless  take  place  immediately  after  the  closing  of  the 
Colombian  Congress  (at  the  end  of  October)  if  the  canal 
treaty  were  not  ratified.  They  were  certain  that  the  revo- 
lution would  occur,  and  before  leaving  the  Isthmus  had 
made  their  own  reckoning  as  to  the  time,  which  they  had 
set  down  as  being  probably  from  three  to  four  weeks 
after  their  leaving.  The  reason  they  set  this  as  the  prob- 
able inside  limit  of  time  was  that  they  reckoned  that  it 
would  be  at  least  three  or  four  weeks — say  not  until 
October  20 — before  a  sufficient  quantity  of  arms  and 
munitions  would  have  been  landed. 

In  view  of  all  these  facts  I  directed  the  Navy  Depart- 
ment to  issue  instructions  such  as  would  ensure  our  hav- 
ing ships  within  easy  reach  of  the  Isthmus  in  the  event 
of  need  arising.  Orders  were  given  on  October  19  to 
the  Boston  to  proceed  to  San  Juan  del  Sur,  Nicaragua; 
to  the  Dixie  to  prepare  to  sail  from  League  Island ;  and 
to  the  Atlanta  to  proceed  to  Guantanamo.  On  October 
30  the  Nashville  was  ordered  to  proceed  to  Colon.  On 
November  2,  when,  the  Colombian  Congress  having  ad- 
journed, it  was  evident  that  the  outbreak  was  imminent, 
and  when  it  was  announced  that  both  sides  were  making 
ready  forces  whose  meeting  would  mean  bloodshed  and 
disorder,  the  Colombian  troops  haying  been  embarked  on 
vessels,  the  following  instructions  were  sent  to  the  com- 
manders of  the  Boston,  Nashville,  and  Dixie: 

Maintain  free  and  uninterrupted  transit.  If  interruption  is 
threatened  by  armed  force,  occupy  the  line  of  railroad.  Prevent 
landing  of  any  armed  force  with  hostile  intent,  either  government 
or  insurgent,  at  any  point  within  50  miles  of  Panama.  Govern- 
ment force  reported  approaching  the  Isthmus  in  vessels.  Pre- 
vent their  landing  if,  in  your  judgment,  the  landing  would  pre- 
cipitate a  conflict. 


Appendices  381 

These  orders  were  delivered  in  pursuance  of  the  policy 
on  which  our  Government  had  repeatedly  acted.  This 
policy  was  exhibited  in  the  following  orders,  given  under 
somewhat  similar  circumstances  last  year,  and  the  year 
before,  and  the  year  before  that.  The  first  two  tele- 
grams are  from  the  Department  of  State  to  the  consul  at 
Panama : 

July  25,  1900 
You  are  directed  to  protest  against  any  act  of  hostility  which 
may  involve  or  imperil  the  safe  and  peaceful  transit  of  persons 
or  property  across  the  Isthmus  of  Panama.  The  bombardment 
of  Panama  would  have  this  effect,  and  the  United  States  must 
insist  upon  the  neutrality  of  the  Isthmus  as  guaranteed  by  the 
treaty. 

November  20,  1901 
Notify  all  parties  molesting  or  interfering  with  free  transit 
across  the  Isthmus  that  such  interference  must  cease  and  that  the 
United  States  will  prevent  the  interruption  of  traffic  upon  the  rail- 
road. Consult  with  captain  of  the  Iowa,  who  will  be  instructed 
to  land  marines,  if  necessary,  for  the  protection  of  the  railroad, 
in  accordance  with  the  treaty  rights  and  obligations  of  the  United 
States.     Desirable  to  avoid  bloodshed,  if  possible. 

The  next  three  telegrams  are  from  and  to  the  Secre- 
tary of  the  Navy: 

September  12,  1902. 
Ranger,  Panama: 

United  States  guarantees  perfect  neutrality  of  Isthmus  and  that 
a  free  transit  from  sea  to  sea  be  not  interrupted  or  embar- 
rassed. .  .  .  Any  transportation  of  troops  which  might  contravene 
these  provisions  of  treaty  should  not  be  sanctioned  by  you  nor 
should  use  of  road  be  permitted  which  might  convert  the  line  of 
transit  into  theater  of  hostility.  Moody. 

Colon,  September  20,  1902. 
Secretary  Navy,  Washington: 

Everything  is  conceded.  The  United  States  guards  and  guar- 
antees traffic  and  the  line  of  transit.    To-day  I  permitted  the  ex- 


382  ^         Appendices 

change  of  Colombian  troops  from  Panama  to  Colon,  about  1,000 
men  each  way,  the  troops  without  arms  in  train  guarded  by  Amer- 
ican naval  force  in  the  same  manner  as  other  passengers;  arms 
and  ammunition  in  separate  train,  guarded  also  by  naval  force  in 
the  same  manner  as  other  freight. 

McLean. 

Panama,  October  3,  1902. 
Secretary  Navy,  Washington,  D.  C: 

Have  sent  this  communication  to  the  American  consul  at  Pan- 
ama: 

Inform  Governor  while  trains  running  under  United  States  pro- 
tection I  must  decline  transportation  any  combatants,  ammunition, 
arms,  which  might  cause  interruption  traffic  or  convert  line  of 
transit  into  theater  hostilities. 

Casey. 

On  November  3  Commander  Hubbard  responded  to 
the  above-quoted  telegram  of  November  2,  1903,  saying 
that  before  the  telegram  had  been  received  400  Colom- 
bian troops  from  Cartagena  had  landed  at  Colon;  that 
there  had  been  no  revolution  on  the  Isthmus,  but  that  the 
situation  was  most  critical  if  the  revolutionary  leaders 
should  act.  On  this  same  date  the  Associated  Press  in 
Washington  received  a  bulletin  stating  that  a  revolu- 
tionary outbreak  had  occurred.  When  this  was  brought 
to  the  attention  of  the  Assistant  Secretary  of  State,  Mr. 
Loomis,  he  prepared  the  following  cablegram  to  the  con- 
sul-general at  Panama  and  the  consul  at  Colon: 

Uprising  on  Isthmus  reported.  Keep  Department  promptly 
and  fully  informed. 

Before  this  telegram  was  sent,  however,  one  was  re- 
ceived from  Consul  Malmros  at  Colon,  running  as  fol- 
lows: 

Revolution  Imminent.  Government  force  on  the  Isthmus  about 
500  men.    Their  official  promised  support  revolution.    Fire  de- 


Appendices  383 

partment,  Panama,  441,  are  well  organized  and  favor  revolution. 
Government  vessel,  Cartagena,  with  about  400  men,  arrived  early 
to-day  with  new  commander-in-chief,  Tobar.  Was  not  expected 
until  November  10.  Tobar's  arrival  is  not  probable  to  stop  revolu- 
tion. 

This  cablegram  was  received  at  2.35  p.  m.,  and  at  3.40 
p.  M.  Mr.  Loomis  sent  the  telegram  which  he  had  already 
prepared  to  both  Panama  and  Colon.  Apparently,  how- 
ever, the  consul-general  at  Panama  had  not  received  the 
information  embodied  in  the  Associated  Press  bulletin, 
upon  which  the  Assistant  Secretary  of  State  based  his 
dispatch ;  for  his  answer  was  that  there  was  no  uprising, 
although  the  situation  was  critical,  this  answer  being  re- 
ceived at  8.15  p.  M.  Immediately  afterward  he  sent  an- 
other dispatch,  which  was  received  at  9.50  P.  M.,  saying 
that  the  uprising  had  occurred,  and  had  been  successful, 
with  no  bloodshed.  The  Colombian  gunboat  Bogota  next 
day  began  to  shell  the  city  of  Panama,  with  the  result  of 
killing  one  Chinaman.  The  consul-general  was  directed 
to  notify  her  to  stop  firing.  Meanwhile,  on  November 
4,  Commander  Hubbard  notified  the  Department  that  he 
had  landed  a  force  to  protect  the  lives  and  property  of 
American  citizens  against  the  threats  of  the  Colombian 
soldiery. 

Before  any  step  whatever  had  been  taken  by  the  United 
States  troops  to  restore  order,  the  commander  of  the 
newly  landed  Colombian  troops  had  indulged  in  wanton 
and  violent  threats  against  American  citizens,  which  cre- 
ated serious  apprehension.  As  Commander  Hubbard  re- 
ported in  his  letter  of  November  5,  this  officer  and  his 
troops  practically  began  war  against  the  United  States, 
and  only  the  forbearance  and  coolness  of  our  officers  and 


384  Appendices 

men  prevented  bloodshed.  The  letter  of  Commander 
Hubbard  is  of  such  interest  that  it  deserves  quotation  in 
full,  and  runs  as  follows: 

U.  S.  S.  Nashville,  Third  Rate, 
Colon,  U.  S.  Colombia,  November  5,  1903 
Sir:  Pending  a  complete  report  of  the  occurrences  of  the  last 
three  days  in  Colon,  Colombia,  I  most  respectfully  invite  the  De- 
partment's attention  to  those  of  the  date  of  Wednesday,  Novem- 
ber 4,  which  amounted  to  practically  the  making  of  war  against 
the  United  States  by  the  officer  in  command  of  the  Colombian 
troops  in  Colon.  At  i  o'clock  p.  m.  on  that  date  I  was  summoned 
on  shore  by  a  preconcerted  signal,  and  on  landing  met  the  United 
States  consul,  vice-consul,  and  Colonel  Shaler,  the  general  super- 
intendent of  the  Panama  Railroad.  The  consul  informed  me  that 
he  had  received  notice  from  the  officer  commanding  the  Colombian 
troops,  Colonel  Torres,  through  the  prefect  of  Colon,  to  the  effect 
that  if  the  Colombian  officers.  Generals  Tobal  and  Amaya,  who 
had  been  seized  in  Panama  on  the  evening  of  the  3d  of  November 
by  the  Independents  and  held  as  prisoners,  were  not  released  by 
2  o'clock  p.  M.,  he,  Torres,  would  open  fire  on  the  town  of  Colon 
and  kill  every  United  States  citizen  in  the  place,  and  my  advice 
and  action  were  requested.  I  advised  that  all  the  United  States 
citizens  should  take  refuge  in  the  shed  of  the  Panama  Railroad 
Company,  a  stone  building  susceptible  of  being  put  into  good  state 
for  defense,  and  that  I  would  immediately  land  such  body  of  men 
with  extra  arms  for  arming  the  citizens,  as  the  complement  of  the 
ship  would  permit.  This  was  agreed  to,  and  I  immediately  re- 
turned on  board,  arriving  at  1.15  p.  m.  The  order  for  landing 
was  immediately  given,  and  at  1.30  p.  m.  the  boats  left  the  ship 
with  a  party  of  42  men  under  the  command  of  Lieut.-Commander 
H.  M.  Witzel,  with  Midshipman  J.  P.  Jackson  as  second  in  com- 
mand. Time  being  pressing  I  gave  verbal  orders  to  Mr.  Witzel  to 
take  the  building  above  referred  to,  to  put  it  into  the  best  state 
of  defense  possible,  and  protect  the  lives  of  the  citizens  assembled 
there — not  firing  unless  fired  upon.  The  women  and  children  took 
refuge  on  the  German  steamer  Marcomania  and  Panama  Railroad 
steamer  City  of  Washington,  both  ready  to  haul  out  from  dock 
if  necessary.  The  Nashville  I  got  under  way  and  patrolled  with 
her  along  the  water  front  close  in  and  ready  to  use  either  small- 
arm  or  shrapnel  fire.    The  Colombians  surrounded  the  building 


Appendices  385 

of  the  railroad  company  almost  immediately  after  we  had  taken 
possession,  and  for  about  one  and  a  half  hours  their  attitude  was 
most  threatening,  it  being  seemingly  their  purpose  to  provoke  an 
attack.  Happily  our  men  were  cool  and  steady,  and,  while  the 
tension  was  very  great,  no  shot  was  fired.  At  about  3.15  p.  m. 
Colonel  Torres  came  into  the  building  for  an  interview  and  ex- 
pressed himself  as  most  friendly  to  Americans,  claiming  that  the 
whole  affair  was  a  misapprehension  and  that  he  would  like  to  send 
the  alcalde  of  Colon  to  Panama  to  see  General  Tobal  and  have 
him  direct  the  discontinuance  of  the  show  of  force.  A  special 
train  was  furnished  and  safe  conduct  guaranteed.  At  about  5.30 
p.  M.  Colonel  Torres  made  the  proposition  of  withdrawing  his 
troops  to  Monkey  Hill,  if  I  would  withdraw  the  Nashville's  force 
and  leave  the  town  in  possession  of  the  police  until  the  return  of 
the  alcalde  on  the  morning  of  the  5th.  After  an  interview  with 
the  United  States  consul  and  Colonel  Shaler  as  to  the  probability 
of  good  faith  in  the  matter,  I  decided  to  accept  the  proposition 
and  brought  my  men  on  board,  the  disparity  in  numbers  between 
my  force  and  that  of  the  Colombians,  nearly  ten  to  one,  making 
me  desirous  of  avoiding  a  conflict  so  long  as  the  object  in  view, 
the  protection  of  American  citizens,  was  not  imperiled. 

I  am  positive  that  the  determined  attitude  of  our  men,  their 
coolness  and  evident  intention  of  standing  their  ground,  had  a 
most  salutary  and  decisive  effect  on  the  immediate  situation,  and 
was  the  initial  step  in  the  ultimate  abandoning  of  Colon  by  these 
troops  and  their  return  to  Cartagena  the  following  day.  Lieu- 
tenant-Commander Witzel  is  entitled  to  much  praise  for  his  ad- 
mirable work  in  command  on  the  spot. 

I  feel  that  I  can  not  sufficiently  strongly  represent  to  the  De- 
partment the  grossness  of  this  outrage  and  the  insult  to  our  dig- 
nity, even  apart  from  the  savagery  of  the  threat. 
Very  respectfully, 

John  Hubbard, 
Commander,  U.  S.  Navy,  Commanding. 
The  Secretary  of  the  Navy, 

Navy  Department,  Washington,  D.  C. 

In  his  letter  of  November  8  Commander  Hubbard  sets 
forth  the  facts  more  in  detail : 


386  Appendices 

U.  S.  S.  Nashville,  Third  Rate, 
Porto  Bello,  U.  S.  Colombia,  November  8,  1903 

Sir:  I.  I  have  the  honor  to  make  the  following  report  of  the 
occurrences  which  took  place  at  Colon  and  Panama  in  the  interval 
between  the  arrival  of  the  Nashville  at  Colon  on  the  evening  of 
November  2,  1903,  and  the  evening  of  November  5,  1903,  when  by 
the  arrival  of  the  U.  S.  S.  Dixie  at  Colon  I  was  relieved  as  senior 
officer  by  Commander  F.  H.  Delano,  U.  S.  Navy. 

2.  At  the  time  of  the  arrival  of  the  Nashville  at  Colon  at  5.30 
p.  M.  on  November  2,  everything  on  the  Isthmus  was  quiet.  There 
was  talk  of  proclaiming  the  independence  of  Panama,  but  no 
definite  action  had  been  taken  and  there  had  been  no  disturbance 
of  peace  and  order.  At  daylight  on  the  morning  of  November  3, 
it  was  found  that  a  vessel  which  had  come  in  during  the  night 
was  the  Colombian  gunboat  Cartagena  carrying  between  400  and 
500  troops.  I  had  her  boarded  and  learned  that  these  troops  were 
for  the  garrison  at  Panama.  Ina'smuch  as  the  Independent  party 
had  not  acted  and  the  Government  of  Colombia  was  at  the  time 
in  undisputed  control  of  the  Province  of  Panama,  I  did  not  feel, 
in  the  absence  of  any  instructions,  that  I  was  justified  in  pre- 
venting the  landing  of  these  troops,  and  at  8.30  o'clock  they  were 
disembarked.  The  commanding  officers,  Generals  Amaya  and 
Tobal,  with  four  others,  immediately  went  over  to  Panama  to 
make  arrangements  for  receiving  and  quartering  their  troops, 
leaving  the  command  in  charge  of  an  officer  whom  I  later  learned 
to  be  Colonel  Torres.  The  Department's  message  addressed  to 
the  care  of  the  United  States  consul  I  received  at  10.30  a.  m,  ;  'it 
was  delivered  to  one  of  the  ship's  boats  while  I  was  at  the  con- 
sul's and  not  to  the  consul  as  addressed.  The  message  was  said 
to  have  been  received  at  the  cable  office  at  9.30  a.  m.  Immediately 
on  deciphering  the  message  I  went  on  shore  to  see  what  arrange- 
ments the  railroad  company  had  made  for  the  transportation  of 
these  troops  to  Panama,  and  learned  that  the  company  would  not 
transport  them  except  on  request  of  the  Governor  of  Panama, 
and  that  the  prefect  at  Colon  and  the  officer  left  in  command  of 
the  troops  had  been  so  notified  by  the  general  superintendent  of 
the  Panama  Railroad  Company.  I  remained  at  the  company's 
office  until  it  was  sure  that  no  action  on  my  part  would  be  needed 
to  prevent  the  transportation  of  the  troops  that  afternoon,  when 
I  returned  on  board  and  cabled  the  Department  the  situation  of 
affairs.  At  about  5.30  p.  m,  I  again  went  on  shore,  and  received 
notice  from  the  general  superintendent  of  the  railroad  that  he 


Appendices  387 

had  received  the  request  for  the  transportation  of  the  troops  and 
that  they  would  leave  on  the  8  a.  m.  train  on  the  following  day.  I 
immediately  went  to  see  the  general  superintendent,  and  learned 
that  it  had  just  been  announced  that  a  provisional  government 
had  been  established  at  Panama — that  Generals  Amaya  and  Tobal, 
the  Governor  of  Panama,  and  four  officers,  who  had  gone  to 
Panama  in  the  morning,  had  been  seized  and  were  held  as  prison- 
ers ;  that  they  had  an  organized  force  of  1,500  troops  and  wished 
the  government  troops  in  Colon  to  be  sent  over.  This  I  declined 
to  permit,  and  verbally  prohibited  the  general  superintendent  from 
giving  transportation  to  the  troops  of  either  party. 

It  being  then  late  in  the  evening,  I  sent  early  in  the  morning 
of  November  4  written  notification  to  the  general  superintendent 
of  the  Panama  Railroad,  to  the  prefect  of  Colon,  and  to  the  officer 
left  in  command  of  the  Colombian  troops,  later  ascertained  to  be 
Colonel  Torres,  that  I  had  prohibited  the  transportation  of  troops 
in  either  direction,  in  order  to  preserve  the  free  and  uninterrupted 
transit  of  the  Isthmus.  Copies  of  these  letters  are  hereto  ap- 
pended ;  also  copy  of  my  notification  to  the  consul.  Except  to  a 
few  people,  nothing  was  known  in  Colon  of  the  proceedings  in 
Panama  until  the  arrival  of  the  train  at  10.45  on  the  morning  of 
the  4th.  Some  propositions  were,  I  was  later  told,  made  to  Col- 
onel Torres  by  the  representatives  of  the  new  Government  at 
Colon,  with  a  view  to  inducing  him  to  reembark  in  the  Cartagena 
and  return  to  the  port  of  Cartagena,  and  it  was  in  answer  to  this 
proposition  that  Colonel  Torres  made  the  threat  and  took  the  ac- 
tion reported  in  my  letter  No.  96,  of  November  5,  1903.  The 
Cartagena  left  the  port  just  after  the  threat  was  made,  and  I  did 
not  deem  it  expedient  to  attempt  to  detain  her,  as  such  action 
would  certainly,  in  the  then  state  of  affairs,  have  precipitated  a 
conflict  on  shore  which  I  was  not  prepared  to  meet.  It  is  my  un- 
derstanding that  she  returned  to  Cartagena.  After  the  with- 
drawal of  the  Colombian  troops  on  the  evening  of  November  4, 
and  the  return  of  the  Nashville's  force  on  board,  as  reported  in 
my  letter  No.  96,  there  was  no  disturbance  on  shore,  and  the  night 
passed  quietly.  On  the  morning  of  the  5th  I  discovered  that  the 
commander  of  the  Colombian  troops  had  not  withdrawn  so  far 
from  the  town  as  he  had  agreed,  but  was  occupying  buildings  near 
the  outskirts  of  the  town.  I  immediately  inquired  into  the  matter 
and  learned  that  he  had  some  trivial  excuse  for  not  carrying  out 
his  agreement,  and  also  that  it  was  his  intention  to  occupy  Colon 
again  on  the  arrival  of  the  alcalde  due  at  10.45  a.  m.,  unless  Gen- 


388  Appendices 

eral  Tobal  sent  word  by  the  alcalde  that  he,  Colonel  Torres,  should 
withdraw.  That  General  Tobal  had  declined  to  give  any  in- 
structions I  was  cognizant  of,  and  the  situation  at  once  became 
quite  as  serious  as  on  the  day  previous.  I  immediately  landed  an 
armed  force,  reoccupied  the  same  building;  also  landed  two  i- 
pounders  and  mounted  them  on  platform  cars  behind  protection  of 
cotton  bales,  and  then  in  company  with  the  United  States  consul 
had  an  interview  with  Colonel  Torres,  in  the  course  of  which  I 
informed  him  that  I  had  relanded  my  men  because  he  had  not 
kept  his  agreement ;  that  I  had  no  interest  in  the  affairs  of  either 
party;  that  my  attitude  was  strictly  neutral;  that  the  troops  of 
neither  side  should  be  transported ;  that  my  sole  purpose  in  land- 
ing was  to  protect  the  lives  and  property  of  American  citizens  if 
threatened,  as  they  had  been  threatened,  and  to  maintain  the  free 
and  uninterrupted  transit  of  the  Isthmus,  and  that  purpose  I 
should  maintain  by  force  if  necessary.  I  also  strongly  advised 
that  in  the  interests  of  peace,  and  to  prevent  the  possibility  of  a 
conflict  that  could  not  but  be  regrettable,  he  should  carry  out  his 
agreement  of  the  previous  evening  and  withdraw  to  Monkey  Hill. 

Colonel  Torres's  only  reply  was  that  it  was  unhealthy  at  Monkey 
Hill,  a  reiteration  of  his  love  of  Americans,  and  persistence  in 
his  intention  to  occupy  Colon,  should"  General  Tobal  not  give  him 
directions  to  the  contrary. 

On  the  return  of  the  alcalde  at  about  11  a.m.  the  Colombian 
troops  marched  into  Colon,  but  did  not  assume  the  threatening  de- 
meanor of  the  previous  day.  The  American  women  and  children 
again  went  on  board  the  Marcomania  and  City  of  Washington, 
and  through  the  British  vice-consul  I  offered  protection  to  British 
subjects  as  directed  in  the  Department's  cablegram.  A  copy  of 
the  British  vice-consul's  acknowledgment  is  hereto  appended.  The 
Nashville  I  got  under  way  as  on  the  previous  day  and  moved  close 
in  to  protect  the  water  front.  During  the  afternoon  several 
propositions  were  made  to  Colonel  Torres  by  the  representatives 
of  the  new  government,  and  he  was  finally  persuaded  by  them  to 
embark  on  the  Royal  Mail  steamer  Orinoco  with  all  his  troops  and 
return  to  Cartagena.  The  Orinoco  left  her  dock  with  the  troops 
— ^474  all  told — at  7.35  p.  M.  The  Dixie  arrived  and  anchored  at 
7.05  p.  M,,  when  I  went  on  board  and  acquainted  the  commanding 
officer  with  the  situation.  A  portion  of  the  marine  battalion  was 
landed  and  the  Nashville's  force  withdrawn. 

3.  On  the  evening  of  November  4  Major  William  M.  Black 
and  Lieut.  Mark  Brooke,  Corps  of  Engineers,  U.  S.  Army,  came 


Appendices  389 

to  Colon  from  Culebra  and  volunteered  their  services,  which  were 
accepted,  and  they  rendered  very  efficient  help  on  the  following 
day. 

4.  I  beg  to  assure  the  Department  that  I  had  no  part  whatever 
in  the  negotiations  that  were  carried  on  between  Colonel  Torres 
and  the  representatives  of  the  provisional  government;  that  I 
landed  an  armed  force  only  when  the  lives  of  American  citizens 
were  threatened,  and  withdrew  this  force  as  soon  as  there  seemed 
to  be  no  grounds  for  further  apprehension  of  injury  to  American 
lives  or  property;  that  I  relanded  an  armed  force  because  of  the 
failure  of  Colonel  Torres  to  carry  out  his  agreement  to  withdraw 
and  announced  intention  of  returning,  and  that  my  attitude 
throughout  was  strictly  neutral  as  between  the  two  parties,  my 
only  purpose  being  to  protect  the  lives  and  property  of  American 
citizens  and  to  preserve  the  free  and  uninterrupted  transit  of  the 
Isthmus. 

Very  respectfully, 

(Signed)  John  Hubbard, 

Commander,  U.  S.  Navy,  Commanding. 
The  Secretary  of  the  Navy, 

Bureau  of  Navigation,  'Navy  Department, 

Washington,  D.  C. 

This  plain  official  account  of  the  occurrences  of  No- 
vember 4  shows  that,  instead  of  there  having  been  too 
much  prevision  by  the  American  Government  for  the 
maintenance  of  order  and  the  protection  of  life  and  prop- 
erty on  the  Isthmus,  the  orders  for  the  movement  of  the 
American  warships  had  been  too  long  delayed;  so  long, 
in  fact,  that  there  were  but  forty-two  marines  and  sailors 
available  to  land  and  protect  the  lives  of  American  men 
and  women.  It  was  only  the  coolness  and  gallantry  with 
which  this  little  band  of  men  wearing  the  American  uni- 
form faced  ten  times  their  number  of  armed  foes,  bent 
on  carrying  out  the  atrocious  threat  of  the  Colombian 
commander,  that  prevented  a  murderous  catastrophe.  At 
Panama,  when  the  revolution  broke  out,  there  was  no 


390  Appendices 

American  man-of-war  and  no  American  troops  or  sailors. 
At  Colon,  Commander  Hubbard  acted  with  entire  impar- 
tiality toward  both  sides,  preventing  any  movement, 
whether  by  the  Colombians  or  the  Panamans,  which 
would  tend  to  produce  bloodshed.  On  November  9  he 
prevented  a  body  of  the  revolutionists  from  landing  at 
Colon.  Throughout  he  behaved  in  the  most  creditable 
manner.  In  the  New  York  Evening  Post,  under  date  of 
Panama,  December  8,  there  is  an  article  from  a  special 
correspondent,  which  sets  forth  in  detail  the  unbearable 
oppression  of  the  Colombian  Government  in  Panama.  In 
this  article  is  an  interesting  interview  with  a  native  Pana- 
man,  which  runs  in  part  as  follows : 

We  looked  upon  the  building  of  the  canal  as  a  matter  of 
life  or  death  to  us.  We  wanted  that  because  it  meant,  with  the 
United  States  in  control  of  it,  peace  and  prosperity  for  us.  Presi- 
dent Marroquin  appointed  an  Isthmian  to  be  governor  of  Panama; 
and  we  looked  upon  that  as  of  happy  augury.  Soon  we  heard  that 
the  canal  treaty  was  not  likely  to  be  approved  at  Bogota ;  next  we 
heard  that  our  Isthmian  Governor,  Obaldia,  who  had  scarcely 
assumed  power,  was  to  be  superseded  by  a  soldier  from 
Bogota.  .  .  . 

Notwithstanding  all  that  Colombia  has  drained  us  of  in  the 
way  of  revenues,  she  did  not  bridge  for  us  a  single  river,  nor 
make  a  single  roadway,  nor  erect  a  single  college  where  our 
children  could  be  educated,  nor  do  anything  at  all  to  advance 
our  industries.  .  .  .  Well,  when  the  new  generals  came  we  seized 
them,  arrested  them,  and  the  town  of  Panama  was  in  joy.  Not 
a  protest  was  made,  except  the  shots  fired  from  the  Colombian 
gunboat  Bogota,  which  killed  one  Chinese  lying  in  his  bed.  We 
were  willing  to  encounter  the  Colombian  troops  at  Colon  and  fight 
it  out ;  but  the  commander  of  the  United  States  cruiser  Nashville 
forbade  Superintendent  Shaler  to  allow  the  railroad  to  transport 
troops  for  either  party.    That  is  our  story. 

I  call  especial  attention  to  the  concluding  portion  of 
this  interview,  which  states  the  willingness  of  the  Pan- 


Appendices  391 

ama  people  to  fight  the  Colombian  troops  and  the  re- 
fusal of  Comnlander  Hubbard  to  permit  them  to  use  the 
railroad  and  therefore  to  get  into  a  position  where  the 
fight  could  take  place.  It  thus  clearly  appears  that  the 
fact  that  there  was  no  bloodshed  on  the  Isthmus  was  di- 
rectly due — and  only  due — to  the  prompt  and  firm  en- 
forcement by  the  United  States  of  its  traditional  policy. 
During  the  past  forty  years  revolutions  and  attempts  at 
revolution  have  succeeded  one  another  with  monotonous 
regularity  on  the  Isthmus,  and  again  and  again  United 
States  sailors  and  marines  have  been  landed  as  they  were 
landed  in  this  instance  and  under  similar  instructions  to 
protect  the  transit.  One  of  these  revolutions  resulted  in 
three  years  of  warfare;  and  the  aggregate  of  bloodshed 
and  misery  caused  by  them  has  been  incalculable.  The 
fact  that  in  this  last  revolution  not  a  life  was  lost,  save 
that  of  the  man  killed  by  the  shells  of  the  Colombian  gun- 
boat, and  no  property  destroyed,  was  due  to  the  action 
which  I  have  described.  We,  in  effect,  policed  the  Isth- 
mus in  the  interest  of  its  inhabitants  and  of  our  own 
national  needs,  and  for  the  good  of  the  entire  civilized 
world.  Failure  to  act  as  the  Administration  acted  would 
have  meant  great  waste  of  life,  great  suffering,  great  de- 
struction of  property;  all  of  which  was  avoided  by  the 
firmness  and  prudence  with  which  Commander  Hubbard 
carried  out  his  orders  and  prevented  either  party  from 
attacking  the  other.  Our  action  was  for  the  peace  both 
of  Colombia  and  of  Panama.  It  is  earnestly  to  be  hoped 
that  there  will  be  no  unwise  conduct  on  our  part  which 
may  encourage  Colombia  to  embark  on  a  war  which  can 
not  result  in  her  regaining  control  of  the  Isthmus,  but 
which  may  cause  much  bloodshed  and  suffering. 


392  Appendices 

I  hesitate  to  refer  to  the  injurious  insinuations  which 
have  been  made  of  compHcity  by  this  government  in  the 
revolutionary  movement  in  Panama.  They  are  as  desti- 
tute of  foundation  as  of  propriety.  The  only  excuse  for 
my  mentioning  them  is  the  fear  lest  unthinking  persons 
might  mistake  for  acquiescence  the  silence  of  mere  self- 
respect.  I  think  proper  to  say,  therefore,  that  no  one 
connected  with  this  Government  had  any  part  in  prepar- 
ing, inciting,  or  encouraging  the  late  revolution  on  the 
Isthmus  of  Panama,  and  that  save  from  the  reports  of 
our  military  and  naval  officers,  given  above,  no  one  con- 
nected with  this  Government  had  any  previous  knowledge 
of  the  revolution  except  such  as  was  accessible  to  any 
person  of  ordinary  intelligence  who  read  the  newspapers 
and  kept  up  a  current  acquaintance  with  public  affairs. 

By  the  unanimous  action  of  its  people,  without  the 
firing  of  a  shot — with  a  unanimity  hardly  before  recorded 
in  any  similar  case — the  people  of  Panama  declared  them- 
selves an  independent  republic.  Their  recognition  by 
this  Government  was  based  upon  a  state  of  facts  in  no 
way  dependent  for  its  justification  upon  our  action  in 
ordinary  cases.  I  have  not  denied,  nor  do  I  wish  to  deny, 
either  the  validity  or  the  propriety  of  the  general  rule 
that  a  new  state  should  not  be  recognized  as  independent 
till  it  has  shown  its  ability  to  maintain  its  independence. 
This  rule  is  derived  from  the  principle  of  non-interven- 
tion, and  as  a  corollary  of  that  principle  has  generally 
been  observed  by  the  United  States.  But,  like  the  princi- 
ple from  which  it  is  deduced,  the  rule  is  subject  to  excep- 
tions; and  there  are  in  my  opinion  clear  and  imperative 
reasons  why  a  departure  from  it  was  justified  and  even 


Appendices  393 

required  in  the  present  instance.  These  reasons  em- 
brace, first,  our  treaty  rights ;  second,  our  national  inter- 
ests and  safety ;  and,  third,  the  interests  of  collective  civ- 
ilization. 

I  have  already  adverted  to  the  treaty  of  1846,  by  the 
thirty-fifth  article  of  which  the  United  States  secured  the 
right  to  a  free  and  open  transit  across  the  Isthmus  of 
Panama,  and  to  that  end  agreed  to  guarantee  to  New 
Granada  her  rights  of  sovereignty  and  property  over  that 
territory.  This  article  is  sometimes  discussed  as  if  the 
latter  guarantee  constituted  its  sole  object  and  bound  the 
United  States  to  protect  the  sovereignty  of  New  Granada 
against  domestic  revolution.  Nothing,  however,  could  be 
more  erroneous  than  this  supposition.  That  our  wise 
and  patriotic  ancestors,  with  all  their  dread  of  entangling 
alliances,  would  have  entered  into  a  treaty  with  New 
Granada  solely  or  even  primarily  for  the  purpose  of  en- 
abling that  remnant  of  the  original  Republic  of  Colom- 
bia, then  resolved  into  the  States  of  New  Granada, 
Venezuela,  and  Ecuador,  to  continue  from  Bogota  to 
rule  over  the  Isthmus  of  Panama,  is  a  conception  that 
would  in  itself  be  incredible,  even  if  the  contrary  did  not 
clearly  appear.  It  is  true  that  since  the  treaty  was  made 
the  United  States  has  again  and  again  been  obliged  forci- 
bly to  intervene  for  the  preservation  of  order  and  the 
maintenance  of  an  open  transit,  and  that  this  interven- 
tion has  usually  operated  to  the  advantage  of  the  titular 
Government  of  Colombia,  but  it  is  equally  true  that  the 
United  States  in  intervening  with  or  without  Colombia's 
consent,  for  the  protection  of  the  transit,  has  disclaimed 
any  duty  to  defend  the  Colombian  Government  against 


394  Appendices 

domestic  insurrection  or  against  the  erection  of  an  inde- 
pendent government  on  the  Isthmus  of  Panama.  The 
attacks  against  which  the  United  States  engaged  to  pro- 
tect New  Granadian  sovereignty  were  those  of  foreign 
powers;  but  this  engagement  was  only  a  means  to  the 
accomplishment  of  a  yet  more  important  end.  The  great 
design  of  the  article  was  to  assure  the  dedication  of  the 
Isthmus  to  the  purposes  of  free  and  unobstructed  inter- 
oceanic  transit,  the  consummation  of  which  would  be 
found  in  an  interoceanic  canal.  To  the  accomplishment 
of  this  object  the  Government  of  the  United  States  had 
for  years  directed  its  diplomacy.  It  occupied  a  place  in 
the  instructions  to  our  delegates  to  the  Panama  Congress 
during  the  Administration  of  John  Quincy  Adams.  It 
formed  the  subject  of  a  resolution  of  the  Senate  in  1835, 
and  of  the  House  of  Representatives  in  1839.  ^^  1846 
its  importance  had  become  still  more  apparent  by  reason 
of  the  Mexican  war.  If  the  treaty  of  1846  did  not  in 
terms  bind  New  Granada  to  grant  reasonable  concessions 
for  the  construction  of  means  of  interoceanic  communi- 
cation, it  was  only  because  it  was  not  imagined  that  such 
concessions  would  ever  be  withheld.  As  it  was  expressly 
agreed  that  the  United  States,  in  consideration  of  its 
onerous  guarantee  of  New  Granadian  sovereignty,  should 
possess  the  right  of  free  and  open  transit  on  any  modes 
of  communication  that  might  be  constructed,  the  obvious 
intent  of  the  treaty  rendered  it  unnecessary,  if  not  super- 
fluous, in  terms  to  stipulate  that  permission  for  the  con- 
struction of  such  modes  of  communication  should  not  be 
denied. 
Long  before  the  conclusion  of  the  Hay-Herran  treaty 


Appendices  395 

the  course  of  events  had  shown  that  a  canal  to  connect 
the  Atlantic  and  Pacific  Oceans  must  be  built  by  the 
United  States  or  not  at  all.  Experience  had  demonstrated 
that  private  enterprise  was  utterly  inadequate  for  the 
purpose ;  and  a  fixed  policy,  declared  by  the  United  States 
on  many  memorable  occasions,  and  supported  by  the  prac- 
tically unanimous  voice  of  American  opinion,  had  ren- 
dered it  morally  impossible  that  the  work  should  be  un- 
dertaken by  European  powers,  either  singly  or  in  com- 
bination. Such  were  the  universally  recognized  condi- 
tions on  which  the  legislation  of  the  Congress  was  based, 
and  on  which  the  late  negotiations  with  Colombia  were 
begun  and  concluded.  Nevertheless,  when  the  well-con- 
sidered agreement  was  rejected  by  Colombia  and  the  revo- 
lution on  the  Isthmus  ensued,  one  of  Colombia's  first  acts 
was  to  invoke  the  intervention  of  the  United  States ;  nor 
does  her  invitation  appear  to  have  been  confined  to  this 
Government  alone.  By  a  telegram  from  Mr.  Beaupre, 
our  minister  at  Bogota,  of  the  7th  of  November  last,  we 
were  informed  that  General  Reyes  would  soon  leave 
Panama  invested  with  full  powers;  that  he  had  tele- 
graphed the  President  of  Mexico  to  ask  the  Government 
of  the  United  States  and  all  countries  represented  at  the 
Pan-American  Conference  "to  aid  Colombia  to  preserve 
her  integrity" ;  and  that  he  had  requested  that  the  Gov- 
ernment of  the  United  States  should  meanwhile  "pre- 
serve the  neutrality  and  transit  of  the  Isthmus"  and 
should  "not  recognize  the  new  government."  In  another 
telegram  from  Mr.  Beaupre,  which  was  sent  later  in  the 
day,  this  Government  was  asked  whether  it  would  take 
action  *'to  maintain  Colombian  right  and  sovereignty  on 


396  Appendices 

the  Isthmus  in  accordance  with  article  35  [of]  the  Treaty 
of  1846"  in  case  the  Colombian  Government  should  be 
''entirely  unable  to  suppress  the  secession  movement 
there."  Here  was  a  direct  solicitation  to  the  United 
States  to  intervene  for  the  purpose  of  suppressing,  con- 
trary to  the  Treaty  of  1846  as  this  Government  has  uni- 
formly construed  it,  a  new  revolt  against  Colombia's  au- 
thority brought  about  by  her  own  refusal  to  permit  the 
fulfillment  of  the  great  design  for  which  that  treaty  was 
made.  It  was  under  these  circumstances  that  the  United 
States,  instead  of  using  its  forces  to  destroy  those  who 
sought  to  make  the  engagements  of  the  treaty  a  reality, 
recognized  them  as  the  proper  custodians  of  the  sover- 
eignty of  the  Isthmus. 

This  recognition  was,  in  the  second  place,  further  justi- 
fied by  the  highest  considerations  of  our  national  interests 
and  safety.  In  all  the  range  of  our  international  rela- 
tions I  do  not  hesitate  to  affirm  that  there  is  nothing  of 
greater  or  more  pressing  importance  than  the  construc- 
tion of  an  interoceanic  canal.  Long  acknowledged  to  be 
essential  to  our  commercial  development,  it  has  become, 
as  the  result  of  the  recent  extension  of  our  territorial 
dominion,  more  than  ever  essential  to  our  national  self- 
defense.  In  transmitting  to  the  Senate  the  Treaty  of 
1846,  President  Polk  pointed  out  as  the  principal  reason 
for  its  ratification  that  the  passage  of  the  Isthmus,  which 
it  was  designed  to  secure,  "would  relieve  us  from  a  long 
and  dangerous  navigation  of  more  than  9,000  miles  around 
Cape  Horn,  and  render  our  communication  with  our  own 
possessions  on  the  northwest  coast  of  America  compar- 
atively easy  and  speedy."     The  events  of  the  past  five 


Appendices  397 

years  have  given  to  this  consideration  an  importance  im- 
measurably greater  than  it  possessed  in  1846.  In  the 
light  of  our  present  situation,  the  establishment  of  easy 
and  speedy  communication  by  sea  between  the  Atlantic 
and  the  Pacific  presents  itself  not  simply  as  something 
to  be  desired,  but  as  an  object  to  be  positively  and 
promptly  attained.  Reasons  of  convenience  have  been 
superseded  by  reasons  of  vital  necessity,  which  do  not 
admit  of  indefinite  delays.  '   -    • 

To  such  delays  the  rejection  by  Colombia  of  the  Hay- 
Herran  treaty  directly  exposed  us.  As  proof  of  this 
fact  I  need  only  refer  to  the  program  outlined  in  the 
report  of  the  majority  of  the  Panama  Canal  Committee, 
read  in  the  Colombian  Senate  on  the  14th  of  October 
last.  In  this  report,  which  recommended  that  the  dis- 
cussion of  a  law  to  authorize  the  government  to  enter 
upon  new  negotiations  should  be  indefinitely  postponed, 
it  is  proposed  that  the  consideration  of  the  subject  should 
be  deferred  till  October  31,  1904,  when  the  next  Colom- 
bian Congress  should  have  met  in  ordinary  session.  By 
that  time,  as  the  report  goes  on  to  say,  the  extension  of 
time  granted  to  the  New  Panama  Canal  Company  by 
treaty  in  1893  would  have  expired,  and  the  new  Congress 
would  be  in  a  position  to  take  up  the  question  whether 
the  company  had  not,  in  spite  of  further  extensions  that 
had  been  granted  by  legislative  acts,  forfeited  all  its 
property  and  rights.  "When  that  time  arrives,''  the  re- 
port significantly  declares,  "the  Republic,  without  any 
impediment,  will  be  able  to  contract,  and  will  be  in  more 
clear,  more  definite,  and  more  advantageous  possession, 
both  legally  and  materially."    The  naked  meaning  of  this 


398  Appendices 

report  is  that  Colombia  proposed  to  wait  until,  by  the 
enforcement  of  a  forfeiture  repugnant  to  the  ideas  of 
justice  which  obtain  in  every  civilized  nation,  the  property 
and  rights  of  the  New  Panama  Canal  Company  could  be 
confiscated. 

Such  is  the  scheme  to  which  it  was  proposed  that  the 
United  States  should  be  invited  to  become  a  party.  The 
construction  of  the  canal  was  to  be  relegated  to  the  in- 
definite future,  while  Colombia  was,  by  reason  of  her 
own  delay,  to  be  placed  in  the  "more  advantageous"  posi- 
tion of  claiming  not  merely  the  compensation  to  be  paid 
by  the  United  States  for  the  privilege  of  completing  the 
canal,  but  also  the  forty  millions  authorized  by  the  act 
of  1902  to  be  paid  for  the  property  of  the  New  Panama 
Canal  Company.  That  the  attempt  to  carry  out  this 
scheme  would  have  brought  Colombia  into  conflict  with 
the  Government  of  France  can  not  be  doubted ;  nor  could 
the  United  States  have  counted  upon  immunity  from  the 
consequences  of  the  attempt,  even  apart  from  the  in- 
definite delays  to  which  the  construction  of  the  canal  was 
to  be  subjected.  On  the  first  appearance  of  danger  to 
Colombia,  this  Government  would  have  been  summoned 
to  interpose,  in  order  to  give  eflPect  to  the  guarantees  of 
the  Treaty  of  1846 ;  and  all  this  in  support  of  a  plan  which, 
while  characterized  in  its  first  stage  by  the  wanton  dis- 
regard of  our  own  highest  interests,  was  fitly  to  end  in 
further  injury  to  the  citizens  of  a  friendly  nation,  whose 
enormous  losses  in  their  generous  efforts  to  pierce  the 
Isthmus  have  become  a  matter  of  history. 

In  the  third  place,  I  confidently  maintain  that  the  rec- 
ognition of  the  Republic  of  Panama  was  an  act  justified 


Appendices  399 

by  the  interests  of  collective  civilization.  If  ever  a  gov- 
ernment could  be  said  to  have  received  a  mandate  from 
civilization  to  effect  an  object  the  accomplishment  of 
which  was  demanded  in  the  interest  of  mankind,  the 
United  States  holds  that  position  with  regard  to  the  in- 
teroceanic  canal.  Since  our  purpose  to  build  the  canal 
was  definitely  announced,  there  have  come  from  all 
quarters  assurances  of  approval  and  encouragement,  in 
which  even  Colombia  herself  at  one  time  participated; 
and  to  general  assurances  were  added  specific  acts  and 
declarations.  In  order  that  no  obstacle  might  stand  in 
our  way.  Great  Britain  renounced  important  rights  under 
the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  and  agreed  to  its  abrogation, 
receiving  in  return  nothing  but  our  honorable  pledge  to 
build  the  canal  and  protect  it  as  an  open  highway.  It 
was  in  view  of  this  pledge,  and  of  the  proposed  enactment 
by  the  Congress  of  the  United  States  of  legislation  to 
give  it  immediate  effect,  that  the  second  Pan-American 
Conference,  at  the  City  of  Mexico,  on  January  22,  1902, 
adopted  the  following  resolution: 

The  Republics  assembled  at  the  International  Conference  of 
Mexico  applaud  the  purpose  of  the  United  States  Government  to 
construct  an  interoceanic  canal,  and  acknowledge  that  this  work 
will  not  only  be  worthy  of  the  greatness  of  the  American  people, 
but  also  in  the  highest  sense  a  work  of  civilization,  and  to  the 
greatest  degree  beneficial  to  the  development  of  commerce  be- 
tween the  American  States  and  the  other  countries  of  the  world. 

Among  those  who  signed  this  resolution  on  behalf  of 
their  respective  governments  was  General  Reyes,  the 
delegate  of  Colombia.  Little  could  it  have  been  foreseen 
that  two  years  later  the  Colombian  Government,  led 
astray  by  false  allurements  of  selfish  advantage,  and 


400  Appendices 

forgetful  alike  of  its  international  obligations  and  of  the 
duties  and  responsibilities  of  sovereignty,  would  thwart 
the  efforts  of  the  United  States  to  enter  upon  and  com- 
plete a  work  which  the  nations  of  America,  reechoing 
the  sentiment  of  the  nations  of  Europe,  had  pronounced 
to  be  not  only  "worthy  of  the  greatness  of  the  American 
people,"  but  also  "in  the  highest  sense  a  work  of  civiliza- 
tion." 

That  our  position  as  the  mandatory  of  civilization  has 
been  by  no  means  misconceived  is  shown  by  the  prompti- 
tude with  which  the  powers  have,  one  after  another,  fol- 
lowed our  lead  in  recognizing  Panama  as  an  independent 
State.  Our  action  in  recognizing  the  new  republic  has 
been  followed  by  like  recognition  on  the  part  of  France, 
Germany,  Denmark,  Russia,  Sweden,  and  Norway,  Nica- 
ragua, Peru,  China,  Cuba,  Great  Britain,  Italy,  Costa 
Rica,  Japan,  and  Austria-Hungary. 

In  view  of  the  manifold  considerations  of  treaty  right 
and  obligation,  of  national  interest  and  safety,  and  of 
collective  civilization,  by  which  our  Government  was  con- 
strained to  act,  I  am  at  a  loss  to  comprehend  the  attitude 
of  those  who  can  discern  in  the  recognition  of  the  Re- 
public of  Panama  only  a  general  approval  of  the  principle 
of  "revolution"  by  which  a  given  government  is  over- 
turned or  one  portion  of  a  country  separated  from 
another.  Only  the  amplest  justification  can  warrant  a 
revolutionary  movement  of  either  kind.  But  there  is  no 
fixed  rule  which  can  be  applied  to  all  such  movements. 
Each  case  must  be  judged  on  its  own  merits.  There  have 
been  many  revolutionary  movements,  many  movements 
for  the  dismemberment  of  countries,  which  were  evil, 


Appendices  401 

tried  by  any  standard.  But  in  my  opinion  no  disinterested 
and  fair-minded  observer  acquainted  with  the  circum- 
stances can  fail  to  feel  that  Panama  had  the  amplest 
justification  for  separation  from  Colombia  under  the  con- 
ditions existing,  and,  moreover,  that  its  action  was  in  the 
highest  degree  beneficial  to  the  interests  of  the  entire 
civilized  world  by  securing  the  immediate  opportunity 
for  the  building  of  the  interoceanic  canal.  It  would  be 
well  for  those  who  are  pessimistic  as  to  our  action  in 
peacefully  recognizing  the  Republic  of  Panama,  while 
we  lawfully  protected  the  transit  from  invasion  and  dis- 
turbance, to  recall  what  has  been  done  in  Cuba,  where 
we  intervened  even  by  force  on  general  grounds  of 
national  interest  and  duty.  When  we  interfered  it  was 
freely  prophesied  that  we  intended  to  keep  Cuba  and  ad- 
minister it  for  our  own  interests.  The  result  has  dem- 
onstrated in  singularly  conclusive  fashion  the  falsity  of 
these  prophecies.  Cuba  is  now  an  independent  republic. 
We  governed  it  in  its  own  interests  for  a  few  years,  till 
it  was  able  to  stand  alone,  and  then  started  it  upon  its 
career  of  self-government  and  independence,  granting  it 
all  necessary  aid.  We  have  received  from  Cuba  a  grant 
of  two  naval  stations,  so  situated  that  they  in  no  possible 
way  menace  the  liberty  of  the  island,  and  yet  serve  as 
important  defenses  for  the  Cuban  people,  as  well  as  for 
our  own  people,  against  possible  foreign  attack.  The 
people  of  Cuba  have  been  immeasurably  benefited  by  our 
interference  in  their  behalf,  and  our  own  gain  has  been 
great.  So  will  it  be  with  Panama.  The  people  of  the 
Isthmus,  and  as  I  firmly  believe  of  the  adjacent  parts  of 
Central  and  South  America,  will  be  greatly  benefited  by 


402  Appendices  ^ 

the  building  of  the  canal  and  the  guarantee  of  peace  and 
order  along  its  line ;  and  hand  in  hand  with  the  benefit  to 
them  will  go  the  benefit  to  us  and  to  mankind.  By  our 
prompt  and  decisive  action,  not  only  have  our  interests 
and  those  of  the  world  at  large  been  conserved,  but  we 
have  forestalled  complications  which  were  likely  to  be 
fruitful  in  loss  to  ourselves,  and  in  bloodshed  and  suffer- 
ing to  the  people  of  the  Isthmus. 

Instead  of  using  our  forces,  as  we  were  invited  by 
Colombia  to  do,  for  the  twofold  purpose  of  defeating  our 
own  rights  and  interests  and  the  interests  of  the  civilized 
world,  and  of  compeUing  the  submission  of  the  people 
of  the  Isthmus  to  those  whom  they  regarded  as  oppres- 
sors, we  shall,  as  in  duty  bound,  keep  the  transit  open 
and  prevent  its  invasion.  Meanwhile,  the  only  question 
now  before  us  is  that  of  the  ratification  of  the  treaty. 
For  it  is  to  be  remembered  that  a  failure  to  ratify  the 
treaty  will  not  undo  what  has  been  done,  will  not  restore 
Panama  to  Colombia,  and  will  not  alter  our  obligation 
to  keep  the  transit  open  across  the  Isthmus,  and  to  pre- 
vent any  outside  power  from  menacing  this  transit. 

It  seems  to  have  been  assumed  in  certain  quarters  that 
the  proposition  that  the  obligations  of  article  35  of  the 
treaty  of  1846  are  to  be  considered  as  adhering  to  and 
following  the  sovereignty  of  the  Isthmus,  so  long  as  that 
sovereignty  is  not  absorbed  by  the  United  States,  rests 
upon  some  novel  theory.  No  assumption  could  be  further 
from  the  fact.  It  is  by  no  means  true  that  a  state  in 
declaring  its  independence  rids  itself  of  all  the  treaty  ob- 
ligations entered  into  by  the  parent  government.  It  is 
a  mere  coincidence  that  this  question  was  once  raised  in 


Appendices  403 

a  case  involving  the  obligations  of  Colombia  as  an  in- 
dependent state  under  a  treaty  which  Spain  had  made 
with  the  United  States  many  years  before  Spanish- Ameri- 
can independence.  In  that  case  Mr.  John  Quincy 
Adams,  Secretary  of  State,  in  an  instruction  to  Mr. 
Anderson,  our  minister  to  Colombia,  of  May  27,  1823, 
said: 

By  a  treaty  between  the  United  States  and  Spain  concluded  at 
a  time  when  Colombia  was  a  part  of  the  Spanish  dominions  .  .  . 
the  principle  that  free  ships  make  free  goods  was  expressly 
recognized  and  established.  It  is  asserted  that  by  her  declaration 
of  independence  Colombia  has  been  entirely  released  from  all  the 
obligations  by  which,  as  a  part  of  the  Spanish  nation,  she  was 
bound  to  other  nations.  This  principle  is  not  tenable.  To  all  the 
engagements  of  Spain  with  other  nations,  affecting  their  rights 
and  interests,  Colombia,  so  far  as  she  was  affected  by  them, 
remains  bound  in  honor  and  in  justice.  The  stipulation  now 
referred  to  is  of  that  character. 

The  principle  thus  asserted  by  Mr.  Adams  was  after- 
ward sustained  by  an  international  commission  in  respect 
to  the  precise  stipulation  to  which  he  referred;  and  a 
similar  position  was  taken  by  the  United  States  with  re- 
gard to  the  binding  obligation  upon  the  independent  State 
of  Texas  of  commercial  stipulations  embodied  in  prior 
treaties  between  the  United  States  and  Mexico  when 
Texas  formed  a  part  of  the  latter  country.  But  in  the 
present  case  it  is  unnecessary  to  go  so  far.  Even  if  it 
be  admitted  that  prior  treaties  of  a  political  and  commer- 
cial complexion  generally  do  not  bind  a  new  state  formed 
by  separation,  it  is  undeniable  that  stipulations  having  a 
local  application  to  the  territory  embraced  in  the  new 
state  continue  in  force  and  are  binding  upon  the  new 
sovereign.    Thus  it  is  on  all  hands  conceded  that  treaties 


404  Appendices 

relating  to  boundaries  and  to  rights  of  navigation  con- 
tinue in  force  without  regard  to  changes  in  government 
or  in  sovereignty.  This  principle  obviously  applies  to 
that  part  of  the  treaty  of  1846  which  relates  to  the 
Isthmus  of  Panama. 

In  conclusion  let  me  repeat  that  the  question  actually 
before  this  Government  is  not  that  of  the  recognition  of 
Panama  as  an  independent  republic.  That  is  already  an 
accomplished  fact.  The  question,  and  the  only  question, 
is  whether  or  not  we  shall  build  an  Isthmian  Canal. 

I  transmit  herewith  copies  of  the  latest  notes  from  the 
minister  of  the  Republic  of  Panama  to  this  Government, 
and  of  certain  notes  which  have  passed  between  the 
special  envoy  of  the  Republic  of  Colombia  and  this  Gov- 
ernment. 


THE  END 


